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PROPOSED CITATION

The 83rd Infantry Division, with these attached units:

- 453rd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (AW)
- 643rd Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP)
- 736th Tank Battalion
- 25th Field Artillery Battalion
- 967th Field Artillery Battalion
- 113th Cavalry Group
- Air-Ground Coordination Party
- 83rd Counterintelligence Corps Detachment
- Military Intelligence Interrogation Team #428-G
- Photo Interpretation Team #42
- Order of Battle Team #20
- Interrogation of Prisoner of War Team # 51
- Interrogation of Prisoner of War Team # 58
- Military Government Detachment II2E3
- 168th Signal Photo Detachment

is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy during the period 3 April 1945 to 18 April 1945, inclusive. Equipped only with the transportation of organic vehicles, this infantry division as the right (south) element of the XIX Corps' sweep across Germany was given a mission, initially planned for assignment to an armored division, and accomplished this role of "breakthrough and exploitation" in a bold smashing and arduous drive which achieved such unprecedented infantry mobility and coordination of all its component elements as to mark an epochal accomplishment in the history of our arms.

From 4th-9th April, the 83rd Infantry Division met and overcame stiff German resistance from formidable forces seeking desperately to reestablish the enemy line. With a relentless advance, the 83rd Infantry Division crushed all opposition of enemy armor and infantry to capture the vital Horn Pass and Veldrom surmounting the rough terrain of the forbidding Teutoburger Ridge; it broke the defenses of the Thuringian Hills to drive the enemy across the WESER RIVER, where on the 6th April, pursuant to orders of the Corps Commander, elements crossed the river on an adjacent division's bridge thereby completely flanking the enemy positions, captured Halle and neutralized all opposition east of the WESER RIVER in its zone of advance. Exposing a long extended right flank, the Division continued to press the attack of the XIX Corps to capture bridges intact across the LEINE RIVER. From 9-12 April it crushed all opposition thrown in its path and, though apprehensive of its exposed right flank, dashed some 75 miles in 48 hours to reach the banks of the ELBE RIVER. While advance elements raced 25-30 miles per day other elements remained to wipe out all organized enemy resistance from the Hartz Mountains to remove the last serious threat to the thinly stretched supply and communication lines reaching toward Berlin. Without pause, while continuing to eliminate all organized resistance west of the ELBE RIVER, the 83rd Infantry Division crossed the ELBE RIVER of rafts and assault boats as engineers began immediate construction of the "Truman Bridge" across this last natural barrier before Berlin, demolishing and expanding its bridgehead

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against fierce resistance and numerous counter-attacks from enemy infantry and armored forces of reinforced company to battalion strength elements of the 83rd Infantry Division from 14-18 April attained the deepest penetration into Germany of any part of the XIX Corps. In 13 days it traversed 280 miles, crossed all natural barriers and broken all organized resistance until the enemy was completely defeated. Sustaining the comparatively few battle casualties of approximately 1000 in this action, this Division inflicted incalculable losses in men and materiel upon the enemy, accounting for more than 40,000 prisoners of war captured as a direct result of the operation. The 83rd Infantry Division thus helped to close the gap between the Allied armies of the east and west thereby speeding the final defeat of the German Army and enhancing the early termination of hostilities in the European Theatre. Characteristic of the outstanding performance of duty during this operation were the individual acts of heroism and extraordinary service which have received recognition in the award of over 425 individual decorations for heroism and extraordinary or outstanding service. The outstanding performance of duty, the courage, tenacity and aggressiveness of the men of the 83rd Infantry Division and the attached units listed above reflects the highest credit on the military forces of the United States.

INTRODUCTION

I---EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM

The War Department has recognized that on occasion a single unit, sometimes of Division strength, will perform so outstandingly in combat that were action of like nature attributed to an individual, he would merit an award of the Distinguished Service Cross for 'extraordinary heroism'. Such are the characteristics of the Distinguished Unit Citation.

Yet an Infantry Division, together with its attached units, is so complex an organization that various attributes of skill, leadership, initiative and aggressiveness all carry a relative meaning which when molded into a cohesive whole will insure such success in combat that 'extraordinary heroism' and outstanding performance of duty must have played an important part in the operations of the unit as a whole.

The spectacular sweep of the 83rd Infantry Division across Germany from the Teutoburger Forest to its bridgehead across the Elbe River was such an operation. It was no mean feat of heroism for this Infantry Division to undertake a mission initially assigned to an Armored Division, press the attack against the enemy, of which more than 20,000 were captured in the drive, extend its exposed right flank in the face of formidable forces of the enemy ever seeking desperately to disengage himself and re-establish his lines, relentlessly advance across critical natural barriers and obstacles with such an outstanding display of coordination between the attack and service echelons as to bid fair to mark an epochal achievement in the history of our arms.

II---CASUALTIES

In the very nature of things, casualties during such a rapidly moving and fluid situation will be relatively light; a clever boxer will always perform more admirably than a slugger with a haymaker, and come out of the fight both well and wise for his experience. Even so, in the fanatical resistance which continually sprang up at critical points such as Horn, Wobbel, Scheider, Holzminden, Hoxter, Polle, the Hartz Mountain area, Nienburg and Barby, as well as the bridgehead area itself, over 1000 casualties in killed, wounded, injured and missing were sustained by the division and its attached units. These engagements as well as repeated action and threat of action against the long extended routs of supply and lines of signal communications never once caused the momentum of the advance to slacken. Unit after unit leap-frogged and flanked one another to continuously press the attack throughout the division zone of advance.

III---AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Individual acts of heroism and exceptional or extraordinary service and conduct displayed during the period have been recognized in the award of 289 Bronze Star Medals, 132 Silver Star Medals, 1 Distinguished Service Cross, 1 Legion of Merit Medal to personnel of the Division and attached units. Additional awards continue to receive consideration and more are being granted as the same are processed.


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IV---PRISONERS OF WAR

Perhaps most significant in estimating the enemy capabilities and conversely the aggressiveness and heroism displayed in action against him were the numerous prisoners of war captured from almost every conceivable branch and service of the German Armed Forces. While upwards of 20,000 were captured by the 83rd Infantry Division in this operation alone, it helped to contain and then by-passed some 65,000 troops holding out in the Hartz Mountains. Little short of insulting to the German High Command, this formidable force was figuratively given the "Bronx Cheer" as elements of the Division swept by to continue its drive and establish its bridgehead across the Elbe River.

From the bridgehead area as a springboard and base for future operations an additional haul of more than 20,000 more prisoners of war was taken as the gap between the Allied Armies of the east and west was closed when forward elements of the 125th Cavalry Group (Mech) made contact with Russian forces at Apollensdorf.

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Part I

Ch. 1

329th & 331st Infantry Regiments.

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NARRATIVE

329th & 331st Infantry Regiments

April 1945 found the war in Europe with a gigantic pincers by the American First and Ninth Armies encircling the Ruhr industrial potential. The 83d Infantry Division was pressing this great pocket from the North along the Lippe Canal in the vicinity of Beckum, Germany, when the XIX Corps directed that this infantry division undertake the mission of continuing the advance of the Corps to the east. The zone of advance and mission was originally assigned to the 8th Armored Division. The 83rd Infantry Division was thus assigned the role of right (south) unit of the XIX Corps' attack across Germany which resulted in an operation the speed of which has seldom, if ever, been equalled.

Advancing initially with two regiments abreast the Division adopted pursuit tactics to meet the lessening defensive organization of the enemy, and launched the attack with the 329th Infantry Regiment on the left, the 331st Infantry Regiment on the right. All available organic transportation was utilized to maximum capacity for the advance of foot elements. The Division launched its initial attack from the vicinity of Sennelager and Paderborn towards its first objectives which were the passes and routes of advance across the forbidding Teutoburger Ridge.

With bold and swift maneuvers the two regiments struck unrelenting blows in their wide zones of advance to crush fanatical resistance at critical towns and road junctions defended by protected road-blocks and enemy armor. "Cracking about", as the Commander in Chief, British Field Marshall Montgomery had put it, was the order of the day as the 329th Infantry captured the Horn Pass and Veldrom, and the 331st took Schwaney and Bad Driburg, to control the ridge. This ten mile advance over rough and mountainous terrain set the stage for the sweep to the WESER RIVER, one of the few remaining natural barriers confronting the XIX corps before BERLIN.

The Thuringian Hills posed as a natural bulwark of defense in depth hard against the WESER RIVER. In three days of continuous fighting they were cleared as the advancing columns of the Division broke all resistance and captured numerous towns including Scheider, Schawlenberg, Nieheim, Hoxter, Polle, Bodenwerder and Hehlen to reach the river. In order to press and maintain the momentum of the attack, XIX Corps made the use of a bridge across the WESER RIVER established in the zone of the 2nd Armored Division available to the 83rd Infantry Division. Immediately the 329th Infantry was swung north from the Division's zone, crossed the WESER over the bridge and knifed back behind the enemy positions east of the river and seized Halle. The 330th Infantry, with the 113th Cavalry Group screening its advance, then crossed the WESER RIVER through the bridgehead established by the 329th and, passing through the 329th, attacked south, cutting off the enemy resistance in front of the 331st Infantry. The 329th then continued east in the north zone to force passages through the Der Hills Ridge.

Finding themselves engaged from the rear, the determined enemy resistance in front of the 331st weakened and after bitter hand to hand fighting in the ruins of Polle and Hoxter the two cities were cleared. With the 331st across the WESER the two regiments sped eastward, regardless of a dangerously exposed right flank, to capture bridges intact across the LEINE RIVER. Thus, after five days and nights of relentless fighting and advancing the 83d Infantry Division had crossed two mountainous ridges, two rivers, gained some 70 miles against discontinuous but dogged resistance and captured countless prisoners of war and equipment, to reach what was then the XIX Corps "Limit of Advance Line" east of the LEINE RIVER.

Spearheading the XIX Corps' right flank with ever increasing momentum the 83d Infantry Division on 9 April was confronted with a two-fold mission: To continue its drive to the east and to protect the now long-extended and dangerously exposed Corps right flank. Acknowledging the danger from formidable enemy forces estimated at 65,000 infantry and panzer troops massing in the strongly defended Harz Mountains, the Division pushed on with the 331st blocking and containing the enemy on the right flank. The 330th, released from its Ruhr Pocket mission far to the rear, raced forward to engage the enemy forces in the Harz Mountains threatening to debauch from their "fortress-wald" to slash at vulnerable rear areas and thinly stretched supply lines. Fast moving cavalry, motorized infantry and armored column of the 330th probed their way into the Harz Mountains against well defended road-blocks in rough terrain that made lateral movement impossible. With the 330th Infantry containing and mopping up enemy forces in the Harz Mountains, other elements of the Division continued rapidly to the east.

The next four days from 9 April to 12 April, the 329th Infantry seeming to throw caution to the winds crushed all resistance in its path and dashed some 75 miles to the banks of the ELBE RIVER. With an exposed right flank, sometimes abreast sometimes ahead of the armored division of its left, the advance elements of the 83d Infantry Division reduced bitterly defended German strongpoints to capture Langelsheim, Goslar, Oker and Vienenburg as tank and infantry teams wiped out all opposition with advances up to 28 miles a day. Employing expert tactics and clever ruses, German garrisons were defeated and sometimes captured en masse. Bad Harzburg on the northern fringe of the Harz Mountains surrendered because of the German wounded in hospitals there and the 329th Infantry rolled on to capture Halberstadt, Harsleben, Wegeleben, and Groningen. At the latter town, the fanatically resisting enemy was subdued only after a bitter all night house to house fight. The morning of the 12th April, the 329th Infantry started its final push and in a matter of hours dashed 30 miles to reach the ELBE RIVER at Barby.

Meanwhile, the 331st Infantry sent combat elements on task force missions south and east and in a 50 mile dash reached Nienburg on the SALE RIVER near its confluence with the ELBE. Ilsenburg, Drubeck, Harlingerode and Wenigerode all had fallen after brief engagements. At Nienburg on the SALE RIVER a pitched battle resulted with stubbornly resisting forces which were finally reduced with hard hitting tank and infantry teams.

At Barby, on the ELBE RIVER, the 329th Infantry found an estimated 600 troops of the newly formed POTSDAM DIVISION strongly entrenched. Against this furiously defending force, two battalions were barely able to secure a small footing on the outskirts of the town as the enemy demolished the one railroad bridge across the ELBE at this point. Continued pressure with tanks and artillery during the night caused the enemy garrison to withdraw across the river. On the morning of the 13th April, the town surrendered.

The speed, daring, and aggressiveness which characterized the operation to this point did not diminish on reaching the ELBE RIVER. Supplies and materiel were already on the way in anticipation of an assault crossing of the ELBE. Negotiations for the surrender of Barby were hardly completed before the first assault wave crossed the ELBE at 1300. As assault wave after wave crossed in boats and rafts, the engineers and supply forces worked frantically to insure an adequate supply of armor and anti-tank weapons, food and ammunition, in the bridgehead area. Before nightfall two battalions were across with armor, tank destroyers and anti-tank guns, meeting and overcoming light to strong resistance from enemy tanks and infantry in the area centered around Walternienburg and the surrounding woods. By the following morning, the "Truman Bridge" across the ELBE RIVER had been completed by the engineers as more and more supplies and equipment poured across to strengthen the bridgehead.

From the 14th April to 18th April the security of the bridgehead was threatened time and again as a determined enemy, flushed with the successful elimination of one bridgehead over the ELBE further north, repeatedly counter-attacked with armor and infantry. Estimated forces of company and battalion strength supported by numerous tanks and self-propelled guns comprised the enemy attacking forces. Without yielding ground in the bridgehead, rather enlarging it, the Division repulsed each attempt by the enemy with serious losses to the enemy in troops and armor. At least 24 tanks and self-propelled guns were destroyed out of an estimated 70 tanks and self-propelled guns employed in these desperate attempts to erase the one remaining bridgehead across the ELBE RIVER. Repeated attempts to destroy the bridge from the air also proved futile as alert anti-aircraft crews drove off the enemy formations ranging from a single plane to flights totaling 15 to 20. In all, seven enemy aircraft were destroyed. Not least of the dangers to the security of the bridge from enemy action were the floating mines and underwater demolition crews of the Kriegsmarine but careful planning and alert bridge guards frustrated every effort. The bridgehead was held against everything the enemy threw against it.

During this swift moving operation the 83rd Infantry Division with attached units, equipped with only organic transportation, advanced a total of 280 miles in thirteen days culminating the establishment of the only bridgehead to be maintained East of the ELBE RIVER. The speed and combat efficiency with which this was accomplished played a large part in the contribution made by the XIX Corps to hasten the enemy's unconditional surrender which shortly followed.

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Part I

Ch. 2

330th Infantry Regiment

NARRATIVE

330th Infantry Regiment

From the 3rd April to 9th April, the 330th Infantry Regiment was assigned the mission of securing the XIX Corps right (south) flank, and assist in containing the enemy trapped in the Ruhr pocket by the juncture of the First and Ninth U. S. Armies at Paderborn. As forward elements of the 83d Infantry Division cut their way deep into Germany, the 330th Infantry continued to block to the right, advancing continually to secure the right flank. Attacking Holzminden after crossing the WESER RIVER it completely flanked the enemy positions, thus enabling other elements of the Division to continue the drive to the east. Resuming its advance after crushing all resistance from tanks, self-propelled guns and dug-in infantry it rushed on to seize intact a bridge over the LEINE RIVER at Greene, Germany with an advance of 30 miles in one day alone.

On the 10th April the 330th Infantry found itself at the door-step to the Harz Mountains with the mission to clear them of all enemy in the Division's zone abreast of the First U. S. Army on the right. The Harz Mountains are a heavily wooded range rising out of the North German Plain. The rise is abrupt, elevating from 200 meters on the plain, to 1142 meters in 12 kilometers. Roads through the mountains were hard surfaced but tortuous and crossed by innumerable streams and canyons which confined operations, especially of mechanized units, to the roads themselves. In such terrain, the 330th Infantry launched attacks from the west at Wildemann and from the north at Langesheim, Oker and Bad Harzburg. It was a slow methodical process against a determined enemy that utilized to the full, every advantage of terrain. Penetrations into the enemy defenses in the hilly wooded terrain left exposed flanks to withering fire from high wooded ridges. Inexorably, the 330th Infantry reduced the strongpoints and roadblocks one by one until by the 15th April the area in the Division zone had been cleared of all enemy and contact with the First U. S. Army was made.

During the period, the regiment captured 2516 prisoners of war, captured or destroyed 5 enemy tanks, 4 half-tracks, 15 trucks, 12 105 Hows, 32 6" artillery pieces and countless other booty.

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Part I

Ch.3

113th Cav Group (Mech)

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
Armored Section
APO 408

20 October 1945

SUBJECT: Operations of the 113th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, from
3 to 18 April 1945.

TO : Commanding General, 83d Infantry Division, APO 83, U.S. Army.

1. a. Pursuant to instructions, the following account of the operations in Germany of the 113th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, during the period 3 to 18 April 1945, is presented.

b. Throughout these operations, which occurred during the Campaign of Central Europe, the 113th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, was attached to the 83d Infantry Division.

c. (1) The composition of the 113th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, was:

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 113th
Cavalry Group, Mechanized

113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
Mechanized

125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
Mechanized (less Troop B)

(2) During the period in question, the following units were attached to the Group as indicated:

25th Field Artillery Battalion (3 - 10 and
11 - 14 April)

2d Battalion 331st Infantry (3 - 9 April)

Company B 643d Tank Destroyer Battalion
(3 - 14 April)

Company B 308th Engineer Combat Battalion
(3 - 10 April)

736th Tank Battalion (less Cos A, B and C)
(3 - 7 April)

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83d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized
(3 - 7 and 17 - 18 April)

Company G 330th Infantry (3 - 7 April)

Co F 331st Infantry (10 April)

3d Battalion 331st Infantry (11 and 13 - 14 April)

Platoon Company C 308th Engineer Combat Battalion (11 - 16 April)

Co K 331st Infantry (12 April)

Co I 331st Infantry (14 - 16 April)

d. For brevity, the word "Mechanized" will hereafter be omitted from the designation of the Group and its elements.

2. a. Letter of Instructions No 135, Headquarters, XIX Corps, issued on 3 April 1945, contained the following paragraph: "113th Cavalry Group will be disengaged as its elements can be relieved by advance of XIII Corps, and thereupon is attached to 83d Infantry Division. Attachment is effective as soon as one squadron is disengaged. Other squadron will follow as disengaged." At this time, the 113th Cavalry Group was attached to 30th Infantry Division and was screening the north flank of XIX Corps and maintaining contact between XIX and XIII Corps. Upon receipt of the Corps instructions, orders were at once issued for the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron to relieve the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, which unit would move to an assembly area in the zone of the 83d Infantry Division. By 1600, this relief had been completed, and by dark the 113th Cavalry Group, less 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, was assembled in the DELBRUECK (B5753) area and prepared for its new mission.

b. (1) This mission was to attack on the morning of 4 April, advancing rapidly in the Division zone, by-passing and containing strong enemy resistance, and reconnoitering for crossings over the WESER River, seizing ferry sites and bridges found intact. For this mission, the 113th Cavalry Group was heavily reinforced; and the plan was for the 113th Cavalry Group to precede the infantry regiments of the Division, which would, in moving forward, mop up resistance by-passed.

(Ltr, Armored Section, The General Board, USFET, Subj: Opns of the 113th Cav Gp, Mecz, from 3 to 18 April, dated 20 October 1945, Contd)

- (2) The 113th Cavalry Group moved out at 0800 on 4 April, with the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, reinforced, on the right and the 2d Battalion 331st Infantry, reinforced, on the left. By 2200, the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had advanced some 15 miles to the areas of BAD DRIBURG (B8849) and SCHONENBERG (B9054), having determinedly overcome stubborn resistance at numerous towns and road junctions enroute.
- (3) On the left, the 2d Battalion 331 Infantry moved rapidly until reaching the large wooded area of the TEUTOBURGER WALD. Here numerous dug-in enemy were met and the Battalion was obliged to fight hard over extremely rugged terrain in order to advance. By 1700, however, the main road crossing the TEUTOBURGER Ridge had been cleared with the assistance of 2d Battalion 329th Infantry, and later in the evening HORN (B8364) was seized, in cooperation with 3d Battalion 329th Infantry.
- (4) On 5 April, at 0600, the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron resumed the attack, and after a day of stubborn and skillful fighting, which included the destruction of an M-VI tank and the seizure of the town of NIEHEIM (B9557), reach the line VORDEN (C0358), BORN (C0263) and LOWENDORF (C0663). On the left, the 736th Tank Battalion (less Cos A, B and C), reinforced, moving out at 0800, passed through 2d Battalion 331st Infantry and captured WOEBBEL (B9468) and STEINHEIM (B9464) and, finally at about midnight, SCHIEDEN (B9869), where determined resistance was met and overcome, in cooperation with elements of 3d Battalion 329th Infantry. On this day, then, the 113th Cavalry Group fought to advance some ten miles. In the afternoon, the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron rejoined the 113th Cavalry Group and prepared to operate on the south flank.
- (5) On 6 April, the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron commenced to attack towards HOXTER (C1354), where a bridge over the WESER was located. After a long day of fighting against stubborn resistance, the outskirts of HOXTER had been reached and the town of ALBAXEN

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(C1459), close to the WESER, captured. In the center, the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron fought determinedly all day to capture STAALÉ (C1661) near the WESER, RISCHENAU (C0767) and FALKENHAGEN (C0867), the latter by means of a skillfully coordinated night attack by Troops A and C. On the north, the 736th Tank Battalion (less Companies A, B and C), reinforced, moved out at 0830 and advanced with great speed to BODENWERDER (C2278), which was captured at 1830 after a hard fight. Here the bridge was found to have been destroyed. By the end of the day, therefore, the 113th Cavalry Group had advanced an average distance of 10 miles and had reached the WESER River, over which all bridges had been found to have been destroyed.

- c. (1) Early on 7 April, the 113th Cavalry Group, having been relieved on the WESER by the 331st Infantry, moved north, crossed the WESER at 1130 on a bridge constructed by the 2d Armored Division at GROHNDE (C1581), and launched upon a mission of advancing south across the Division front and then attacking east, in the right half of the Division zone, to the LEINE River, while protecting the Division's right flank.
- (2) The attack began at 1600, with the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, reinforced, in the lead. By dark, a point some 5 miles southeast of ESHERSHAUSEN (C3073), as well as the outskirts of NEGENBORN (C2667) and STADTOLDENDORF (C3066), had been reached; and unusually stubborn resistance had been encountered at these two towns. During the night, the Group participated in their capture, cooperating with units of the 330th Infantry.
- (3) Early on 8 April, the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was committed to the task of securing the lengthening right flank, a mission which it performed with great skill, while the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron resumed its vigorous advance towards the LEINE River, which it reached before dark at GREENE (C5264), seizing the bridge at that point intact. Early in the day, Troop C 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had participated in the 331st Infantry's assault of HOXTER, west of the WESER. In the meantime, at 1300, the 2d Battalion 331st Infantry, reinforced, was committed in the left portion of the Group zone, and by midnight it had crossed the LEINE and reached the "No Advance Line" established by higher authority. Before noon on 9 April, elements of the

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113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 2d Battalion 331st Infantry seized the city of GANDERSHEIM (C5766), in a coordinated attack. Accordingly, the 113th Cavalry Group's mission had been accomplished, and reconnaissance was at once launched to the east and northeast, reaching the outskirts of SEESEN (C6768) at 1630.

- (4) At noon on 9 April, the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was relieved by the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion from its mission of protecting the exposed south flank of the Division from the WESER to DASSEL (C3458), and that Squadron then became attached to the 30th Infantry Division on the Corps north flank. The 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, however, continued to secure its portion of the Division flank; and furthermore, during the day Troop B, on its own initiative, captured the important city of EINBECK (C4660), which, although lying in the VII Corps zone on the right, nevertheless constituted a threat to the 83d Infantry Division's flank. Three general officers and five colonels were included among the large number of prisoners taken in this town. In the late afternoon, EINBECK was threatened by a large enemy column, including tanks, moving from the southwest. However, the entire 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, reinforced, was moved to the defense of the town, as its elements were relieved in the defense of road blocks by advancing infantry and tank destroyer units; and so with the support of the 25th Field Artillery Battalion, EINBECK was successfully held until the arrival of VII Corps elements on the following day.

d. On 10 April, Troop A 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron passed to Corps Reserve while Troop C was attached to the 330th Infantry and played a gallant role in that regiment's attack into the western part of the rugged HARZ area. The remainder of the 113th Cavalry Group moved late in the day to the GROSS RHUDEN (C6474) area, in Division reserve.

- e. (1) Early on the following morning, the 113th Cavalry Group moved to the OHLHOF (C8874) area; and at 1100, reinforced principally by 3d Battalion 331st Infantry and 25th Field Artillery Battalion, it advanced rapidly east and southeast along the northern edge of the HARZ

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Mountains, seizing successively, against sharp resistance, and holding until relieved by elements of the 330th Infantry, the towns of ILSENBURG (D0267), ALTENRODE (D0665), and the city of WERNIGERODE (D1064), and pushing reconnaissance to SILSTEDT (D1467) and BENZINGERODE (D1564). At this time, enemy forces of considerable strength were known to have gathered in the HARZ Mountains, and so this area, most of which lay in the zone of the VII Corps and relatively little of which had yet been cleared, constituted a severe threat to the right flank and rear of the 83d Infantry Division, which was advancing with great rapidity in the northern part of its sector and was, on 12 April, to reach and cross the ELBE, at a point some 40 miles to the east.

- (2) Early on 12 April, the advance was resumed, this time against the town of HEIMBURG (D1963), which guarded the approach to the important city of BLANKENBURG (D2259), to the southeast. The 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron attacked from the north and Co K 331st Infantry, reinforced, attacked from the west. This town, however, was strongly and skillfully defended by elements of the POTSDAM and SCHARNHORST Divisions, and furthermore the terrain upon which it lay comprised a well-nigh perfect defensive position. Accordingly, at the end of the day, HEIMBURG remained in enemy hands, despite gallant efforts and heavy sacrifice; but in the meantime the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had extended its protection of the Division's south flank 8 miles east to North-South Grid Line 32, utilizing Troop C which had reverted to Group control.
- (3) Early on 13 April, these road blocks were strengthened and security was extended some 5 miles further east, in preparation against threatened enemy counter-attacks from the directions of QUEDLINBURG (D3560) and BLANKENBURG; and later in the day, the attack against HEIMBURG was resumed, with 3d Battalion 331st Infantry, reinforced, participating. After darkness, and a day of heavy fighting, the town was entered; but at this time, orders were received that the relief of the 113th Cavalry Group by elements of 8th Armored Division, as far east as North South Grid Line 40, was imminent, and that the Group would be prepared to extend its flank

(Ltr, Armored Section, The General Board, USFET, Subj: Opns of the 113th Cav Gp, Mecz, from 3 to 18 April, dated 20 October 1945, Contd)

security 25 miles east to the SAALE River. Accordingly, HEIMBURG was strongly blocked, and the 113th Cavalry Group, less the bulk of 3d Battalion 331st Infantry, struck east during the night and rapidly established the security ordered. Later on 14 April, the 113th Cavalry Group was able considerably to thicken that defense, by virtue of being further relieved as far east as North-South Grid Line 57 by elements of the 8th Armored Division.

- (4) On 16 April, the 113th Cavalry Group took over the defense of the west bank of the SAALE River, in addition to its current mission; and on the following day, reinforced by 83d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, it cleared the area east of the SAALE as far east as North-South Grid Line 83. Starting on 18 April, the 113th Cavalry Group commenced the relief of the 320th Regimental Combat Team, which had been clearing the area between the SAALE and ELBE rivers east of the North-South Grid Line 83. This relief was completed early on 19 April, when the 113th Cavalry Group assumed responsibility for the defense of the west bank of the ELBE from the BREITENHAGEN (D8977) Bridgehead south to the boundary between XIX and VII Corps.

3. a. Thus, in the course of 16 days, the 113th Cavalry Group had advanced from the DELBRUECK area to the ELBE, a distance of fully 150 miles. Up to the WESER, a distance of some 35 miles, this advance had covered the Division front; and, especially in the southern half of the zone, hard fighting had been required. East of the WESER, the 113th Cavalry Group's effort had been made mainly on the right of the Division zone, both in the sense of pushing the advance and of providing security for a highly vulnerable flank; and in the execution of this mission, the 113th Cavalry Group, although reduced at one time to only 1/5 of its normal reconnaissance strength, had been extended over distances as great as 25 miles.

b. Throughout these operations, sometimes far-flung and extremely fluid and at other times restricted and stiffly opposed, the 113th Cavalry Group had not faltered in its stride; and it is felt that the quality of its performance and of its contribution to the Division's effort can best be judged from the following paragraph contained in the letter of commendation which Major General Macon wrote to the Group Commander on 30 April:

- "1. The crossings of the Rhine, the Weser, the Leine and the Elbe Rivers within the short space of sixteen days

(Ltr, Armored Section, The General Board, USFET, Subj: Opns of the 113th Cav Gp, Mezz, from 3 to 18 April, dated 20 October 1945, Contd)

mark the high point in the history of the 83d Infantry Division on the Continent. The contribution of the 113th Cavalry Group toward this achievement provides me with the opportunity of expressing my appreciation for your performance.

- "2. The impetus of the drive from the Rhine to the Elbe River was sustained in large measure by the skill and rapidity with which your troops operated. By blocking to the south along our exposed right flank, you prevented enemy interference with our eastward drive. At the same time you greatly aided our advance toward the Elbe River by screening and reconnoitering in front of our leading infantry columns. These missions your troops performed with all necessary speed and smoothness. Their accomplishment was of vital importance to the 83d Division's operations and directly responsible for the securing and holding of the Elbe River Bridgehead.
- "3. Please extend to every officer and man of your command my sincere appreciation and thanks for their courageous and untiring efforts."

4. a. While not occurring during the period in question, the final combat effort of the 113th Cavalry Group is believed pertinent to this summary of its service under the 83d Infantry Division.


b. Early on 23 April, the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron returned to the 113th Cavalry Group from its attachment to 30th Infantry Division; and later on that day, reinforced by 83d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, it took up the defense of the Elbe, which by that time included the entire Division front, exclusive of the bridgehead. In so doing, the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron relieved the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron which then undertook the mission of providing security for the entire Division rear area, extending west some 30 miles.

- c. (1) On 28 April, ZERBST (D9883) was seized by the 329th Infantry; and early the next day, the 113th Cavalry Group, less 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and 83d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, which remained to perform the missions of area security and river line defense, crossed the ELBE and, passing through the 83d Infantry Division's bridgehead, struck east and

(Ltr, Armored Section, The General Board, USFET, Subj: Opns of the 113th Cav Gp, Mecz, from 3 to 18 April, dated 20 October 1945, Contd)

southeast in enemy territory with mission of establishing contact with Russian Forces.

- (2) For two days, the 113th Cavalry Group, with the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron carrying the entire combat burden, fought its way towards the Russian lines, some 25 miles beyond other combat elements of the Division; and at 1330 on 30 April, after having captured some 5000 German prisoners and inflicted numerous additional casualties against the enemy, it established contact with the 1st Battalion 320th Infantry Regiment, of the 121st Russian Elite Infantry Division, at the town of APOLLENSDORF (E3174), the first contact with the Russian Army to be made by Ninth U.S. Army and only the second contact between American and Russian forces to be made in the European Theater.
- (3) As an indication of the unusual capabilities and remarkable flexibility of this cavalry force, it is pointed out that, at this time, the western element of the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, the other main unit of the 113th Cavalry Group, had just completed the execution of a security mission some 60 miles to the west.


WILLIAM S. BIDDLE
Colonel, Cavalry
Former Commanding Officer,
113th Cavalry Group,
Mechanized.

EXTRACT AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORT
83D INFANTRY DIVISION - APRIL 1945

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

(RHINE TO THE ELBE)

The problem of Signal Communication from the crossing of the Rhine to the crossing of the Elbe was unique. Quite possibly there has never been an equal communication problem in which an Infantry Division Signal Company has managed to keep all units within the Division in constant wire and radio communication.

Starting 28 March 1945, the Division crossed the Rhine with what was believed to be adequate supplies of wire. Thence came anywhere from one to three displacements per day for the Division Headquarters to correspond to the moves of the Infantry Regiments.

The period of 28 March 1945 to 13 April 1945, the Division drew an additional 700 miles of field wire bringing the total expenditure to 1295 miles. This of course does not include the hundreds of miles of civilian open wire and cable without which the displacements would have been impossible.

In order to insure continuous communication, it was necessary to reorganize the telephone and telegraph section into four echelons. Often all four echelons were in operation with all equipment. Non standard German Army equipment, normally telephones were pressed into service.

Another function which fell to the Signal Company was of an intelligence nature. First, when the Division Headquarters arrived in a town it was necessary to send a small detachment to the Division CIC to interrupt the local service without destroying any of the equipment so that it would be available for later use by both Division and Corps. Secondly, much undamaged enemy signal equipment that fell into our hands had to be evaluated and reported to higher headquarters. Much critical and heretofore unknown enemy signal equipment was located this way.

The Regiments had the same problem as the Division, although on a smaller scale. Often in the continuous advance, the only phone communication consisted of a telephone on the end of the Division line, with another phone partied on ahead to serve as the advance command post. All Radio nets were constantly kept open, and a large volume of traffic was handled, both clear text and code.

FACTUAL DATA

NUMBER OF DISPLACEMENTS: The Division made 18 moves in 16 days.

NUMBER OF MILES OF FIELD WIRE USED: During period 28 March to 13 April, the entire Division used 1295 miles of field wire. Upon crossing the Rhine each unit carried its basic load of field wire in addition to the 595 miles held in reserve by Division Signal Supply. It was necessary to draw an additional 700 miles of field wire from the Army Signal Dump. At one time, toward the end of the march to the Elbe, the wire reserve had fallen to less than 67 miles, and arrangements were being made to have some flown in by cargo aircraft.

FACTUAL DATA - (Continued)

OPEN WIRE: Civilian open wire was generally in fair condition along the highways and railways. Because of the rapidity of the advance there was little destruction of open wire circuits, hence conversion to military use was accomplished by routing the wire with cut-throughs and jumpers. This proved quite a problem but was overcome by long hard hours of work.

UNDERGROUND CABLE: Some underground cable was cleared by the XIX Corps wire teams to bring communication to the Division. However this practice was secondary to finding open wire or overhead cable because of the longer period time required to locate and clear underground cable circuits.

ENEMY EQUIPMENT USED: A large enemy signal warehouse was taken in Alfeld, Germany. This installation provided the Division Signal Company with about 50 extra German Telephones. In addition to these, a few public address systems were acquired and were to prove to be of great value, later when used by the Regiments to convey to the cities, instructions for surrender. It is impossible to state even approximately the amount of German Signal Equipment used because it greatly varied from time to time to conform to the needs of the situation. Much equipment, such as additional phones, switchboards, etc, would be picked up and used.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS: Constant radio communication with Corps as well as subordinate units was maintained throughout the entire drive. No technical difficulties were experienced except that the telephone-radio link equipment had some difficulty in suitably beaming its signal across the Hartz Mountains. Because of the rapidity of the moves, it was necessary to attach a radio team to the command post reconnaissance parties. This practice expedited the movement from one command post to another neatly.

MESSAGE CENTER OPERATION: From 28 March to 13 April, the Message Center provided more Cryptographic Service than the total amount of cryptographic work done for the preceding four months. This was due to the fact that radio was used extensively and because teletype was usually in to Corps by Radio Link. Scheduled Messenger runs ran between 25 miles to 250 miles round trip. Fortunately, all vehicles withstood the gaff.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

A. J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Part II

Ch. 1

Artillery

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HEADQUARTERS 83D DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO 83 U.S. ARMY

16 October, 1945.

SUBJECT: Unit Citation.

TO : Commanding General, 83d Infantry Division, APO 83,
United States Army.
Attention: Awards and Decorations Officer.

The period 3 April, 1945 to 13 April inclusive may roughly be divided into three phases: the crossing of the Weser, the envelopment of the Harz Mountains, and the establishment of the Elbe bridgehead. Throughout these operations, the Thunderbolt Division was the right flank division of the XIX Corps, with the mission of exploiting the pursuit to the fullest extent; final destination - Berlin.

Third April found the 83rd Division Artillery command post at Delbruck with two organic light battalions; the 322d of the 329th combat team and the 908th of the 331st combat team, an organic medium battalion, the 324th, and two attached battalions, one light, the 25th, and one medium, the 967th. To facilitate the rapidity of movement and to insure close fire support, General Montague recommended that the organic light battalions be placed under combat team control with the two mediums, the 324th and 967th, in general support. To further aid the movement, the 967th followed close in behind the 908th, reinforcing their fires and the 324th played the same role with the 322d on the left flank of the Division. The entire 330th command team, including the 323rd FA Battalion, was left behind in the vicinity of Hamm, holding the Lippe Canal until relieved. The 25th FA Battalion was attached to task force Biddle, protecting the right flank of the Division.

The pursuit became very rapid, and at times, the situation obscure. Communication was difficult and radio had to be employed to a great extent. Pockets of fierce resistance were met frequently; some die hard Nazis holding out with fanaticism. Bitter fighting took place before Bad Lippspringe on the evening of the 3rd.

Nevertheless, on the 4th, the Division Artillery displaced to Bad Lippspringe, bypassing the pocket of resistance holding out before the town. Along the route, streams of prisoners lined the roads offering surrender to all takers. Some tiring of this, prepared their breakfast with crude white flags stuck in the mud beside them.

The 329th met some resistance in the mountains east of Bad Lippspringe, but with effective artillery and TD support, a through road was quickly secured and the pursuit swept on. On the 5th, Division Artillery Headquarters was at Steinheim, and on the 7th, moved to Richenau. Upon reaching the Weser, the 329th combat team with the 322d and 324th FA Battalions, swung to the north, crossed quickly on a 2nd Armored Division bridge and swung again to the south. The 331st met opposition in attempting to force a bridgehead in the vicinity of Holzminden on the south right flank. The 908th and 967th went into position to support this attack. Corps sent the 228th Group, consisting of one 8 inch howitzer battalion, one 155mm howitzer battalion, and one 155 gun battalion to support the fires of the light and medium battalions. A total of two thousand and eighty-three rounds were fired in preparation for the assault and in targets of opportunity in the ensuing engagement. A bridgehead was effected and at the same time, the 330th combat team rejoined the Division. The resistance was

effectively broken and the pursuit resumed.


Little organized opposition was encountered until the Division reached the next defense barrier, the Harz Mountains. Division Artillery occupied successive command post at Eschershausen and Langelsheim. The 330th Combat Team with the 323d FA Battalion, was given the mission of protecting the right flank of the Division and cleaning out the Harz Mountains. The fighting here was of guerilla nature with strong bands of fanatical Nazi troops, supported by tanks, infiltrating through the heavily wooded and mountainous terrain. This area constituted a serious threat to the right flank of the entire Corps, but the threat was never allowed to materialize.

The 329th Combat Team pushed ahead vigorously, aided by Task Force Biddle with the 25th FA Battalion, while the 331st Combat Team followed in reserve. As the east edge of the Harz mountains was cleared, Task Force Biddle dropped to the south as flank protection, the 331st moved up on the right of the 329th. Division Artillery displaced to Heudeber and Cochstedt. Pockets of heavy resistance were still encountered and overcome everywhere. The enemy had become demoralized; some fighting bitterly, others surrendering in groups.


On the morning of the 13th, Division Artillery entered Calbe. Prisoners jammed the streets; the infantry of 331st was still cleaning out the northern part of the town. The 329th Infantry and elements of the 331st Infantry crossed the Elbe in the vicinity of Barby, on the morning of the 13th. The crossing was supported by the 322d, 908th, 324th and 967th FA Battalions.

The crossing came so fast that the enemy resistance, uncovered later, came too late and found artillery and infantry already across the river and waiting for them.

The entire period, 3rd April through 13th April, was characterized by the rapid movement of a headlong pursuit. The enemy was thoroughly beaten and was not given time to recover. It necessitated aggressive leadership and ingenuity on the part of all artillery commanders. Radio provided the principal means of communication. Supporting fires had to be delivered promptly to enable the infantry units to push forward. Battalion commanders and parties were constantly exposed to small arms fire, fire from direct fire weapons, and enemy ambush. And yet, the Division Artillery moving in rear of the infantry, moved some 265 kilometres and fired around 10,350 rounds in this short period. The outstanding merit of the Division Artillery, and of the Division, is clearly indicated in this move which was such a radical change from all previous battle experiences, the Division had encountered, yet which was brought to such a successful conclusion that the war ended shortly after it was concluded.



R. P. CLAY,
Colonel, FA,
Commanding.

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Part II

Ch. 2

Engineers

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HEADQUARTERS 308TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
APO 83, U. S. Army

24 October 1945

308TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION, 83D INF DIV
ACTIVITIES: PERIOD 3 April 45 to 14 April 45

During the fast moving operations across the plains of Germany from 3 to 14 April 45, the 308th Engineer Combat Battalion encountered the most arduous engineer combat missions since their intense Normandy, France fighting. The companies displayed unusual ability in accomplishing their engineer tasks of mine sweeping, removing road blocks, bridge construction, bridge security guard, mine laying and removal, and assault river crossings. The natural water barriers of the many Rhineland rivers proved to be one of the most formidable and treacherous encountered. Against difficult combat and terrain conditions the 308th Engineer Combat Battalion accomplished their numerous and difficult engineering missions to contribute materially to the success of the unprecedented advance by the 83d Infantry Division in their race across the Elbe River.

From 3 April to 6 April 45 the sweeping drive of the 83d Infantry Division initially gained its overwhelming force and momentum. The 308th Engineer Combat Battalion greatly facilitated this advance by the prompt clearance from roads of mines and obstacles.

With the 329th Infantry Regiment at the point of the spearhead, Company A moved with the advanced elements, removing obstacles and mines. On 3 April 45, this Company successfully removed a large section of enemy minefield, providing a path for the advancing troops and removed huge road blocks in Sennelager and Schlangan, permitting this Regiment to advance twenty-five miles in one day.

Each line company was in direct support of their respective Infantry Regiment with the exception of Company B, which provided platoons for attachment as close engineer support for Task Forces of the 113th Cavalry Squadron, 125th Cavalry Squadron and Task Force McDermott.

On 4 April 45 the companies continued to provide their Regiments and Task Forces with timely and efficient engineer support. Road blocks and obstacles were consistently encountered and in order not to delay the advance, these obstacles were frequently removed under small arms fire from the enemy. Without hesitation the engineers moved forward in the face of this enemy fire removing road blocks, destroyed tanks, sweeping for the sensitive mines, left behind by the enemy in their attempts to delay the Division. The companies on this day cleared another 25 miles of road toward the Weser River. The platoons of Company B were occupied with the engineer support of the piercing vanguards of the 3 Task Forces. The engineers moved at all times with the forward elements of the

forces to enable prompt removal of delaying obstacles, and keep this column of combat vehicles rolling East.

On 5 April 45 another 25 miles was added to the distance travelled to the Weser River. The Division units continued their relentless advance, with the engineers called upon countless times to remove delaying obstructions. Four large abatis were removed in the vicinity of Horn, 1 road block was promptly removed in the vicinity of Kehlstadt and 2 knocked out tanks were blown from the road near Steinheim, under enemy artillery fire.

On 6 April 45, elements of the division reached the Weser River in the vicinity of Bodenwerder. A forward engineer reconnaissance party found all existing bridges across the river destroyed with demolition charges. So that no momentum would be lost in the drive, one element of the Division, crossed the Weser River over the 2d Armored Division bridge in the vicinity of Grohnde, and then proceeded to swing back into the 83d Division sector. To augment and support the initial crossing that same afternoon a civilian ferry was mustered by the Engineers and began immediate operation to pour across the river, supplies, vehicles and troops. Tirelessly through the long black night and under intermittent enemy fire, the engineers kept the ferry operating. The following day the engineers built their own ferry at Hehlen, and later another raft began operating at Kenned. This engineer company operated the civilian ferry and the Hehlen ferry for 3 days and nights, spewing vast amounts of supplies and troops across the Weser River.

A bulldozer was used on 7 April 45 to remove road blocks and debris in Hehlen. The operator worked with a buttoned up armored cab, to protect himself from shrapnel of enemy artillery fire. With stubborn tenacity the ferries operated continuously back and forth across the Weser River maintaining a constant flow of supplies. To establish a link between the ferry sites, the engineers also this day removed an enemy road block between the two sites.

On 8 April 45, after destroying bitter enemy resistance, the 331st Infantry Regiment reached the Weser River in the vicinity of Polle. C Company made the assault river crossing across the Weser at this point at 0900 hours, 8 April 45. The crossing was accomplished with two companies abreast. The Weser is a swift stream about $1\frac{1}{2}$ times as wide as the famous Roer River. The engineers arrived at the site about 0200 hours near Heinzen, after advancing through a narrow, winding fire-break trail through dense woods. Two trucks ran off the narrow road and only the thick growth of the trees prevented their plunging over the steep cliff. Despite the extreme conditions of terrain, the assault boats and equipment were brought forward in sufficient operational time. At 0500 hours, the final plan was decided upon by the Engineer Commander and the Regimental commander. A heavy artillery preparation and smoke screen was laid by Division Artillery, and the engineers moved forward with the assault boats to the rapid current of the near shore, at 0900 hours.

The engineers using 34 assault boats to carry the infantry troops across, making repeated trips from shore to shore with the initial assault troops. This crossing site had been so advantageously selected by reconnaissance parties that the enemy was completely surprised and their resistance to the assault waves was comparatively light. In the meantime, the engineers not in the assault crossing were engaged in the hasty construction of a raft ferry to transport the urgently needed vehicles and heavy equipment across, after the initial assault crossing. The assault elements successfully crossed the river, the engineers continued to assist the operation. Receiving official reports of improvised enemy mines encountered, and booby trapped road blocks being placed by the enemy on the east bank of the Weser, the engineers sent a reconnaissance party forward. These road blocks and mines were successfully located, knocked out enemy wagons were also discovered to be booby trapped. These were all promptly removed, under enemy fire. A small stream was encountered east of the Weser where the enemy had blown a bridge with demolition charges, so, without delay the engineers threw up a steel treadway bridge to enable the attacking infantry to continue forward. Eight miles of road was also swept for possible enemy mines so as to establish safe supply routes around the bridgehead. An M-2 treadway bridge was constructed near Polle at the ferry site despite the difficult problems encountered caused by the swift current of the Weser. Construction began on the bridge at 1030 hours the morning of 8 April 45 and the bridge was completed at 2030 hours that night, facilitating greatly the flow of troops and heavy equipment across to the established bridgehead.

Due to the surprisingly rapid advance, all bridges across the Leine River were left intact, and engineer reconnaissance proved them suitable and safe for Division loads and immediate crossing.

The 330th Infantry Regiment turned right attacking the enemy in the Harz Mountains, which afforded protection to the Divisions southern flank, so that the forward supply lines would not be severed. Company B of the engineers reverted to the control of this regiment with the entire company in support. The other two regiments, with the engineers in support continued their drive toward the Elbe River, the next water obstacle to be tamed.

On 9 April 45 the advance continued forward with the engineers adding about 12 miles for the day, and on 10 April 45 another 25 miles were clocked on the speedometers. Additional road blocks, obstacles and mines were removed on numerous occasions. The advance streaking through Ki Rhuden, Goslar and Langelsheim, with 39 more miles added to the advance on 11 April 45.

A D/7 Dozer was used in Halberstadt on 11 April 45 to remove 3 log road blocks, and the engineers completed the clearance of the roads in Halberstadt on the next day. On 12 April one company of engineers convoyed 40 miles from Halberstadt to Schoneback. The 329th Regiment rapidly converged toward Barby, meeting fanatical resistance and they successfully reached the Elbe River on 13 April 45. The engineers still in close support.

On the afternoon of 12 April 45 the last bridge in this Division Sector over the Elbe was demolished by the enemy. Another assault river crossing was then necessary to cross the Elbe. This crossing supported by the 308th Engineers was one of the most unusual assault crossings ever made in military history. Before, and after the actual assault waves went over, intense enemy fire met the advancing infantry; yet, during the actual assault crossing, only light enemy fire was encountered.

The Elbe River rivals the Rhine River in width at many places and also has a similar swift current. On the afternoon of 13 April 45 elements of two regiments made assault river crossings in the vicinity of Barby. The engineers pushed off at 1330 hours with their assault boats loads of infantry troops. Despite the fanatical resistance met in Barby, again the enemy was completely stunned by the swiftness and well chosen location of the crossing. The first wave of assault boats nosed their way through the dense smoke screen prepared by Division Artillery and hit the eastern shore of the Elbe River, against little opposition. Each regiment used 34 assault boats, crossing two companies abreast. About 2 hours after the assault crossing and after the infantry had pushed on, the enemy self-propelled guns started shelling the crossing site with terrific fire, concentrating on both banks of the Elbe.

Immediately after the first assault companies of infantry crossed successfully, the engineers constructed one five-boat treadway raft and three infantry support rafts. These rafts were the only means of getting the vehicles and anti-tank weapons across to the foot establishing the bridgehead. The operation of these ferries, especially the treadway ferry, was of utmost importance, enabling the infantry commanders to be supplied during the entire operation until the engineers constructed a treadway bridge. Working all night the bridge was completed at 0700 hours on 14 April 45. The two regiments of infantry, ammunition, vehicles, and guns, including medium tanks and tank destroyers were then quickly deployed across. On return trips the wounded were rapidly evacuated to the near shore for prompt attention at medical aid stations. Before the treadway bridge was completed and in spite of the enemy artillery fire, the ferries transported over 200 vehicles and guns, including tanks and tank destroyers across the swift current of the river to support the infantry on the precarious bridgehead.

This rapid and immediate crossing of heavy guns and equipment contributed immeasurable to the success in repelling persistent enemy counterattacks. Soon after the tank destroyers arrived on the enemy shore, the enemy self-propelled guns were silenced.

A Regimental Commanding Officer of the Division was asked by a War Correspondent, why he could maintain his bridgehead, while a nearby division's bridge had been lost. He stated, "It was a matter of the Engineers being able to get anti-Tank equipment across".


In order to make the bridgehead more secure a second bridge was ordered across the Elbe River. The near side of this crossing site, however, was in enemy hands and in order to reach it, an assault crossing of the Saale River was necessary. "C" Company of the engineers was assigned this support mission and by crossing at a well-selected point, by-passed most of the enemy resistance entrenched on the far shore. Ferries were again successfully operated until a bridge could be completed.

After the second bridge was completed across the Elbe River, the engineers displayed superior planning in fending off enemy attempts to destroy the bridges. Floating mines and under-water swimmers were made ineffective by the countermeasures employed. Engineer riflemen stood at their posts on the bridge and fired on approaching mines, one of which came within ten feet of the bridge before an engineer exploded it with the knowledge that he would become a casualty therefrom.

The 308th Engineer Combat Battalion kept three water-points in constant operation throughout this fast moving period of operation and produced approximately 120,000 gallons of highly potable water, under the difficulties of frequent moves in order to keep up with the advancing division, materially contributing to the health and efficiency of the entire division personnel. The three points operated in 22 different locations in the 8 day period.

In addition, it was urgently necessary that the Division be supplied with the current map sheets for each sector it so rapidly devoured. Sheet after sheet of maps quickly became obsolete due to division's rapid advance. At no time, was the division delayed or stopped because of the lack of appropriate maps for the areas it moved across. The engineers consistently anticipating the potential map requirements and in sufficient operational time, procured the required maps for prompt distribution to all the division elements and the attached units.

The achievements of the 308th Engineer Combat Battalion contributed materially in the defeat and disruption of the enemy in the fast moving operation to the Elbe River, and the establishment of the one and only remaining Elbe River bridgehead.



ROY T. DODGE
Lt Col., CE,
Commanding

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Part II

Ch. 4

Quartermaster Corps

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HEADQUARTERS 83d INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Quartermaster
APO 83, U.S. Army

30 August 1945

SUBJECT: Historical narrative of military operations.

TO: AC of S, G-2, 83d Infantry Division, APO 83, U.S. Army.

Following, in narrative form, is a report of the operation of the 83d Quartermaster Company during the period 3 April-14 April, 1945, both dates inclusive:

"Continuous and rapid movement characterized the 83d Infantry Division's operations from the Rhine River to, and across, the Elbe River, and the ultimate expansion of the Elbe Bridgehead to mark the deepest penetration into Germany. The entire operation was characterized by extremely long hauls of supplies, great numbers of prisoners and displaced persons to be evacuated, hauling of supplies for displaced persons, and operation of supply installations close to enemy territory, and subject to enemy action.

"The Quartermaster Company moved six times during this period. The Class I and III supply runs averaged over 300 miles round trip daily, yet the Division ate "A" rations during the entire period, and all organic and attached units were at all times adequately supplied with gasoline. Travel at night in rear of the Division area was extremely hazardous, due to by-passed resistance pockets, and roving guerrilla bands, and was therefore avoided insofar as possible. No troops were deployed along the Main Supply Route between Army supply points and Division supply points, and there was never any certainty that the MSR was open. On one occasion, near the village of Engelade (between Seesen and Gandersheim), a convoy was ambushed at night, and one officer, two enlisted men, and a 2½-ton truck were captured. Remainder of the men and trucks in the convoy made their way back to the company bivouac.


"For six days of this period a truck platoon from the Quartermaster Company was attached to an Infantry battalion. Infantrymen rode these trucks until contact was made with the enemy. Whenever contact was made the infantrymen dismounted and engaged the enemy, and in some cases were supported by machine gun fire from 50-caliber guns mounted on the QM trucks.

"Whenever the company moved into a new bivouac it was always necessary to patrol the surrounding country and eliminate enemy soldiers left in the area. Upon arrival of leading elements in a new area a patrol was formed immediately from whatever men happened to have arrived first, and the area cleared. As a result of these patrols 41 prisoners were taken in the 12-day period.

"During this period the Division consumed an average of 19,575 gallons of gasoline daily. Average daily consumption of gasoline during operations prior to this time was 8,586 gallons. Gasoline convoys travelled at top speed with seven-ton loads over distances ranging up to 380 miles. West-bound convoys evacuated 22,540 prisoners of war to Army PW cages, and trucks were often obliged to return to the east empty, because the west-bound cargo volume (principally PW's and empty gasoline cans) was greater than the east-bound (principally rations and gasoline). In spite of the fact that men were driving 16 to 18 hours per


day there were no accidents during the period. Truck failures were rare, in spite of overloading, excessive speeds, and trucks 80% of which were original issue, with an average of 20,000 combat miles behind them."

I certify that the above report is a true account of the operations of the 83d Quartermaster Company during the 12-day period from 3 April 1945 to 14 April 1945.


JOHN D. McLAUGHLIN
Lt Col, QMC
Division Quartermaster

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Part II

Ch. 5

83rd Recon Troop

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HEADQUARTERS
83RD RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 83, U. S. ARMY

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

On April 5, 1945 the 83rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, after passing through the British Bridgehead, was assigned to Task Force Biddle, formed by units of the 83rd Infantry Division. The assembly area for the task force was the town of Horn, Germany, which was within view of some of the heaviest fighting of the war, the struggle to seal the Ruhr pocket, industrial center of Germany and in which the Germans chose to make a last ditch stand. Assigned the mission of a spearhead drive to the Weser river and overcoming any opposition which might thwart its achieving its objective, Task Force Biddle was divided into two smaller task forces, Task Force Ritchie and Task Force Hulse. The 83rd Reconnaissance Troop was given the roll of lead unit in Task Force Ritchie.

At 0800 on the fifth the task forces jumped off. The 83rd Reconnaissance Troop, fulfilling its roll as point advanced rapidly to the town of Schmierder, where, in a driving rain it encountered the enemy. The opposition consisted of one company of Infantry deployed throughout the town and as snipers in the hills overlooking the town. The enemy fire was composed of small arms and 20mm. The town was cleared and eleven PW's taken. Troop casualties totaled five, two enlisted men being fatally wounded and the Third Platoon Leader seriously wounded.

Continuing its mission on the sixth of April the 83rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop overcame on three different occasions, small groups holding up its advance. Early in the afternoon, while moving down the slopes leading into the town of Kemnade,

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS - cont'd

Germany, the Troop received fire from three anti-tank guns covering the approaches to the town, and small arms and panzerfaust fire from a force estimated at two companies. So withering was the enemy fire on the exposed slope that the troop was forced to withdraw to cover of the ridges overlooking the town. Here they dismounted from their vehicles and assumed the role of Infantry. Mounted on supporting tanks they rode into the town, and after bitter house to house fighting took Kemnade and the mission of the task forces was completed. The task forces were dissolved.

The next morning after a short rest, the troop was assigned the mission of reconnaissance in front of the 3rd Battalion, 329th Infantry, in its advance on the town of Deligsen, Germany. This mission was successfully accomplished by nightfall, and was marked by several small skirmishes and the capture of thirty-five PW's.

While reconnoitering for the Infantry in its advance on Lampspringe, Germany, the alertness and aggressiveness of the men of the 83rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was instrumental in the capture of a military train and six enemy field guns intact. After numerous engagements with the enemy the mission of reconnaissance to the town of Lampspringe was completed.

On the afternoon of the eighth of April the First Platoon of the 83rd Reconnaissance Troop was dispatched on a mission to reconnoiter bridges in the Division zone and over the Leine river, and to secure these bridges if they were intact. In a madcapped dash of twenty miles in which they bowled over any opposition blocking their advance, the Platoon reached the river and found three bridges intact. Although hampered by both enemy fire and rioting displaced persons, the Platoon secured the bridges and

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS - cont'd

removed charges set for the blowing of the bridges. Other units of the Troop were rushed to aid the Platoon in holding its precarious position. The units were relieved the following morning by Division Infantry and attached tanks. This action greatly facilitated the Division crossing of the Leing River and was a major factor in the saving of many lives.

Next on the list of objectives was the Elbe River. This mission was assigned to the 329th Infantry with the 83rd Reconnaissance Troop spearheading the attack and conducting frontal reconnaissance for the Infantry. Slashing out on its new mission, the Troop found its advance hindered by numerous roadblocks and spotty and disorganized resistance. These caused the 83rd Troopers temporary delays, but were readily overcome. Highlighting the first day's advance to the Elbe, was the capture of fifty-seven prisoners, thirty of which were the result of the singlehanded action of T/5 Charles Kelley of the Reconnaissance Troop. Advancing dismounted into the town of Leuditz, Germany, T/5 Kelley discovered thirty German soldiers in the town Gasthaus. Typifying the spirit of the men of this organization, Kelley capitalized on the element of surprise in his favor with the resultant surrender of the thirty Germans. Close on the heels of this action was the action of a Headquarters radio operator while the CP was under the attack of a single enemy airplane. Engaging the plane with machine gun fire, he successfully destroyed the plane.

Reports of a large concentration of Allied Prisoners of War in Halberstadt spurred the drive for that town on April 11th. The Troop, together with the Infantry in a spirited drive against a stubborn defense, succeeded in clearing the town of Halberstadt

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS - cont'd

by 1600 that day. This action resulted in the freeing of 1200 British and American prisoners, and 1000 Russians being assembled at the town for evacuation to the interior.

Paced by the Second Platoon of the Reconnaissance Troop, the 12th of April found the dash to the Elbe in its closing stages. Within view of the last bridge over the Elbe in the Division zone, strong resistance from dug-in troops covering the German retreat over the bridge was encountered. On the long level Elbe plain, against an enemy armed with panzerfaust, small arms and mortars, and fighting a last ditch fight, the troopers joined in the battle as Infantry. The enemy position was overrun too late to secure the bridge over the Elbe at Barby, which had been previously prepared for demolition. The action forced the enemy to blow the bridge much sooner than anticipated, resulting in the capture of thousands more of the cut-off enemy forces. With the Division closed on the banks of the Elbe, the Troop reverted to Division control on April thirteenth and was assigned the mission of protecting Division flanks.

Upholding the reputation of the 83rd Infantry Division and its nickname, the 83rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop definitely proved themselves a Thunderbolt in the Division's drive across Germany. Over two hundred miles against a desperate fighting enemy in eight days, a total of 946 Prisoners of War captured, unaccountable number of enemy killed and wounded, eighty towns cleared, plus one enemy aircraft and one train captured or destroyed. One thousand twelve allied Prisoners of War sing the praises of the troopers for an early release, and equally loud are the praises of their fellow Infantrymen for the lives saved by the Troop's action at the Leine River. A hardfighting aggres-

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NARRATIVE OF EVENTS - cont'd

sive outfit, the 83rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop is truly a credit to both the Division and the American Army.

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329TH INFANTRY
APO 83

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/ AFTER ACTION REPORTS APRIL 1945

3 APRIL 1945

On 3 April 1945, the 329th Combat Team (see composition) was committed to the attack. The immediate mission was the relief of the 8th Armored which was then engaged in repulsing a counterattack by a reported 200 SS Troops and 20 tanks on their assembly area in vicinity of NEUHAUS (B6750). The mission was accomplished when the 1st Bn, which relieved CCB of the 8th Armored Division at 1800, in one hour captured the town of NEUHAUS (B6750) along with approximately 180 PW's and knocked out one tank. The 3rd Bn having occupied the town of SENNELAGER (B6853) mopped up the remnants of the enemy forces in the woods south of that town in an attack at 0630 the following morning, destroying 3 tanks and capturing 60 prisoners. The night of the 3rd, the CT received the mission of advancing in the left of the division sector, preceded by Task Force Ritchie (a provisional task force of tanks, TD'S, Inf, and Rcn) to secure bridgeheads over the Weser and Leine Rivers - a projected operation involving an advance of 89 kms, air-line distance.


4 APRIL 1945

The 2nd and 3rd Bns, not preceded by the task force, advanced against resistance by enemy tanks and infantry defending the mountain passes and over very rugged terrain. During the day, the towns of BAD LIPPSRINGE, SCHLANGEN, and KOHLSTADT, along with five other towns were cleared, and by evening the main enemy defenses at HORN (B8364) and VELDROM (B8259) were encountered. There then ensued an all night fight against stubborn, almost fanatical resistance by infantry and AA units, employing AA, 20 mm AA, and panzerfausts. By 0400 the following morning these towns were in our hands and the passes through the mountains secured. Total day's advance - 16 kilometers. PW's taken - 245.

5 APRIL 1945

Preceded by Task Force Ritchie, the 2nd and 3rd Bns moved out in the attack, utilizing only organic transportation to move their troops. It was this day on which the Bn Comdrs discovered that a tank or TD would hold 34 men each, and a jeep 12 men, while their few kitchen trucks could shuttle the remainder of the battalion. They also learned to their sorrow that this could only be accomplished at the expense of regular feeding, as shuttling with kitchen trucks until dark invariably means midnight suppers. During the day, the Armored Units were held up by enemy tanks along the routes and toward the end of the day by infantry with panzerfausts in the towns of SCHIEDER (B9769) and SCHWALENBERG (B9866). The stubborn resistance in each of these towns was overcome by the 1st and 2nd Bns respectively in stiff all-night fighting at close quarters. (The second night of fighting for the 2nd Bn). Result of the day's action - 894 PW's, including 744 in hospitals, and STEINHAM (B9364) and 18 other towns cleared. Distance for the day - 19 kilometers.

A Certified True Copy:


ANTONIO J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC
Asst. AC of S, G-2

329TH INFANTRY
APO 83

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS APRIL 1945

6 APRIL 1945

The 2nd Bn moved out from SCHIEDER, secured the mountain pass to the east and permitted the debouchment of the task force to the east. Following the task force, the 3rd Bn, under Major George C. White, moved through the pass, and finding that the armored elements had moved to the east from LUGDE (C0374) and that the road to the WESER River Bridgehead of the 2nd Armored Division at GROHNDE (C9681) was clear, pulled a sneak play on the armor by dashing across their bridge without waiting for clearance. By 1300, the 3rd was well on their way to HALLE (C2579), east of the WESER, without resistance. The 1st Bn meanwhile was held up behind a portion of the task force by tank fire from the vicinity of RISCHENAU (C0666). This delayed their advance the greater part of the day and it was possible only by completely rerouting most of the battalion to reach the vicinity of VAHLBRUCH (C1070) by 2200, against some resistance in several towns. By 2200, the 3rd Bn had cleared the town of HALLE and that part of the towns of HEHLEN (C1978) and BODENWERDER (C2276) on the east side of the WESER. The 2nd Bn in very stiff fighting cleared that part of those towns west of the river. Some fighting continued in a section of BODENWERDER throughout the night. (The third night of fighting for the 2nd Bn). During the day a total of 27 towns and villages had been cleared, and a total distance of 35 kilometers was covered.

7 APRIL 1945

The 3rd Bn, with the Div Rcn Trp and the I & R platoon attached, moved out from the vicinity of HALLE to clear the part of the regimental sector between the WESER and the mountains to the east, to capture the large town of ESHERSHAUSEN (C3071) and to secure the passes at (C3175) and (C3573). By 1400 this mission was brilliantly accomplished and the battalion was driving east through the mountains toward DELLIGSEN (C4173). The 2nd Bn had in the meanwhile crossed the WESER and was pushing east toward ALFELD (C4278). During the day a huge underground factory and concentration camp was uncovered at GRUNEPLAN (C3774) by the I & R. By nightfall the forward elements of 2nd Bn had reached the vicinity of Duingen (C3480) and DELLIGSEN (C4173). The 1st Bn at this time was 25 kilometers away, mopping up in the regimental sector, and an adjacent cavalry unit was 10 kms to the right rear. The forward bns did not button up for the night but continued to drive. The 2nd Bn during the night secured the pass overlooking the LEINE River at (C3878) - its fourth night operation, while the 3rd Bn worked its second successive night by making a dash to the LEINE and securing a bridge over the river at WISPENSTEIN (C4575). The total distance covered during the day was 26 kilometers over difficult terrain. 20 towns were cleared.

A Certified True Copy:

Antonio J. Gaudio
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329TH INFANTRY
APO 83

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS APRIL 1945

8 APRIL 1945

This day, crossings of the LEINE River were made by the 2nd Bn at ALFELD, (C4378), and by the 3rd Bn at GROSSE FREDEN (C4872), both bridges being found intact. The bns continued to the "Limit of Advance" line, 10 kms east of ALFELD, encountering only light opposition, and settled down to a well earned rest. During the day, a distance of 15 kms was covered, and 28 towns cleared. Many large factories and numerous foreign workers were overrun during this advance, and huge quantities of war supplies uncovered.


9 APRIL 1945

Only enemy activity of the day was a bombing and strafing incident by 6 FW 190's. Otherwise the day was spent in maintenance of vehicles and equipment and a sideslipping of the regiment 5 kms to the south to agree with new boundaries received. This day also, a new attack order was received for a drive to and past the city of HALBERSTADT 73 kms distant. Along with the attack order came another, detaching the 10 non-organic trucks which had been used to supplement the regimental transportation. From that time on, we were on our own. Upon objection by the Bn Comdrs that they were thus immobilized, the regimental commander instructed them to move as best they could, to ride tanks and TD's, to unload supply trucks and to utilize to the fullest extent the captured German transportation that they had in their possession. The bns improved on this by acquiring extra German transportation. Thus the "Ragtag Circus" was born.

10 APRIL 1945

On this day the dash to the ELBE began. The 1st Bn jumped off from the vicinity of HELMSCHERODE (C5872), cleared the woods to the east, and seized a bridge over the METTE River at GROSSE RHUDEN (C6474). First resistance was encountered at a defended road block (C7074) and overcome in a brief firefight. A more serious fight took place at LANGELSHEIM (C7874) in which 100 enemy defending a roadblock in front of the town were routed. The 3rd Bn on the left of the sector had cleared their portion but were held up by the inadequacy of road net in their zone. After the capture of LANGELSHEIM the 3rd moved through to the northeast and succeeded in reaching VIENENBURG (C9476), where an all-night fight against stubborn resistance took place. The 1st Bn meanwhile had pushed on and taken the city of GOSLAR (C8571) after a brief fight. At OKER (C8970) fanatical resistance by young German troops with automatic weapons and panzerfausts was overcome at the cost of one tank, one TD and a small number of infantry casualties. The bn then pushed into SCHLEWECKE (C9270). The I & R platoon operating on the right of the regiment discovered that all approaches to the Harz Mountains were defended by infantry with automatic weapons and panzerfausts. All in all, despite stubborn, almost fanatical resistance in spots, the regiment advanced a total of 39 kms, cleared 29 towns and villages, including the cities of GOSLAR and VIENENBURG, and captured 2938 PW's including 2710 in hospitals.

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329TH INFANTRY
APO 83

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS APRIL 1945


11 APRIL 1945

Another day of rapid progress followed. The 1st ^{bn} drove into the town of BAD HARZBURG, while the 2nd ^{Bn} moved by to the north and spearheaded against light resistance. Here and there, as at LANGELN, (D1072), determined resistance was encountered. Near DERENBERG (D1868) a column of approximately 700 British and American PW's was liberated. The 3rd Bn, once started, was hard to stop. They drove east from VIENEBERG, clearing one town after another. Though their zone ran to the north of HALBERSTADT (D2671) the 3rd Bn, finding themselves closest to the city, drove into the city against heavy small arms resistance. The 2nd Bn assisted to complete the capture of the city. Orders having been received to dash to the ELBE, the 3rd Bn did not stop in HALBERSTADT, but continued to push on to GRONINGEN (D3976) where the fight against stubborn opposition occurred. The 2nd halted for the night at WEGELEBEN (D3670), where somewhat lighter opposition was encountered. The 1st Bn mopped up what remained of resistance in HALBERSTADT. This day's work brought the regiment 46 kms closer to the ELBE, resulted in the clearing of the large city of HALBERSTADT, the cities of BAD HARZBURG and DERENBURG, along with 31 other towns and villages, and the capture of 5428 PW's, approximately 4000 of whom were hospitalized.

12 APRIL 1945

This was a day of high hopes and hard fighting. The 3rd Bn, who had fought all night in GRONINGEN started shortly after daybreak on a dash to the ELBE in an attempt to secure the RR bridge at BARBY (D8582). Through the day excellent progress was made against light opposition, and by 1400 the 3rd had reached the outskirts of BARBY. Here they were stymied in all attempts to reach the RR bridge and the river by about 800 enemy troops, equipped with automatic weapons, panzerfausts, and mortars, fighting stubbornly from well sited, dug-in defensive positions. Not even with the help of the 2nd Bn, which had swept their sector and had arrived at BARBY around 1800, was it possible to dislodge the enemy. Several of our tanks and TD's were lost in the action and many casualties sustained. The troops were too exhausted after several days of continuous movement, marching, and fighting to continue the attack throughout the night. An air bombardment, artillery preparation and coordinated attack were planned for the following day. This dash to the ELBE took the regiment an additional 49 kms, cleared 30 more towns, and resulted in the capture of 600 prisoners. That evening the RR bridge over the ELBE was blown.

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329TH INFANTRY
APO 83

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS APRIL 1945

13 APRIL 1945

The attack planned for this day did not come off as planned. During the night the enemy withdrew to the east bank of the ELBE, and at 0945 the Burgomeister of BARBY surrendered the town. The crossing of the ELBE and the establishment of a bridgehead was ordered, therefore at 1330 the 1st Bn, which had been in reserve, went across the river in assault boats without opposition under cover of a smoke screen. The troops moved inland to WALTERNIENBURG (D8882) and the 2nd Bn followed the 1st and moved in on their left. Priority on AT Wpns and armor was assigned by the regimental commander despite the lack of resistance, and by nightfall all the AT guns and one company of TD's had been ferried across. This was the salvation of the bridgehead, as during the night, between 1830 and 2400, four counter-attacks of battalion strength supported by a reported 20 assault guns took place. The morale of the enemy attacking forces was excellent and they fought fiercely, but all attempts to penetrate our positions were thrown back with heavy losses. The crossing of the ELBE had been made, and the bridgehead was secure.

This advance of 235 kms in 10 days was made possible not only by the initiative and tirelessness of leaders, but also by the willingness of the men in the ranks. Night after night they fought, day after day they moved and marched and fought halfway across Germany. They endured sleepless nights, suppers at 0100 and breakfasts at 0530 or earlier. Too tired to eat, many men subsisted on one K ration unit per day to make this drive possible. The swiftness of the advance prevented the enemy from keeping up continuous resistance, and lightened the casualties which we might have suffered.

The Regimental Combat Team (see composition) was subdivided into three Battalion Combat Teams, each composed of a battalion of infantry, a platoon of tanks, a platoon of TD's, a platoon of engineers, and a medical collecting platoon. Each battalion combat team was preceded by a reconnaissance unit either an organic "R" group or an attachment as the Div Rcn Trp, I & R Platoon, or TD Rcn Platoon.

During the course of the advance, approximately 172 cities, towns and villages, including the large city of HALBERSTADT, were cleared, and 12,875 PW's were taken, 7,865 of whom were hospitalized.

Communications and supply were excellent during the advance. Most of the communication with battalions was by radio; however, at times, regiment had wire communication with all three battalions. Wire communication was maintained with division chiefly through utilization of high wire, although many miles of field wire were laid to keep constant wire communication between forward and rear regimental CP's and between regiment and division. Radio communication was chiefly in the clear, consisting of a pre-arranged system, in which towns, road junctions, and principal terrain features were numbered. This system was the chief means of control of movement during the operation.

13 APRIL 1945 (Cont'd)


Composition of CT 329:

329th Infantry Regiment
322nd Field Artillery Battalion
Co "A", 736th Tank Battalion
Co "A", 643rd Tank Destroyer Battalion
Co "A", 308th Engineer Battalion
Co "A", 308th Medical Battalion

Temporarily:

83rd Reconnaissance Troop
324th Field Artillery Battalion
1 Platoon, Co "D", 743rd Tank Battalion
Reconnaissance Platoon, 643rd Tank Destroyer Battalion

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ANTONIO J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC
Asst. AC of S, G-2

329TH INFANTRY
APO 83

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS APRIL 1945

14 APRIL 1945

There was no change in positions. An attack to the east to enlarge the bridgehead was planned for 1600 but called off. There were probably three reasons for calling off the attack; first, the 2nd Armored Division bridgehead to the north was eliminated by heavy enemy counterattacks; second, more troops would have been needed to protect the flanks while the advance was being made to the east; third, higher hq didn't seem to want any further advance to the east.

CCR of the 2nd Armored Division crossed the river on our bridge and took up positions on our left or north flank. One bn of the 331st Inf crossed the river and took up positions on our right or south flank.

Co "B", 643rd TD Bn, was attached and crossed the river during the night.

15 APRIL 1945


It was decided to attack again and enlarge the bridgehead just enough to make it secure. Both the 1st and 3rd Bns jumped off at 0930, the 3rd Bn going through the 2nd Bn on the left. Both bns met stiff resistance from enemy infantry and SP guns, but they advanced 5 kms to the east to the towns of NUTHA (D9382), and GUTERGLUCK (D9284), where they prepared defensive positions along the line of a N-S stream.

The 331st Inf on the right and CCR on the left also made advances, and 331st Inf got another bn across the river.

The Regtl CP moved across the river to WALTERNIENBURG, (D8882).

Our two platoons of Co "D", 736th Tk Bn, were taken away from us.

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ANTONIO J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC
Asst. AC of S, G-2

329TH INFANTRY
APO 83

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS APRIL 1945

16 APRIL 1945

At 0600, the enemy attacked NUTHA and GUTERGLUCK, Against NUTHA, in 1st Bn area, the enemy had 2 companies of infantry and 10 assault guns. Three of the assault guns were knocked out and the infantry suffered heavy losses. The attack against GUTERGLUCK was infantry and an undetermined number of tanks and assault guns. The attack succeeded in penetrating that part of GUTERGLUCK held by CCR of 2nd Armd Div, but our 3rd Bn held firm and then assisted CCR in cleaning out their part of the town. In this attack, too, the enemy infantry suffered heavy losses and our TD and arty fire knocked out one assault gun and three tanks.

After these heavy losses, the enemy bothered us no more. At 2300, General Macon called the CP and said there was a rumor that the enemy would put 500 men across the ELBE River north of BARBY, attack BARBY from north and west, and then destroy our bridge. Major Benion was put in charge of the defense of BARBY. He took "G" Co over to BARBY and set up defenses with aid of Service Co and any other elements that could be found in the area. The I & R Platoon worked north of BARBY to try to establish contact with the enemy. Capt Gust took over the defense of the immediate area of the bridge, organizing what was available of AT Co, Co "A", 308th Engr Bn, and the AA unit on the bridge. The rumor turned out to be strictly a rumor, for nothing happened.

In the early part of the evening, 2nd Bn manned the RRL on the left, behind CCR, with E and F Cos, G Co in BARBY.


Co "B", 643rd TD Bn, was detached, but we held on to one platoon. At 1800, the 1st Bn of 330th was attached, along with a platoon of tanks (2nd plat, Co "B", 736th Tk Bn) and a platoon of Engrs.

17 APRIL 1945

At 0500, the 1st Bn of 330th Inf closed into the vic of WALTERNIENBURG, with the exception of "C" Co, which relieved our "G" Co in BARBY. "G" Co then rejoined the 2nd Bn.

This was a quiet day, with most of the activity being our arty fire on various points where movement of the enemy was observed.

A Certified True Copy:


ANTONIO J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC
Asst. AC of S, G-2

329TH INFANTRY
APO 83


ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS APRIL 1945


18 APRIL 1945

The enemy counterattacked again in the bridgehead area, but this time it was in the sector of the 331st Inf. The counterattack was in bn strength, starting at 1000 and continuing throughout most of the afternoon. The enemy infiltrated through the 331st lines in some woods, and after the penetration was blocked, it took some time to clean them out.

1st Bn, 330th Inf, was relieved by 2nd Bn, 320th Inf, and went into sector behind 331st Inf during the enemy counterattack. This terminated their attachment to this regt. The 2nd Bn, 320th Inf, was attached to the 329th, but with strings. 2nd plat, "B" Co, 736th Tk Bn, which had been with 1st Bn, 330th Inf, remained with us. For the second night, enemy aircraft in some strength attempted to knock out our bridge. Probably 10 to 15 planes took place in the attack, and about 25 bombs were dropped, but none came closer to the bridge than 300 yards.

A Certified True Copy:


ANTONIO J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC
Asst. AC of S, G-2

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Part III

Ch. 1

After Action Reports

Sec. 3

330th Infantry

HEADQUARTERS 330TH INFANTRY
APO 83 U S ARMY

EXTRACT FROM AFTER/ACTION REPORT 330TH INFANTRY
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3 April 1945

The mission of the Regiment remained essentially the same: protect the right flank of the Division and Corps while the remainder of the Division advanced to the East. The Regiment was ordered to relieve elements of the 329th Infantry East of the 23-grid line. L Company, reserve Company, of the 3d Bn, was ordered to effect relief. Relief was completed at 1600.

The sector continued quiet with little enemy activity South of the LIPPE RIVER.

Company B, 643 TD Bn (SP), was relieved from attachment.

4 April 1945

L Company was relieved in its sector by the Rcn Trp of the 95th Inf. Div at 032335, and assembled in its former area at 327430.

The 1st Bn established contact with the elements of the 8th Armd Div in LIPPSTADT (4242) at 0030. The 1st Bn at that time was covered by elements of the 8th Armd Div atkg W, S of the LIPPE RIVER. Because G2 reports indicated that the 116th Pz Gr Div and one enemy inf Div intended to atk N across the LIPPE R, the Regtl Comdr ordered the 1st Bn to assemble in rear of the 3d Bn whose sector extended about 15 kms along the N bank of the LIPPE RIVER and was therefore lightly held. This was to deepen our position defensively.

The 1st Bn had completed withdrawal and had assembled vic of CR (358480) at 0555, behind the 3d Bn.

During the morning hours the Regt was engaged in perfecting the defense of the river line and at the same time preparing to move and join the Div in the vic of DELBRUCK (5752).

At 1100, the Regt was notified by Div that it would maintain defense along the LIPPE RIVER until further notice and would not move. One platoon of Regtl AT guns was atchd to 3d Bn. More road blocks were established and rcn was conducted by 1st and 2nd Bns to occupy a Regtl Reserve Line in case of enemy c/atk. The sector remained quiet throughout the period. The I & R Plat maintained motor patrols beginning at 1200 to the S of LIPPSTADT along LIPPE R to the left flank of Regt. The 3d Bn sent patrols across LIPPE RIVER in sector. The 1st Bn was ordered to send one Co back into LIPPSTADT to control displaced persons who were getting out of hand. LIPPSTADT was made a collecting point for DP's, Regtl Comdr ordered that all DP's in Regtl sector be sent there. Mil Govt was arranging for feeding and housing.

5 April 1945

The sector remained quiet with no contact with enemy forces. The Corps Comdr informed Regtl Comdr that the Regt would remain in this sector from 24 to 48 hours until the situation to the S of the LIPPE R cleared up; still danger of strong enemy C/Atk from that sector. The Regt passed to Corps control at 1330.

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In order to strengthen our defense along the river line, the 1st Bn was given the left of the sector from 351405 E to CAPPEL (393430). The sector was occupied by A Co, reinforced. B and C Cos remained in Bn reserve. The 3d Bn occupied its sector from 351405 W to HERZFELD (279404), with I Co, reinforced. K and L Cos remained in Bn reserve. D Co remained in LIPPSTADT guarding captured warehouses and factories and maintaining order. Displaced persons barriers were established and a camp established to house them. Regtl Surgeon supervised the medical treatment and inmates of the camp were dusted with DDT Powder. Serv Co engaged in trucking personnel to the camp and hauling food and water to them.

I & R Plat patrolled along W bdry of the Regt.

Plat Y, 453 AAA Bn, released from attachment.

6 April 1945

No change.

7 April 1945

The threat of c/atk by the enemy S of the LIPPE R having been relieved by the advance of the 8th Armd Div to the W and the 95th Inf Div to the S, which covered the Regt, the Regt was relieved of its defensive mission along the N bank of the LIPPE R. At 1200, the Regt reverted to control of the 83d Inf Div. At 1335, Regt crossed IP at CAPPEL (395429) to move to assembly area E of WESER R vic of HEVEN (c2180). CT had closed in at 2030. A temporary CP was established in HALLE (255785) but was later moved to ESCHERSHAUSEN (314714).

G Co reverted to Regtl control at 2300.

C Co, 736 Tk Bn, atchd to Regt upon Regts arrival in assembly area.

8 April 1945

The Regt was initially given mission of attacking E in right zone of Div and securing bridgehead on E bank of the LEINE R in sector, follow closely behind the 113th Cav, pass through and eliminate resistance the Cav was unable to overcome.

The 331st Inf on the W bank of the WESER R was held up by stubborn resistance from the vic of HOXTER (1455) and HOLZMINDEN (1860) and therefore the Regt was ordered to atk and seize HOLZMINDEN and relieve pressure on the 331st Inf and allow it to advance.

The Regtl Comdr therefore assigned the mission of securing HOLZMINDEN to the 2d Bn which was in the best position to launch the atk. The 1st Bn, reserve Bn in former plan, was given to the left sector and the 3d Bn was given the right Regtl sector, atkg in original direction to E.

All three Bns moved from assembly areas in the early hours of the 8th. The 1st and 2d Bns met stubborn resistance while the 3d Bn moved rapidly in zone against light resistance. The 2d Bn was held up by enemy strong pt at 280680. F Co contained it while E and G Cos advanced and took strong pt of NEGENBORN (263673). The strong pt holding up F Co was reduced by bombing mission in the afternoon. In the meantime, the 1st Bn had taken STADTOLDENDORF (3066) after having knocked out two Mark IV tks, one by bazooka fire and one by 57mm AT gun. The 1st Bn had secured the city by 1120 and the Cav moved to the SE to establish

blocks on the right 1st Bn to protect their flank as they swung to the E. Progress of the Cav was slow and delayed the 1st Bn. The Regtl Comdr ordered one Co of 1st Bn held in STADTOLDENDORF to be committed only on his order. Reason: A force to be used to aid either 1st or 2nd Bns should the situation warrant. Request for TD's was made because of enemy tks in zone but initially refused because they were all employed elsewhere.

While the 3d Bn continued to advance rapidly to the E, the 2d Bn was meeting stubborn resistance in a pass between two high wooded hills vic of 250664. Dug-in inf using Panzerfausts and supported by MG's made progress slow. The pocket was finally eliminated by flanking movement with tks and inf. The 331st Inf, in the meantime, had crossed the WESER R at POLLE and started atkg S to reduce resistance in HOLZMINDEN, therefore the 25 N-S grid line was established as a bdry beyond which 330th would not advance. The 2d Bn after taking GOLMBACH (S2468) that a captured enemy order indicated was a strong point, established blocks to the E awaiting contact with 331st Inf.

The advance of the 3d Bn having met only light resistance, the Regtl Comdr ordered I Co to continue in 3d Bn zone and secure bridgehead over LEINE R at GREENE (521645) and L and K Cos were directed to seize pass through hills at 466714 and cross LEINE R on a bridge in the zone of 329th Inf and secure the left part of the Regtl objective. By 1900, I Co had secured the bridge at GREENE intact after overcoming light resistance W of the town that had held up the Cav. L and K Cos secured the pass (466714) and at 1900, L Co had occupied DANKELSHEIM and was on the Regtl Objective. Twelve 105mm Howitzers and thirty-two 6 inch artillery pieces were captured intact by K and L Cos. A Co occupied WANGELNSTEDT (348653) and B Co LUTHORST (370629). C Co (- 1 plat), 643d TD Bn (SP), atchd and joined at 1900. One platoon immediately atchd to 1st Bn.

9 April 1945

The operation on the 9th consisted mainly of bringing the Regt forward to secure and consolidate Regtl Objective. The 2d Bn made contact with 331st Inf at 0200 and at 1020, the 2d Bn was relieved by the 331st Inf and began moving forward to take up positions at GREENE, guarding bridges over LEINE R, and protecting right flank of Corps.

The 1st Bn advanced against light resistance. In order to speed the movement of the 1st Bn, artillery trucks were used to move the rear troops forward.

At the close of the period the 2d Bn had relieved 3d Bn elements protecting bridges. The Regt held line generally 542720-605655-540628 with 3d Bn on the left and 1st Bn on the right. B Co continued on behind Cav and by 2000 together with one troop of Cav had occupied SEESEN (6768), rcn to E and SE and established road blocks.

Regtl CP opened in NAENSEN (486670) at 1550.

Total PWs taken 1 thru 9 April: 1249 (This figure does not include those taken in overrun Army hospitals).

PHASE II OPERATIONS IN HARZ MOUNTAINS

The operation of Regt from 10 April - 20 April 1945 consisted of clearing the enemy from the HARZ MOUNTAINS in the zone of the 83d Inf Div.

The HARZ MOUNTAINS are a heavily wooded range rising out of the N German plain. The rise of the mts is abrupt. In 12 kms, the elevation rises from 200 meters on the plain to 1142 meters on the highest peak. All but highest peaks are covered with a dense growth of trees principally of the evergreen variety. The road net through the mts is excellent but due to the growth of trees along the roads, and the great number of bridges over small streams the roads were easy to block. Cross country travel by vehicle, either tracked or wheeled was impossible.

The plan set up for this operation was for 1st Bn to move from W to E through the mts while the two remaining Bns following in zone of the 329th Inf on the left (N), which was open and comparatively flat. These Bns would then atk S, block and patrol and thus a small segment at a time would be cleared. The 801st TD Bn (T) (-) was to follow closely the lead elements and establish blocks to the S and E on main roads after being cleared by inf, and prevent enemy from re-entering cleared areas or using roads for vehicles and thus release inf to move E to clear another sector. To assist the Regt in this operation, the 801st TD Bn (T) (- C Co), C trp 113th Cav Sq, C Co 643d TD Bn (SP), and Co B plus 1 plat Co D and 2d AG Plat 736th Tk Bn were atchd. Co B, 308th Engr Bn, in direct support.

10 April 1945

The plan of atk for 10 April was for the 2d Bn to relieve B Co in SEESEN. B Co would then atk E towards LAUTENTHAL (7586); A and C Cos to seize MUNCHEHOF (6864), then atk E through mts and take WILDEMANN; the 3d Bn to move in the zone of the 329th Inf to LANGELSHEIM, from there to atk S.

S2 and G2 information indicated strong enemy forces were moving E on our R flank. The 2d Bn therefore ordered to remain in the vic of GREENE and KREIENSEN (538335), and protect bridge at 535643 and block to the S.

The 3d Bn was moved to SEESEN to relieve B Co. B Co moved out at 1300 to follow close behind a plat of C Trp, 113th Cav. B Co moved slowly through the woods against Panzerfaust, A/W and S/A fire. At 1700, B Co had taken a road block at 716672 and foot elements pushed on to 725 674 while Regtl Mine Plat began blowing block to allow Cav vehicles through.

A and C Cos moved up to MUCHEHOF (S6864) behind the Cav but came under Mg fire W of the town. A Co atkd town but met hvy resistance from inf supported by four tks. C Co was sent to flank town from N and cut off tks but ran into fire from HERRHAUSEN (652661). C Co cleared the town at 1600, advanced E to woods then S to join A Co.

In the meantime, the 2d Bn (- F Co) had been moved to reserve positions vic HERRHAUSEN (6264) and ILDEHAUSEN (652642). F Co remained behind protecting bridge. Movement of the 2d Bn (- F Co) was screened by I & R Plat who had previously scouted ILDEHAUSEN and engaged in a firefight with a small group of enemy trps. Later elements of the 801st TD Bn relieved F Co and F Co was moved to SEESEN where it relieved I Co on road blocks and guard on captured warehouses, trains and hospitals. The 3d Bn moved to LANGELSHEIM (7974) and 2000 began atk S on the two main roads S of LANGELSHEIM. L Co had occupied WOLFSHAGEN (6971) at 2130. K Co established blocks S of LANGELSHEIM and sent patrol to contact B Co atk LAUTHENTHAL from the East.

B Co continued atk throughout night to take LAUTHENTHAL.

Regtl CP opened in GANDERSHEIM (577662) at 1030. Closed at 1830 and opened at SEESEN at 1830.

11 April 1945

The 2d Bn was ordered to move to assembly area vic of OKER (8870) and from there atk S. G Co was given mission of atk S from OKER and E Co to atk S from BAD HARZBURG (945670). Regtl Hq Co took over the task of guarding installations in SEESEN and the 801st TD Bn established blocks to the N, E, NE and SE of the town. F Co joined the 2d Bn in OKER.

The mission of all three Bns remained the same. The 1st Bn pushed steadily ahead throughout the day against moderate resistance but was slowed down by wooded terrain and steep hills that favored the defense and made maneuver difficult and time-consuming. The advance was characterized by fighting for, and removing road blocks. WILDEMANN (S7561) was cleared by A and C Cos at 1400 and B Co had secured HOHNENKEL (795655) by 1900.

The 3d Bn established blocks S of LANGELSHEIM and the 801st TD Bn established rd blocks vic of WILDEMANN. Thus the sector of the Regt W of the 78 grid line had been cleared of all organized resistance. Small groups still held out in the mts but the Regt had neither the time nor the trps to hunt down these isolated groups of the enemy.

The 2nd Bn began its atk with G Co pushing S from OKER (890700) and E Co atk S on rd from BAD HARZBURG (945670). The resistance in this sector was considerably stiffer and the progress of both E and G Co was slow. Both E and G Cos advanced along ridges to flank roads, enemy fire from the flanks made roads untenable.

F Co who had been held in reserve in OKER was committed early in the afternoon to follow G Co and mop up along the route taken by G Co and clear rd blocks to enable vehicles to get forward. At 1900, F Co was involved in a s/a fight with elements that had infiltrated behind G Co. G Co was at 885670 receiving fire from front and flanks. E Co was reported by the Bn Comdr to be in difficulty at 942657 just short of RJ at 937653; they were getting fire from front and flanks and enemy groups were working around to the rear. He had ordered one platoon of F Co mounted on TDs to come to the assistance of E Co. The Regtl Comdr ordered L Co atchd to 2d Bn and to move from WOLFSHAGEN (777713) to OKER to assist 2d Bn if the situation became more critical. L Co was used to block to W and S of OKER but was not otherwise employed.

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I Co was moved to GOSLAR where it maintained blocks and patrolled to S. K Co was moved to ILSENBERG (026673) where it relieved TF Biddle and blocked to the S.

Elements of the 116th Pz Div were identified by the 1st Bn, two half-tracks and one Mark IV tank were destroyed in the 1st Bn sector. Hitler Jugend were encountered by all three Bns.

Regtl CP closed in SEESEN (68685). Opened in GOSLAR at 1300.

Co C, 643d TD Bn (SP) and C trp, 113th Cav Sqdn released from attachment.

12 April 1945

A and C Cos were engaged throughout the night 11-12 April with enemy vic of RJ (803641). B Co who had taken BOCKWEISE (791643) joined A and C Cos vic of (800640). The 1st Bn began atk to clear rd from RJ (805640) to meet I co who was securing road blocks on southern outskirts of GOSLAR (840697). B Co led the atk, followed in column by A and C Cos. Progress was slow initially. Dug-in inf was encountered at 804643, and after that strong pt was reduced progress was fairly rapid. At 1610, B Co made contact with I Co outpost at outskirts of GOSLAR (842698). The 1st Bn was ordered to assemble in same vic.

The 2d Bn began mission of clearing the area roughly S along 89 grid line to the 66 grid line then E to the 95 grid line then N to BAD HARZBURG. E company maintained rd blocks (940657) with two platoons and one sec to tks while a combat patrol of one platoon cleared the area to the E and N. F and G Cos swept E from present positions clearing woods and mts. At 1900, G Co had linked up with F Co at 910678. G Co remained at this point, establishing blocks and outposts, while F Co continued to clear woods N towards BAD HARZBURG. L Co took over road blocks established at 885687 when G Co moved to the East.

I Co maintained rd blocks in GOSLAR until 1800, when I Co was relieved by B Co. I Co moved at 1830 to WERNIGERODE (1064) to relieve 113th Cav on rd blocks in that city. K Co maintained rd blocks in ILSENBERG (0267) and ALTENRODE (0655).

A Co 1 plat of tks was sent to VECKENSTEDT at close of period, on order of Div, to be available to assist TF Biddle in repelling an expected c/atk on the S flank of the Div, E of the Regtl sector.

The 801st TD Bn (T) continued to establish and man rd blocks behind the advance of the three Bns on key rds and junctions. PWs were taken and casualties inflicted on enemy by 801st TD Bn as small groups attempted to pass through blocks to the N and W.

The advance of the Bns was opposed by miscellaneous units, principal resistance came from fanatical groups of Hitler Jugend. The enemy employed rd blocks of fallen trees extensively to impede our advance.

At the close of the period the sector W of the 85 grid line had been cleared and blocked, and the sector N of the 67 grid line to the 95 grid line had been swept and blocked.

13 April 1945

All three Bns were engaged in blocking and sweeping areas along Northern edge of mts. The only resistance of any extent was encountered in the sectors of E and I Cos. E Co repulsed three small c/atk at rd blocks vic 937651. Several enemy were killed after which bulk of atkg force surrendered. Arty fire was received, for the first time since RHINE crossing, in E Co sector.

I Co was atkd from flank by small en group armed with machine pistols and panzerfausts. Two jeeps were lost in the engagement.

L Co was released from attachment to 2d Bn and moved to WERNIGERODE (1063), rejoining 3d Bn.

As a result of the days operation, the area N of a line between 825686-957655 was cleared of enemy troops and blocks were established to prevent enemy from reoccupying the ground.

14 April 1945

The Regtl Comdr called Bn Comdrs to meeting at the Regtl CP at 2300 on 13 April to issue order for completion of mission of clearing HARZ MTS from W to E in XIX Corps zone.

The plan: The 2d Bn to advance S from rd blocks vic of OKER then E along E-W rds vic 880626 and take objective along N-S line, 973628-973608, establish blocks on right flank, and act as contact pt with 1st Inf Div. The 1st Bn advanced S from blocks S of BAD HARZBURG and then E to take objective on line 976647-972628. The 3d Bn to atk S from blocks at ILSENBURG (025670) and secure E-W line (977655-021637) and at the same time maintain blocks to S of ALTENRODE (066657) and WERNIGERODE (1064).

Reasons for plan:

(1) the 2d Bn, by moving E along S bdry of Corps, could establish and maintain contact with 1st Inf Div who was coming up to our right-

(2) By this plan all of the zone to the S bdry could be cleared and at the same time the enemy would be compressed into a smaller area and thus the task of cleaning them out would be less difficult.

(3) The E-W rd net in this area was considerably better allowing advance to the E, where before only trails to the S existed.

A Co rejoined the 1st Bn at 0715 and relieved E Co on rd blocks at 038655. E Co joined 2d Bn at OKER (890704). B Co with one platoon of tks, remained at SCHELWECKE (925705) in Regtl reserve.

All three Bns began process of sweeping to S in zone. 1st and 2nd Bns encountered heavy s/a fire and very accurate sniper fire. Road blocks of fallen trees extending every few feet over a stretch of road for 200 yds were removed by the engineers supporting the 2d Bn. All advances were made with strong patrols covering each flank, small groups of enemy attempted to circle our leading elements and atk from the flanks. All bridges in zone of advance had been destroyed.

The 2d Bn continued to make good progress but constantly encountered small groups of enemy riflemen who fought stubborn delaying action. At one point the enemy had begun to construct a rd block in rear of ground cleared by the 1st Bn before the 2d Bn was able to put forces in to take over 1st Bn positions. The terrain plus our limited forces, made it possible for small enemy groups to infiltrate behind our lines and harass our supply lines.

The 3d Bn maintained positions along the left (N) flank and continued to patrol between strong pts.

The 801st TD Bn (T), while putting in a rd block at RJ (964600), was atkd. Eight enemy were killed and eighteen PWs taken. The Mine Plat of AT Co was sent to reinforce this block.

At close of period, E Cos leading elms were at 000616 with F Co to right of rear and G Co to the left rear.

Regtl CP displaced at ILSENBURG (0367).

17 April 1945

Steady progress was made throughout the day by 2d and 3d Bns. Opposition continued to be small groups of enemy inf supported by a/w defending rd blocks and defiles. The enemy continued to infiltrate in small groups to the rear of our lines attempting to escape or ambush small parties on our supply and communication lines.

The 2d Bn swept area for 3500 kms clearing the general area included in grid squares 0060-0062 then E to include 0360-030615. At 1140, 15 rds of 105mm arty fell in E Cos zone. The 2d Bn continued to receive arty, over 200 rds falling in their area, throughout the day. The guns were firing from 1st Inf Div zone, on our right 1st Inf Div fired c/btry fire for us. E Co remained at contact pt (013600), waiting for elms of 1st Inf Div to establish contact while F and G Cos pushed to the E. At 2030, E Cos kitchen truck was ambushed on rd 500 yds to NE of their position. The vehicles were recovered.

K Co assembled vic of RJ (023634) after outposts and blocks had been uncovered by the 2d Bn. L Co pushed to the SE followed by K Co. I Co maintained blocks to the E.

K Co maintained contact with the 2d Bn initially by patrol. At 1930, K Co was abreast of F Co at 038614 and L Co was at 045615.

The rd block (965600) of A Co, 801st TD Bn (T), supported by AT Co mine Plat, continued to be atkd by small enemy groups. This block was contacted by 1st Inf Div elms at 1813.

18 April 1945

The operation of the 18th saw the 3d Bn pushing to the SE and the 2d Bn to the E. The atk followed the same general pattern. Rd blocks and strong pts were established at key pts and the areas between swept with strong combat patrols. As our advance continued to the E the sector became narrower and once more the Regtl Comdr made plans to relieve the 2d Bn to reorganize and rest in preparation for atk on BLANKENBURG (2259), the last remaining key pt in our sector of the HARZ MTS.

HEADQUARTERS 330TH INFANTRY
APO 83, U. S. Army

6 October 1945

Subject: Extract from "After Action Report", 330th Inf. 15-18 April 1945 inclusive.

To : Awards Officer, 83d Inf Div, APO 83, U. S. Army.

15 April 1945

Progress during the day was rapid, considering the terrain, the opposition was generally much lighter. At 1100, A and C Cos made contact with E Co, 26th Inf, 1st Inf Div at RJ (924609) and the 2d Bn contacted elms of the 26th Inf at 874640 at 1340.

The 2d Bn swung to the E at RJ (874640) sending a strong patrol to the SW where the 26th Inf was contacted. At 1900, the 2d Bn had reached 951625.

B Co was returned to Bn control at 1330. The 1st Bn established rd blocks at 924610 and sent patrols to contact the 2d Bn coming up from the NW. The 1st Bn then swept N to 938653 then E. At nightfall, the 1st Bn forward elms were at 980624.

The 2d Bn moved rapidly to the SE and at nightfall leading elms were at 950625.

The 3d Bn maintained rd blocks and continued to clear area between strong pts with combat patrols.

With the 1st and 2d Bns generally abreast, the 3d Bn blocking all exits to the NE, and the 1st Inf Div abreast on our right, the pocket was slowly being compressed with little chance of organized trps escaping the trap in our sector.

16 April 1945

The 1st and 2d Bns renewed atk to the E at 0630. Both Bns made good progress during morning against light resistance. Small pockets were effective in slowing down advance at times because of difficulty of manuver.

Orders were received at 1200 that one reinforced Bn would be attached to the 329th Inf as soon as it could be made available. The Regtl Comdr had planned his atk so that the 2d Bn would be pinched out by the 1st Bn when the 2d Bn had taken its objective generally along the 98 N-S grid line. He had estimated that the 2d Bn would take this objective on the following day. With the taking of the objective along the 98 N-S grid line the 1st Bn would continue on to the E; the 2d Bn would be assembled vic of ILSENBURG (0267) where it was to be reorganized and rested preparatory to being employed in the final phase of the operation against BLANKENBURG (2159).

The sudden demand for one Bn upset this plan. The 2d could not be withdrawn without leaving a wide open right (S) flank. The 2d Bn was therefore ordered to side slip to the N and assume the sector of the 1st Bn. The 1st Bn was ordered to assemble vic of ILSENBURG. Some delay was caused because B Co was engaged in a fire fight vic 000615 and had to break contact.

The 1st Bn (1 plat Co B, 736 Tk Bn and Co B, 308 Engr (-1 plat) had assembled at 1645 and were awaiting transportation to arrive from Div.

The 801st TD Bn (T) was ordered to relieve the 2d Bn on its blocks and one Co of 2d Bn was ordered to relieve the 3d Bn on blocks and contact point with 1st Inf Div (070589) when established and also to establish block at RJ (952586) after which the 2d Bn (-1 Co) would assemble vic of WERNIGERODE while the 3d Bn pushed to the E.

Both Bns atkd to carry out above plan. Resistance appeared to be better organized. An enemy demolition squad supported by inf established rd blocks and blew bridges just ahead of the 2d Bns advance throughout the day.

Elms of the 801st TD Bn (T) relieved E Co at blocks (094616) and (013598). E Co advanced to CR (038604) and established defense for the night. F and G Cos, at nightfall, were on line (046595-046593) and were engaged with two SP guns.

The 3d Bn encountered light resistance. K Co advanced cross country from 047617 to 060609 then S along rds to 050600 to 066604. L Co at close of period, was at 087601.

/s/ Charles D. Perry
/t/ CHARLES D. PERRY
1st Lt., Infantry,
Asst S-3 Officer.

TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

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Part III

Ch. 1

After Action Reports

Sec. 4

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HEADQUARTERS 331ST INFANTRY
APO 83
UNITED STATES ARMY

5 May 1945

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

EXTRACT

3 April 1945

CT 331, upon being relieved by elements of the 95th Infantry Division, was ordered to move to an assembly area East of DELBRUCK.

The 1st Bn. maintained its positions along the LIPPE RIVER until relieved by elements of the 95th Infantry Division. Relief was completed by 1745. During the initial stages of the relief a heavy enemy artillery concentration fell in DOLBERG from 1450 to 1515. The Company "A" CP was demolished and the company had 5 casualties. 5 jeeps and 1 kitchen truck of the relieving elements (3rd Bn. 378th Inf.) were destroyed by direct hits. At 2030 the battalion crossed its IP enroute to its new assembly area in the vicinity of HOLHOVEN, East of DELBRUCK, closing at 0430, 4 April 1945.

At 1200 the 2nd Bn. was relieved of its positions along the LIPPE RIVER by elements of the 378th Infantry and moved into an assembly area near SCHIEPBR. At 1715, the Battalion entrucked for HOVELHOP, 45 miles to the East arriving there at 2000.

3rd Battalion. A reconnaissance group from the 95th Division arrived to make plans to relieve the 3rd Battalion as soon as practicable. The bridgehead itself had a very quiet day with very little enemy activity. All supplies and evacuation had to be done by hand. Battalion Headquarters Company and all other available personnel were used for hand-carrying supplies over the bridge while the medical detachment evacuated the wounded. At 1430 "K" Company reported 150 enemy infantrymen assembling on their right flank. Artillery fire was placed on them and heavy casualties inflicted. No attack was made by the enemy at this time. At 1800 the enemy attacked with a large force of infantry. At first it was thought that this attack might be as large and determined as the one the previous night. However, when our artillery and mortar fire, as well as our automatic and other small arms opened up against them, the enemy attack turned into a rout. Enemy troops were seen throwing their weapons in the air and running for their lives. The entire attack lasted less than 15 minutes and was disastrous to the enemy. After this attack the enemy lost all interest in our bridgehead so that immediately after dark elements of the 95th Division were able to relieve our Battalion without interruption. At 2300 Major Sellers received orders from Colonel York to move the Battalion to an assembly area in the vicinity of DELBRUCK as soon after daylight as possible. Hot chow was waiting for the men when they returned

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to the North side of the CANAL. This was the first hot meal they had had since the initial crossing of the CANAL. The relief was completed at 2400 and the Battalion made preparations to move out by 0800, 4 April 1945. This Battalion had now gone for three days and three nights with practically no sleep, yet their combat efficiency was high enough to repulse the most vicious enemy counter-attacks.

Casualties: 1 Killed, 19 Wounded, and 29 Prisoners captured.

4 April 1945

Orders were issued for movement of CT 331 (-1st and 2nd Bns) to new assembly area East of DELBRUCK. CT 331 (-) crossed IP at 0735 and closed in new area

at 1100. Regimental CP closed at WALSTEDDE and opened at NEUHAUS (678505) at 1430. CT 331 (-2nd Bn.) was given the mission of following Task Force Biddle on the Northern route, protecting the right flank of the Division and mopping up enemy resistance by-passed. During this period the Regimental CP was located in the following towns in order: Closed AHLEN at 1000, opened NEUHAUS (678507) at 1000: PADERBORN (711475) at 1500: and ALTENBEKEN (835527) at 2000.

1st Bn. closed in HOLHOVEN at 0430 and ate breakfast at 0630. The Battalion was assigned the task of following Task Force Biddle and of cleaning up any by-passed enemy resistance. By 1100 the Battalion was on the move again with Companies "B" and "A" riding tanks and tank destroyers, respectively and with Co "C" in 2-1/2 ton trucks. The route taken went through SANDE and PADERBORN (7047), the Battalion arriving at ALTENBEKEN at 2000. Co. "C" swept the woods East of town where enemy small arms and panzerfaust fire had been directed against elements of the 113th Cavalry. Some abandoned panzerfaust and small arms only were found. Again a defense was set up, but most of the men in the companies were able to get some sleep for the first time in about three days.

2nd Battalion was now attached to the 113th Cavalry. Co "E's" riflemen riding on a platoon of tanks, a platoon of tank destroyers and 3 2-1/2 ton trucks left HOVELHOF at 0730 for HOHLSTADTERHEIDE, nine miles distant. The attack was launched at 1030 against a road block between HOHLSTADT and HORN. Moving through thick forests and over hilly terrain the company advanced on its final objective, a road block, which was reduced at 1800 as the men, using marching fire, completely routed the dug-in enemy. Orders were then received to proceed to and outpost HORN, recently taken by Co "G". At 0630 Co. "F" moved out on trucks from HOVELHOF and traveled 60 miles to an assembly area five kilometers from PADERBORN. There the first platoon joined Troop "C" of the 113th Cavalry Recon Squadron and as an assault team drove from BUKE to BAD DRIBURG. The fighting was especially difficult due to the terrain - a combination of flat open country dense forest, and dug-in enemy infantry. The first platoon took 300 prisoners. During the fight in the woods Sgt. Carl W. James, a machine gunner, distinguished himself when he singlehandedly manned his gun to relieve the first platoon which was pinned down.

The second platoon joined Troop "A" and jumping off from its assembly area, in the vicinity of PADERBORN, took the town of ATTENBECKEN. Here the second platoon was joined by the third platoon and in an attack against light opposition took REELSEN. 99 prisoners were taken, Co "G" left HOVELHOF at 0800 and traveled 17 kilometers to ESTERHOLZ. At 1030 it attacked from the East side of ESTERHOLZ through heavily wooded terrain, advancing 6,000 yards against scattered but well dug-in troops to successfully complete its mission of opening a main supply route through the HARZ MOUNTAINS on the right of elements of the 329th Infantry. Co. "G" plus the Battalion Command Group arrived in HORN as darkness was falling.

The 3rd Battalion crossed the IP at 0730 for assembly in PADERBORN. Tanks, tank destroyers, and trucks were used to move the battalion. Colonel York visited the CP at PADERBORN and gave Major Sellers orders to move the battalion on into EAST PADERBORN as quickly as possible. The battalion was given the mission of following Task Force Biddle and cleaning out any pockets of resistance they might by-pass. At 1600 orders were received that the town of SCHWANEY had to be cleared immediately. Major Sellers ordered the battalion to move out in a column of companies. "K" company to lead out with the mission of taking over the cavalry's positions at BUKE: "I" Company to follow "K" Company and attack the town of SCHWANEY; "L" Company to follow "I" Company and be prepared to assist "I" Company in the accomplishment of its mission. "I" Company jumped off at 1800 with one platoon of tanks and one platoon of tank destroyers in direct support. At 2100 "I" Company was in the edge of SCHWANEY meeting only light resistance. At 2130 the town was reported clear. In the meantime orders had been received for the woods between SCHWANEY and BAD DRIBURG to be cleared as soon as possible. "L" Company was assigned this mission and, as they were moving through SCHWANEY on their mission Colonel York radioed that "L" Company's mission was cancelled. "I" and "L" companies outposted SCHWANEY. The Battalion CP was located at BUKE with "K" Company. At 2300 Lt. Ashmore reported to the Regimental CP where Colonel York instructed him to have Major Sellers send one company to follow Task Force Biddle, one company to clean out the woods between SCHWANEY and BAD DRIBURG and one company to remain in SCHWANEY.

Casualties: 3 Killed: 19 Wounded: and 429 Prisoners Captured.

5 April 1945

The 1st Bn. was assigned the mission of cleaning out woods in vicinity of 850535 taking the town of ERPENTRUP, and having one company (Co "B") follow elements of Task Force Biddle on the Northern Route as closely as possible. Companies "A" and "B" moved out at 0730. The remainder of the battalion was to follow as closely as the tactical situation permitted. The attack of the Battalion was rapid against light opposition over the following routes: ALTENBEKEN, MERLSHEIM (8956), H IMMIGHAUSEN (8958), OYENHAUSEN (9158), and ROLFZEN (978620), which was reached by 1450. The Battalion (-Co. "C") remained here the rest of the period organized for defense. Co. "C" and Co. "G" 736th Tank Bn. were in Regimental Reserve in ALTENBEKEN.

2nd Battalion. As Co. "E" remained in Group Reserve, first in HORN and later in BREDENBORN to which it moved with Battalion Headquarters shortly after supper, Co. "F" had two platoons attached to Troops "A" and "B" of the Cavalry. The third platoon joined Troop "A" and against stiff

resistance took the towns of NIEHEIM, BREDENBORN, and BORDEIN. The infantry fought as motorized troops, detrucking outside of each town or as resistance was encountered and deploying as regular infantry until the enemy was cleaned out. The second platoon joined Troop "B" to clear the towns of PONBSEN, OYENHAUSEN, BERGHEIM, EVERSEN, ENTWERP, and SOMMERSELL. Lt. Nottage in charge of the third platoon was declared Burgomeister of NIEHEIM for four hours during which he expedited civil affairs in a manner as to bring parise from all. Co. "G" was attached to Task Force of the Cavalry. It consisted of one section of combat engineers, one platoon of light tanks and a platoon of the 83d Recon. Troops. The company less the second platoon attached to Task Force Ritchie attacked and captured the town of OBERHESCHEN, VINSEBECK, and STEINHEIM. It advanced 20 kilometers, killed 6 and captured 40 enemy. Task Force Ritchie attacked and captured SCHEIDER taking 11 prisoners and killing 3.

3rd Battalion. At 1730 "K" Company moved out for BAD DRIBURG to follow Task Force Biddle and "L" Company started on their mission of cleaning out the woods between SCHWANEY and BAD DRIBURG. "I" Company remained in SCHWANEY. At 0900 orders were received to have one company take the Southern Route "A" and swing around and contact the Cavalry which took the Northern Route "B" at VORDEN. "L" Company moved through the woods without any trouble and arrived at BAD DRIBURG at 1230. "I" Company was ordered to move from SCHWANEY to BAD DRIBURG. "L" Company with one platoon of tanks and two platoons of AA multiplw .50 calibers and one platoon of heavy machine guns followed Route "A". No resistance was encountered by "L" Company until the high ground on the edge of the woods northeast of BRAKEL was occupied. At this point between two and three hundred Germans were observed on the main road from BRAKEL and VORDEN. Since the presence of our Task Force was unknown to the Germans, Captain Windsor was able to get his tanks, machine guns, mortars and multiple .50 calibers in position to open fire simultaneously on the enemy. For thirty minutes there was a constant rattle of the machine guns, tanks, and mortars firing into one concentrated area. It was slaughter, Out of the estimated 200 or 300, over 150 were killed in the thirty minutes and less than ten shots were fired back at us. From there "L" Company swept on North overrunning the towns of BELLERSE, BOKENDORF, and ABBERURG, encountering light resistance. The town of BOKENDORF was taken my mistake due to getting on the wrong road. The Cavalry was contacted at VORDEN at 1900, at which time the enemy had the main road leading into VORDEN cut by fire. However, when our tanks opened fire on the enemy they retreated. "K" Company had followed the Cavalry and was at this time located just west of VORDEN. "I" Company had been ordered to follow "L" Company's route and when they approached the site of "L" Company's ambush they picked up 35 prisoners who had somehow escaped injury by "L" Company. At 1930 orders were received to attack and capture KAITENBERGEN and to have one company take over the Cavalry's positions in VORDEN. "L" Company was given the mission of going into VORDEN and "K" Company to take KAITENBERGEN. At 2130 "K" Company moved into take the town and having only three snipers for opposition had the town cleared by 2215, killing two Germans and capturing six. At 2330 orders were received to send a strong combat patrol to HOXTER and determine the enemy resistance and see if the bridge was intact. Due to the darkness of the night and small enemy strong points the patrol became disorganized and was forced to abandon its mission.

Regimental CP in ALTENBEKEN moved to and opened at NIESEIM (9957) at 1500.

Casualties: 7 Wounded and 70 Prisoners captured.

6 April 1945

The 1st Battalion was directed to continue on its mission of cleaning up any enemy resistance left behind by Task Force Biddle. At 1000 CT 331 (-2d Bn) was ordered to move to the vicinity of LOWENDORF behind elements of the 113th Cavalry. At 1540 instructions were issued by General Macen to Colonel York that if heavy resistance from tanks and small arms fire could not be reduced by the Cavalry, the Combat Team was to pass through them and clear out the sector to the Weser River in the vicinity of POLLE (1568).

At 0800 Captain Moore, Co. "B", was oriented on the plan for crossing the WESER RIVIER. Co. "B" was to take a different route through the woods, leading Northeast out of FURSTENEAU to POLLE. The armor got bogged when the trail was found impassable for tanks, so Captain Moore was directed to take another route, the road from FURSTENAU to NIESE and assist the Cavalry in the capture of this town. About 1700 leading elements of Co. "B" were fired upon attempting to enter NIESE. At 1720 the Battalion Commander radioed Captain Moore that the town was clear and directed that he move to KOTERBERG and feed his men before continuing on his mission.

At 1720 Co. "A" riding tank destroyers, left for KOLLERBECK, its initial objective, thence to continue to POLLE by way of RISCHENAU and FALKENHAGEN, passing through the Cavalry if they were held up. Co. "C" was to follow Co. "B" on order.

Co. "B's" route in pitch darkness through woods towards POLLE by way of HUMMERSEN, where enemy were suspected, eliminated the use of tanks due to their vulnerability to panzer-faust fire. Therefore Captain Moore moved out on foot. Upon reaching the outskirts of HUMMERSEN Co. "B" was engaged in a fire from the woods outside the town and a bitter fight ensued with the civilians also taking part and sniping. The period closed with Co. "B" still fighting for HUMMERSEN.

Co. "A" had encountered stiff resistance behind the Cavalry on the outskirts of RISCHENAU, but by 2000 the town was clear although there was sniping and small arms fire coming into the town sporadically. By 2100 Cavalry patrols were probing the outskirts of FALKENHAGEN from which tank fire had been received. Captain Barber, Co. "A", was directed upon completion of reconnaissance and conference with Cavalry Group and Task Force Commander HULSE, to go into FALKENHAGEN and pass through the Cavalry. The close of the period found Co. "A" in FALKENHAGEN and fighting on the outskirts against stubborn infantry and estimated 2 enemy tanks. Cavalry stopped for the night planning to resume the attack the next morning.

Co. "E", attached to Task Force of the 125th Cavalry, left for BREDENBORN at 0530 with the mission of taking HOXTER, FURSTENAU was cleared by 1000 and 50 prisoners taken. The advance continued for a mile where a delay was caused by two blown bridges. Once repaired the attack continued and by 2130 BRENKSEN was cleared after light resistance was overcome and 25 enemy were captured and 10 were killed.

The second platoon of Co. "F" was attached to Troop "C", 113th Cavalry at SOMMERSELL and from there moved against BIESTERFIELD. Through the enemy resisted stoutly, the Cavalry provided good cover for the attack of the infantry and the town was cleared in a short time. The remainder of the company moved to BIESTERFIELD by truck. From there the 2nd Platoon moved out with Troop "C" to take RISCHENAU. Stiff opposition was encountered from the enemy, with heavy small arms, panzerfaust, and direct AA gun fire. The 1st and 3rd Platoons following in support, now moved into position with elements of Co. "G" and by their concerted efforts drove the enemy out about 2000. 60 prisoners were taken.

Co. "G" attacking over open and rolling terrain alternating the 1st and 3rd Platoons as resistance was met, advanced through the town of SCHWALENBURG at 0800 against light resistance and then proceeded through the heavy woods on the East of RISCHENAU to assist Co. "E" in the capture of the town. At 0800 the motorized 2nd Platoon attacked and captured KANNADE. In the afternoon the company rejoined Task Force Ritchie and moved to the town of HOHE against a few fanatical enemy, a distance of 54 kilometers. There they captured 2 and killed 7 Germans. During this drive the troops rarely got more than three hours sleep a night and sometimes less.

3rd Battalion, The Battalion had a quiet morning "K" Company was in KAITENBERGEN, "L" Company was in VORDEN, "I" Company was in NIEHEM with the Battalion CP. At this point the men were able to get a much needed rest as well as a chance to clean themselves and their equipment up. At 1800, Colonel York came to the Battalion CP and ordered Major Sellers to move the Battalion, less "K" Company to FURSTENON. "K" Company was ordered to move from KAITENBERGEN to VORDEN. The Battalion closed into FURSTENON at 2100. Orders were received to have one company follow the Cavalry East and move into BODEN. At 2230 word was received that the Cavalry had cleared ALBAXEN and "L" Company was ordered to move there and reinforce the Cavalry's positions. At 2400 "L" Company was ordered to send patrols into STAHE and the Western edge of HOLZMINDEN to see if the bridge was still intact. IF STAHE was unoccupied the remainder of "L" Company was to move there which Co. "L" did by 0500, 7 April 1945.

Regimental CP moved from HIEHEIM and opened at LOWENDORF (0661) at 1930.

Casualties: 1 Killed: 8 Wounded: and 138 Prisoners captured.

7 April 1945

"C" Troop 125th Cavalry, was attached to the Regiment effective at daylight. Co. "C" reverted to Battalion control as of 0900. Co. "A" probed all night long in the Eastern edge of FALKENHAGEN and in the woods to the Southeast, but was unable to make any appreciable gains against stubborn small arms fire and infiltrating enemy infantry. After daylight some progress was made, but an enemy tiger tank protected by SS Troops, covering a road block prevented Co. "A" from bringing its tank destroyers into use. About 1030 Co. "A" advanced some 1,000 yards East out of FALKENHAGEN and engaged the enemy in a brisk

fire fight, losing 4 men killed and 5 wounded. Precision adjustment of medium artillery piece forced tank to move. Co. "A" resumed the attack and attempted to outflank the enemy infantry and tiger tank without success. Finally as pressure was kept up the tank withdrew to POLLE protected by infantry. Co. "A" kept up steady pressure and advanced to the outskirts of POLLE at 1715 where the left flank patrol of Co. "A" and a section of 81-mm mortars engaged a 13 man enemy patrol in the woods, our patrol killing 6 enemy, the mortars killing 3, and the patrol capturing 3. One escaped.

Early in the afternoon one platoon of tanks was detached from Co. "B" and attached to Co. "C" for its attack against the high ground overlooking POLLE. At 1530 Co. "C" sent 32 prisoners, including 2 officers, captured in the woods and open ground, Southwest of POLLE, back to the PW cage. In this vicinity Co. "C" was subjected to heavy enemy small arms fire most of the afternoon. Captain Moore Co. "B", with a platoon of tanks attached had a task force of his own and, after clearing HUMMERSEN at 0745, started out with a strong patrol in pursuit of fleeing enemy, later sending for the company to join him. He pushed on almost to the high ground west of POLLE before being passed through by Captain Murphy, Co. "C" about 1100. Captain Moore then collected the rest of his company, backed off and moved on HEINSEN, attacking this town about 1800, after an artillery preparation, and clearing it by 1935 against light to moderate opposition.

Co. "A" and Co. "C", after a 10-minute artillery preparation, including 5 minutes of smoke on the town of POLLE, jumped off at 1940. By 2045 Co "A" had advanced almost 1500 yards and occupied three buildings in the Western edge of town. The smoke mission fired by Co. "D" mortars was most effective and also fired several buildings which illuminated the town facilitating our attack. During this time Co. "C" was being heavily shelled by 20-mm Ack-Ack guns and tank fire and was receiving heavy machine gun fire both from the town and the woods. Co. "C" received fifteen casualties before occupying a single house so heavy was the enemy fire on the troops of Co. "C". Lt. Ritchie, Co. "C" was wounded in the knee about 2200. Once in the town, the burning houses both assisted and hindered our advance. By midnight both companies had a foothold in the town, Co. "A" about 20 houses and Co. "C" about 2. Co. "A" encountered heavy enemy AA guns and machine gun fire from the cemetery. At 2000 the 3rd Platoon of Co. "A" repulsed a counter-attack from the woods North of POLLE.

2nd Battalion. Battalion Headquarters and Co. "E" remained in ESCHENSHAUSEN while Co. "F's" 1st and 2nd Platoons remained in RISCHENAU. The 1st Platoon later rejoined the company and with the 3rd Platoon moved to the town of KRIEPEKE by truck at 0200 and were joined by the 2nd Platoon at 0500. Co. "G" moved from HOHE to GORH NDE and crossed the WESER RIVER at 1400 near FRENKE. From there it went through BROCKENSEN and HEYEN to ESPERDE which had already been taken. At 1800 it received orders to rejoin the Battalion in ESCHERSHAUSEN.

3rd Battalion. The air OP reported an enemy tank at (177607) and also there were two tanks and a large number of infantry in HOLZMINDEN across the river from "L" Company in STAHL. Orders came down that our next mission was HOXTER and that we were to try to get a bridge intact over the river if possible. "I" Company with one platoon of tank destroyers, one platoon of heavy machine guns, and one section of 81-mm mortars were given this mission. At 1300 "I" Company jumped off from BRENKHAUSEN and secured the high ground west of HOXTER meeting very little resistance. A civilian was sent into the town telling them to surrender, but the answer was that they chose to fight. An air mission was requested and Major Sellers, seeing the size of the town, requested that "K" Company be allowed to assist "I" Company in taking the town. The first air mission started at 1530 and the men really saw a good air show. From our high position enemy tanks and vehicles could be seen trying to get out of the way of our airplanes but to no avail. Eight tanks were seen to leave the town and five of these were seen destroyed by the Air Corps. German infantry were also seen leaving the town and our artillery did a magnificent job and inflicted heavy casualties on the retreating enemy. Another air mission was requested for 1900 and while it was an anti-climax to the first mission several new fires were started within the town. Immediately after the second mission was completed "I" and "K" Companies jumped off and took the town with very little resistance taking over 150 prisoners. The railroad and vehicle bridges over the river were destroyed during the first air mission, preventing the battalion from securing a bridgehead at this point. "K" Company moved back to FURSTENAU. "I" Company remained in HOXTER. At 2000 orders were received to make an assault river crossing at HEINSEN. The battalion was minus "I" Company, but "B" Company attached. The mission was to establish a bridgehead and block to the East and North. Major Sellers issued orders to have "L" Company move North up the river road from STAHL to HEINSEN, and "K" Company to take the same route as the 1st Battalion into HEINSEN. Major Sellers and Lt. Ashmore then left for the 1st Battalion CP to make arrangements and to coordinate the crossing.

Regimental CP closed LOWENDORF, opened KOTERSBURG (0963) at 1930.

Casualties: 4 Wounded: and 101 Prisoners Captured.

8 April 1945

All through the night Companies "A" and "C" fought in POLLE. At 0155 a few captured SS soldiers reported that there were in the town a Tiger tank, 2 companies of SS troops, all full strength, and 4 companies of Wehrmacht troops. Enemy strong points were set up which included panzerfausts, ack-ack guns, and enemy infantry firing at our men.

At 0030 the Battalion Commander and Lt. Stranahan went forward from the Co. "A" OP, located in one of the first houses captured in the town, to see if the advance of our troops in the town could make faster progress. This visit resulted in 6 more houses captured in short order and the increased use of our tank destroyers to drive the enemy from buildings they had stubbornly defended. At 0220 a tank destroyer, protected by infantry which had been sent into the center of town to blast out the enemy direct fire AA guns and to again try to knock out the Tiger Royal tank, was destroyed by one shot from this enemy tank, killing 2 of our tank destroyer men and wounding 3. At 0230 Lt. Tyner's Platoon captured a wagon in the street loaded with ammunition. The Battalion PW cage had 45 inmates as of 0340,

but this was only the beginning. At 0445 Lt. Col. Neilson and Lt. Stranahan made their fourth visit to the forward elements to spur the men on. Co. "C" was trying hard to link up with Co. "A" but had not yet done so by 0500. At 0530 Captain Murphy saw some enemy trying to get across the River. Artillery and mortar fire was immediately placed on them. By 0515 there were about 80 prisoners in the PW cage. At 0600 all organized resistance ceased, except for a few pockets here and there. The SS troops had destroyed the Tiger Tank. By 0800 some 200 prisoners had been captured in the town and by 1000 the bag had swelled to more than 300.

About 1000 Lt. Moriarty was killed when his jeep hit a mine returning with chow for his company. The Battalion lost a real gentleman and a hard fighter. The troops had now been moving and fighting for three days and two nights without sleep.

Orders came from Regiment to cross the river as soon as the bridge was completed. Co. "B" was ordered to advance from its assembly area across the river from POLLE to FORST, LUTGENADE (2268), and GOLMBACK (2468) to relieve elements of the 330th Infantry and take over road blocks, while Co. "A" was to advance through BEVERN to LOBACH (2364) to relieve elements of the 330th Infantry on a road block in a defile at 247655. Co. "C" remained in POLLE to guard the bridge. Upon completion of the bridge at 2000, elements of the 331st CT started crossing the river. One of our tanks broke the pontoon bridge at the Eastern approach, stopping all vehicular traffic, so that it was necessary for Co. "B" to continue its mission on foot. Colonel York instructed Lt. Col Neilson to try to cross as many of our foot elements and vehicles as possible over the bridge ahead of the tanks. With permission from the Engineers the movement was expediated and crossing was accomplished by 2330. Necessary trucks from the 3rd Barralion met Co. "A" and trucked the company to BEVERN where 1st Battalion CP was being set up. Co. "B" captured several prisoners in LUTGENADE at 2330 and shortly thereafter continued on to GOLMBACK.

2nd Battalion. At 1430 Co. "E" moved from ESCHERHAUSEN on 5 tanks and 3 2-1/2 ton trucks, traveling 15 miles to high ground above EYERSHAUSEN and GEBRENRODE. A platoon was sent to each of these towns and to feel out the enemy as the 3rd Platoon was sent to clear OHLENRODE. No enemy were met. One Platoon plus two tanks were then given the mission of outpostting EYERSHAUSEN as the second and third platoons and three tanks outpostted OHLENRODE. Co. "F" traveled as a unit with the 113th Cavalry. No opposition was met as the company moved to ESCHERSHAUSEN. Later in the day the second platoon under its newly battle-commissioned leader, Lt. Dalton, moved forward and routed the enemy from the stoutly held town of WANGELDSTADT. Now assisting the 113th Cavalry, Co. "G" moved from ESCHERHAUSEN 11 kilometers to DEEMSEN and outpostted the town behind the 125th Cavalry who relieved the 113th just before nightfall. The third platoon traveling on foot a distance of 2 kilometers helped the 125th Cavalry outpost ARHOLZEN. It was here that Pfc Anthony V. Mattie, while on outpost held off many enemy riflemen from his vantage point behind a road block. In the morning two severely wounded enemy were found. Headquarters and "H" companies were guarding at this time a bridge intact over the LEINE RIVER. A Major General, out of contact with his command

for three weeks, surrendered to Tec 5 John W. Burns of Hq Co. Tec 5 Burns whose specialty is "nothing lower than a Major" later captured along with his company commander, Captain Patterson, a Colonel and a Major.

The 3d Battalion, less "I" Company, but with "B" Company attached, assembled in HEINSEN. Due to the darkness of the night and the poor condition of the roads "K" Company did not arrive at the crossing site until 0600 and "H" hour was set at 0830. "L" and "K" Companies were to be the assault waves and "B" Company to follow in the second wave. Our artillery and mortars were to lay down a 30-minute barrage beginning at 0800. Smoke pots were set up along the river to screen the crossing of the battalion.

At 0830 the first waves started across and by 0845 the first troops had landed on the Eastern bank. At 0945 all of "L" and "K" and "B" Companies were across the river and at 1100 the initial battalion objective was taken. This river crossing and subsequent establishing of a bridgehead was the first operation of this type to be accomplished by any unit of the 83d Infantry Division. This successful operation was accomplished under the direct supervision of Colonel York, the Regimental Commander, and Major Sellers, the Battalion Commander. After the bridgehead was firmly established, the battalion moved out in a column of companies, "K" Company leading. "B" Company had reverted to 1st Battalion control when the bridgehead was firmly established. The battalion moved with such swiftness that enemy positions in the open fields north of BEVERN were overrun and over 100 prisoners taken without a shot being fired. "K" Company then moved into BEVERN without resistance except for an occasional sniper. Over 50 prisoners were taken from this town. From the Battalion OP on the southwestern edge of town, enemy positions could be spotted in the open fields between the Battalion and HOLZMINDEN. Artillery and mortar fire were placed on the positions causing casualties among the enemy and making him abandon his positions. The Battalion at 2200, then moved into ALLERSHEIM with no difficulty. Patrols were organized and sent into HOLZMINDEN and encountered outposts on the northeast edge of town.

Regimental CP closed out at KOTERSBURG at 1545, opened at POLLE at 1610. Closed at POLLE at 2045, opened at BEVERN (2163) at 0030 on 9 April 1945.

Casualties: 5 Killed, 27 Wounded, and 935 prisoners captured.

9 April 1945

1st Battalion. Co. "B" reported by radio closing into GOLMBACH at 0210, and Co. "A" closed in LOBACH at 0315, and was unable to contact elements of 330th Infantry during darkness. Co. "A" completed relief of the roadblock at 1120. At 1300 the Battalion (-Co. "C") had closed in GOLMBACH. Co. "A" sent patrols into NEGENBORN and reported it clear. At 1230 a PW reported that a company of enemy infantry occupied the woods North of GOLMBACH. Co. "B" was directed to send out patrols to investigate. This patrol was fired on by some enemy, so Co. "B" supported by a platoon of tank destroyers followed up at 1350 and at 1640

reported woods clear of enemy. 4 enemy prisoners were taken. Co. "A" at 1400 sent a strong patrols to check HEINRICHSHAGEN, BREITENKAMP KIRCHBRAK, and BODENWERDER. These patrols brought back 40 enemy prisoners and the patrol to BODENWERDER reported being fired on by 3 enemy who immediately fled. Remainder of period spent cleaning equipment and maintaining vehicles.

2nd Battalion. Co. "E" rested until 1500 when it entrucked for FREDEN. It remained there long enough for a hot meal following which it moved to STADTOLDENDORF to spend the night. With the second platoon already in WANGELDSTADT, the remainder of Co. "F" moved there by truck. After staying several hours in WANGELDSTADT the company moved to GREENE at 2000 where two platoons took up defensive positions aiding a unit of the 330th Infantry to outpost the town. The first platoon working with "B" Troop of the 113th Cavalry fought its way to KINBECK. There a 10-man patrol was sent forward to feel out the opposition. The patrol was successful and smashed a roadblock in town killing 7. Co. "G" moved from DEENSON a distance of 43 kilometers through STADTOLDENDORF, ESCHERSHAUSEN, EINEN, KUVENTHAL to EINBECK where it detrucked at 1700. Here the company aided Co. "F" to outpost the town. At the close of the day the 2nd Battalion returned to Regimental control.

3rd. Battalion. At 0300 the bridge over the Weser River was completed and the battalion's attached tanks and tank destroyers rejoined the battalion at ALLERSHEIM. At 0500 the Battalion jumped off in an attack on HOLZMINDEN with "K" Company on the left and "L" Company on the right. Enemy resistance was very light with occasional automatic fire coming from small enemy strong points. At 0800 the town was reported clear and 18 enemy were known dead and over 75 captured. "I" Company rejoined the Battalion at this point and once again the men were able to get a few hours rest and wash up. At 1600 the Battalion was relieved of its positions in HOLZMINDEN by elements of the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion and returned to BEVERN.

At 2300 Regiment was informed that CT 331 was to be in XIX Corps Reserve. Regimental CP closed at BEVERN at 1600 and opened at NEGENBORN at 1620.
Casualties: 9 Killed: 19 Wounded: and 340 Prisoners Captured.

10 April 1945

CT 331 moved to new assembly areas in vicinity of ALFELD, closing at 2100 Co. "C" 331st Infantry, guarding the bridge at POLLE, reverted to Regimental control and would rejoin the Regiment when transportation to move the company became available. At 2030 Division Headquarters directed that one battalion be prepared to move to GOSLAR at 0600 11 April 1945, for attachment to Task Force Biddle. 3rd Battalion was alerted for this mission. While in Corps Reserve Co. "C" 736th Tank Battalion, Co. "A" 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, and troop "A" 125th Cavalry were attached to the Regiment. Companies "F" and "G" were released to Regimental control at 1300 and joined the 2nd Battalion at STADTOLDENDORF at 1700.

The 1st Battalion (-Co. "C") left GOLMBACH in trucks, on tank destroyers and tanks, at 1400 for WRISBERG and GRAFELDE, closing at 1800. Bn. Hqs Co., Co. "C", and Co. "B" were in WRISBERG and Companies "A" and "D" were in GRAFELDE. Roads were jammed with traffic and were very dusty. Colonel York informed the Battalion Commander, Lt. Col Henry Neilson at 2100 that he was to report to Regimental Headquarters the following morning to become Regimental Executive Officer and to turn the Battalion over to Lt. Col, Kuhlman. Before leaving Lt. Col. Neilson told Captain Wilfred Barber, commanding Co. "A" that he was to leave for the United States on April 19th for a 45-day furlough. Lt. Lynch was to take command of Co. "A", effective at once. Lt. Col Neilson had commanded the Battalion since 12 September 1943, except during the time he was in a hospital in England recovering from wounds received in the Normandy hedgerows.

2nd Battalion. Battalion Headquarters and Co. "E" moved to SIBBESSE. Lt. Henage of Co. "D" received a delegation of EINBECK citizens and negotiated for the surrender of the town and garrison. The yield was 200 men and officers. Battalion Headquarters Co., "E" and "F" Companies remained in SIBBESSE while Companies "G" and "H" stayed in WESTFIELD.

3rd Battalion. At 0700 word was received to have a quartering party ready to leave at 0800. Captain Windsor and a representative from each company left with Captain Walker to go to the new assembly area. Major Sellers had a company commanders and staff officers meeting to discuss the proposed move. At 1200 orders were received to move the battalion to AFTONSTADT where the Regiment was in XIX Corps Reserve. The battalion crossed the IP at 1400 and closed in the new area at 1600. At 2130 word was received that the battalion would revert to Division control at 0600 the next morning and that the battalion would leave to rejoin the Regiment at GOSLAR at that time.

Casualties: 2 Wounded: and 41 Prisoners captured.

118 April 1945

At 0730 the 3rd Battalion left for GOSLAR for attachment to Task Force Biddle. At 1200, CT 331 reverted to Division Control, alerted to move to the vicinity of GOSLAR as soon as trucks became available, Upon reverting to Division control, the following attachments reverted to Corps control:

Co. "A" 823rd T. D. Bn. (SP)
Troop "A" 125th Cavalry.

The advanced elements of CT 331 crossed IP at 1530 and the Regimental CP closed out at ALFELD at 1630. At close of the period all elements of Comabt Team had not closed in their new assembly areas.

The 1st Battalion was alerted at 1145 to move to vicinity of GOSLAR. The Battalion OP Group and company commanders were to move with Colonel York, leaving at 1630. The Battalion was to follow as soon as Quartermaster trucks arrived from Corps. At 2000 the Battalion moved out behind the 2nd Battalion and at the close of the period had not closed into their new assembly area.

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2nd Battalion. The Battalion remained in SIBBESSE and WESTFIELD until 1800 when it entrucked for LANGENSTEIN arriving there at 0200, 12 April 1945, after a journey of 62 miles. Hot breakfast was served at 0430. Col. McDonald issued his attack order which called for a drive of 40 miles, the final objective being the town of NIENBERG. Co. "E" moving out at 0530 led the drive and had attached a platoon of tanks and two 2-1/2 ton trucks. It was to by-pass all resistance leaving that for Companies "F" and "G" to clean up. Very little resistance was met by the companies - the enemy preferring to surrender rather than fight. By 1730 NIENBERG WAS cleared after a fight - the only real one of the day. Lt. Clepton spearheaded the Battalion with skill and aggressiveness, personally taking care of many pockets of resistance. The Battalion's first objective DITFURT, was taken at 0700 against little resistance - 900 British and 70 American PW's were freed including two original members of Co. "E". GATERSLEBEN, NACHTERSTADT, FRASE, and KONGISAUE were taken in quick order. In the latter town a few die-hards chose to fight but wurrendered when they saw the infantry deploy. About two miles past WINNINGEN the point observed a train traveling across the front. A tank moved up and knocked out the engine with three rounds of 76-mm. About one mile beyond HECKLINGEN the convoy over-ran a German wagon train moving to the rear. This netted 250 prisoners and six officers and many souvenirs. At LEOPOLDSTALL no resistance was met but about 2000 Allied PW's were freed, mostly Poles and French. At HEBENDORF a few fanatics decided to fight. When nearing the town Lt. Sloan observed a truck trying to get away. He immediately engaged it with .50 caliber MG fire, setting it afire. The company dismounted and with all guns blazing quickly cleared the town. The final objective of the day, NIENBERG, on the SAAL RIVER, resisted very stubbornly with small arms fire. The third platoon pushed to the far edge of town and set up road blocks on roads leading back into town. The other two platoons cleared the town of the enemy by-passed by the third. Two Hitler Youth were met who fired on our troops. They were dealt with accordingly. At 1730 the town was cleared and outposted. Distance covered - 50 miles: Allied PW's recaptured - 2,500: enemy killed - 25: PW's captured - 1,149 including 57 officers. Companies "F" and "G" followed the lead company mopping up where necessary. At the close of the day Co. "F" helped Co. "E" outpost NIENBERG and Co. "G" moved to NEUGATTERSLEBEN to outpost it. Co., "G's" CP was set up in a castle built in 1537 containing 50 sumptuously furnished rooms.

3rd Battalion. At 0100 orders were received that the IP time would be 0930 and Major Sellers would report to Colonel Biddle at the Division CP at 0800 the next morning. The Battalion crossed the IP at 0939 and closed into GOSLAR at 1100. At Division CP Major Sellers had received orders that we were attached to Task Force Biddle and that our mission was to protect the right flank of the 2nd Armored Division by capturing and securing ILSENBURG, DRULECH, DARLINGERODE, and WINDERODE. The Battalion moved out in a column of companies at 1230. Order of march was "I", "L", "K". The towns of ILSENBURG and DRULECH were taken with no resistance, however DRULECH was very strongly defended and only after the commitment of both "I" and "K" companies were the enemy driven from thier positions. The terrain surrounding the town was very flat and open and only the exceptionally well executed marching fire kept our casualties to a minimum. At 1600 the battalion moved out for WINGERODE and entered the northern edge of town without difficulty. However, once into the town the enemy used sniper and panzerfaust fire to a maximum to delay our advance.

After bitter street fighting against snipers, panzerfaust and automatic weapons, the town was finally cleared at 2000. A large prisoner of war camp was overrun and two or three hundred British soldiers were liberated. They were fed, given baths, and a place to sleep comfortably. To see the gratitude in their faces made us more fully realize the cause for which we were fighting. Several fanatical German snipers kept up harrassing sniper fire until they were located and killed.

Regimental CP closed out ALFELD at 1630 and opened at DERENBERG at 0230, 12 April 1945. Casualties: 7 Wounded: and 431 Prisoners captured.

12 April 1945

Regimental CP opened at DERENBURG (1868) at 0230. CT minus 3rd Bn. closed at 0900. Mission of CT 331, to advance on right sector of division to secure

bridgehead over the ELBE RIVER at BREITENHAGEN (9078) and protect right flank of Division.

PLAN - 1ST BATTALION: Attack along Route "B" seize BORNECKE (2763) WESTERHAUSEN (2962), and DITFURT (3864) and be prepared to attack S. E. and secure GATERSLEBEN (4564), NACHTERSTEDT, and FROSE (5161) or follow 2nd Battalion to SCHADELEBEN (5066), continue N.W. and seize COCHSTEDT (5371), BORNECKE (5771), HODERBURG (6271), FORDERSTEDT (6873), BRUMBY (7474), GALBE (7874). In the event 2nd Battalion is held up at STASSFURT (6564), 1st Battalion will constitute the main effort and press the attack along Route "B" and continue to seize ZUCHAU (8469), PATZETZ (8572), HODDERITZ (9073), and BREITENHAGEN (9078). At 1700 the Battalion's mission was changed by Colonel York to block to South in town of HEDERSLEBEN (4268) HAUSNEINDORF (4466), GATERSLEBEN (4564), NACHTERSTEDT (4963), SCHODELEBEN (5066), and FROSE (5161). At 2200 General Macen directed that the Battalion be assembled in the vicinity of HEDERSLEBEN.

PLAN - 2ND BATTALION: 2nd Battalion to attack along Route "A" and seize HEDERSLEBEN (4268), HAUSHEINDORF (4466), SCHADELEBEN (5066), KONIGSAUE (5365), WINNINGEN (5665), HECKLINGEN (6268), LEOPOLDSHALL (6569), H OHENERXLEBEN (7069), HOHENDORF (7469), MIENBURG (7868), GERBITZ (8268), ZUCHAU (8420), PATZETZ (8573), LODDERITZ (9073), BREITENHAGEN (9078) in order and be prepared to seize and secure bridgehead at the ferry site at BREITENHAGEN. Patrol to GATERSLEBEN (4564), NACHTERSTEDT (4963), FROSE (5161), and NEUNDORF (6565) to determine if these areas are cleared of enemy, if only light resistance is met, If resistance is met which will cause delay in taking objectives on Route "A", they will block these objectives from the North until relieved by the 1st or 3rd Battalions, and continue the attack along Route "A".

PLAN - 3RD BATTALION: 3rd Battalion (-1 Company attached to Task Force Biddle) will assemble in vicinity of DERENBURG at 0800, 12 April 1945, and will protect the South flank of the Regimental zone, maintain contact with Task Force Biddle and be prepared to take over the mission or parts of the mission of the 1st Battalion on order. At 2025 General Macen directed that 3rd Battalion occupy HARLSLEBEN (3169) and block to South of HABERSTADT, prepared to stop any enemy penetration from South towards the city.

The 1st Battalion closed in DERENBURG at 0630

after a hectic night of black-out driving in pitch-black darkness in which some elements got off on the wrong road. As the Germans were on the run it was imperative that maximum pressure be maintained. Accordingly at 0730 Co. "B" spearheaded the Battalion toward LANGENSTEIN. Captain Danial Moore, in a jeep, dashed ahead of his company riding tanks to check the road net and was ambushed. He had just by-passed an enemy group without knowing it. Captain Moore's radio operator was killed, his bodyguard wounded, his driver captured, and he himself fatally wounded. They put up a determined fight but were overwhelmed. When Lt. Schwadron, in the vehicle behind Captain Moore, tried to follow, the first enemy group fired on them, slightly wounding Lt. Schwadron in the head. He immediately returned to the head of the company, took charge, sent two tanks forward with directions as to the locations of the enemy group, deployed a platoon behind the tanks, sent security groups to the high ground on both flanks, and then went to the aid of Captain Moore. Lt Schwadron continued to command the company and move through the woods with the tanks in support. Small arms and machine gun fire from light to moderate was met several times along the route "B" Company quickly overcame this resistance, taking no prisoners and came upon Captain Moore and his bodyguard lying along the road, both wounded, Captain Moore seriously. "B" Company continued along the route determined to make the "jerries" pay for their underhandedness and utter disregard for the rights of others. Upon reaching the outskirts of the town of BORNECKE (Harz) (2763), the Battalion's second objective, the company was met by heavy mortar, machine gun and small arms fire. Lt. Schwadron, Co. "B" made an estimate of the situation and then requested assistance from the Battalion Commander. At 1025, after appraising the resistance in front of Co. "B", "C" Company was ordered to LANGENSTEIN and thence to BORNECKE from the North. Co. "C" was committed against the town from the North under a machine gun, mortar, tank destroyer, and artillery barrage. Co. "C" commanded by Captain Patrick Murphy, put on a nerve shattering demonstration of marching fire as they moved into town with three platoons spitting lead. Apparently the marching fire was too much for the defenders, for "C" Company quickly linked up with "B" Company and cleared the town of all "jerries". Captain Moore's driver captured when Captain Moore was wounded, was released from enemy hands by "C" Company. He was a happy and grateful man. Apparently some of the enemy was trying to escape as four wagons, with fine horses hitched to them and loaded with all kinds of clothes, mortars, and ammunition, were captured on the Eastern edge of BORNECKE. The M-8 of the tank destroyers caught two SS officers trying to escape on a motorcycle and killed them. At 1320 "C" Company quickly reorganized and moved to the next Battalion objective, WESTERHAUSEN and captured it at 1415 with little opposition. Perhaps the volume of firing and the smoke of burning buildings from BORNECKE convinced the enemy of our strength so that it was only a matter of collecting the prisoners from the cellars and buildings. "B" Company followed closely into this town. While preparations were being made to move to DITFURT, "A" Company in Battalion Reserve, and the Battalion CP were moved into LANGENSTEIN. As soon as "B" and "C" Companies assembled in WESTERHAUSEN, the Battalion Executive Officer, Major Scott, was ordered to move the Battalion CP and reserve company immediately at 1730 into DITFURT and prepare to receive the rest of the Battalion. Some concern was felt over the mechanical condition of the tanks and the gas supply of the tank destroyers, but the Battalion assembled in

DITFURT without trouble just before dark. At 1915 the Battalion Commanders received orders for refueling of the armor and also for the movement that night to the town of HEDERSLEBEN where an all-around defense would be set up. During the day Co. "B" had 4 killed and 30 wounded. The Battalion had taken 91 prisoners, killed and estimated 30 Germans, and turned over 100 army age Germans for screening. This action was characterized by small determined enemy strongpoints and the first heavy mortar fire in some time was encountered.

When Captain Moore was evacuated it was a great loss to the Battalion and to the Regiment. Co. "B" had been through some of the heaviest fighting of this war, and Captain Moore, the only original rifle company commander in the Regiment, had led this company all way through the bitter fighting in Normandy, France, Luxemburg, Belguim, the Hurtgen Forest, the Ardennes, and in the epochal race of the Division into the heart of the German Reich. This gallant and outstanding combat leader, with more decorations for exploits in battle since landing on the Continent than any other fighter in the Division, not only had the love and admiration of his officers and men, but left behind indelibly written in the hearts of the brave soldiers whom he so gallantly led, a brilliant combat record few mortals will ever equal.

3rd Battalion. At 0100 orders were received that the battalion less one company, would revert to Regimental control. This company was to stay attached to the Cavalry and assist them in their mission. This mission was assigned to "K" Company. The remainder of the Battalion was to move to DERENBURG as soon as possible the next morning. Major Sellers and Lt. Ashmore went forward and contacted Lt. Col. Neilson at the Regimental CP. He gave the Battalion the mission of cleaning out an enemy pocket in the woods South of DERENBURG. At first it was estimated that this pocket consisted of approximately 20 enemy and one platoon from "I" Company ran into a very strong enemy strongpoint consisting of over 100 Germans and more enemy artillery and mortar fire than had been encountered since we crossed the RHINE. When the one platoon was not able to advance the remainder of "I" Company was sent down to clean out the pocket. Very stubborn enemy resistance was finally overcome and the woods cleared. Our Battalion suffered high casualties. Lt. Col. Neilson came to the Battalion OP and ordered Major Sellers to move the Battalion on to the East to protect the 2nd Battalion's fast advance. At 1700 the Battalion moved out of DERENBURG to HARSLEBEN with the mission of blocking all roads coming up from the South in the vicinity of HARSLEBEN and HALBERSTADT.

Regimental CP was mobile during majority of day due to rapid advance of 2nd Battalion and fact that elements of the Regiment were spread over such a large area.
Casualties: 3 killed: 54 Wounded : and 469 Prisoner captured.

13 April 1945

1st Battalion Mission: 1st Battalion to passthrough 2nd Battalion after its capture of CALBE, proceed to BARBY and make coordinated assault crossing of ELBE river with elements of 329th Infantry. 329th Infantry cleared BARBY prior to the time expected and Battalion mission changed to block to South in vicinity of CALBE.

2nd Battalion Mission: Attack and secure CALBE. To cross ELBE RIVER after assault crossing by 1st Battalion. Due to early crossing of Elbe by 329th Infantry with light opposition, Battalion was ordered across immediately following 329th Infantry, as 1st Battalion could not move to crossing site in time to cross at designated time. To advance SE and secure TOCHHEIM and woods to north.

3rd Battalion Mission: 3rd Battalion attached to Task Force Biddle.

1st Battalion. At 0015 the Battalion moved to HEDERSLEBEN, closing in in less than an hour. Still on a 30-minute alert to move, and set up for all around defence, the Battalion rested until 0900. At this time orders were received to send the forward group immediately to the Regimental CP and have the Battalion follow. Forward group was met by Colonel York at 1000 and followed him to BARBY. Colonel York, then at BARBY, ordered the 2nd Battalion across the ELBE. No opposition had been encountered by the 329th in crossing. 1st Battalion was ordered into BRUMBY at 1545, with one company and Battalion CP remaining in CALBE, prepared to protect the south flank of the Division or to move across the ELBE. At 2400 "B" Company was ordered to move to BARBY and cross the ELBE for attachment to the 2nd Battalion, which was being heavily counter-attacked in the vicinity of WALTERNIENBURG.

2nd Battalion. The Battalion's mission this date was to help the 329th Infantry clear the town of CALBE and then to assemble in BARBY to receive further orders. Resistance was met but was dealt with quickly by tanks and tank destroyers, clearing CALBE about 1000, the Battalion moved to BARBY. On the way many former PW's and slave workers were freed. Upon reaching BARBY orders were received to cross the ELBE RIVER and for Company "G" to move to the far reaches of the town of WALTERNIENBURG as Company "F" cleared the woods to the Southwest with the help of Company "E". The Battalion was to secure the right flank of the Division Bridgehead. No opposition was encountered in the crossing of the river, but at 1900 when we entered WALTERNIENBURG the enemy launched the first of three determined and vicious counter-attacks. In the face of heavy mortar fire and tanks firing point-blank in the darkness, Company "G" held firm - one squad, though cut off, refused to yield to superior numbers and piled up enemy dead but a few feet from its location. One enemy tank was knocked out by our panzerfaust fire after it had gotten to within one hundred yards of the Battalion CP.

3rd Battalion. At 0600 a liaison officer from Task Force Biddle came to the Battalion CP and informed Major Sellers that the Battalion was again attached to the Cavalery. Lt. Ashmore went to the Regiment to verify the message. At 0900 the Battalion moved back into DERENBURG and "K" Company reverted to Battalion control. Orders were received from Colonel Biddle to attack and capture HEIMBURG. At 1200 "L" Company jumped off in an attack from BENZINGERODE with the mission of capturing HEIMBURG. One platoon of light tanks was attached to "L" Company and one platoon of heavy machine guns were in direct support. At 1330 the leading elements of "L" Company were on the western edge of the town but were meeting heavy enemy automatic and mortar fire. A high ridge on "L" Company's right flank and they were receiving fire from the ridge as well as from the town and from a high hill on their left flank. The enemy had well prepared positions and had used the terrain to the utmost having constant observation on "L" Company. Due to the terrain, tanks were not able to give close support to the Infantry. At this time Major Sellers committed "K" Company around the right of "L" Company along the high ridge. "K" Company was able to reach the western edge of the town and the high ground surrounding the town. General Ferenbaugh, the Assistant Division Commander, was at the Battalion CP all after-noon and at 2200 decided to withdraw both companies from the town. Although "I" Company had a platoon in the center of the town, heavy fire was still being received from all around the town. "K" and "L" Companies were ordered to withdraw at 2230 and to outpost all approaches leading into BENZINGRODE.

Regimental CP closed at STASSFURT, opened at CALBE at 1000.

Casualties: 17 Killed; 22 Wounded; and 904 Prisoners Captured.

14 April 1945

1st Battalion Mission: "B" Company attached to 2nd Battalion ordered to cross bridgehead at 0030. 1st Battalion (-"B" Co.) to cross River and move into assembly area in vicinity of WALTERNIENBURG upon release to Regimental control.

2nd Battalion Mission: Attack and seize Badetz and KAMERITZ.

3rd Battalion Mission: 3rd Battalion (-"I" Co.) released to Regimental Control at 1030. Ordered to move to assembly area in vicinity of BRUMBY. Later ordered to cross River to assembly area in woods SE of WALTERNIENBURG.

1st Battalion. At 1135 the 1st Battalion (-Co. "B" attached to 2nd Bn.) moved out from their assembly areas in BRUMBY (Co's "C" and "D"), and CALBE (Bn. Hqs. Co. and Co. "A") to cross the ELBE RIVER at BARBY and move to an assembly area in the vicinity of WALTERNIENBURG. At 1245 WALTERNIENBURG was being shelled so the Battalion detrucked on the East side of the river and moved to its assembly area on foot. At 1315 Co. "C" moved South of the town thence to its assembly area, clearing the woods as they went, while "A" Co. moved through the town and to the North to its assembly area, clearing the woods enroute. Both companies came under enemy fire as they entered their assembly areas. Co. "A" encountered dug-in infantry and fire from automatic weapons, while Co. "C" encountered fire from 6 tanks protected by infantry. Sgt. Monroe aided Co "A" taking a light machine gun and flanking the enemy position. This positive action caused 25 Germans to leave their positions and surrender. These 25 enemy left behind a large number of automatic weapons which could have held up the company a considerable time. At 1428 "C" Company called for artillery on the 6 tanks and three of them were destroyed, the others leaving the vicinity. "C" Company then moved out against the enemy infantry and soon had the assembly area secured. However they suffered a great loss as Captain Murphy, company commander, was fatally wounded. He led the company in many hard battles and was an outstanding combat leader, loved and admired by his officers and men. Lt. Edwards, Jr., company executive officer, took command of the company. "C" Company also suffered the loss of two other fine combat officers in Lieutenants Williams and Berquist, both wounded, both the company never faltered in the accomplishment of its mission.

About 1500 "A" Company received an enemy counter-attack of about company strength using marching fire. The enemy attacked viciously from the North and forced Co. "A" to give up some ground but Co. "A" quickly recovered it. Lt Riley, whose platoon bore the brunt of the attack was killed in this action. "C" Company continued to receive fire from its South flank and about 1600 sent a tank with a platoon of infantry to clean out 4 houses. The Platoon received small arms fire as they approached the houses, so the tank opened fire as the platoon closed in. Result - 20 dead Germans and 25 prisoners. At 1800 the Battalion received orders to dig in for the defense in its present area from WALTERNEINBURG to KAMERITZ, defending from the South. The Battalion hoped the "jerries" would attack our position as it would give the Battalion a splendid opportunity to further reduce the dwindling strength of the German Army. However nothing happened. Casualties: 4 Officers, 10 EM. Prisoners - 41. Estimated German dead - 60.

2nd Battalion. On the morning of the 14th the bridge was completed by the Engineers who had been working for 12 straight hours. After noon chow Companies "G" and "E" were moved to areas to the right - WALTERNIENBERG being the 329ths area. Co. "G" moved to an area one kilometer Northeast of TOCHEIM and Co. "E" to the town of BADETZ where defensive positions were dug.

3rd Battalion. The Battalion was relieved by elements of the 8th Armored Division at 0930. The Battalion, less one company which was to remain under the Cavalry's control, reverted to Regimental control. Orders were received to move the Battalion, less one company to CALBE, "I" Company was ordered to remain with the Cavalry and the remainder of the Battalion left BENZINGERODE at 1145 on tanks, tank destroyers, and kitchen trucks to rejoin the Regiment. Major Sellers and Lt. Ashmore went to the Regimental CP and from there Lt. Col. Neilson sent them to the bridge site to contact Colonel York. Colonel York gave Major Sellers orders to move the Battalion across the river to the Regimental reserve line. The company commanders were called forward and reconnaissance was made to place the troops into position as soon as they arrived. The troops left CALBE at 2030, moved across the river, and dug in positions on the Regimental reserve line.

Regimental CP closed at CALBE 1650, opened at BARBY 1715.

Casualties: 11 Killed: 32 Wounded: and 288 Prisoners captured.

15 April 1945

1st Battalion Mission: Seize BADETZ, KAMERITZ, STECKBY, EICHOLZ, and LEPS. Not to advance beyond EICHOLZ until ordered. Protect right flank of Regiment.

2nd Battalion Mission: Seize KAMERITZ and attack and secure HOHENLEPTE on order.

3rd Battalion Mission: 3rd Battalion (-) Regimental Reserve. At 2025 "No Advance" line by General Macon, general line - EICHOLZ-NIEDERLEPTE.

At 0400 "B" Co., attached to the 2nd Battalion, crossed the ELBE RIVER at BARBY. At 0500 it entered WALTERNIENBURG, where it set up a defense facing East toward the woods, covering 2nd Battalion's right flank. At 0930 "B" Co. jumped off and captured TOCHHEIM. It then moved on and took BADETZ. Orders were then received to take KAMERITZ, an enemy stronghold Northeast of BADETZ. At 1845 the company attacked. Attached to the company for the attack was a section of tanks, a heavy machine gun section, and a section of mortars. The artillery preparation consisted of two salvos of artillery, which had no appreciable effect on the enemy in the town. One platoon, supported by a section of tanks approached the outskirts of the town and met heavy small arms fire. Numerous panzerfausts were used against our tanks and one of our tanks was destroyed. Heavy small arms fire coming from strongpoints in KAMERITZ forced Co. "B" to withdraw to defensive positions 100 yards Southeast of the town. The Company suffered considerable casualties in this action.

16 April 1945

1st and 2nd Battalions directed to prepare strong defensive positions making maximum use of mines, booby traps, trip flares, and fallen trees. 3rd Battalion (-) prepared positions on Regimental Reserve Line. Enemy planes bombed and strafed in attempt to knock out bridges.

1st Battalion. The time of attack having been changed from daylight to 0730, Co "C" jumped off on time, but just after passing "A" Company's defensive position in the woods, the lead vehicle was fired on by two enemy armed by burp Guns. Our infantry immediately detrucked and moved against the center of "C" Company's column but failed to reach due to a tree burst. A platoon of Co "C" was immediately dispatched through the woods and came on 6 enemy, one of whom fired a panzerfaust at the platoon. But again it was ineffective and 3 enemy were killed, including the one firing the panzerfaust. The other 3 withdrew. In the meantime, "A" Company's defensive platoon was ordered to search the woods to the rear for infiltrators but found none.

Orders were received to stand fast and permission was received to clear the woods to the Canal. A patrol of Co "C" came upon three Germans, killed two one escaping. Bridges were checked over and the Canal in front of defensive position and 3 were reported intact. Orders were received to discontinue the attack and dig in for the defense. The Battalion was given a zone of at least 3000 yards of which at least 1500 yards was heavily wooded. "B" Company was moved east of BADETZ, "A" Company in the center, half in the open half in the woods, and "C" Company on the right entirely in the woods.

2nd Battalion. Early in the morning, about 0500, the sleep of the men on the MLR was disturbed by the crackle of gun fire from the outposts. Through our complete telephone communication set-up the entire battalion was quickly alerted. We were being attacked by a battalion of infantry supported by self-propelled guns. The attack struck our left flank in "G" Company's sector. Artillery fire was immediately called for and received. This fire, combined with accurate tank destroyers, mortar, rifle and machine gun fire, stopped the enemy infantry in their tracks. About this time a number of enemy self-propelled guns were observed coming from the vicinity of NEIDERLEPTE. The deadly fire of the artillery and tank destroyers knocked out 5 of those guns within a few minutes after they were first observed. The enemy attack was stopped. At the cost of one man killed in "G" Company we had killed 40 Germans, taken 70 prisoners, and destroyed 5 self-propelled guns.

3rd Battalion. The Battalion CP remained in the woods one mile east of the TRUMAN BRIDGE. "K" Company remained in their positions guarding the approaches to the new bridge site. "L" Company remained in their defensive positions in the sector. However they only remained there a few hours and then returned to their former positions along the new bridge site.

Casualties: 7 Killed; 16 Wounded; and 88 Prisoners captured.

17 April 1945

Units continue to improve defensive positions. "K" Company attached to Co. "C" 308th Engineer Battalion to assist in defense of bridge at TOCHHEIM. Regimental CP moved from TOCHHEIM to BADETZ at 1000.

1st Battalion. This day was spent in improving the defensive position and blowing up the 3 bridges over the Canal in the woods, laying mines at trail junctions, clearing fields of fire and preparing overhead cover. Tanks, tank destroyers, and anti-tank guns were dug in on the positions. Enemy action consisted mainly of artillery fire light to moderate in nature that fell in the Battalion forward area. A platoon of "A" Company, Lt. Tyner commanding, with one tank attached, outposted the town of EICHOLZ for the night. A swimming enemy saboteur was captured with his companion in the river, while his heavy charge passed under the gridge and exploded harmlessly 75 yards below it.

2nd Battalion. After spending a somewhat restless night, anticipating another enemy attack, it was decided that the enemy's last attack had jumped off from HEIDERLEPTE. It was not believed that the town was strongly held and that the civilians would surrender the town. Lt. Wiselegle volunteered to go into the town and effect the surrender. Co. "E" was alerted to go into NEIDERLEPTE if it was cleared. At 1230, accompanied by an interpreter, Lt. Wiselogle left the CP and walked into NEIDERLEPTE bearing a white flag. About 40 later the interpreter came back to our CP with 2 PW's and with the word that the town was clear. Co. "E" was immediately sent into the town and prepared defensive positions around the Eastern end of the town. Positions were completed by 1900.

3rd Battalion. The Battalion was alerted at 0445 for a possible counter-attack. This policy will continue as long as we hold our present bridgehead position. At 1900 orders were received to move "L" Company to an area South of KAMERITZ and for them to take up defensive positions in that sector. At 2130 "L" Company was in position and had started digging in their new positions. From 2130 to 2200 there were about 20 enemy planes overhead trying to destroy the bridge.

Casualties: 2 Wounded; and 11 Prisoners captured.

18 April 1945

Strong enemy counter-attack in "A" Company sector requiring employment of 2 platoons of "L" and "F" Company to sweep woods in rear of 3rd Battalion positions and assist in restoration of original line. 1st Battalion 330th Infantry, attached to Regiment at 1200. Ordered to occupy right defensive sector. Enemy air again made attempt to knock out bridges.

1st Battalion. At 0430 some small arms fire was reported on the right of the Battalion Area near the river. At 0530 the action was reported by "C" Company outpost as probing by enemy patrols. A little later it began to appear that the enemy was attacking in some strength. At 0630 "C" Company was hit on its extreme right flank first and then in the center. It finally had to withdraw its outpost platoon to keep it from being surrounded. The


outpost platoon was skillfully used by Lt. Edwards to strengthen his thin defensive line. The enemy attack in Battalion strength to be followed by enemy engineers to blow up the pontoon bridge across the ELBE RIVER. At this time this information did not appear to be correct. About 0800 it was estimated that "C" Company, followed possibly by the reserve company which was later caught in the open by our artillery fire. "C" Company continued to hold its main position against the furious attack.

While the enemy attack was directed against "C" Company, probing at 0630 against "A" Company's positions in the woods by small patrols was changing by 0730 to strong combat patrols. On the left of "A" Company's defensive position in the woods were an attached dug-in position of tank and tank destroyers. As the intensity of the attack increased about 0830 the tank attempted to leave its dug-in position to better assist "A" Company, but bogged down in the open field in front of its dug-in position. The tank destroyer was able to move and supported "A" Company, but with HE and MG fire until forced to withdraw later. By 0900 the attack had somewhat slowed against "C" Company and at this time "A" Company's position was hard hit. The enemy found a gap on "A" Company's right flank between "A" and "C" Companies. He poured through wave after wave of ten men each, and at 1100 this caused "A" Company to withdraw from its position. At 0930 Captain Rodgers of 736th Tank Battalion reported his own and one other tank to Lt. Col. Euhlman, 1st Battalion Commander. Upon learning the situation these two tanks went forward to support "A" Company. When the enemy tanks appeared Captain Rodgers' tank was knocked out but the other tank continued to support Co. "A" until later when forced to withdraw with "A" Company. At 1000 two enemy tanks appeared about 1200 yards in front of "A" Company's position which caused little damage except to the trees but were very trying on the nerves. After withdrawing from its position "A" Company occupied successive positions to slow the attack down, doggedly fighting every step of the way. It was estimated "A" Company was engaged at least a company during the attack.

While this attack was being pressed against "A" Company the enemy pushed with renewed vigor against "C" Company but it held firm throughout although its left flank was open. This was due to the cool and aggressive leadership of Lt. Edwards. By 1220 "A" Company at this time had been forced to withdraw about 800 yards and "F" Company at this time temporarily took over "A" Company's zone so it could reorganize. At 1000 due to the progress of the attack, permission was asked for and granted to withdraw the platoon of "A" Company from EICHOLZ and bring them back to the battalion. At 1330 "A" Company was reorganized and moved out to restore its position. This was accomplished by 1515 encountering no opposition. Our planes, P-47's, helped stem the attack by causing the enemy tanks to withdraw and by strafing the enemy infantry for a half hour starting at 1230. Some enemy artillery and mortar fire fell in the woods during the attack and enemy artillery was also directed against the position from the East. By 1430 the entire position had been restored. The valor of the Battalion was shown by the following figures: 33 Prisoners taken, 13 more wounded, including a company commander, and 122 dead Germans on the battle position. In addition more dead and wounded were in the woods in front of the battle position, caused by our mortar and artillery fire. PW later reported it to be a two battalion attack with tanks in support and followed by engineers to blow the bridge.

Countless examples of heroism are already on record, one such being Pfc Martin M. Agnew, A Co. "C" BAR man. He was stationed with four others on an outpost at a vital crossroad. Shortly after the attack began the other four

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Authority 

men were killed and Pfc Agnew maintained the position alone, knocking out an enemy machine gun before it fired a shot. He continued firing at 30 Germans facing him until he had expended all his ammunition. He then collected the ammunition from his dead comrades and continued to fight, firing it all before he pulled back for help. Our casualties were 13 killed, 13 wounded, and 14 missing. The Germans tried hard to wipe out the bridgehead from the South but were expensively unsuccessful.

About 1800 orders were received to shorten the lines with a company of the 1st Battalion 330th Infantry taking over the right flank position on the river, "G" Company in the center, "A" Company on "G" Company's left and "B" Company on "A" Company's left. The position was moved slightly back and organization of the defensive position continued all night.

2nd Battalion. After a very quiet night we received word that the 1st Battalion was receiving an attack on their right company and that we might possibly be called upon to assist them. At 1200 Co. "E" pulled back from NEIDERLEPTE and assembled in HOHENLEPTE. At 1300 Co. "F" pulled back from their MLR positions and were placed under Regimental control. They were to be used to counter-attack the enemy who were viciously attacking the 1st Battalion. Company "E" was alerted to move back also. "G" Company now occupied our entire MLR. About 1900 we received word that the enemy attack had been driven back. Co. "F" had played a major part in driving back the attack. The remainder of the day and night was very quiet. A small amount of enemy artillery fell in our area.

3rd Battalion. Increasing enemy action was reported in front of the 1st Battalion at 0600. At 0830 "L" Company with one platoon of "K" Company attached was given the mission of cleaning out the woods to the west of the "C" Company area and to restore the former lines in that sector. "L" Company jumped off at 1130 and reached its objective without opposition. At 1400 patrols were sent out to contact "F" Company on "L" Company's right and "C" Company to the front. The patrols having accomplished this mission "L" Company prepared to dig in for the night. Orders were received that "L" Company would be relieved by "B" Company of the 330th Infantry. At 1845 the relief was completed and "L" Company returned to their defensive position South of KAMERITZ. Enemy aircraft were over the area from 2100 to 2120, bombing and strafing the bridgehead area. "K" Company's area was hit hardest and Co. "K" suffered six casualties.

Casualties: 13 killed; 29 wounded; and 96 Prisoners Captured.

*A True Copy;
Antonio J. Gandis
Capt. G.S.C.*


HEADQUARTERS
 83D INFANTRY DIVISION
 APO 83, U. S. Army

4 October 1945

C E R T I F I C A T E

I HEREBY certify that records of this Headquarters indicate the following number of battle casualties sustained by personnel of the 83d Infantry Division, 643d Tank Destroyer Battalion, 736 Tank Battalion and 453d AAA AW Battalion, during the period 4 April 1945 to 18 April, inclusive.

Killed in Action.....	247
Died of Wounds	20
Missing in Action.....	64
Seriously Wounded in Action.....	145
Slightly Wounded in Action.....	454
Seriously Injured in Action.....	3
Slightly Injured in Action	52
Captured	3
Died of Injuries.....	3


 KARL N. SMITH,
 Captain, GSC,
 Asst AC of S, G-1.

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HEADQUARTERS 83D INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 83, U. S. Army

8 October 1945

C E R T I F I C A T E

I HEREBY certify that records of this Headquarters indicate the following number of decorations have been awarded to personnel of the 83d Infantry Division, 643 Tank Destroyer Battalion, 736 Tank Battalion and 453d AAA AW Battalion, for acts of service and/or heroism during the period 4 April 1945 to 18 April 1945 inclusive.

DISTINGUISHED
SERVICE CROSS

1

LEGION OF MERIT


1

SILVER STARS


132

BRONZE STARS

289


KARL N. SMITH,
Captain, GSC,
Asst AC of S, G-1.

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Part III

Ch. 2

Sec 2

G-2. Periodic Reports

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(G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 192
(From 030001 to 032400 Apr 45))

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P2, P3, Q2, Q3.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines: Points of enemy contact, HAMM (B0542), LIPPBORG (B5140), NEUHAUS (B6750), SCHELANGEN (B7657), and B7660).

b. Units in Contact: See Annex No 1.

c. Defensive Organization: Unmanned roadblocks were found at B615606, B654582, B672583, B755585, and one which was mined at B680583.

d. Reserves: Elms of 2 Pz, 11 Pz, 130 Pz, 3 Pz Gren and 17 SS Pz Gren Divs were identified during the day on other fronts. 15 Pz Gren Div, while not reported in direct contact, is believed to be in local reserve on the British front. Most of 116 Pz Div is apparently out of contact with some elms last reported SE of HAMM. Of the above Divs the 116 Pz, the 130 Pz, the 3 Pz Gren and elms of 9 Pz are believed to be still largely in the pocket between the First and Ninth Armies. Several PWs have stated that the 130 Pz and 3 Pz Gren Divs, which have been contacted progressively farther NE in the pocket, will spearhead an attempt to break out of the encirclement in the WINTERBURG (G5688) area. One P.W stated other unknown elms will make a similar attempt to the N of this point.

While there are no other known Pz type divisional reserves in the West, at least three Inf Divs are carried as possible reserves - 361, 169, and 715. This list can be enlarged by divisional staffs that may be contacted coordinating training and replacement bns. (See: XIX Corps Per Rpt No 291)

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Early in the period the enemy placed high velocity fire in the town of LIPPBORG in an attempt to conceal vehicular movement S of the LIPPE RIVER. Movement ceased when our arty fire was directed against the activity. During the morning half-tracks and/or SP guns were reported moving toward HAMM from the SW.

Late in the afternoon our trs cleared NEUHAUS taking 200 PWs, some of which identified 500 Pz Res Bn. Elms which withdrew NE from the town, according to PWs, were an estimated 100 SS trs and 3 to 4 tanks with the intention of attacking our trs in SENNELAGER (B5753).

8th Armd Div: The counterattack in vic NEUHAUS prior to dawn was frustrated by our arty. An estimated Bn of inf supported by arty and 8 to 12 tanks were involved in the attack. 5 enemy tanks were reported destroyed. Resistance in NEUHAUS remained determined during the day.

2d Armd Div: The enemy, utilizing the excellent defensive terrain, continued to resist our advances. During the morning, 200 inf fought stubbornly in vic B7570 with SA and AT fire. 16 to 18 enemy tanks were reported operating in scattered groups throughout the Div zone. AT fire was received from vic KOHLSTADT (B7859) shortly before dark. Adv elms reached B6675, B7670, and B7658.

b. Component Elements:

Air: 2 enemy aircraft reported over Div sector between 0300 and 0400. No hostile action report.

Armor: Civilians report 3 tanks vic roadblock B679512.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Total PWs from 4 July 1944 thru 2 April 1945: 42,644

b. Weather Forecast - 4 April 45: Overcast forming at dawn and continuing through the morning. Clouds becoming broken in afternoon. Visibility improving to good after early morning. Favorable for ground operations and moderately favorable for air operations.

*A True Copy:
Antonio J. Gaudis
Capt GSC*

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 193
(From 040001 to 042400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P3, Q3.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy Front Lines: Adv elements reached B880497, B875540, B8359 and RR at B8465.
- b. Units in contact: See Annex No 1.
- c. Reserves: 116 Pz Div remains unlocated and therefore available for commitment. 130 Pz Lehr and 3 Pz Gren Divs have been reported counterattacking against the E wall of the pocket. Fus Bn of 361 Inf Div (one of the 2 remaining Divs in HOLLAND) has been identified on British front. Only Inf Divs carried as reserves for the west are 331 Inf Div (from N HOLLAND), 169 Inf Div (from NORWAY) and 715 Inf Div (from ITALY).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary:

329th Inf. Our attack in the morning through the woods at B6852 SE of SENNELAGER (B6753) caught the enemy by surprise. Two tanks and approx 60 inf sleeping nearby were taken. Our advance was temporarily held up by two enemy tanks at B797601 early in the afternoon. Moderate resistance was then encountered until our forces entered HORN (B8364) and VELDOM (B8259). Here the enemy resisted stubbornly from house to house with SA and Panzerfaust. Our troops in VELDOM received considerable 20mm fire from the high ground to the East. I & R Platoon encountered no opposition in reaching Hill at B8257. At close of period our troops in HORN had advanced to the railroad. VELDOM was not completely cleared.

Genmaj (Brig Gen) KRYSSING, a Dane, captured in HORN early in the evening formerly organized and assembled a volunteer corps from DENMARK in 1942. Being relieved after only three months in that command, he then served with the Germans as an observer. He has had no recent command.

331st Inf. Attacking late in the afternoon our forces advanced to B8654 and B8347 against light scattered resistance.

113 Cav Gp. SA and MG fire characterized resistance during the morning as our troops advanced to BUKE (B8350), clearing it at 1600. AT gun at B8450 was knocked out, and resistance was increasing with our advance. By 1830 our troops advanced to B880-497, B889513, and B880497.

b. Component Elements:

Air. 1 ME-109 was destroyed near Div CP in BAD LIPPSRINGE (B7454) shortly after 1400. Enemy had strafed along highway SW of the town. At 1700, 330th Inf reported 6 enemy aircraft strafed near RJ B4053.

Armor. 5 enemy tanks were destroyed in 329th Inf zone during the period. Civilian reports 8 tanks vic BAD DRIBURG (B8849).

Engineer. PWs report fields are mined on both sides of road running NE from MARIENLOH (B8252) to BAD LIPPSRINGE.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. Weather Forecast - 5 Apr 45: Scattered to broken clouds forming in morning with high clouds moving to the East late in the day. Visibility good. Temperature 39 to 52 degrees.

*A True Copy;
Antonio J. Gaudin
Capt GSC*

www.footstepsresearchers.com

Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 5 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 194
(From 050001 to 052400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P3, Q3.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines: Adv elms reached B6769, B6866, B7064, C0469, C0561, C0960, C0456, B9949.

b. Units in Contact: See Annex #1.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Opposition from tanks and dug-in infantry comprised the bulk of enemy resistance during the period. Throughout the morning good advances were made against scattered SA fire. Four tanks operating in the vic of STEINHEIM (B9363) and WOBEL (B9467) temporarily slowed our advance early in the afternoon. When the tanks were forced to withdraw, supporting infantry readily surrendered. Thereafter, opposition continued moderate as SCHIEDER (B9769) was cleared and our troops occupied SCHWALENBERG (C0065).

On the right of the Div zone an estimated 50 enemy resisted from dug-in positions in vic B987585 shortly after 1200 hrs. Here, resistance was described as scattered SA fire and occasional AT gun and tank fire. Good advances were registered as the towns of LOWENDORF (C0561) and FURSTENAU (C0960) were entered.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast - 6 April 45: Broken clouds with occasional showers throughout the morning and continuing through the afternoon. Visibility poor, conditions generally unfavorable for all military operations.

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A True Copy:
Antonio J. Lundy

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 195
(From 060001 to 062400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P3, Q3, P4, Q4.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Front Lines: Adv Elsm reached C1559, C0867, C1573, C2276, C1977. Troops E of WESER River cleared BODENWERBER (C2276) and HALLE (C2578).

b. Units in Contact: Identifications today continued to be those of a host of miscellaneous units primarily under administrative control of 476 and 466 zbV Divs.

c. Reserves: Both Regts of 116 Pz Div were again identified on 95th Inf Div and 8th Armd Div fronts. As our troops enter WEHRKREIS XI, we can expect to contact elements of 471 Mobilization Div and 411 zbV Div (HANOVER). (See Annex No 1)

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy action throughout the period was of a harassing and delaying nature. By defending from key terrain features such as cross roads, road junctions and towns, he was able to slow our advance. Tank-infantry combination at road blocks was effective during the afternoon at the western approaches to RISCHEAU (C0669). Principle fire being from SA, Panzerfaust, Tank and AT gun. Infantry again demonstrated the lack of the will-to-fight as they readily surrendered when the tanks withdrew or when a pincer movement threatened. Our troops E of the WESER RIVER cleared HALLE against no opposition while moderate resistance was encountered in clearing BODENWERBER. ALBAXAN (C1459) was cleared toward the end of the period after stubborn resistance was initially encountered. Good advances were made throughout the Div zone.

Loud explosions were heard at 1105 in vic bridge at HOXTER (C1354) and at 1830 vic bridge at BODENWERBER (C2276), indicating the enemy intends to deny their use to us.

b. Armor: One enemy tank was operating in vic RISCHEAU during the afternoon. At 2130, two enemy tanks were reported on Southern edge of FALKENHAGEN (C0867). One Tiger tank at C0371 reported destroyed by the enemy.

3. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. No. of PWS taken from 4 July 1944 thru 5 April 1945: 44,243.

b. Weather Forecast:

7 April 1945 - Low overcast with light showers through entire day. Westerly winds 4-7 MPH. Favorable for screening smokes. Temperature 44 to 54 degrees.

Long Range Forecast - Decreasing cloudiness on 8 and 9 April. Broken to overcast clouds with light rain on 10 April. Moderately favorable for all military operations.

A True Copy:
Antonio J. Sandoz
Capt. S. S. C.

Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 7 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 196
(From 070001 to 072400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P3, P4, Q3, Q4.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Front Lines: Adv Elms reached WESER River at HOXTER (C1354) to STAHL (C1661) - C2768 - C4273.

b. Units In Contact: Identifications today continued to represent the miscellaneous units encountered on previous day. Of interest, were the units identified as being under control of 411 zbV Div which is one of the two adm Divs controlling the numerous repl units in WEHRKREIS XI (See Annex No 2).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

A. General Summary: The enemy continued to delay our advance with isolated strongpoints consisting of roadblocks supported by infantry, tanks and AT guns. On the right of the Div zone, the enemy displayed greater determination in resisting our advances on HOLZMINDEN (C1860) and HOXTER (C1354). The approaches to HOLZMINDEN were well defended and considerable vehicular movement was heard in the town during the day. Late in the afternoon, the city of HOXTER surrendered to our troops as the enemy forces were withdrawing to the E. The enemy withdrawal was taken under fire. An air mission on the wooded area immediately E of the town revealed 11 enemy tanks and motor transport. 3 of the tanks were destroyed when engaged by our air. Vehicular movement to the E continued when at 1830, fire was placed on targets at C2667.

On the left of the Div zone remaining pockets of enemy W of the river were cleared. Our forces E of the river advanced SE from HALDE (C2578), clearing ESCHERSHAUSEN (C3171), then E to occupy DELIGSEN (C4173) against light opposition.

b. Armor: 3 of the 11 enemy tanks observed in woods vic C1653 were destroyed by our air. During the morning 2 tanks were observed across river from HEINSEN (C1566). A total of 3 tanks were reported throughout the day at POLLE (C1568). At 2030, 1 enemy tank was destroyed by 113th Cav Gp vic C275676 and another was observed in same vic.

c. Engineers: Enemy minefield located during the morning at C225775 (See Annex No. 1).

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast - 8 April 45: Scattered clouds throughout the morning becoming broken during afternoon. Visibility good. Northerly winds 5 - 10 MPH. Temperature 36 - 53 degrees. Favorable for all military operations.

b. Long Range Weather Forecast - 8 thru 11 Apr 45: On the 8th thru the 10th, generally fair weather with scattered to broken clouds and morning haze. Clouds becoming overcast with rain on the 11th with poor visibility.

*A True Copy:
Antonio J. Gaudio*

Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 8 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 197
(From 080001 to 082400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P3, P4, Q3, Q4.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Front Lines: Adv elms along WESER RIVER from HOXTER C1354 to STAHL C1661), thence across river to BEVERN (C2163) - C2465 - C3364 - LUMORST (C3762), BRUNSEN (C4665), GREENE (C5264), across LEINE RIVER from C5864 to C4983.

b. Units in Contact: See Annex No. 1.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy resistance during period was confined in the main to the right of the Div zone. Opposition from tanks and dug-in infantry met our advance on STADTOLDENDORF (C3066). The enemy aggressively defended with MG and SA fire from strong points on high ground south and SW of NEGEBORN (C2667). In advancing on BEVERN (C2163) from the north, moderate resistance was encountered. Air Rcn revealed a road block at N end of BRAAK (C2963) defended by two tanks with a third tank on the southern approach to the town.

Opposition against our bridgehead over the LEINE RIVER in the left of the Div zone remained light. Rcn elements made excellent advances as they continued to the East.

b. Component Elements:

(1) Air: Ten enemy aircraft were reported over area during period. At 1350 hrs, 330th Inf destroyed one FW-190 in vic C4867 and 113th Cav Gp reported destroying another in vic C5368 at 1715 hrs.

(2) Armor: Two enemy tanks destroyed in vic C2969 during the morning. After removing the light weapons, the enemy abandoned 4 tanks in vic C3571.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast - 9 April: Light fog at dawn becoming clear later in the morning. Some high scattered clouds during the afternoon. Visibility good. Winds northeasterly 6-10 MPH. Temperature 33-53 degrees.

*A True Copy,
Antonio J. Sandoz
Capt GSC*

Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 9 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 198
(From 090001 to 092400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P3, P4, Q3, Q4.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Front Lines: Adv elms E of LEINE RIVER - C5766, C5670, C5676, C5381.
- b. Units in Contact: The following units were identified by PWs during period:

<u>Units</u>	<u>No PWs</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>No PWs</u>
18 Inf Repl Bn	14	26 Engr Repl Bn	11
193 Inf Repl Bn	2	Engr Ord Shop, HOKTER	2
*194 Inf Repl Bn	2	Hq, Engr Lehr Bn zbV	1
167 Inf Repl Bn	1	I/6 Home Guard Bn	12
*396 Inf Repl Bn	1	11 Home Guard Bn	11
276 Convalescent Marsch Co	1	46 (L) AA Bn	89
SS Pz Rcn Res and Tng Bn, SENNELAGER	43	64 (Hv) AA Bn	2
508 Pz Bn	5	6 Communication Repl Bn	3
OC School Detmold	7	6 Med Repl Bn	7
6 Obsn Repl Bn	2	Hitler Youth, (Army)	1
5 Air Corps Repl Bn	1	O. T. Workers	1
*18 Pz Engr Repl Bn	89	Hospital Cases	15
6 Driver Repl Bn	1	Stragglers	16

* Repl and Tng Units of Wehrkreise XI.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy resistance was scattered as our trs were engaged in clearing the Div zone. HOLZMINDEN (C1860) was occupied against opposition from light SA fire, late in the morning. To the E negligible resistance was encountered in clearing GANDERSHEIM (C5766). 20mm fire was received in the town after our trs entered.

IMMERSEN (C4956), to the right of our zone, was the scene of considerable enemy movement throughout the afternoon and evening. Tanks, motor transport and trs were observed moving through the town to the NE and SE in an attempt to gain the E bank of the LEINE RIVER.

b. Component Elements:

Air: 6 ME 109s were over the Div Z at 1800 hrs strafing in the vic of ALFELD (C4377).

Armor: 7 tanks were observed in the movement NE of IMMERSEN late in the day.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast - 10 April 1945: Fog forming at dawn and persisting throughout the morning. Scattered clouds and haze in the afternoon. Visibility poor in the morning but improving to fair in the afternoon. Northerly winds, 1-5 MPH. Temperature 35 - 55 degrees.

A True Copy:
Antonio J. Gaudin
Capt G.S.C.

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 199
(From 100001 to 102400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P4, P5, Q4, Q5.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines: Adv ELms reached SCHLEWECKE (C9270), VIENENBURG (C9476), C7568, C7066, C6964.

b. Units in Contact: An identification today was made of the 29 Pz Gren Regt, 3 Pz Gren Div (See Annex No. 1).

c. Reserves: Higher Hq states the 715 Inf Div, long reported out of contact on the Italian front, and potentially a reserve in the West, has been identified on the Eastern front.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Defending from the heavily wooded terrain with tanks and/or SP guns, Panzerfausts, and SA fire, the enemy attempted to utilize every capability for defense on the right of the Div zone. Here our troops met with SA, MG, and fire from Panzerfaust on entering defile at C7068. 4 tanks, supported by inf, were reported firing from the woods E of MUNCHEHOF (C6864) throughout the morning and early afternoon. Results of our arty fire on these targets was described as excellent.

The enemy's efforts to defend on the left of the zone were met with little success. In our advance to LANGESHEIM (C7874) during the morning, the bulk of resistance was centered around two defended road blocks at C7174 and C7674. Continuing to the East at an unabated pace, GOSLAR (C8571) was occupied against little opposition. OKER (C8971) was the scene of a brisk fire fight late in the afternoon with the enemy when he resisted with SA and Panzerfaust fire. This resistance afforded chiefly by youths of 17 to 18 years was soon overcome.

b. Component Elements:

(1) Armor: 4 tanks or SP guns were operating on edge of woods just East of MUNCHEHOF the greater part of the day.

(2) Engineers: Two instances of the enemy's use of mines were reported during the period. 5 mines, hastily thrown on the street by the retreating enemy, were found in MUNCHEHOF. A friendly tank was the victim of a mine on the western approaches to OKER. A civilian report (reliability unknown) states the enemy has placed explosive charges on the sides of the road running S from OKER. Because of the narrow defile formed by the road, an explosion on the bank would result in a formidable barricade.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. No. of PWs taken from 4 July 1944 thru 9 April 1945: 48,657
No. of PWs today (including 3058 hospitalized soldiers): 4,314

b. Weather Forecast - 11 April 1945: Fog or low clouds forming at dawn and dissipating during the morning with clear to scattered low clouds in the afternoon. Visibility fair. Winds northeasterly 4-8 MPH becoming southeasterly 5-10 MPH in the afternoon. Temperature: 34-54 degrees.

*A True Copy;
Antonio J. Ludio*

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 201
(From 120001 to 122400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P5, P6, Q5 and Q6.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Front Lines: Adv elms reached ELBE River at D8484 - BARBY (D8482) - D7767 - D7368 - Along Div right flank C8063 - C8862 - D0364.

b. Units in Contact: The following units yielded the largest number of PWs today: 398 Inf Repl Bn (one of Wehrkreis XI Bns); 593 Inf Repl Bn, 11 Construction Engr Repl Bn (a Wehrkreis XI unit from HAIBERSTADT). 100 different units were identified in Div cages today. Most significant was the identification of "CT SHOERKEN" composed of 3 Cos of about 80 men per Co, most of whom are members of 116 Pz Div. This unit, together with 398 Inf Repl Bn, probably are responsible for defense of CLAUSTHAL-ZELLERFELD (C7960).

c. Reserves: A fairly reliable civilian states that on night of 9 April heavy vehicular traffic, including 50 tanks, passed thru CLAUSTHAL-ZELLERFELD in direction of ALTENAU. This may tie in with the identification of a combat team composed of elms of 116 Pz Div opposing our penetrations from N into the area of CLAUSTHAL-ZELLERFELD.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

General Summary: The period was again marked by sweeping advances on the left in the 329th Inf sector which culminated in our reaching the ELBE RIVER at 1230 hrs. Opposition became more determined as our forces approached BARBY (D8482). Here the enemy employed SA, Panzerfaust, 20mm and mortar fire in the attempt to defend the approaches to the RR bridge across the river. Their anxiety over our intended crossing was shown when at 1945 the RR bridge at D8583 was reported blown. To the right in our zone the resistance remained light and scattered with the blowing of bridges over the SALLE RIVER to delay our advance. CALBE (D7774) was the scene of intensive fighting toward the close of the period.

On the South, resistance continued strong in the HARZ MOUNTAIN area. Opposition from dug-in inf, minefields, roadblocks, and snipers made advances slow as our forces were penetrating from the north through the narrow defiles. Enemy minefield was reported in vic C224668. Considerable enemy movement in CLAUSTHAL-ZELLERFELD was the butt of our arty during the day. A light volume of arty fire was received in 113 Cav sector during day.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. No. of PWs processed thru Div cage for period from 111600 to 121600 April - 2,221.

b. Weather Forecast: 13 April - Overcast clouds with small amount of rain through the day. Visibility fair. Temperature: 49 to 58 degrees.

A True Copy,
Antonio J. Gaudin
Capt GSC

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 202
(From 130001 to 132400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P5, P6, Q5, Q6.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Front Lines: Adv elms E of ELBE R reached - FLOTZ (D8784) - WALTERNIENBURG (D8882) - SAALE R on right of zone.

b. Units in Contact: Today's PWS continued to represent the miscellaneous Repl and Tng units of WEHRKREIS XI. A most significant identification was made by PWS from the 1st Bn, 1064 Inf Regt, POTSDAM Div (See Annex No. 1).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Enemy opposition during the period centered around our bridgehead area. Fanatic resistance from dug-in infantry with SA and Panzerfaust fire was met throughout the early hours of the period in clearing BARBY (D8482). Our fwd elms on the outskirts of the town were bombed by 2 enemy planes shortly after 0100 hrs. At 0945 hrs the town surrendered to our trs.

The initial crossing of the ELBE R by 1st Bn, 329th Inf was made without opposition. The enemy soon retaliated by placing a light volume of high velocity and mortar fire on the crossing site and on BARBY. As our bridgehead was strengthened so was the enemy's determination to erase it. Between 1800 and 2145 hours the enemy counterattacked 4 times in vic D894832 with an estimated Bn of inf and 7 tks. Each atk was repulsed without loss of ground. 2 enemy tks were reported destroyed during this action. The volume of high velocity fire remained light as the period drew to a close.

An attempt by the enemy to infiltrate into our rear area was thwarted late in the afternoon when two enemy tks supported by an undetermined number of inf entered SCHADELEBEN (D5066) from the S. After an engagement with three of our tks which were passing through the town, the two enemy tks were destroyed and the inf dispersed.

In sector of 330th Inf patrol activity in vic C9364 was reported during the morning. Two patrols with strength of 20 men each were targets for our arty. Activity elsewhere throughout that sector was confined to scattered SA fire.

b. Component Elements:

Air: A total of 4 enemy aircraft were reported over Div zone during period with two bombing in vic BARBY, one strafing at crossing site early in the afternoon and the other on rcn after the hrs of darkness.

Armor: A total of 4 enemy tks were destroyed during period. An estimated 9 tks and/or SP guns were operating in the Div zone.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast - 14 April 45: Fog forming at dawn with overcast clouds persisting throughout the morning. Clouds becoming broken to scattered in the afternoon. Visibility fair. Temperature 46 - 58 degrees. Moderately favorable for ground and fighter-bomber operations.

A True Copy:
Antonio J. Gaudis
Capt S.S.C.

Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 14 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 203.
(From 140001 to 142400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P5, P6, Q5, Q6.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines: ELms of Div hold bridgehead on East bank of ELBE River generally from D8784 - D8882 - D9081 - D9180.

b. Units in Contact: The most significant identification of the day was that of Regt LANGEMEIER, Div SCHARNHORST, the 2d Bn of which was contacted defending village of WALTERNLENBURG (D8862). (See Annex No. 1).

c. Reserves: Regts MALO and FRIESEN, the two remaining Regts of the newly identified div SCHARNHORST which are probably located in ROSSLAU (E1074) and DESSAU (E1068) according to late interrogation reports. With the commitment of Div SCHARNHORST, we may expect that the last of the newly formed Divs, Div ULRICH VON HEUTTEN, is capable of intervention anywhere along the ELBE River line.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Resistance against our bridgehead continued determined throughout the period. A counterattack against the town of FLOTZ (D8784) from the North at 0600 hrs was short-lived. The attacking enemy employing marching fire provided an excellent target for our arty and machine guns. During the day considerable movement of enemy personnel and tanks was observed. Two enemy tanks were destroyed and a third disabled by our arty fire.

Enemy fire against our pontoon bridge across the ELBE River vic BARBY (D8662) was negligible during the day. However, at 1800 hrs a few scattered rds of arty fire fell near the bridge site. Throughout the remainder of the Div zone, arty fire continued light with the bulk of fire received being high velocity.

b. Component Elements:

(1) Air: Between 0530 and 0830 hrs, 3 enemy aircraft were over the bridgehead area. Strafing and bombing was reported, with no damage resulting. One enemy plane was destroyed.

(2) Armor: The largest concentration of enemy armor was in vic D910822 at 1350 hrs when 6 tanks were reported by the Air OP. The tanks were dispersed by our arty with the probable destruction of one. Other tank movement was observed at D908821, at D913820, and at D916822. Two tanks were destroyed and one disabled when these targets were engaged by our arty.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast - 15 April 1945: Fog or low clouds forming at dawn and dissipating during morning. Scattered high clouds throughout the afternoon. Visibility poor in morning becoming good by afternoon. Moderately favorable for air and ground operations.

*A True Copy:
Antonio J. Landis
Capt GSC*

S E C R E T

NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD OF BN CPS. HQ BELOW REGT AND DIV ARTY WILL DESTROY THIS DOCUMENT BY BURNING WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS OF RECEIPT.

Hq, 83d (Thunderbolt) Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 15 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 204
(From 150001 to 152400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P5, P6, Q5, Q6.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Front Lines: Adv elms in Bridgehead reached GEHRDEN (D8987) - NUTHA (D9382) - HOHENLEPTE (D9481) - D9280. Elms S of SAALE R - GR ROSENBURG (D8676).

b. Units In Contact: See Annex No 1.

c. Reserves: The enemy is capable of committing 1 Bn, LANGMEIER Regt, SCHARNHORST Div and the uncommitted Regt now located at ROSSLAU (E1069) against our expanding bridgehead on the E bank of the ELBE River. (See Annex No 2)

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Our attack in the bridgehead area at 0900 hrs was met by resistance from SA, arty and fire from SP guns. The enemy defended strongly from well prepared positions with machine guns and high velocity fire in vic D917826. Dug-in inf supported by 4 SP guns resisted our advances from vic S of GUTERGLUCK (D9284) early in the afternoon. Determined resistance was encountered in clearing woods at D9182 where high velocity fire was intense. Our trs continued to exert steady pressure and by late afternoon NUTHA and HOHENLEPTE were occupied.

CC R, 2d Armd Div, made good advances during the day clearing GODNITZ (D8785), GUTERGLUCK, and GEHRDEN. Resistance from direct fire weapons in vic MORITZ (D9485) and TOPPEL (D9584) formed the bulk of opposition. SA and Panzerfaust fire was also encountered from dug-in infantry during the period.

The attack of the 320 RCT S across the SAALE R was met initially by SA and MG fire from vic D8676. Light mortar fire was received from GR ROSENBURG by our advancing trs. At 2045, the town was reported cleared. PWs taken identified an Air Tng and Experiment Regt.

b. Armor: A minimum of 14 SP guns and 4 enemy tks were reported operating in the Div zone during the period. 10 of these were reported destroyed by our fire.

c. Rail: Air OP reported a train with 20 cars moving SW in vic E001901 at 1940 hrs. When engaged by our arty, a large explosion was heard with smoke obscuring the target area.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Annex No 1 to G-2 Periodic Report No 204.

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT
(For period 151600 to 161600 Apr 45)1. No of PWs: 186.2. Units Identified:

2 Bn, Regt LANGMEIER, Div SCHARNHORST	92
1170 Assault Arty Brig, Div SCHARNHORST	1
281 Inf Repl Bn	1
497 Inf Repl Bn	1
811 GHQ Coast Arty Regt	8
6 Home Guard Bn	1
55 Home Guard Bn	2
720 Home Guard Bn	2
Ordnance School, MAGDEBURG	5
Ammo Factory, STASSFURT	4
Arty Ord Det, HILDESHEIM	3
3 Com Repl Bn	1
2 Air Corps Com Co	1
Org SPEER	5
Police	6
Hospital Cases	8
Stragglers	45

3. 5 Co, Regt Langmeier, Div SCHARNHORST: 5 Co, supported by 8 Co, had mission of counterattacking our bridgehead yesterday at 1430. An Assault Co plus 13 Assault Guns were to lead the attack. Their attack was spoiled when our trs launched an assault before they did. The Assault Guns never arrived. PW claims another Regt plus arty is in ROSSLAU. This Regt has not been committed as yet. Ammo supply is sufficient but all PWs complain about the poor food situation. Div is supposed to take its orders directly from Hitler. It was to have been organized as an SS Div.

4. 8 Co, Regt Langmeier: Co is Hv wpns Co with 4 plats. It has 6 - 8 HMGs, 6 80mm mortars, 4 75mm Inf Hows. Co supported 2 Bn in operations against us and suffered heavy losses.

5. 13 Co, Regt Langmeier: Co had 4 120mm mortars and 8 80mm mortars. Its CP was located at GUTERGLUCK (D9284). 1 120mm mortar was destroyed by our planes yesterday, and PW believes other mortars were overrun by our trs when we took GUTERGLUCK where guns and 1 150mm Inf How were in position.

6. 14 Co, Regt Langmeier: Co is planned to be a bazooka Co but wpns have not yet arrived.

7. Assault Co, Regt Langmeier: Each man is armed with a machine pistol. Major Langmeier organized this Co to be used for special missions. It has a strength of approx 90 men.

8. Engr Plat, Hq Co, Regt Langmeier: Plat has 60 men, all inexperienced in regular Engr duties. They are used as inf. Plat is well armed and has 5 LMGs, 10 MPs and 35 Panzerfaust.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Signature,

(Illegible but probable SPEER, Minister of Production)

(Distribution: Very wide circulation is given to this Document.)

Supreme Hq of the Fuhrer,
30 March 45

Der Fuhrer

S E C R E T

For the uniform execution of my order of 19 March 1945 I decree the following:

1. The ordered destruction of all industrial plants has the purpose of denying the enemy the use of all plants and factories for his own combat uses.

2. In no event will these measures be taken so as to hamper our own war effort.

Production must continue until the last possible moment even when imminent danger is approaching and thus endangering the capture of a valuable factory. All industrial plants as well as supply points should be destroyed only when directly threatened by the enemy.

3. All bridges and other traffic structures must be totally destroyed to deny the enemy their use for the longest possible time. Effective sabotage methods, in the case of factories and industrial plants, can accomplish the same results as total destruction.

Especially important plants will be totally destroyed only by my order and executed by the Reichsminister for Armament and War Production. (For example: Munition factories, important Chemical plants, etc.)

4. All measures for paralyzing and destruction of industrial plants will be ordered by the Gauleiters and Reichs Defense Minister who will supervise the execution of these orders jointly. All offices of Party, Wehrmacht and Government will give their fullest cooperation.

5. These orders are issued by the Minister of Armament and War Production with my full approval. He is empowered to issue further detailed instructions.


6. These principles are to be interpreted in spirit and in accordance with the specific situation in the Combat Zone.

A true copy.
Salm, Lt Col

Signed,
Adolph Hitler

3. Another document, marked secret, and published by the MAGDEBURG branch of the Ministry contains a follow up to the above document with specific instructions as to the means and methods of carrying out HITLER's order.

A Certified True Copy:


ANTONIO J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC
Asst. AC of S, G-2

ISADORE HAMLIN,
1st Lt, Inf,
OIC, OB Team #20

S E C R E Tb. The Enemy is Everywhere:

CALBE (D7774) had been occupied by 83d Div Headquarters three days. An officer of the Div Judge Advocate section, armed with a carbine, was walking alone on the street early afternoon 15 April. When rounding a small bend in the street, the officer was fired upon by a civilian who had stepped from a doorway. The shots went astray, but the shots of four American soldiers, who were but a short distance away, found their mark as this Nazi youth fell dead.

c. Empty Foxholes? A concussion grenade was hurled from a foxhole at a 3/4 ton truck of Div Mil Gov detachment when traveling along the road in vic D262658. Two men in German uniforms had been observed in the foxhole by the occupants of the truck and by prudently speeding up, the grenade fell to the rear of the truck.

d. Climax in OHRDRUF: Albert Schneider was the mayor of OHRDRUF, a small town 17 km from GOTHA. A concentration camp is situated on the top of a hill nearby, in which three thousand Russians, Poles, Jews and others were systematically beaten to death, starved and shot. The day before the arrival of the American troops 33 sick inmates were shot by SS men. Their bodies were still on the grounds of the camp when the Germans left. Among the murdered was an American flyer.

Schneider joined the Nazi party in 1933 and became a troop leader (Ober Truppfuhrer) in the SA. He was made mayor of OHRDRUF six years ago. The mayor had a good reputation for honesty and was considered a fair administrator. Though harsh toward local people Schneider was never guilty of actual cruelties, according to statements of his fellow citizens. Town people describe him as a conscientious man. Nevertheless, because of his Nazi background MG intended to remove him from office as soon as a suitable non-party member could be found.

When the Americans occupied OHRDRUF the mayor as well as the citizenry denied knowledge of the atrocities committed in the camp. The MG officer, decided to take Schneider to the camp to show him the bodies of the murdered inmates. The mayor was profoundly moved by the sight. He said: "I did not believe that Germans are able to commit atrocities like these. We were told that the Russians are cruel and commit wholesale murder in a brutal manner. There were rumors in town, but we did not believe it." The MG officer ordered him to take representatives of the population to the camp the next day. Considering it an excellent idea Schneider promised to prepare a list of prominent members of the community. The mayor and the representatives were supposed to appear at the MG office at 0800 hours next morning. When the mayor failed to appear at the fixed hour, the MG Officer sent a soldier to his home. (The mayor and his wife lived at the house of Mr and Mrs Arthur Singer, his brother-in-law and sister). On the back porch on the second floor the sergeant found the mayor and his wife, their wrists slashed, held upright by cords around their necks. They had committed suicide the night before. In town, people believe that the mayor felt responsible for the atrocities committed in the camp in his area. They assume this to be the only reason for the suicide. A handwritten note was left by the mayor reading: "Forgive us for this in your house, but it cannot be helped." (See: VIII Corps)

/s/ C.R. Noe
for DESHOTELS

G-2

S E C R E T

NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD OF BN CPS. HQ BELOW REGT AND DIV ARTY WILL DESTROY THIS DOCUMENT BY BURNING WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS OF RECEIPT.

Hq, 83d (Thunderbolt) Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 16 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 205
(From 160001 to 162400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, sheets P5, P6, Q5, Q6.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines: Bridgehead area: No change. South of SAALE River adv elms reached BREITENHAGEN (D8977) - D9175.

b. Units in Contact: Our forces in the bridgehead area are opposed by Regt LANGMEIER, Div SCHARNHORST as indicated by PWS. PWS were taken from 1 Bn and Engr Bn Regt MAHLOW, Div SCHARNHORST by 320 RCT in the SAALE River pocket.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

General Summary: The enemy attacked desperately to liquidate our bridgehead shortly after dawn. Coordinated attacks supported by arty and armor were made on the perimeter of the bridgehead from the North, East and South East. The attack from the North against CC R 2d Armd Div and 329th Inf toward GUTERGLUCK (D9284) was made with an estimated 150 inf and 8 assault guns and/or tanks. Attacking from the East toward NUTHA (D9382) was a smaller force estimated to be 50 inf supported by two assault guns. An attack against the 331st Inf from the South East in the direction of HOHENLEPTE (D9381) contained a somewhat larger force. An estimated 200 Inf supported by 14 SP guns and tanks were involved. Each enemy thrust was repulsed without loss of ground by the coordinated efforts of our arty and air. The enemy sustained terrific losses in men and armor. 12 tanks and SP guns were reported destroyed and 2 damaged. Numerous targets were engaged by our arty and air throughout the morning, including a railway gun at D959836, a concentration of 7 tanks at 961821 and a train in vic E0179. Throughout the afternoon and evening enemy movement was confined to small scattered groups. Arty and high velocity fire following the counterattacks remained light.

Enemy infiltration into our outpost positions in 320 RCT sector was made during the hours prior to dawn. Resistance to our advance was primarily from SA and Panzerfaust fire from dug-in inf. Sniper fire was prevalent at bridging site. BREITENHAGEN was cleared and our attack progressed south into the woods vic D9175.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast: 17 April 1945. - Light fog in early morning with scattered high clouds forming in late morning and remaining throughout the day. Visibility fair - becoming good in afternoon. Favorable for air and ground operations.

S E C R E T

Annex No 1 to G-2 Per Rpt No 205

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

- No of PWS: 659
- Units Identified:

Div SCHARNHORST

Regt LANGMEIER

Regtl Hq 48

1 Bn Hq 1

1 Co 7

2 Co 12

3 Co 36

4 Co 17

5 Co 6

6 Co 8

7 Co 11

8 Co 79

2 Bn Hq 41

13 Co 28

14 Co 9

Assault Co 56

Signal Personnel 12

Regt MAHLOW

1 Co 7

2 Co 8

4 Co 6

Engr Bn (1 Co) 40

Combat Team ERDMANN 1

Combat Team MARETZKI 4

Assault Arty Tng Brig BURG 25

NCO School ZERBST 26

943 Lt AA Bn 5

131 AA Bn 2

960 RR AA Bn 2

Air Corps Signal Tng Regt KOETHEN 53

Air Corps Repair Co BARBY 4

193 Inf Repl Bn 3

720 Home Guard Bn 7

11 Home Guard Bn 2

4 Engr Repl Bn 4

Airport KOETHEN 8

Airport ZERBST 4

3 Med Repl Bn 1

11 Med Repl Bn 2

Volkssturm 3

Hospital Cases 3

Stragglers 66

3. 1 Bn, Regt LANGMEIER, CT MARETZKI and elements of Assault Arty Tng Brigade BURG launched counterattacks against our bridgehead E of ELBE with mission to reduce and destroy it.

1 Bn, Regt LANGMEIER, Div SCHARNHORST: This Bn arrived only last night from vic GOMMERN (8093) where they saw action for the first time 3 days ago. This Bn, just as the 2 Bn, is composed of NCO and OCS candidates. Each Co had an original strength of approx 150 men but they suffered heavy losses. 4th Co had 4 mortars and about 6 MGs. Bn had the mission to retake GUTERGLUCK (9284) supported by 8 - 10 assault guns. According to PWS 6 of them were definitely destroyed.

CT MARETZKI: Former members of construction and working Cos were mobilized in ZERBST yesterday and organized into a CT of 3 Cos with 60 men each. None of these men had any previous inf tng. At 0200 they attacked our positions in NIEDERLEPTE (9582) and HOHENLEPTEPTE (9381) supported by 10 - 12 assault guns. They suffered most severely and PWS claim that at least 5 - 6 assault guns were destroyed. Two days ago the women of ZERBST removed roadblocks and appeared with white flags. This infuriated the Kreisleiter, who removed the flags. During our air attack against the airport at ZERBST 10 April, the runways for jet-propelled planes were completely destroyed.

- 1 -
S E C R E T

83rdInfDivDocs.org

www.footstepresearchers.com

S E C R E T

ASSAULT ARTY TNG BRIGADE BURG: Brigade was organized at BURG and received its training at ALTENGRATOW (0409) which is a large training camp and testing ground for tanks and guns. A large ammo dump (3 km long and 1½ km wide) which stores ammo for all caliber guns is located in an area bounded by coordinates D0008-0308-0009-0309. PWS claim barracks with approx 12,00 American and British PWS are located in ALTENGRATOW. Brigade arrived E of MAGDEBURG 10 April but was not committed. They arrived last night in ZERBST and were immediately committed this morning at 0440. Brigade consists of 11 - 105mm How SP and 15 - 75mm guns SP. It has a strength of 230 men, including 90 men fighting as inf support for assault guns. 9 assault guns had mission to counterattack and to retake villages W of ZERBST. Attack was repulsed and 6 assault guns were destroyed. One PW whose home is in HALBERSTADT claims that a large underground ammo dump is located in vic of city, in woods at approx C248782-257781.

2. 2 Co, Regt MAHLOW, Div SCHARNHORST; supported by 4th Co; Engr Bn, Div SCHARNHORST: CT of AC Tng & Experiment Regt, Air Corps Signal Tng Regt KOETHEN, had mission to attack our positions S of SAALE R.

1 Bn, 2 Regt (MAHLOW), Div SCHARNHORST: Regt is named after its CO, Major MAHLOW and is supposed to have 3 Bns. It was organized in ROSSLAU 7 April and most men are tasting combat for the first time. 1 Co arrived in ZUCHAU (8369) night of 14 April. PWS of this Co were captured while on patrol vic 8272. This morning 2 Co supported by 4-75mm inf hows of 4th Co started from vic ZUCHAU along RR and attacked our positions in this sector. 1 Co has 80-90 men, 2 Co 120 men, and 4 Co approx 150 men.

Engr Bn, Div SCHARNHORST: Bn has 3 Cos with approx 150 men each. 1 Co arrived this morning from PATZETZ (8572) and being employed as inf had mission of attacking our position vic SAALE R at 846766.

Air Corps Signal Tng Regt KOETHEN: This unit is organized in 3 Cos with a total strength of 150 men. They arrived in this sector from KOETHEN and were put in line to fight in the SAALE R sector.

Air Corps Tng & Experiment Regt: 2, 8 and 10 Cos were organized into one CT with a strength of about 150 men. They were told to hold S bank of SAALE until the arrival of reinforcements which were expected since 13 April. CT was armed with rifles only. Bn CP was located at DIEBNITZ (893714); Regt CP at WULFEN (895660). Trs located at DIEBNITZ intended to withdraw to DIEBNITZ FOREST 15 April. PWS were told by NCOs in ZUCHAU that the SCHARNHORST Div is planning to maintain a bridgehead W of ELBE in the AKEN-DESSAU-KOETHEN triangle.

CT ERDMANN: Consists of 3 Cos with 100 men each located in vic KUEHREN (9272). On 15 April, CT was to have come under the control of Div SCHARNHORST.

KURT SANDER
Capt, QMC
OIC, IPW Team #51

S E C R E T

Annex No 2 to G-2 Per Rpt No 205

12TH ARMY GROUP, WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 35
FOR PERIOD ENDING 111200 APRIL, 19451. GENERAL SUMMARY

We are witnessing the only alternative to unconditional surrender--the gradual disintegration and destruction of the WEHRMACHT. In the past seven days, 12th Army Group forces along have taken some 231,000 prisoners. Whereas Germans were formerly captured in platoon and occasionally company-sized bodies, companies and battalions today are being surrendered in units, and division and corps commanders are being captured as their troops are cut apart and encircled. Not only are the German field Armies in the West being destroyed, but attrition is consuming the replacement army and the Volkssturm--the last remaining enemy manpower. Contributing to the inability of the German Army to stand its ground are shortages of small arms, of ammunition, and of gasoline to move supplies and reinforcements. Even where movements by rail are possible Allied air superiority makes transport by day a hazardous if not suicidal risk while interdiction of roads keeps enemy mobility at a minimum.

While there are some 63 nominal divisions in the West, the enemy's difficulty is lack of organization and disruption of his chain of command. There are many division staffs without troops and many troops without a division command. Facing armored breakthroughs of his front in many places, the enemy threw into battle all available replacement and training battalions, Flak, Landeschutzen and Volkssturm units that were near at hand. The result was local opposition which varied from nil to stubborn depending on the character of the commander and the state of supplies but there was no overall strategy other than that of holding the Allies at all cost. The speed of advance was such that the enemy had no chance to form battlegroups much larger than battalion size and no comprehensive plan of defense was possible. The will to resist was not strong except in parachute and SS units. Isolated battalions generally were rounded up with little difficulty. With his defenses shattered along a considerable portion of the front, the 14 divisions that the enemy has been able to bring to battle since our crossing the RHINE have been unable to stop the avalanche. Only on the northern and southern parts of the front has the enemy been able even to slow the Allied advances, while in the center such commitments as 166 Training Division, 476 z.b.v. Division, SS WESTPHALIA Brigade, Division DANUBE and other ad hoc units have been thrust aside or destroyed by overwhelming power. The only organized forces now left to the enemy on 12th Army Group front, aside from those isolated and being destroyed in the RUHR, are those in process of reformation or brought from tactical reserve on the Russian front.

Enemy capabilities in the 12th Army Group area appear to be as follows:

a. To attempt to impede US advances through the North German Plain towards MADGEBURG and BERLIN and through the THURINGIAN Basin towards LEIPZIG and DRESDEN by counter-attacking the flanks of the US salients with forces gathered in the HARZ Mountains and the THURINGER WALD.

b. To retreat from the north to the REDOUBT in the south with an attempt to build a defense line based on the BLACK FOREST, SWABIAN JURA, FRANCONIAN JURA and the BOHNER WALD.

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As the bases for counter-attacks, the HARZ Mountains and the THURINGER WALD obviously are well suited. There is evidence that hastily set-up divisions, as yet unidentified, have been moved to the HARZ Mountains. Similarly, it appears that remnants of 9 Panzer, as well as the new Divisions "DANAU", "BAYERN", and 18 SS Panzer Grenadier HORST WESSEL, are moving towards the THURINGIAN Forest. Simultaneous attacks against the THURINGIA Basin north and south is an obvious capability. It is believed, however, that the speed of our advance both to the north and south of the HARZ Mountains probably finds the enemy unprepared to attack promptly and there is a substantial possibility that the HARZ Mountains will prove to be only a new pocket trapping another sizable bag of prisoners. An attempt to exercise capability a. is to be expected at any time but the maximum force involved probably would not exceed the equivalent of three divisions and hardly can do more than cause delay in our movement to the East.

There is little evidence that any substantial movement of troops to the south is as yet underway but there is a wealth of evidence that preparations for the exercise of capability b. are in progress. The firm holding of the western approaches to the BAVARIAN Foreland, tactical reconnaissance showing heavy traffic moving towards the REDOUBT and many secret ground reports indicating the movement of supplies, building up of troops and substantial increases in security guards, are strong indicators of enemy intention to exercise the final capability of making a last stand in the south. The BLACK FOREST, the SWABIAN JURA, FRANCONIAN JURA and the BOHNER WALD offer the most favorable terrain for defense north of the BAVARIAN Foreland. It is here that the outer defense of the REDOUBT itself is likely to be concentrated.

Subsidiary to both of the above major capabilities, the enemy is capable of attempting to delay Allied progress by the use of small airborne forces of saboteur or commando-type personnel to sabotage vital points on the lines of communication or to attack Allied military headquarters. It is believed that military headquarters should be alert to this enemy capability.

A Certified True Copy:

Antonio J. Gaudio
ANTONIO J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC
Asst. AC of S, G-2

SECRET

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3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. No of PWs taken in operation since 1 April 1945: 27,930
Total No PWs from 4 July 1944 thru 16 April 1945: 67,936

b. Weather Forecast - 18 April 1945: Broken clouds in the morning with low scattered clouds throughout the afternoon. Visibility fair. Temperature: 44 - 70 degrees. Favorable for ground activity and moderately favorable for air activity.

c. Defensive Installations of the HARZ: PW information appears to be aiming at the headquarters of the 11th Army as the one which is directing enemy operations in the HARZ mountains. The Germans have tried to organize and group their available forces into four divisions. These divisions are called HARZ North, South, East, and West, and are made up of all the available manpower, consisting of stragglers and stray units. There is no evidence from PWs up to now that even elements of the Field divisions we used to encounter are directly in command of certain sectors. In other words, the entire defense has been created on the terrain covering the road net leading into the mountains. Troops are disposed as squads, or possibly platoons, with bazookas, panzerfaust and riflemen at all points of ingress, with orders to hold. (See: 9th Inf Div, thru VII Corps Per Rpt No 105)

d. Enemy G-2 Setup: Officer PW from the 11th Army Hq states that one of the major sources of information at the present moment for the 11th Army Hq are approximately 30 agents who are operating for the G-2 section of the 11th Army High Command. These agents are equipped with civilian clothes and the papers identifying them as civilians. They are to try to get back to their Hq, having circulated in our rear areas to gain information concerning our armored spearhead CP locations, and our preparations and installations. Other sources of information are the AT squads operating along the approaches to the HARZ mountains. Radio intercept also contributes to the knowledge of a German G-2 section. The G-2 also pays a great deal of attention to the announcements and news flashes of Radio LUXEMBOURG and other Allied German speaking radio stations, and on the G-2 Map have plotted the US 3rd, 9th and "11th Army" as the ones approaching the HARZ mountains. PW claimed to be unfamiliar with the 9th Div shoulder patch. (See: 9th Inf Div, thru VII Corps Per Rpt No 105)

/s/ C.R. Noe
for DESHOTELS
G-2

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Annex No 1 to G-2 Periodic Report No 206, 83d Inf Div.

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT1. No of PWS: 367.2. Units Identified:

Div SCHARNHORST:		Comm School ZERBST	17
Regt LANGMEIER		811 GHQ Coast Arty Regt	5
1 Bn Hq	2	2 Co, 4 Engr Repl Bn	38
2 Co	2	60 Pz Gren Regt, 116 Pz Div	4
3 Co	4	714 Home Guard Bn	5
4 Co	19	11 Home Guard Bn	1
5 Co	1	12 Inf Repl Bn	2
8 Co	6	18 Inf Repl Bn	2
13 Co	8	583 AA Searchlight Bn	2
14 Co	4	7 AA Bn	4
Regt MAHLOW		3 AA School MAGDEBURG	1
2 Co	3	772 AA Bn	1
4 Co	1	Air Corps Tng School KOETHEN	4
Engr Bn		171 Labor Service AA Bn	2
1 Co	2	Air Port ZERBST	11
CT MARETZKI	17	11 Air Corps Comm Bn	3
CT EICHMEYER	17	Airport KOETHEN	6
Assault Arty Tng Brig BURG	5	Air Corps Photo Rcn Sv	2
1170 GHQ Assault Gun Brig	5	Hospital Cases	129
		Stragglers	32

3. 2 Co, 4 Engr Res & Tng Bn: Co left MAGDEBURG 16 April, arriving the same night at Bn CP in LEITZHAU (D8992). From there one plat was ordered to hold TOPPEL (D9484), another to hold MORITZ (D9485), and one plat was held in res. The plat holding TOPPEL was captured in toto as our arty and mortar fire was too much for the 16 year old defenders, seeing action for the first time. Co had strength of 120 men organized in 3 plats and armed with inf wpns only.
4. 8 Co, Regt LANGMEIER: Before the counterattack was started 16 April, all men of Co were called together and CO asked them to fight to the last man. He promised 50 cigarettes for each captured American, the Iron Cross 2d Class for 3 PWS, and the Knight's Cross for 3 destroyed or captured tanks. PWS claim that in several villages the civilian population has taken Panzerfausts away from the soldiers, in order that their villages would not become the scene of battle.
5. 1170 GHQ Assault Gun Brigade: 140 men with 10 - 75mm assault guns left BURG 12 April via LINDAU (D9990) and arrived in this sector 14 April. They were committed for the first time night of 15 April and took part in the counterattack the following morning to retake NIEDERLEPTE (D9582) and HOHENLEPTE (D9381). PWS claim that almost all their guns were put out of action.
6. 60 PGR, 116 Pz Div: 4 PWS from 2 Bn, 60 Regt, 116 Pz Div captured vic WINNINGEN (D5664) had left HARZ with orders to reassemble S of HAMBURG to either reform a new 116 Pz Div or to be incorporated into 9 Pz Div. CG of 116 Pz Div, Maj Gen Von WALDENBURG, and 70-80 men, 2d Bn, arrived in WEPINGEN on 15 April. PW observed about 50 soldiers in ASCHERSLEBEN (D5757).
7. 1 Co, Engr Bn, Div SCHARNHORST: PWS state that remainder of Co and of the 1 Bn,

2 Regt MAHLOW, were ordered to retreat E of RAJOCH (D8772). Straggler collecting point in AKEN (D9770).

KURT SANDER,
Capt, QMC,
OIC, IPW Team #51.

Annex No 2 to G-2 Periodic Report No 206, 83d Inf Div.

ORDER OF BATTLE NOTES

1. Translation of documents found pertaining to "FAHNENJUNKER Div, (OCS Div), POTSDAM".

9 April - Div left early morning from DOBERITZ Garrison by train. Reached FALKENSEE in the afternoon. Left FALKENSEE at 2100. Arrived at QUEDLINBURG via GUESTEN on 10 April late in the afternoon. From there the troops hiked to KLOSTERGUT, a big estate near MICHAELSTEIN, vic of BLANKENBURG. On their trip they had several air attacks.

Quotes from letters in packet containing above document and referring to same Div:

"Our morale is very good".

"The population of QUEDLINBURG however was very unfriendly, but you may rest assured that pretty soon we shall launch a big counterattack".

2. Composition of Regt LANGMEIER, Div SCHARNHORST: An alert order captured today gives the composition of this Regt. It is composed of two Bns, 13 Co, 14 Co, Hq Co, and Storm Co.

3. Translation of Extracts of a Letter Written by a German Soldier:

"In EBELEBEN the Yanks have marched in. The population displayed white flags everywhere. It is incredible that our own people much rather throw us out of a town rather than the enemy. What will happen in the future I cannot say but I know that we are well prepared for any eventuality."

4. Extracts from a Girl's Letter to a Friend:

"We have been bamboozled in the most irresponsible manner for a long time. But now I have come to the conclusion, uninfluenced by the present situation, that we have lost the war."

Note: About 500 letters were processed in the last 10 days. It is the honest conclusion of the translator that the extracts reproduced over this period of time reflect the true frame of mind of the average German citizen as mirrored by these 500 letters. Those chosen for reproduction are most strongly worded. However, it must be noted that the great majority of these letters were written by civilians. Not many soldier letters were processed but the impression is gained that soldier morale is, in general, somewhat higher. This may be due, in part, to the restraint imposed by fear of censorship.

5. "Scorched Earth?": Further clarification of the policy of the German government as concerns "Scorched Earth Policy" is contained in a journal entry of a conversation between an Alkali Works manager and an army official dated 4 April 45. Following is a translation of extracts of this document:

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S E C R E T

NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD OF BN CPS. HQ BELOW REGT AND DIV ARTY WILL DESTROY THIS DOCUMENT BY BURNING WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS OF RECEIPT.

Hq, 83d (Thunderbolt) Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 18 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 207
(From 180001 to 182400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P5, P6, Q5, Q6.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy Front Lines: Bridgehead Area - No change. 320 RCT adv elm at D8366 - D8568 - D8970 - D9271.
- b. Units in Contact: See Annex No 1.
- c. Reserves: Higher headquarters reports from a reliable source that elements of 21 Pz Div may be in the general area to our front. This Div was identified on the Russian front recently where it had been sent early in January from the SAAR area. It is believed to be a part of the 39 Pz Corps which also has the 25 PG Div as one of its elms.
- d. Defensive Organization: Freshly dug trenches with fortifications were reported by our air in vic Z233010. At 1330, enemy were observed digging and laying wire in vic D949866. Civilian reports infantry has dug defensive positions in SW portion of woods and along railroad track E0080.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. General Summary: The wooded area along the East bank of the ELBE RIVER in 331st Inf sector was the scene for the bulk of enemy action during the period. A counterattack was to have been launched by the 1st Bn Regt MAHLOW supported by 5 SP guns at 2400 hrs N from STOCKBY (D9474) with BADETZ (D9279) and TOCKHEIM (D9079) as its objective. Through lack of coordination apparently caused by our interdictory arty fire the enemy attack failed to develop, but by 0600 hrs enemy had infiltrated to vic D925765. Our arty fire prevented any further advance at this time. At 0800 hrs, after reorganization by the enemy, a second attempt was made to carry out his mission. High velocity fire from SP guns supporting the attack fell in vic D9477 and BREITENHAGEN (D8977). The strength of the attack forced our outposts on the extreme right of the sector to fall back, but again our arty prevented any further penetration. Throughout the afternoon our forces were engaged in clearing the wooded area through which the enemy had infiltrated.

Scattered harassing fire fell throughout the remainder of the Div sector with only small groups of enemy being observed. Shortly after dark, enemy air was active over the area, bombing and strafing with particular attention directed toward the North bridge across the ELBE RIVER in vic BARBY (D8482).

S E C R E Tb. Component Elements:

Artillery: Civilian reports arty pieces located in woods at D7695, D8288, and D8391. During the afternoon, arty pieces were seen firing from D952738. Tac/R reported as of 1400 hrs, 7 RR guns, at E083759 and 4 guns at E133827.

Air: For the second night in succession the enemy had directed his rapidly diminishing airforce against our bridgehead area. A change in tactics employed was observed in that one plane was used initially to attract the fire from our guns while the other planes converged on the target from different directions. At 2040 hrs, 3 ME-190s staged a low-level strafing and bombing attack in the left of the sector. An undetermined number of JU-88s and ME-410s were over some minutes later to bomb in vic of our North bridge at BARBY, and in the area immediately to the SE. No damage to the three bridges in the Div sector was reported. Three enemy planes were destroyed.

3. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Weather Forecast - 19 April 1945: Light fog in early morning hours with clouds becoming broken. Scattered low clouds during afternoon. Visibility fair becoming good during the afternoon. Winds northwesterly 5-10 MPH becoming northerly. Favorable for screening smoke. Moderately favorable for air activity over bases and Corps sector in the afternoon.

b. Translation of Captured Documents:SECRET

From: CO, Div "SCHARNHORST"
To : Regiment "MAHLOW"

April 6, 1945.

What a war means in our own country, each one of us should be able to realize from his own experiences in countries formerly occupied by us. Our women and children, already hard hit by the horror of bombs, find themselves now surrounded by the fighting itself, Everything we have, our homes are now a battlefield.

I expect from every member of the Division:

Friendly manners and willingness to help our own people,

Consideration while in quarters,

Strong distinction between "mine" and "yours".

Discontinuation of all unnecessary requests for food of any kind.

I do not want to leave any doubt, that I will strongly punish all lack of discipline and looting of any kind. To assume a continuation of our great struggle it is important that our civilian population will be certain of their daily rations and that the appearance of the German soldier gives our people renewed confidence.

This order will be announced by the unit commanders and will be commented upon. Enforcement will be reported by 1900, April 10, 1945.

Signature illegible.

See: 3d Armd Div thru VII Corps)

/s/ C.R. Noe
for DESHOTELS

G-2

S E C R E T

Annex No 1 to G-2 Per Rpt No 207

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

1. Number of PWs: 331

2. Units Identified:

Div SCHARNHORST		179 AA Searchlight Bn	2
Regt LANGMEIER		130 Construction Bn	2
7 Co	2	11 Construction Bn	2
14 Co	21	507 Pz Bn	1
Regt MAHLOW		720 Home Guard Bn	3
2 Co	3	718 " " "	20
4 Co	1	704 " " "	1
12 Co	1	329 Convalescent Co	3
Engr Bn (1 Co)	10	Police Comm Bn HILDESHEIM	12
Div POTSDAM	2	Army Res Inspectorate MAGDEBURG	20
1170 GHQ Assault Gun Brig	2	Bomb Disposal Squad DESSAU	4
Arty Regt ELBE	9	Army Prison GLUTZ	8
Air Corps Tng Regt KOETHEN	22	Air Corps Photo Rcn Sv.	1
NCO School ZERBST	1	Org TODT	10
Air Port KOETHEN	52	Stragglers (mostly soldiers in civilian clothes)	101
4 Engr Repl Bn	11		
811 GHQ Coast Arty Regt	2		
36 AA Bn	2		

3. 1 Bn, Regt MAHLOW, Div SCHARNHORST: Bn assembled morning 17 April at LODDERITZ (D9072) for a withdrawal across ELBE river. Bn suffered most severely. 1 and 2 Co, formerly located vic AKEN (D9670) had a total strength of 60 men as of 171800 with 6 assault guns supporting both Cos. Bn CO, Capt HOPPE, was killed in yesterday's action. Bn took 31 US soldiers as PWs.

PWs confirm large training camp and dumps at ALTENGRABOW (EO508) and state that as late as 16 April a large concentration of tanks and assault guns were assembled in woods vic of camp.

4. 12 Co, Regt MAHLOW, Div SCHARNHORST: PW straggler states that Co is organized as ordinary rifle Co without hvy wpons. He confirms that Regt MAHLOW has 3 Bns.

5. 507 Pz Bn: PW was captured trying to reach QUELLENBURG (EO369) where remnants of Bn were to reassemble.

6. 1170 GHQ Assault Gun Brigade: After losing most of their guns in counterattack against NIEDERLEPTE (D9582) and HOHENLEPTE (D9381) 16 April, replacements of 10 assault guns were received from vic DESSAU. 8 of these guns were put out of action shortly afterwards.

KURT SANDER
Capt, QMC
OIC, IPW Team #51

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S E C R E T

Annex No 2 to G-2 Per Rpt No 207

OPINIONS OF A GERMAN CORPS COMMANDER

A German Lt Gen, PW, gave the following information in the course of an informal conversation:

The Allies should not expect a surrender by the German Army, nor by the Germans en masse. The reason lies in the fact that in Germany today there is not a single authority or agency which might conduct negotiations with the Allies. No member of the German armed forces will ever be authorized to contact the Allies for this purpose. And if some influential and high ranking officer were to undertake such a mission on his own, it is certain that the armed forces would not carry out his orders because the strangle-hold which the National Socialist state has gained upon the military is too powerful. After the failure of the Ardennes offensive of 16 Dec 44, RUNDSTEDT was emphatically in favor of capitulation. He would have undertaken negotiations if it had not been for his certain knowledge that he would not be able to carry out his commitments. RUNDSTEDT thought more of himself than to get trapped out on a limb. He even knew that a great majority of the higher ranking members of the officers' corps would support him in such a movement; but these officers knew as well that any order they might issue for a wholesale surrender would be blocked effectively by the Nazis.

The National Socialist party and the German state amount to the same thing. Thus anyone in that government is a political criminal or war criminal by the Allied definition. None of them could have any conceivable interest in negotiating with the Allies, in view of the punishment which the Allies promised they will mete out to such men - even if the Allies were willing to accept such a representative in negotiations. For the Nazis the measure of retribution will be the same if the war ends today or in a few months; they lose and suffer nothing by continuing the war as long as it is possible to do so by any means. Thus they are at least able to stave off the day of reckoning for some time. If, in doing that, they are able to make an even more impressive mark in history, so much the better.

Individual commanders will continue to surrender bodies of troops piecemeal where they know that the Nazis will not be able to take reprisals against them anymore. But the unconditional surrender of Germany, de facto, will only come about with the total physical occupation of Germany.

It is certain that a National Redoubt is being prepared. It is a corollary to the Nazis avowed intention to fight to the last. But what of it? German staff officers do not believe that this will be taken seriously by the Allies. To accord it the dimensions of a serious military capability is ridiculous. Reducing the Redoubt will tie down some assault troops and specialized troops equipped to deal with that type of warfare. Beyond that the general did not believe that it would be a military venture of any particular significance. Medieval romanticism has little room in the era of modern weapons.

The Germans have only sparse information on the allocation of areas for occupation in western and southern Germany. It was fairly clear, however, which areas were to be occupied by the Russians. In all these eastern areas the bombing and

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destruction confined itself to purely military installations. Industrial and armament plants were not touched in these areas provided the Germans did not carry through the scorched earth policy. In many cases plants were in full production when the Russians appeared, and they continued operations as if nothing had happened as the Russians swept by. As soon as one moved further west the destruction became complete as regards anything that furthered the German war effort.

The general does not know the particular reason for which KESSELRING was called to the west. While KESSELRING was able to build up a good reputation in the South, he will not be able to do anything on the western Front that will improve or maintain that reputation. Nothing further can be done to save the situation in the West, just as RUNDSTEDT was unable to prevent the threatening collapse. In the eyes of German staff officers KESSELRING has never been rated as highly as RUNDSTEDT. KESSELRING conducted his defense in terrain which threw all the odds upon the attackers. His success is based upon the correct application of the principles of the book to the military situation. His was a sound, healthy leadership, but there was nothing brilliant about his generalship that would have made him an outstanding military leader. ROMMEL is an easy parallel. His campaign was successful as long as the Allies did not take the war in the Mediterranean too seriously. As soon as the Allies poured supplies, materiel and men into this sector to fight a full-fledged war his good fortune (which was largely a by-product of his close affiliation with the party, too) soured. Propaganda and uncritical popular opinion have made more of KESSELRING and ROMMEL than they actually were.

The general dropped the cryptic remark that Field Marshal BOCK just narrowly escaped capture when he himself was captured. He would give no further explanation beyond the fact that DOCK held no command in the West. (The presence of DOCK in the West has also been confirmed from another PW source.)
(See 1st Inf Div)

A Certified True Copy:

Antonio J. Gaudio
ANTONIO J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC
Asst. AC of S, G-2

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *[Signature]*

Part III

Ch. 3

Sec. 1

Letters of Commendation

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH U. S. ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 339, U. S. Army

9 April 1945

330.13 GNMCG

SUBJECT: Commendation.

Classification cancelled ~~or~~

~~changed to~~

TO : Major General Raymond S. McLain, by authority C. G. Second Army
Commanding General, XIX Corps,
APO 270, U. S. Army.

29 Apr 45
(Date)

W. H. Simpson
(Name and Grade)

1. It has been my good fortune to have the XIX Corps operating under my command since the Ninth Army undertook operations in Germany, in October, 1944. Likewise it has been my pleasure to be able to congratulate you and the officers and men of your command upon frequent occasions wherein the Corps has distinguished itself and added to its long record of achievement on the Continent.

2. The crossing of the Rhone and subsequent operations to the eastward mark the high point in the history of the Ninth Army on the continent to date. The outstanding accomplishment achieved by you in the current operations provides me with the opportunity of expressing my commendation for your series of successes that have contributed so materially to the steady advance of the Ninth Army since last October.

3. In considering the importance of the Rhine crossing, not to be overlooked is the operation known as "GRENADE" in which the Army mounted its first fully coordinated major offensive to clear the area between the Roer and the Rhine. In that operation, I may say, I confidently assigned the XIX Corps the difficult mission in the right of the Army zone of advance. Therefore, it was indeed gratifying to note the skill with which your mission was executed. Most impressive to me was the manner in which you successfully employed the art of maneuver to the maximum advantage in turning the enemy out of his strong positions, thereby achieving surprise which subsequently was exploited to the utmost.

4. With respect to the operations east of the Rhine, I am mindful that you were faced with an extremely difficult and complicated problem in the movement of your command from its location in the Army southernmost zone to an assembly area across the river from where offensive operations could be launched. This was accomplished only by virtue of the skill and precision which, I have noted, are so characteristic of your organization.

5. Equally gratifying to me was the speed with which your troops were committed on the far shore and the power with which they began immediate exploration of the bridgehead. As in the preceding operation from the Roer River to the Rhine, the welltimed integration of the troop buildup resulted in a quick breakthrough and rapid advance to the eastward. It is most significant that the impetus of this advance was sustained from the Rhine to the Weser, crushing hostile opposition and at the same time preventing the enemy's escape from his Ruhr citadel.

6. It is my desire that this commendation be transmitted to every officer and man of your command together with an expression of my appreciation of their untiring and unremitting efforts.

/s/ W. H. Simpson
W. H. SIMPSON
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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www.footstepresearchers.com

330.13 (CG) 1st Ind.
HQ XIX CORPS, APO 270, US ARMY, 15 APRIL 1945

TO: Unit Commanders, XIX Corps.

1. This commendation of the Army Commander applies to every officer and enlisted man associated with the XIX Corps during these operations. Our Infantry and Armored Divisions, and our Cavalry, Tank, Tank Destroyers, Artillery, Engineers, AAA, Signal, Medical, Military Police, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Finance, Special Service, MRU, and Red Cross units have each contributed an essential part to the making of a splendid fighting machine equal to the best of its kind in all of the army. The support given by the Air Corps units that have fought with us have played a decisive role in the successes realized. The officers and enlisted men of the various staffs, working long and unremittingly, have made possible smooth functioning and coordination and are deserving of the highest praise.

2. To each member of this command I extend my personal appreciation and congratulations. Commanders will insure that this commendation is brought to the attention of every officer and enlisted man concerned.

/s/ Raymond S. McLain
RAYMOND S. McLAIN,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

2nd Ind.
HEADQUARTERS 83D INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 83, U. S. ARMY, 18 April 1945.

TO:

1. The above commendation of the Army and Corps Commanders are directed to all officers and enlisted men of this division.

2. a. In the 83d's successful action from the Rhine to the Weser River, our missions were accomplished through hard work and devotion to duty.

b. The Divisions drive from the Weser to the Elbe was accomplished with brilliant coordination and speed that fully repaid us for the hard work done in training after reaching the Rhine.

c. The blows we struck were very serious ones to the enemy and have helped greatly to bring him to the verge of utter collapse.

d. Finally, the establishing and holding of a strong bridgehead over the elbe has won the admiration of all those who fight with us.

3. Your high combat efficiency has again brought praise from higher commanders. I wish to add my full appreciation for the supreme efforts put forth by all of us.

/s/ Robt C. Macon
ROBT C. MACON,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

A. J. Gaudio
A. J. GAUDIO,
Captain, GSC

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS, APO 270, U. S. Army.

17 August 1945

TO: Commanding General, 83 Infantry Division, APO 83
(Attention: Awards and Decorations Board)

1. The advance of the XIX Corps across Germany was an operation the speed of which has seldom, if ever, been equalled. The original planning contemplated the use of two armored divisions abreast, each to be backed up by one infantry division. Because of the necessity of compressing the Ruhr pocket, the 8th Armored Division was unavailable, so the 83rd Infantry Division, which was to have backed up the 8th Armored Division, was given the whole mission. The performance of the Division in keeping up with the 2nd Armored Division on its left was magnificent, and played an important role not only in broadening the Corps spearhead, but also in protecting the exceedingly long exposed Corps right flank.


2. The speed and dispatch with which the Division moved was of particular importance in the crossing of the Elbe, making possible the crossing of the river on a broad front and the exploitation of the successful bridgehead. This was of the greatest importance because the enemy resisted the crossings fiercely as shown by the fact that farther north in the Corps zone, the enemy was able to throw back one crossing attempt.

3. The available records of the Corps do not show in detail the part that the 329th Infantry Regiment played in the Division's operations, however, it is noted that the Regt was one of the leading elements of the Division as far as the Leine River, and was the leading element from there on and was the Regt which forced the crossing over the Elbe.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ A. R. Lyman, Jr.
A. R. LYMAN, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

A True Copy:


ANTONIO J. GAUDIO
Captain, GSC
Asst. AC of S, G-2

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 270, U. S. Army

17 August 1945

SUBJECT: Operations from the Rhine River to the Elbe River, Germany.

TO : Commanding General, 83rd Infantry Division.

1. The advance of the XIX Corps across Germany was an operation the speed of which has seldom, if ever, been equalled. The original planning contemplated the use of two armored divisions abreast, each to be backed up by one infantry division. Because of the necessity of compressing the Ruhr pocket, the 8th Armored Division was unavailable, so the 83rd Infantry Division, which was to have backed up the 8th Armored Division, was given the whole mission. The performance of the Division in keeping up with the 2nd Armored Division on its left was magnificent, and played an important role not only in broadening the Corps spearhead, but also in protecting the exceedingly long exposed Corps right flank.

2. The speed and dispatch with which the Division moved was of particular importance in the crossing of the Elbe, making possible the crossing of the river on a broad front and the exploitation of the successful bridgehead. This was of the greatest importance because the enemy resisted the crossings fiercely as shown by the fact that farther north in the Corps zone, the enemy was able to throw back one crossing attempt.

RAYMOND S. McLAIN,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS XIX CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 270, U. S. Army

17 August 1945

SUBJECT: Operations from the Rhine River to the Elbe River, Germany.

TO : Commanding General, 83rd Infantry Division.

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RAYMOND S. McLAIN,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 83D INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the AC of S, G-3
APO 83, U. S. Army

After Action Report for April 1945

E X T R A C T

* * *
T R O O P L I S T - 1 - 1 8 A P R I L

329th INFANTRY REGIMENT

330th INFANTRY REGIMENT

331st INFANTRY REGIMENT

83d DIVISION ARTILLERY:

322d Field Artillery Battalion
323d Field Artillery Battalion
324th Field Artillery Battalion
908th Field Artillery Battalion

308th ENGINEER BATTALION

308th MEDICAL BATTALION

83d CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

83d DIVISION SPECIAL TROOPS:

83d Headquarters and Headquarters Company
83d Quartermaster Company
83d Signal Company
783d Ordnance (Light Maintenance) Company
83d Military Police Platoon

ATTACHED UNITS:

453d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (AW) (1 through 30 April)
643d Tank Destroyer Bn (Self-Propelled) (1 through 30 April)
736th Tank Battalion (1 through 30 April)
25th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) (1 through 30 April)
967th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) (1 through 30 April)
113th Cavalry Group (3 through 30 April)
Air-Ground Coordination Party
83d Counterintelligence Corps Detachment
Military Intelligence Interrogation Team #428-G
Photo Interpretation Team #42
Order of Battle Team #20
Interrogation of Prisoner of War Team #51
Interrogation of Prisoner of War Team #58
Military Government Detachment 112E3
168th Signal Photo Detachment

* * *

A Certified True Copy:

Jules K. French
JULES K. FRENCH
Lt. Col., GSC
AC of S, G-3

Classification cancelled
changed to
by authority C. G. Second Army
29 Nov 45
(Date) *J. M. Anthony*
(Name and Grade)

Legend

- 329 INFANTRY REGIMENT
- 331 INFANTRY REGIMENT
- 330 INFANTRY REGIMENT
- ASSAULT AND FERRY BOAT CROSSINGS




**OVERLAY of OPERATIONS
 4-13 APRIL 1945, GERMANY
 MAPS: L52, M52, L53, M53,**

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11 APRIL

HALBERSTADT



GRONINGEN



WEGELEBEN


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12 APRIL



QUEDLINBURG

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APRIL

NORTHEIM

10 APRIL

Heklen

HALLE

DUINGEN

ALFELD

BODENWERDER

WISPENSTEN

ESCHERHAUSEN

VAHLBRUCK

ROLLE

GREEN

HOLZMINDEN

DASSEL

HOKTER

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
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GR. RHUDEN

LANGELSHEIM

VIENENBURG

HELMACHERODE

GOSLAR

BAD HARZBURG

10 APRIL

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HARZ

ST. ANDREASBURG

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83rd Airborne Division

NORTHERN

10 APRIL