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83RD INFANTRY DIVISION

RHINE-RUHR-ELBE OPERATION

PART II

Report 24060/180

Edited by
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20.8.45.

In connection with the action hereinafter reported it is to be noted that most of the regiments successful operations had hinged around towns. The regiment was accustomed to assembling in a village. In this case they used the town for an assembly area and they went to the river via the shortest route. In the judgment of the Regimental Commander this fact had a considerable bearing on the operation of 13 April.

The fighting in Barby had been quite severe on the night of 12 April and after Col Edwin B. Crabill talked the situation over with the Commanding General it was decided that the regiment would not attempt to cross the Elbe until the following morning. Both the 2d and 3d Bns had suffered fairly heavy casualties in this brief action, the aggregate number being 24 men and one officer killed, 35 EM wounded and 5 EM missing.

At Bivouac the regiment occupied ground roughly along the railroad line W of Barby. None of its elements had, as yet, progressed as far as the river bank.

That night the enemy pulled out completely from Barby and it is presumed that all of his forces fled across the river. The Burgomeister formally surrendered the town at 0945 on 13 April, and when the Inf thereupon advanced on the Elbe the engineers who were to do the bridging moved right along with them. In anticipation

of this advance Lt Col Tim O'Cook, commanding the 1st Bn made a personal run of the W shore. An order had come down from Div as to whether the regiment was to make the crossing. This was at the old ferry site, which had already been reconnoitered by members of the Div staff who had flown across the Elbe in a cub plane. The 1st Bn closed on the river line by 1230, Co E going down to clear the ferry site. The engineers, bringing their heavy equipment to the river bank at the front of the column of Inf, got the boats into the water immediately, and within 30 minutes the 1st Bn was moving across the water. The 3d Bn on the left and the 2d Bn on the right were in fire positions, 3d Bn Co in the factory building and along the river line while Co E was covering from close to the waters edge with its mortars at the edge of the town. The rest of 2d Bn was in position among the buildings at Barby. As a matter of fact the two battalions who were supposed to provide fire support were only just engaged in setting up while 1st Bn went forward and they were barely set into position when the time came for 1st Bn to deploy along the river.

In a rough line of 34 boats with Co A on the right and Co C on the left, the Bn front moved across the Elbe at 1330. The Elbe is about 200 yards broad at this point. Not a single weapon opened fire on the Bn during the crossing and no Germans were seen in the vicinity. Cook led his

Bn right into Walternienberg, closing on that village by about 1500. By dark, two Platoons of Tank Destroyers and all of the AT guns of the regiment were also across the river. One Platoon of tanks came across that night. (See the note further along on Craybill.)

Now it is to be noted that the crossing in the assault boats was made 600 yards down stream from the ferry site and between the ferry site and the railroad bridge. This was an intentional deception which added immeasurably to the success of the operation. Upon dropping the assault boats, the engineers moved up stream immediately and started building the ferries.

They had spent the morning collecting materials for this purpose. About 1430 or a little later, the first ferry went into operation and before long two more were being serviced. It was just about this time that the enemy started shelling the site where the assault boats had shoved off around noontime, and they also liberally shelled the railroad bridge area. This shelling was maintained partly by big guns and partly by assault guns throughout remainder of the afternoon and during the hours of darkness. But the enemy did not shell the ferry site at any time. It had happened that a German recon plane had also come across the Elbe at the time of the assault boat crossing and had strafed the

troops, puncturing one of the boats. It is believed that this plane carried back information about the early crossing.

About 1500 the engineers started rolling the bridge material in. The work on the bridging did not actually get under way however until about 1900, and the bridge was not completed until 0730 on the second day.

(As he brought his men into the river bank for the Inf crossing, Col Crabill had gone up and down the line exhorting his men with these words: "Don't waste the opportunity of a life time. You are on your way to BERLIN. You can get across without having a shot fired at you. But you have to move now. Don't wait to organize. Get going. Get over there in any shape that you can." It was in this fashion that the Bn had crossed the river. It had proceeded without order and with the men scrambling for the boats as fast as they could go. Crabill said that he actually booted some of his men in the pants to make them go faster.)

The 2d Bn crossed the river during the early part of the night and the 3d Bn, starting its move around 2400, was complete on the E bank of the river before dawn of the next day. The forces E of the river consisted of one Inf regiment, three Platoons of Tank Destroyers (one of which had made the crossing with the 2d Bn) and the platoon

of tanks.

That night the forward positions were in Walternienberg at a depth of about 2000 yards from the bridge site. (The regiment's left was at Flotz about 3500 yards to the L and was bent back along the railroad track. The right flank turned from the southern edge of Walternienberg, back through the woods at 8960 and thence to the river.) All of this country is perfectly flat and is quite well wooded, and studded with small villages. At that distance and from the positions along the bridgehead perimeter there was practically no chance for enemy observation of the bridge site.

The destroyers and tanks were all put in the perimeter around Walternienberg except for one platoon of destroyers which were covering the positions around Flotz. They were used to back up the Inf line directly, covering the tank approaches to the Inf positions. All of the Inf companies were in contact, and all the Bn CIs were in Walternienberg. The enemy counterattacked four times during the first night with an Inf force of approximately Bn strength supported by an unknown number of assault guns. The method of assault was that after only a few rounds by the assault guns, the Inf would come on in and charge under cover of intense machine gun fire. To make the shortest approach on

the center of the American positions, they deployed from out of the woods to the E and L of Walternienberg. These attacks were made by the 2d Bn of the Langensier Regt, Scharnhorst Div, a specially constituted outfit largely composed from OCS men, who fought intelligently and persistently. Crabill's regiment had dug in all around the perimeter.

At about 2300 Co E at Flotz began to ^{get} fire from forces which had filtered in on both sides of their position. Finally this enemy got into houses of the village and the Co began to draw fire from close up. The Co thereupon asked for the artillery to be turned directly against its own position and the men got down into the basements of the houses as this concentration fell among them. This fire from two Bns of the supporting Div artillery effectively checked the attack and the enemy Inf withdrew from Flotz.

At Walternienberg the attack was pressed to a point where several squads of the enemy got in among the houses of the village, but these were driven back by the supporting fire from the destroyers and by riflemen working at close range. A check of the ground on the following morning showed that five of the enemy's assault guns had been destroyed. But because of the darkness it was not possible to establish whether this result had been obtained by

the destroyers or by the supporting artillery fire.

Interview Number 1

Unit: 329th Inf. Regt., 83d Inf. Div.

Action:

Source: 1st Lieutenant William Stout, Ass't. S-3;

Sergeant Marion A. Knoll, Operations Sergeant;

Tec 4 Harry Curtis, Ass't. S-2.

Interviewer: 1st Lt. Frank Houcek

Place and Date of Interview: Walternienburg, Germany (D8882);

1430, 20 April 1945; 1000, 21 April 1945.

Maps: GSGS 4416, Munster, Dortmund, Detmold, Paderborn,

Hildesheim, Halberstadt, and Magdeburg Sheets, 1:100000.

Journals: G-3 Journals, 329th Inf. Regt., April 1945.

COMMENTS

At the time of this interview, at the 329th Regimental CP, all the men had been well rested and had had ample opportunity to clean up. The CP was located on the division's bridgehead over the Elbe River.

Major Bagley, S-3 of the regiment, referred me to his assistant for any information needed, as he was busy at the time. Having been introduced to the functioning of the 4th Info & Historical Sv in Neuss, Germany, after the push to the Rhine, they kept notes on each day's happenings which were extremely helpful, although not as detailed as they might have been (at least partly due to the extremely fast moving situation). When asked to recall times, or types of resistance at different phases of the operation, they would say that we would be able to get a more accurate account of it from the battalions themselves.


Interview with Lt. Stout, Sgt. Knoll, Sgt. Curtis, 329th.

The first few days, as you know, were merely a move from one assembly area to another. The 329th Infantry crossed the Rhine River beginning at 1900 on 29 March 1945, moving to an assembly area about four miles west of Bruckhausen (A269359*). We again moved on the 30th to the vicinity of Eppendorf (A565485), which was approximately 30 miles from our former area. At 1700 on 31 March we again moved to the vicinity of Seppenrade (A765517). There, Task Force George, consisting of Company I, 3d Battalion Headquarters, and the antitank company, was sent to Olfen (A755457*) four miles south of Seppenrade. Their mission was to hold the north flank of the division along the Lippe Canal and prevent a counterattack from developing on the regiment's exposed right flank. The 1st of April found us crossing the Dortmund-Ems Canal at 0330 and moving to a point three miles east of Ludinghausen (A798526), thence to Ascheberg (A920548) and on to Beckum (B210510*) for the night. There, while the remainder of the regiment stayed in Beckum, the 2d Battalion was committed on the north side of the Lippe Canal, in the regiment's zone. The I & R Platoon was with the 2d Battalion, and it had a little difficulty in Company F's area with some Germans on the south side of the canal, but no crossing was made by either side.

The 1st Battalion was relieved in Beckum by elements of the 95th Infantry Division and was alerted to move between 1500 and 1600 of 3 April to relieve elements of the 8th Armored Division north of Neuhaus (B675500). Upon the completion of this relief, the battalion moved into the town against negligible resistance from a few riflemen. The 3d Battalion also moved to a new assembly area in Sennelager (B678530). The 2d Battalion, having not yet been relieved by the 95th Division, was still on line along the Lippe. It had been completely relieved and had moved to Haustenbeck (B716614) by 0200, 4 April. On the morning of 4 April, the 1st Battalion shoved off from Neuhaus to the northeast, through Bad Lippspringe (B750545) and on to Schlangen (B765575), where it reverted to division reserve. About 1100, the 2d Battalion moved from Haustenbeck to Horn (B833646) as the left assault battalion, receiving small arms fire from the wooded area along the road. On the outskirts of Horn, small arms and direct 20mm fire was received as resistance stiffened, but the town had been cleared by 2000. The 3d Battalion (- Company I) moved across country from Sennelager through Schlangen at 1100 and was held up at about B8060 by Task Force Biddle, which was stopped along the road. The battalion was then told to swing across country to Veldrom (B830595), but tank, 20mm,

MISSING

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up in Vinsebeck (B893640) in division reserve. The 1st Battalion, which was at Schlangen, proceeded through Horn, passed through the 3d Battalion at Vinsebeck, and went through Steinheim (B936640), Lothe (B975657), Hagedorn (B983634), Ruensiek (B990641), Brakelsiek (B985670), and was met with small arms and tank fire upon approaching Schwalenberg (C007654). Shortly thereafter, the tanks took off for the east and the town surrendered by early evening without any trouble. The 3d Battalion had moved to Steinheim in the meantime. The 6th of April found the 1st Battalion leaving Schwalenberg, only to be held up after a short advance, by a road block at C0566, just west of Rischenau (C065660). Here, infantry and antitank guns gave a small amount of trouble. Companies A and C then continued to Elbrinxen (C045890), at which point they met Company B, which had been sent to Brakelsiek (B985670) and through the dense woods between there and Elbrinxen. The battalion then continued its advance to the east, through Ratsiek (C057695), Sabbenhausen (C067695), Worderfeld (C090693), and pulled up in Vahlbruch (C105693). The I & R Platoon had preceded them through this whole advance. The 2d Battalion, which had been in Scheider (B975695), moved to Harzberg (C007707) with a mission of clearing out the pass through the hills and protecting the 3d Battalion as it proceeded through. After this had been accomplished,

the 2d Battalion proceeded to assembly areas in Glas-
hütte (B9972) and Harzberg, later moving to Lugde
(C038745). At 1500, the advance to the east was
resumed, the battalion reaching Kemnade (C221778) by
nightfall. Company E was sent to Brevorde (C165697)
about midnight because some enemy activity was noticed
there. The 3d Battalion passed through the 2d Battalion
in the pass northeast of Scheider, moved through Lugde,
and then advanced 36 kilometers along the north boundary
of the division to the Weser River. The river was
crossed at Grohnde (C160815), and the battalion arrived
at Halle (C256788) at 1300. Company K was sent to
Hunzheim (C2878) and Company I went to the east side
of Bodenwerder (C225770) where it encountered very
stiff resistance.

On the 7th of April, the 1st Battalion cleaned out
the wooded area from Vahlbruch to the river, concentrating
on the area around Brevorde. The battalion crossed the
river later that day on two German ferry sites near
Hehlen (C193779). The 2d Battalion (- Company E) crossed
the river in the morning and by nightfall had reached
Brunkensen (C397790). Company E attacked toward Polle
(C1568) when the enemy was sighted attempting to cross
the river there. The 3d Battalion cleared Breitenkamp
(C247736) and continued on the Eschershausen (C3172),
where Company I also returned. The battalion, intact,
then continued its advance to the east, having the

83d Reconnaissance Troop screening their advance to the Leine River.

On 8 April, the 1st Battalion crossed the Weser River at 1000 and moved to an assembly area at Delligsen (C418736), then to another at Alfeld (C435785), after it had been taken by the 2d Battalion. The 2d Battalion jumped from Brunkensen (C397790) at 0730 and took Warzen (C410778), Alfeld, Eimsen (C4380), Langenholzen (C4579), and was on its objectives of Wrisberg (C4983), Grafelde (C5083), Sellienstedt (C5182), and Adenstedt (C5180) by 1600. The 3d Battalion took off from the Leine River at 0730, and by 1600 its objective of Lamspringe (C5676) and Harbarssen (C5379) had been reached. The Recon Troop went on and cleared Bockenem (C6482), securing the bridge over the Nette River there.

The division boundary was shifted to the right on the morning of 9 April, and the 1st Battalion, which was still in Alfeld, moved to occupy it in the vicinity of Gehrenrode (C5773), relieving elements of the 330th Infantry in that sector about 1600. The 2d Battalion was relieved by elements of the 2d Armored Division in its area around C5080. The 3d Battalion moved from Lamspringe to the vicinity of Neuhof (C5878) as the left flank battalion.

The 1st Battalion jumped off in the right sector at 0800 on 10 April, advancing from Gehrenrode against light resistance at Goslar (C8571) and Oker (C8971) and reaching Schlewecke (C9370). The 2d Battalion, in reserve, followed

the 1st by bounds and stopped for the night in Harlingerode (C917715). The 3d Battalion jumped off from Neuhoef and met light resistance in moving to Vienenburg (C9476). The disposal of prisoners was the main problem for the units, and all sorts of improvised transportation had to be devised to transport them to the PW cages. During the advance, one platoon of the 83d Reconnaissance Troop was in front of each of the 1st and 3d Battalions as a screening force. As the regiment approached the Harz Mountains during the morning, the I & R Platoon had to make a reconnaissance a short distance into the mountains along each road passed in the advance, and an antitank gun was placed on each road to protect the regiment's flank against any possible counterattack from that direction.

The 2d Battalion attacked at 0700 on 11 April from Harlingerode and by nightfall had cleared Bettingerode (C955723), Stapelburg (D017710), Veckenstedt (D065712), Langeln (D108725), Heudeber (D142717), moved through the southern half of Halberstadt (D3801), and taken Wegeleben (D370705) and Harsleben (D320688), where it held up for the night. The 3d Battalion started from Vienenburg at 0800 and swung southeast to assist the 2d Battalion at Halberstadt. At 1600, the battalion moved to Groningen (D395765), where it met heavy resistance with most of the night being required to clear the town. The 1st Battalion went into regimental reserve and followed the 2d Battalion

all day, after having cleared out the woods near Schlewecke on the regiment's right flank. It spent the night in Halberstadt.

The instructions to the 3d Battalion for 12 April were to move straight through to the Elbe River as fast as possible, without bothering to clean out the sector thoroughly. The 1st Battalion followed along behind to attend to the cleaning up operation. The 3d Battalion was to seize the railroad bridge at Barby (D8582) and cross the river if possible. However, after having had only light resistance all the day, the battalion ran into a tough defense line at the outskirts of Barby in the middle of the afternoon, and by nightfall it had only been able to gain a foothold in the outskirts of the town. The enemy employed mortars, panzerfaust fire, and small arms to good advantage to hold off the battalion there. The railroad bridge was blown up at 1945. The 2d Battalion took the right sector of the regiment and moved off from Wegeleben early in the morning, meeting light resistance in its advance to the river. One company was then sent north to help the 3d Battalion at Barby, but was unable to enter the town that night. The 1st Battalion spent the night in *GRANDAY (D7883)* (~~Wespen (D8181) and Grosse Muhligen (D7300)~~) in regimental reserve.

Early in the morning of 13 April, the burgermeister of Barby sent word to the 3d Battalion that the troops had left the town and that it would surrender at 0945, and at that time the 2d and 3d Battalions both moved into the town, closely followed by the 1st. The 1st Battalion then proceeded to cross the river in assault boats at 1330; the operation was "just like a Sunday afternoon picnic," with no fire of any kind being received at the time. The town of Walternienburg (D8882) was soon taken, with only slight resistance of small arms and a little self-propelled gun fire. At 1500, the 2d Battalion followed the 1st across the river, advancing to Walternienburg and then swinging north to Flotz (D8784). The 3d Battalion was at that time being held in reserve in Barby. The battalion crossed the river between midnight and dawn of 14 April, however, because of a rather strong counterattack against the elements which were already across. One of the four enemy counterattacks was an attempt to emulate the American marching fire technique, but the enemy was mowed down and the attack completely broken up.

Plans were made to continue the attack at 1600 of 14 April, but this was called off, probably because of the elimination of the 2d Armored Division's bridgehead to the north. During the evening, Combat Command R of the 2d Armored Division crossed our bridge and took over the left sector of the bridgehead. There were no other position changes.

An attack was launched at 0930 on 15 April by the regiment, for the purpose of enlarging the bridgehead area. The 1st Battalion, on the right, moved six or seven kilometers, occupying Nutha (D9382), while the 3d Battalion passed through the 2d, on the left, and advanced to a line roughly even with the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion met resistance from dug in infantry and self propelled guns in its advance through the woods between Walternienburg and Nutha. The 2d Battalion was held in reserve in Walternienburg at that time. The situation has remained comparatively stationary since that time, with only slight changes in the boundaries.

Generally speaking, there was practically no resistance in most of the towns captured by the regiment. However, several hard fights were encountered, and there the resistance might well be termed fanatical. Usually, the taking of a town required no more than several bursts of .50 caliber machine gun fire, or at best a couple of rounds of tank fire. Resistance, when there was any, practically always consisted of small arms fire and panzerfausts, with an occasional self propelled gun thrown in. The operation was hard on the men because there was very little organic transportation and it was often necessary to pile 20 or 30 men on a tank or tank destroyer and make long runs lasting all day. Then, when a town was reached where they could stop for the night, it often took till midnight to get it cleaned up. As the men had to get up very early each morning to prepare for the next day's advance, they got

very little rest most of the way here.

Interview Number 2

Unit: 1st Battalion, 329th Infantry.

Action:

Source: Captain Dennis E. Henricks, S-3.

Interviewer: 1st Lt Frank Houcek

Place and Date of Interview: Nutha, Germany (D9482);
1100, 28 April 1945.

Maps: GSGS 4416; Detmold, Paderborn, Hildesheim,
Halberstadt, and Magdeburg Sheets, 1:100000.

Journals: None used in interview.

COMMENTS

Although offensive operations had ceased for better than a week and everyone had ample time in which to recuperate from their trying dash, Captain Henricks still appeared slightly weary and unable to make exact statements. This, on the other hand, might have been caused by unknown circumstances.

Interview with Captain Hendricks, S-3, 1st Bn., 329th Inf.

On 3 April, the 1st Battalion took over the sector held by elements of the 8th Armored Division around Paderborn (B7047) about 1800 and had advanced to and taken Neuhaus (B675500) about 30 minutes later. As there was a rumor afoot that 200 SS troops and some tanks were going to counterattack the town that night, the battalion set up a perimeter defense there, but this attack did not come off. The next morning, the battalion was given the mission of clearing the woods from Neuhaus to Bad Lippspringe (B750545) along the north side of the road. A considerable supply of ammunition and food were found there, and from 80 to 90 prisoners were taken without much trouble. Company A did this job, while Company B swept two other woods in the same area. The two companies also found two intact enemy tanks, and these were destroyed on the spot. Company C went up the main road to Bad Lippspringe on the tanks which were attached to it. After arriving there in the afternoon of 4 April, the battalion moved on to Kohlstadt (B7859) in division reserve.

On the morning of 5 April, Company B went to Horn (B833646), with the rest of the battalion following about noon. There, the battalion took over the ~~2d~~ Battalion's

sector and Company C went on tanks to Steinheim (B936640) with Companies A and B following behind on trucks. At Steinheim, Company C ran into the rear of Task Force Ritchie at the edge of town and was held up there until the task force had taken the town. However, at Lothe (B975657) Task Force Ritchie was held up by tank fire from the front, so the battalion swung to the right and occupied Hagedorn (B983634) and started from there to Schwalenburg (C007654). It got to Ruensiek (B990641) but started getting tank fire from the ridge over Schwalenburg. The valley between Ruensiek and Schwalenburg was flat, with a steep cliff along the right side of the road. When the battalion commenced shelling the town and the supposed position of the tank with white phosphorus, a number of buildings, including a barn on the left side of the road in the valley, were set on fire, lighting up the neighborhood after dark. The battalion could not cross the valley on the right, however, because of enemy infantry sitting on top of the cliff with panzerfausts. However, the tank and infantrymen pulled out of the area before dawn and the battalion moved into Schwalenburg easily on the morning of 6 April. Company B then moved through Elbrinxen (C045690) and started to clear the wooded hill to the west of the town, at C0268. Task Force Ritchie went

through the pass between Schwalenburg and Elbrinzen but ran into antitank, 20mm and small arms fire from a road block at the east end of the pass (C0566). The battalion, behind the task force, tried to move up over the hill on the left to Elbrinzen but was unable to find the supposed path through the woods and was forced to return to the main road. Task Force Ritchie had by that time received word to pull back, but the battalion commander got Colonel Ritchie to wait until it had passed through and gone on past the road block. Company C, riding on tanks, managed to get around the corner and headed toward Elbrinzen, but a tank commenced firing on the road from the cliff to the right and considerable small arms fire was also received from the position (C0667), which prevented the rest of the battalion from using that route. The rest of the battalion swung around the hill to the north and came into Elbrinzen. Company B had meanwhile finished clearing off the hill and had passed through Elbrinzen and gone on to Ratsiek (C057695). Company C followed them there and finally the rest of the battalion also caught up with them at Ratsiek. Company C, with the tanks, then proceeded to pass through Sabenhausen (C067695), Worderfeld (C090693) and Vahlbruch (C105693) that evening with little

Interview Number 5

Unit: 2d Battalion, 329th Infantry Regiment.

Action:

Source: Lieutenant Colonel Granville A. Sharpe, Commanding Officer; Captain Antonio J. Gaudio, S-3; 1st Lieutenant Samuel T. Hastings, S-2.

Interviewer: 1st Lieutenant Frank Houcek.

Place and Date of Interview: Walternienburg, Germany (D8882),
1100, 23 April 1945.

Maps: GSGS 4416; Detmold, Paderborn, Hildesheim,
Halberstadt, and Magdeburg Sheets, 1:100000.

Journals: None used in interview.

COMMENTS

Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Sharpe, Captain Gaudio,
Lieutenant Hastings, 2d Battalion, 329th Infantry.

The first fight the battalion engaged in during the push occurred during the clearing of the pass through the wooded hills between Kohlstadt (B7859) and Horn (B833646). The movements of the battalion prior to that engagement, which took place on 4 April, consisted only of moving from one assembly area to another. In the pass, an enemy lieutenant colonel and 59 men, many of whom were Luftwaffe personnel, defended the pass from the steep hills on each side of the road as it led into the hills. They employed panzerfausts, small arms, and one 20mm flak gun in defending two road blocks which had been constructed in the pass. After these road blocks had been broken through, the battalion advanced through the pass with foot patrols scouting to the front and the rest of the men following on tanks and tank destroyers. Major General Kryssing was captured by Company E on a hill just outside of Horn, which town was cleared by about 2200 in the evening. Out of the reported 160 men who had been brought in from Paderborn (B705473) for the defense of Horn, 146 were taken prisoner at that time. There were some young and fanatical enemy troops defending from the steep

slopes along the road leading into Horn and it was necessary to kill them before the town could be entered. The resistance they put up might be termed fanatical, but a little tank fire soon induced that part of the garrison in Horn itself to surrender. No artillery fire was received during the operation.

Task Force Ritchie passed through the battalion at Horn on the morning of 5 April, and at 1100 the battalion commenced following the task force. Company G was attached to the task force itself, and when the force got to Schieder (B975695) toward evening, it proceeded to wade head on into a road block defended with small arms and panzerfausts. "There shouldn't have been a fight, but the task force had made no reconnaissance," was the opinion expressed. After the road block had been encountered, Company G and the elements of the task force pulled back and the town was shelled by the tanks and tank destroyers. Company E was sent around to the right and, with Company G, moved into the town. It was cleaned out that night, with the taking of 151 prisoners. Company F, which had to be shuttled along in the kitchen trucks because of a lack of any other transportation, got to Schieder later that evening.

More stragglers were picked up in Schieder on the morning of 6 April, and before the battalion moved on to the east Companies E and F were sent to secure the high ground east of the town so as to prevent any enemy attack from the flanks during the advance. This was easily accomplished and Task Force Ritchie passed on through with the rest of the 2d Battalion after it. "That was really the beginning of the rat race, for that seemed to be the last organized resistance," said Captain Gaudio. A semblance of a stand was made at Bodenwerder (C226770), which the battalion reached on the night of the 6th. Task Force Ritchie hit another road block at the outskirts of the town and stopped, but Company F hit the enemy from the left and Company G in the center; resistance in that part of the town on the west bank of the Weser River was soon crushed. The enemy as usual employed small arms and panzerfausts in his defensive efforts.

On the morning of 7 April, Company F moved to Grohnde (C158815) and crossed the Weser on the 2d Armored Division's bridge there. The rest of the battalion crossed the river on bridges and ferry sites in the vicinity of Hehlen (C193779), and the battalion then advanced through the hills to the east, through

Duingen (C350805) and to within about three miles of Alfeld (C4378) that evening. During this move, 199 prisoners were taken by the battalion. According to Captain Gaudio, "They couldn't believe we were moving so fast. They didn't have the personnel. They had road blocks in preparation to be put up, but they were not finished. Nearly all of them were quite surprised."

In the morning of 8 April, Company F took over the high ground overlooking Alfeld, in preparation for a fight, but the town was taken "without a shot being fired." The town netted 146 prisoners, plus a synthetic oil plant and a Luftwaffe spare parts factory. The evening of 8 April found the battalion at Almstedt (C5384) and on the division's "no advance line". Patrols were sent out to the northeast and elements of the 2d Armored Division were contacted at 1700. The battalion remained at those positions, with the CP at Adenstedt (C5180) on 9 April, awaiting further orders.

The battalion followed the 3d Battalion in its advance to Goslar (C8571) on 10 April, then moved to Harlingerode (C9271), where it took 32 prisoners in clearing the town after dark.

"The whole thing was the speed of it. It was a question of how far you could go while it was still light, for they were completely disorganized," said Captain Gaudio.

11 April found the 2d Battalion helping the 3d Battalion clear out Halberstadt (D2871). There was some small arms fire at Halberstadt, but it was all disorganized and easily crushed. The battalion moved on through the town to Wegeleben (D370705) that evening, with no opposition whatsoever being offered by the enemy. 412 prisoners were taken between Halberstadt and Wegeleben.

On 12 April, the battalion advanced to the Elbe River south of Barby (D8582) against practically no resistance, then sent Company G and one platoon of the 643d Recon Troop toward the southwest edge of Barby. The town was strongly defended, with regular soldiers plus Volkssturm, wounded troops, and civilians all helping to hold a line along the west edge of town. This was the only place during the entire advance that the enemy employed artillery in his defense, but here mortars, automatic weapons, panzerfausts, and antitank guns were all used with good effect. The reconnaissance party was allowed to get almost to the edge of town, then was ambushed and forced back. It was decided to lay a smoke screen over the south and west sides of town, then to run the tanks and tank destroyers up and give it a working over. This was done, and under cover of this fire Company G was able to get a foothold on two

BILL NICKEL



buildings in the western edge of town. They were unable to advance further into the town that night because several nearby houses caught on fire and lit up the whole neighborhood, so that no one could even stick his head around a corner without having everything cut loose at him. During the night, a German plane came over and managed to hit one of the two buildings occupied by Company G and part of Company F (which had also gotten into the two houses) with a bomb, but little damage was done. About 0300, 13 April, the heavy firing eased off, and in the morning the ~~M~~ burgermeister surrendered the town. There was no resistance when the two battalions walked in around 0945, but the troops which had occupied the town (from 400 to 500, probably) had left and the railroad bridge across the river had been blown up.

The 2d Battalion crossed the river after the 1st Battalion in the afternoon of the 13th and dug in along the road from Walternienburg (D885823) to Flotz (D880848). During the night, the Germans made repeated fanatical counterattacks against the battalion's sector of the bridgehead with infantry, tanks, self-propelled guns, and mortars. Our machine guns held off the infantry, and the armor was kept away by almost constant

firing of our antitank guns. The attacks were finally driven off for good on the morning of the 14th. It was found later that the enemy troops used in these counter-attacks were young Nazis from an OCS Company. Since that time, there has been very little action and the battalion has been used in the present defensive positions.

The success of this drive was due in large measure to the excellent radio communication which was maintained. The battalion carried many extra radios with some of higher power than those normally called for in the T/E. This was very necessary because of the great distances involved much of the time. The drive would not have been possible had it not been for the large number of radios used. Transportation was a constant problem, and it was necessary to use any vehicles which could be found along the way to transport the men. Often, it was necessary to pile 20 to 30 on a tank or tank destroyer, which would have been very bad if they had had to be used suddenly. More organic transportation would have been a great help to the battalion in this operation.

INTERVIEW NUMBER 4

Unit: Company F, 329 Infantry

Action:

Source: 1st Lt. Ira E. Boyer, Commanding Officer

Interviewer: 1st Lt. Frank Houcek

Place and Date of Interview: Hedeper, Germany (D023895);
0930, 1 June 1945

Maps: G.S.G.S. No. 4416 Magdeburg

Journals: No journals used

Comments:

Co. F 329 Inf.

Interview with 1st Lt. Ira E. Boyer, Commanding Officer

Initially, Company F was in reserve in Wespen (D8181). Having been alerted around 2000 on 12 April, the Commanding Officer made a reconnaissance prior to the attack. His mission was to move the company into Barby (D8582), then kick through G Company and secure a larger foothold in the town. Battalion had reported G Company holding a complete block in town, but that was later found not to be true. The company left Wespen at about dusk, in open column, with the 1st platoon leading, followed by the 2d, weapons, headquarters, and 3d, on the road to Barby. At the railroad crossing (D830815), the company left the road and proceeded along the ^{LEFT} ~~right~~ side of the railroad tracks, to the crossing at (D840825). The 1st platoon turned right here and proceeded down the road, toward Barby, for about fifty to seventy-five yards at which point they held up. The second building on the left of the road was on fire, as was a large school (D841821), making it impossible for them to move without being seen. The Commanding Officer contacted G Company in the first building on the right side of the road, and found that that was ^{one of} the ^{few} ~~only~~ house in the town held. A patrol was sent toward town, but when they approached the lighted area automatic weapons and panzerfausts were received, forcing them back. Permission was received from Battalion about 2300 to set up a defensive position along the railroad tracks and remain there the

rest of the night. Company F pulled back to (D830815) before setting up their defensive area. At this same time another patrol was sent out to skirt the southern edge of the lit up area and to approach Barby guiding along the Barby-Wespen Road. At 2400 they contacted the Company Command Post and reported they had crossed the creek (D840-818) and had received small arms fire. A few minutes later, they again called stating they had reached (D844817) and were returning because of intense small arms fire. The next morning orders were received to continue the attack at 0845, but G Company, having contacted the Burgmeister, found that the Germans were pulling out and the town would surrender at 0900, so the jump off was postponed fifteen minutes. The Line of Departure, the railroad tracks, was crossed on time, with the 1st platoon on the right guiding on the Wespen-Barby Road and the 2d platoon on its left, both platoons being in squad column with two squads forward and one in support. The 3d platoon followed at about four hundred yards. White flags were up and the company merely walked through town, setting up a defense on the east side of town (D853825), with G Company on the right flank extending the line. This was to give covering fire to the assault battalion crossing the river. The cleaning of the houses was left to the support platoon.

CHECK OUT

INTERVIEW NUMBER 5

Unit: Company G, 329 Infantry

Action:

Source: 1st Lt. Arthur D. Littlepage, Commanding Officer

Interviewer: 1st Lt. Frank Houcek

Place and Date of Interview: Winnigstedt, Germany (D0890);
1100, 1 June 45

Maps: G.S.G.S. No. 4416 Magdeburg

Journals: No journals used

Comments:

Interview with 1st Lt. Arthur D. Littlepage, Commanding Officer, Company G, 329 Infantry

G Company arrived in Wespen (D8181) about 1400 on 12 April and received word to move to Barby (D8582) and contact the 3d Battalion, supposedly in town. At 1500, the company left Wespen, on the secondary road leading east, preceded by elements of the Recon which had three jeeps and two armored cars. The 2d platoon, G Company, followed on four light tanks, while the 1st, 3d, and weapons platoons were riding trucks of all descriptions. As the Recon approached (D846818), the leading vehicles received a heavy burst of fire, wounding quite a few men. The other vehicles started to back out while the 2d platoon of G Company deployed, moving forward with the tanks to give supporting fire to the Recon. Smoke was called for to help in getting the wounded out and permit G Company to move forward and build up along a slight embankment (D83928172). The other platoons were still working their way up the road in open column on either side of the road. Under the smoke laid down the Recon and most of the wounded got out. Then the tanks that had moved into the open field (D843817) were pulled back across the bridge. The 1st platoon, which had moved up by this time, joined the 2d platoon and both platoons, in line of skirmishers, with the tanks moved along the west side of the creek and

CHECK OUT
→

took the first group of buildings at (D842823). During this time, the 3d and weapons platoons, upon reaching the railroad crossing at (D830815), moved northeast along the west side of the railroad to meet the remainder of the company at (D839824). About 1300, the 3d and weapons platoons arrived at the two houses already held by the 1st and 2d platoons. The Commanding Officer of G Company all this time did not know where his 3d and weapons platoons were because he had had no communication with them since the action started. When the 1st and 2d platoons started for their new objective, he stayed back to place five medium tanks reporting to him, short of the creek, at (D839818). The tanks were to take up positions and fire to the east covering the town. At 1700, the Commanding Officer finally arrived at the houses, and for the first, found out the whereabouts of his two platoons. "At this point things were relatively quiet." Word was received at 1730 to hold their position and wait for F Company. A patrol of two men were sent out to contact elements of the 3d Battalion approaching us from the west, but they were found dead the next morning. During the night the Jerries infiltrated a few men close to our tanks and about six panzerfausts were fired although no great damage was done. About 0100 the Command Post was hit by the only bomb dropped and eight men were wounded. The next morning

the Burgermeister was contacted and arrangements to surrender the town at 0900 were made. We moved through the town and built up a line from (D856818) to (D854823), and later crossed the river at about 1700.

Interview Number 6

Unit: 3d Battalion, 329th Infantry Regiment.

Action:

Source: Captain James R. Land, Executive Officer.

• Interviewer: 1st Lieutenant Frank Houcek

Place and Date of Interview: Güterglück, Germany (D9285);
1300, 23 April 1945.

Maps: GSGS 4416; Detmold, Paderborn, Hildesheim,
Halberstadt, and Magdeburg Sheets, 1:100000.

Journals: None used in interview.

COMMENTS

Interview with Captain Band, Exec. Off, 3d Bn, 329th.

Resistance during the push, when there was any, was centered mainly in road blocks with small arms covering them. No artillery was encountered until we got to the Elbe River, at Barby (D8582). We were held up at times by our own reconnaissance elements, which could not always reconnoiter fast enough to keep us going.

The battalion jumped off at Kohlstadt (B780593) in the morning of 4 April with a mission of clearing the pass through the hills between there and Horn (B834645). However, it ran into some small arms and panzerfaust fire from the steep hills along both sides of the road soon after leaving Kohlstadt, which made it impossible for the tanks to move along the road until they had been removed. The battalion then took a trail toward Veldrom (B828595), in the hills south of the pass, in order to outflank the enemy positions in the pass. At Veldrom, rather heavy small arms fire and some fire from self propelled guns held the battalion up for a while, but Companies K and L hit the town from the north and east and wiped out the resistance, knocking out two Mark IV tanks with bazooka fire. In the evening, Company I was sent to clear the pass, and this was done by taking the road blocks from the rear. Several

civilian snipers were found in Veldrom, but there was no coordinated effort anywhere. What we met were remnants banded together under a strong leader. The only places we encountered where resistance could be termed more than scattered were Veldrum, Halberstadt, and Barby.

All of the resistance in Halberstadt was small arms. The enemy, as usual, held the high ground just outside of the town and made things hot for a while. Company K entered the town on tanks, with Company L following on tank destroyers and Company I on whatever they could find. If any fire was observed coming from any house, the tanks would blow it down, which soon stopped the small arms trouble. After the 2d Battalion came into town, the 3d went on to Groningen (D395765), where the same sort of resistance was encountered, but the town was cleared that evening and the battalion remained there that night (11 April).

The next day, the battalion moved to Barby, but there we encountered SS troops dug in around the town, with heavy mortar, self propelled, automatic, and small arms fire. Company I was initially on the left, astride the main road leading into town from the northwest, with Company K along the railroad tracks on the right.

CHECK OUT

Resistance was so strong that we could not gain a foothold in the edge of town until Company L was also committed on the left and the town was heavily smoked. The heavy resistance continued all night, but in the morning of the 13th, the troops defending the town had been pulled out and the town surrendered without any trouble about 0945.

The battalion crossed the river early in the morning of 14 April and assembled at Walternienburg (D887824) at 0930, from whence it attacked toward Güterglück (D9285). Company K was leading and got to within 400 yards of the town when the Germans opened up with small arms and mortars. Company L was pinned down for a while near the woods on the right of the road. Company K worked into the edge of town against the heavy fire, and Company L was able to get around to the left of the railroad tracks paralleling the road, from whence it hit the town from the left flank. Resistance soon collapsed after that. A heavy counterattack was launched after the battalion got into the town, but it was repulsed with the aid of the antitank guns, with a heavy loss of tanks to the enemy. The air support was excellent during this maneuver, and without it Company K would not have been able to move into the town from the front, across the open fields.

INTERVIEW NUMBER 7

Unit: Company I, 329 Infantry

Action:

Source: 1st Lt. Earl E. Hoover, Executive Officer

Interviewer: 1st Lt. Frank Houcek

Place and Date of Interview: Obersieckte, Germany (Y9906);
1000, 4 June 1945

Maps: G.S.G.S. No. 4416 Magdeburg

Journals: No journals used

Comments:

Interview with 1st Lt. Earl E. Hoover, Executive Officer, Company I, 829 Infantry

I Company arrived in Pommelste (D815850) at about 1200 on 12 April. At the same time, they received word that the elements of the Recon, that were preceeding them with eighteen men of their 3d platoon, had run into dug in machine guns and panzerfausts at (D836-837). The greater percentage were able to withdraw, but a few were pinned down under a terrific volume of fire. Having been alerted, I Company moved out at 1230 along the right side of the Pommelste-Barby Road (D8582). The 1st platoon led out, in open column, followed by the 2d platoon, weapons platoon, and the remainder of the 3d platoon. The company, being in column, followed a ditch which offered very good cover to (D825843). At this point the 2d platoon swung to the right and moved abreast of the 1st platoon, both with two squads forward and one in support. The remainder of the 3d platoon remained in support. The four light tanks which had been attached to the company, formed a line and followed the two leading platoons. The two leading platoons advanced rapidly to the edge of the orchard (D830838) at which time they were subjected to machine gun and panzerfaust fire. Here, the company was held up all afternoon. The infantry and tanks, both, fired everything they had. The enemy was very

hard to see, for when he had dug his fox hole, all surplus dirt had been removed, making it impossible to get a line on the foxholes. The only thing to be fired at was possible positions and one or two Jerries you might see bob their heads out of their foxholes too fast. The 3d platoon was still not committed, however, they were still subjected to the same fire holding up the 1st and 2d platoons. Around 2030 the company attacked from the edge of the orchard in the same formation with the four tanks and three assault guns which had arrived about five minutes before H-hour. Both rifle platoons, tanks, and assault guns, on line, moved across the Line of Departure firing as fast as they could. They soon overran the Jerry defensive position which was about a hundred yards from our position pushing forward to a point about five hundred yards from the railroad. The company arrived at this point about 2100 and it was exceptionally dark out. The tanks, as well as the infantry, were having difficulty in maintaining direction and keeping contact. It was then decided to move back to our original position and wait the rest of the evening. There were still a few Jerries, that had been overlooked due to the darkness, firing at us, but they were soon taken care of. The company arrived back at its original position at about 2300, remaining there the rest of the night.

The tanks and assault guns continued on back to Pommelte for the evening. At 0900 on April 13, the company moved out in the same formation as the preceeding day and on into Barby without firing a shot. Having cleared the town thoroughly, road blocks were established and we remained there the rest of that day and night, crossing the river early the next morning. "These were the best soldiers I had ever seen."

INTERVIEW NUMBER 8

Unit: Company L, 329 Infantry

Action:

Source: 1st Lt. Alden D. Allen, Commanding Officer

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Interviewer: 1st Lt. Frank Houcek

Place and Date of Interview: Hondelage, Germany (X9617);
1300, 4 June 1945

Maps: G.S.G.S. No. 4416 Magdeburg

Journals: No journals used

Comments:

Interview with 1st Lt. Alden D. Allen, Commanding Officer, Company L, 329 Infantry

Company L, in battalion reserve, arrived in Pommelte (D815850) about noon on 12 April. Both I and K Companies had already started their attack on Barby (D8582). While the company remained in Pommelte, the Commanding Officer of L Company stayed with the Battalion Commander all afternoon watching the progress of the two forward companies. At 1700, the 1st platoon established an outpost (D832841) to protect the left flank of both I Company and the Battalion. Around 1800, from the observation post, I Company was noted having trouble and immediately L Company was committed on the left of I Company. Leaving the 1st platoon in its same position, the 3d platoon, at 1830, began to infiltrate down and build up on the left of the 1st platoon. The only available cover was the ditch on the left side of the road. The 2d platoon, advancing by bounds, remained in the rear. As the two leading platoons came abreast of each other and prepared to continue the attack, the platoon of attached medium tanks were brought forward. They formed a line behind the 1st and 3d platoons giving them all the supporting fire possible. As the tanks reached the creek at (D843835), they were held up for the creek was about waist deep and four feet wide. The forward platoons, having reached the creek at about 1945, were

held up but momentarily and continued their advance by marching fire. As they moved forward, sniper fire was received from the town and the high ground across the river. As the 1st and 3d platoons crossed the creek, a gap was created and without orders the 2d platoon filled in. Advancing rapidly they reached the factory (D847834) which was their objective by 1900 and shortly thereafter the railroad bridge was blown. Patrols were sent out to probe the river's edge, while the rest of the company set up a defensive position in front of the factory, facing the river with all three platoons on line. Here the company remained throughout the night. The next morning, 13 April, they cleared the other factory that was close by without firing a shot. The company again remained the rest of the day, crossing the river about 0400, 14 April.

ORGANIZED RESISTANCE CEASED
AT 0600 APRIL 8, 1945

GRAVEYARD - CONTINUED N. 6 & H. R. GUNS

Woods
SS. Parah. Encountered. Rifle Fire
Parah. Killed 3, 3-Captured,
By A Co. Mortars Killed 6.
Killed 6.

U.S. T.D. KNOCKED OUT BY TIGER TANK
AT 0230 APR. 8, 1945, R.R. GUNS & IN
DRIVING OUR INF. BACK.

(20 M.M. A.R. GUNS PLACED AT ST
CORNERS, IN BARN, ETC. COMMUN.
INTERSECTIONS & PASSES. T

TIGER TANK DESTROYED BETWEEN
0415 & 0515. APR. 8, 1945

MOST OF SS. TROOPS CROSSED
RIVER EARLY A.M. 8 APR. &
ESCAPED, ALTHO SHOT BY
OUR TROOPS

Co. C Received Heavy
Enemy M.G., A.R., Small Arms
& 88-M.M. Tank Fire From
Center Of 4 Edges Of Town
Woods, Causing Some 19
Casualties In Reaching The
Edge Of Town.

"H" Co. Plus
Attr's. From We

F 
 2 PLATS
 0  .30 M.6
 0 
 81 M.
 MARTAR

Total

Scale: $\frac{1}{12,500}$

GRAVEYARD - CONTAINED M.G. & M.R. GUNS.

(U.S. T.D. KNOCKED OUT BY TIGER TANK
AT 0230 APR. 8, 1945, P.R. GUNS & INF.
(DRIVING OUR INF. BACK.

{ 20-M. M. P.R. GUNS PLACED HT STREET
CRANNERS, IN BARNs, ETC. COMMANDING
INTERSECTIONS & PROTECTING TANK.

TIGER TANK DESTROYED BETWEEN
0415 & 0515. APR. 8, 1945

MOST OF SS. TROOPS CROSSED
RIVER EARLY A.M. 8 APR. &
ESCAPED, ALTHO SHELLED BY
OUR TROOPS

ENEMY TROOPS IN TOWN:
2 - S.S. Co's.
4 - WEHRMANT Co's.
- MISC. STRAGGLERS

PRISONERS TAKEN IN POLLE BY 1ST

TOTAL

Scale: $\frac{1}{12,500}$

Co. C Received Heavy
Enemy M.G., A.R., Small Arms
& 88-M.M. Tank Fire From
Center Of 4 Edges Of Town
Of Woods, Causing Some 19
Casualties In Reaching The
Edge Of Town.

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NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD OF BN CPS. HQ BELOW REST AND DIV ARTY WILL DESTROY THIS DOCUMENT BY BURNING WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS OF RECEIPT.

Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 31 Mar 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 189
(From 310001 to 312400 Mar 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P2, Q2.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Front Line: Adv elms of 2d Armd Div reached B2065, B2359, B2656, and B2351.

b. Units in Contact: See Annex #1. PWs taken today represent eight Reserve and Training units most of which originate in WEHRKREIS VI. Of these eight units, five have been identified previously by 2d Armd Div. PW identifications do not disclose any units of divisional size and PWs disclaim affiliation with any of the Reserve Divs (406, 466, 476) of WEHRKREIS VI.

c. Reserves: 166 Tng Div from DENMARK was identified 30 March on III Corps front. This is the last of the Divs which were once stationed in DENMARK. Currently favored as reserves for the entire Western front are 169 Inf Div from NORWAY and 715 Inf Div from ITALY, both of which have arrived in GERMANY.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. General Summary: No resistance of any consequence was encountered during the period by our forces engaged in mopping up operations following the advances of the 2d Armd Div.

2d Armd Div: Spectacular advances were made during the period as resistance was generally lighter than that encountered the day previous. On the left of the Div zone, CC A advanced against opposition that was described as negligible. To the right, CC B encountered scattered groups of dug-in infantry and a light volume of arty and mortar fire. The enemy appeared particularly sensitive to our advances near the LIPPE CANAL.

b. Bridges: Reconnaissance by I & R Platoon 329th Inf revealed bridges across LIPPE CANAL at A743426, where river appeared fordable, A775416, and A653472 as being destroyed.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast - 1 April: Light intermittent rain and drizzle throughout the morning. Low broken to overcast clouds in the afternoon. Visibility fair. Moderately favorable for ground operations, unfavorable for air operations.

b. Handling of Captured Documents: A flagrant violation of rules for handling captured documents was brought to light by a front line unit 25 Mar 45. A Co Commander who surrendered himself and his entire company (60 men) was taken while he had in his possession a brief case filled with annotated maps and numerous other documents. The brief case with its contents did not reach interrogation point. Capturing personnel had done a thorough job of destruction (See: 7th Armd).

c. Unfinished letter found in a typewriter upon arrival of Hq 83d Inf Div at new location (translation):

"Dear Mother: This will probably be the last letter which I will write to you during the war. Germany is in the immediate vicinity and here all hell has broken loose. I believe that all must - - -"

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d. Keep Your Eyes Open: XX Corps reports that a group of 25 enemy troops engaged Corps Headquarters personnel in a short fire fight vic of Corps Air Strip. According to PW this small force represented 7 different units, these scattered groups had banded together under an enemy SS Lt and were attempting to get through to German lines. More of these small scattered groups might appear in the near future and they seem to be a danger to any small group of American soldiers, and will attack and engage in a fire fight with our troops, whenever they see a lonely vehicle, or scattered American soldiers, especially during the night and on side roads. They might try to steal American jeeps and uniforms and use them for their own purposes. Some of the PWs state that they did not have the courage to surrender to American troops, being afraid to be taken prisoner in this last stage of the war. They hoped to get through to their families (across the RHINE) by this way.

e. ALTENKIRCHEN: A detachment of 50 men from the 5th Co of the Skorzeny Division under SS 1st Lt PAWEL, is supposed to go into hiding and let the American troops pass through the town. Their mission is to attack individuals and commit sabotage on military installations. The detachment is said to be equipped with 9 American automobiles, hidden at the houses of inhabitants of the town who are lodging and feeding the saboteurs. The assembly place for the group is said to be about 250 m west of the church. (See: III Corps).

f. Projected Sabotage of Utilities, TRIER, GERMANY. From information procured in the screening of civilian employees for reemployment in the utility plants of TRIER, GERMANY, the following information was disclosed:

(1) Members of the Wehrmacht, in civilian clothing, had visited these plants and set charges of explosives.

(2) Upon investigation it was found that clam bombs with an extra charge of plastic explosive molded on the outside had been placed, unarmed, on the bottom of the generator bearing housing of the three generators supplying power to the city. Charges of forty sticks of British PE (plastic explosive), wrapped in black wrapping paper had been placed on the rear of the oil switches in the transformer station. A charge of 200 pounds of explosive had been placed in the water works generator house. An oxygen container, normally used in connection with an acetylene gas torch, filled with German dynamite (Donarit), had been placed in the corner of the Generator house. This container was used as a camouflage.

(3) Information received from the same source indicated that two stay behind agents were to set these charges off. (See: FUSA G-2 Per Rpt No 289).

CRK:oe
for DESHOTELS
G-2

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Annex No 1 to G-2 Periodic Report No 190.

ORDER OF BATTLE NOTES

1. Units in Contact:

Following organizations were represented among 535 PWs taken today by 83d Inf Div:

Inf Repl and Tng Bns
58, 193, 286, 37, 211 (Regt)

Home Guard Bns
16 (Tng), 319, 477, 614

AAA Bns
36 (Res), 46 (Lt), 838 (Lt), 479 (Searchlight), 158 (Searchlight), 221, 230, 243, 366, 955, 956, 106 (Balloon Barrage)

Miscellaneous Units
6 Sig Repl and Tng Bn
16 Sig Tng Co
216 Sig Res Co
323 Security Bn
686 RR Battery
Wehrkreis VI Officer Candidate
Reserve School
11 Construction Bn

6 Res Engr Bn
26 Res Engr Bn
16 Pz Engr Res Bn
6 Pz Rcn Res Bn
169 Arty Res Bn
62 Arty Res Bn
86 Nobelwerfer Regt
116 Pz Repl Bn
KG Regt KOBELINSKI

Included in the total of PWs there were 121 from Volksturm, Police, Organization TODT, RR, and Russian units. 98 PWs can be classified only as stragglers.

2. 116 Pz Div: PWs captured today from 116 Pz Div's Repl Bn state that after the Div retreated from CLEVE it was reorganized. 16 Pz Regt was formed into six Cos; four Cos had 10 Panther tanks each, one Co consisted of 10 Mk IV tanks and one Co had 8 assault guns. After the attack of XVI Corps across the RHINE River, only 10 Panther tanks, 5 Mk IVs and 7 assault guns remained in the Regt which was then in vic RECKLINGHAUSEN (A6235). When FW's tank was destroyed about one week ago he was sent to the Repl and Tng Bn of 116 Pz Div vic ARNSBERG (A2210). This unit was to have moved to BERLEBECK on 28 March for further training prior to commitment. They were organized into 9 Cos and were prematurely committed vic BECKUM (B2151). In case of retreat they were told to join 60 Pz Gren Regt at LIPPSTADT (B4241).

Comment: Latest reports indicate that 116 Pz Div has side-slipped from the RECKLINGHAUSEN area to LUNEN (A8535) and WERNE (A9340) where PWs from the Engr Bn were captured. It is also possible that 116 Pz Div has moved E as far as LIPPSTADT in an attempt to escape the pocket formed there by the meeting of 2d and 3d Armd Divs.

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3. The RUHR Pocket: The junction of Ninth and First US Armies at LIPPSTADT created a pocket containing elements of three German armies consisting of about 19 Divs. On the S fringe of the pocket, a line running generally E from COLOGNE, VII Corps has identified nine Divs as late as 27 March. These Divs are: 12 VG, 363 VG, 353 VG, 130 Pz Lehr, 62 VG, 9 Pz, 340 VG, 3 Pz Gren, and 326 VG Divs. Contact with 130 Pz Lehr was very light and the 3 Para, 11 Pz, 106 Pz Brig and 59 VG Div are out of contact but a very short time. It would therefore be reasonable to assume that any of the latter units may be moving in a NE direction with the hope of escaping the pocket.

In the DUSSELDORF area there are three Divs: 176, 183 and 338 VG Divs. Tac/R reports indicate traffic moving out of the DUSSELDORF area to the E.

In the GLADBECK (A4830) and RECKLINGHAUSEN (A6235) areas four Divs have been in contact with XVI Corps. These Divs are: 180 VG, 190 VG, 2 Para and 116 Pz Divs.

It is not at all unlikely that elms of some four or five other Divs not mentioned above may be somewhere in the pocket following the extreme demoralization of enemy units in the past week. Twenty Divs represent fully one third or more of the total strength of the enemy on the Western front.

ISADORE HAMLIN,
1st Lt, Inf,
OIC, CB Team #20.

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NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD OF BN CPS. HQ BELOW REGT AND DIV ARTY WILL DESTROY THIS DOCUMENT BY BURNING WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS OF RECEIPT.

Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 1 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 190
(From 010001 to 012400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P2, P3, Q2, Q3.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines: S of LIPPE RIVER from LUNEN (A8535) E to LIPPSTADT (B4242).

b. Units in Contact: PWs taken today represent approx 60 miscellaneous Repl Tng units. No unit of divisional size was identified during period.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Light to scattered resistance was encountered by the Div as it continued mopping up operations. The advances of the 331st Inf on the northern approaches to HAMM (B0542) were challenged by enemy SA and high velocity fire. Throughout the afternoon and evening no opposition was met by our forces in occupying positions along the LIPPE RIVER. At 2030, vehicular movement was heard S of the river in vic B4239.

2d Armd Div: Resistance continued light during the morning, as our troops registered sensational advances. A junction was effected with the First US Army's 3d Armd Div in vic LIPPSTADT. In the afternoon our advance was temporarily delayed when the enemy attempted to defend along ridge line at B6076.

b. Bridges: All bridges across the LIPPE Canal are reported destroyed as are bridges across LIPPE RIVER at HERZFELD (B2840) and KESSELER (B2641).

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Total number of PWs taken from 4 July 1944 thru 31 March 1945: 40,006

No of PWs taken today: 535

b. Weather Forecast - 2 April 1945: Low overcast with light drizzle throughout morning with clouds becoming broken in afternoon. Visibility fair. Moderately favorable for ground operations, but unfavorable for air operations.

c. Poisoned Food: Information has been received from captured German saboteurs indicating that the Germans either are preparing or have prepared poisoned NESCAFE, sugar, German cigarettes and German chocolate. The German brand of chocolate SAROTTI was especially mentioned. (See: British Second Army thru VII Corps Per Rpt No 89)

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d. The following is a translation of an order signed KESSELRING as Oberkommando West, which was read to soldiers of the German Army on 23 March; it was reported to a VII US Corps interrogator by two prisoners who recalled its content in detail. "The complete inefficiency of a few officers at the REMAGEN bridgehead makes it necessary to stress once more the importance of previous orders and of their strictest execution. It is an account of insufficient fighting spirit and lacking courage on the part of soldiers that the American Army succeeded in crossing the undamaged bridge at REMAGEN. We have suffered unnecessary losses for this reason, and our present military situation has become nearly catastrophic. From now on, every soldier has to bear and endure whatever may happen and must be willing to shed his last drop of blood while fighting with the greatest bravery. He who does not fight to the last, giving his all, will have to take into consideration the fact that not only himself, but also his kinsmen, will be subject to martial law. (See: V Corps G-2 Per Rpt No 294)

e. Civilian Trouble?

XVI Corps reports that a S/Sgt from one of their lower units, while walking from his CP to his billets, was seized by two persons in civilian clothes. The two individuals were armed with pistols and carried a small radio set. They demanded the whereabouts of the CO; informing the sergeant that they would kill him whether he revealed this information or not. The sergeant made a break for it, was wounded, but succeeded in escaping back to his CP. The two persons are believed to be Paratroopers or SS men. (See: VII Corps Per Rpt No 88)

P.R. McC.
F. W. DESHOTELS
G-2

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Annex No 1 to G-2 Periodic Report No 191

ORDER OF BATTLE NOTES

1. Units in Contact: The following units have been identified today among the 1631 PWs processed:

Arty Units: 62 Mts Repl Bn, 76 Lt Repl Bn, 16 Hvy Repl Bn, 890 Regt, 16 Mts Tng Btry, 688 RR Btry, 62 Convalescents Btry, 16 Weirier Bns, 200 Bn

AAA Units (all Bns): 248 Searchlight, 955, 6 Repl, 276 GHQ Res, 993, 956 NR, 4 AA Div.

Inf Units: (all Repl and Tng Bns unless otherwise noted) - 58, 167, 146, 348, 286, 276, 323 Security Bn, OC School DETMOLD.

Landesschutzten Bns: 614, 328, 499, 874, 778, 464, 254, 1/6 Tng.

Miscellaneous Units:

VI Air Security Bn
213 Air Corps Sig Regt
II/169 Sig Comm Btry
XII Fortress AT Bn
211 Sig Res Co
29 Pz Gren Regt, 3 Pz Gren Div
146 Pz Arty Res Bn (?)
361 Pz Tng Bn
Ordnance Co, 116 Pz Div
2 Tech Res Bn
13 Tech Res Bn
6 Engr Bn
16 Engr Bn
III/21 Fortress Engr Staff
500 Pz Res Bn
24 Constr Engr Bn
106 Constr Bn
1 PW Constr Bn

531 MP Bn
6 Driver Tng Bn
SOEST Driver: Tng Bn
16 Ammo Co
6 Transportation Corps
AA RR Security Bn
6 Medical Res Bn
351 Interpreters School
6 Vet Tng Bn
Air Corps CM
LIPPSTADT Air Field
MUNSTER Air Field
SOEST Naval Radio Station
BECKUM censors
617 Motor Pool
LIPPSTADT Motor Pool
LIPPSTADT Draft Board

About 420 PWs were Hungarians, French, and Russians (all in the Wehrmacht), Organization TODT workers, German Labor Service, VOLKSTURM, Air Raid Police, NSKK, Firemen, AA MACS, and stragglers.

Most of the units listed above contributed small groups of Inf for help less stands generally along the LIPPE River line. The greater portion of organized groups are part of the Wehrkreis VI repl and tng system and a fair number of Landesschutzten Bns under control of 406 zbV Div are represented. The few PWs from 29 Pz Gren Regt, 3 Pz Gren Div are actually stragglers, having been separated from their Div for quite some time. In connection with the identification of 146 Pz Arty Res Bn, it is recalled that 146 Pz Arty Regt is the arty regt of 116 Pz Div.

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2. 500 Pz. Res Bn: PWs from this unit claim that it was stationed in PADLBORN where it trained tank personnel for 507 SS and 502 SS Pz Bns.

It had 4000 men a week ago but on 25 March 3000 of them were sent off as Inf to the HAMBURG area. PWs claim that there were 27 tanks in the Bn but that only 15 were serviceable and that these were dispersed in groups of 5 toward ELSEN (A6548) and to the NE of PADLBORN. The other 12 tanks were in repair a week ago. All these movements occurred about 25 March. About 700 remaining troops, with Inf weapons, were sent to the S and SE of PADLBORN.

3. Landesschutzten Tng Bn I/6: Company CO of 1 Co of this Bn deserted to our troops in civilian clothes. His Co consists of 170 45-50 year old men who were drafted within the last few weeks. The Co had a training mission until the present crisis when they were told to defend the LIPPE Canal in the area of HEMZFELD (A2340). When he heard of the power and speed of the American drive he ordered his men to dispense with their rifles and disperse into the woods. He advised them to surrender at the first opportunity. The town people were gratified when he made this decision. He states that his Bn consists of 4 Cos similar in nature to his own. They are very poorly armed--his Co had 20 rifles for 170 men. The Bn is under administrative control of 406 zbv Div but PW claims that this control is hardly effective.

4. 6 Med Repl and Tng Bn: This unit had a total strength of 100 men and was stationed at HAMM. When US forces approached the LIPPE Canal line this unit was given rifles and machine pistols and told to defend the Canal at BENNINGHAUSER (A3640). PW knew of 21 who had already deserted to our forces and stated that there were no mines, road blocks, arty or armor in the BENNINGHAUSER area.

5. 2 Technical Res Bn: This unit is organized into three Cos of 150 men each. They were ordered to retreat to LINDEN, W of HANNOVER a few days ago. Bn was employed to repair bomb damage.

6. General: PWs state that great numbers of VOLKSTURM were called up in the RUHR valley. They are being ordered to defend road blocks with Panzerfausts of which there are many. Roadblocks consist of wooden logs sunk into highways.

ISADOR J. HALLIN
1st Lt, Inf
OIC, CB Team #20

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Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 2 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 191
(From 020001 to 022400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P2, P3, Q2, Q3.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines: S of LIPPE RIVER near LUNEN (AC535) E to LIPFSTADT (B4242) with exception of small bridgehead held by our troops at B055423.

b. Units in Contact: PWs taken today represent approx 85 miscellaneous units.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: There was no indication that the enemy was attempting to break from the RUHR pocket in this sector. However, he demonstrated concern over our small bridgehead across the LIPPE RIVER at B055423. Late in the afternoon, our arty fire was placed on the enemy forming for an attack, and at 2100 an attack of undetermined strength, preceded by an arty preparation, was repulsed. No armor was observed at any time.

SA fire was received as our forces were reconnoitering the bridge at HENZFELD (B2840). Arty and high velocity fire fell in LIPPBOURG (B2140) throughout the day.

I & R platoon 330th Inf, fired upon by small arms, in vic OVERHAGEN (B398402) captured a member of the Volksturm who stated that approx 150 Volksturm occupied and defended that area. The negotiations for surrender of an undetermined number of enemy in vicinity south of bridge at B353405 did not materialize. However, use of loudspeaker resulted in response of 30 PWs.

2d Armd Div: Resistance remained unorganized except in the passes through the TEUTOBURGER FOREST where the enemy defended with dug-in infantry and tanks. Advance elms were at B7470, B7069, B6657, B6474.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Total number of PWs taken from 4 July 1944 thru 2 April 1945: 42,476.

b. Weather Forecast - 3 April 1945: Clouds broken in early morning becoming overcast thru the afternoon with moderate intermittent rain in late afternoon. Fair visibility. Temperature 54 to 58 degrees.

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c. Counter-Sabotage.

(1) A recently captured German saboteur has reported that agents may be equipped with a cigarette lighter, which, if used to light a cigarette, poisons the cigarette smoker. A small spherical pellet about 1 mm in diameter, of unknown chemical constitution, is fixed on the lighter near the wick, in such a way that when the wick burns, the chemical becomes heated and volatilises. The fumes or volatile products are highly poisonous.

(2) The lighter is about 1 1/2" long and 3/4" - 1" wide. The corners are rounded. There is a protective metal cap the color of tin over the top of the lighter. The cap pulls off and is not hinged to the main body of the lighter. The main body of the lighter is made of green bakelite or plastic material. The agent was told that other lighters of the same size existed with a leather removable top.

(3) Recommendation: Captured saboteurs should be searched for lighters answering to this description. If found, they should be sent to AG of S, G-2 this headquarters. (See: FUSA).

d. KESSELRING Confirmed as C in C WEST
(Translation of a secret order from Supreme Command West, dated 17 March 1945)

An important RHINE bridge has fallen into enemy hands in spite of expertly prepared demolition plans, because some responsible commanders, due to their undecided, irresponsible and cowardly attitude, abandoned the bridgehead and gave demolition orders too late. The five guilty officers have been sentenced to death by a court-martial, one of them, a captain, in absentia. The sentence was carried out on three majors and one 1st Lt. The liability of kin has been applied to the family of the missing captain. The men will be notified of the above by the fastest means possible. This shall be a warning to all. He who does not live in honor, will die an infamous death. I order again that each offense is examined by court-martial in the briefest manner and dealt with accordingly. I expect the most energetic action and greatest severity from the courts-martial.

(see: III Corps)

The Supreme Commander West
signed, KESSELRING

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Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 3 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 19
(From 030001 to 032400 Apr 45)

MAPS: CGSG 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P2, P3, Q2, Q3.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines: Points of enemy contact, HAMM (B0542); LIPPBORG (B5140), NEUHAUS (B6750), SCHELANGEN (B7657), and B7660.

b. Units in Contact: See Annex No 1.

c. Defensive Organization: Unmanned roadblocks were found at B615606, B654582, B672588, B755585, and one which was mined at B680583.

d. Reserves: Elms of 2 Pz, 11 Pz, 130 Pz, 3 Pz Gren and 17 SS Pz Gren Divs were identified during the day on other fronts. 13 Pz Gren Div, while not reported in direct contact, is believed to be in local reserve on the British front. Most of 116 Pz Div are apparently out of contact with some elms last reported SE of HAMM. 13 Pz Gren Div, the 116 Pz, the 130 Pz, the 3 Pz Gren and elms of 9 Pz are believed to be still largely in the pocket between the First and Ninth Armies. Several PWs have stated that the 130 Pz and 3 Pz Gren Divs, which have been contacted progressively farther NE in the pocket, will spearhead an attempt to break out of the encirclement in the WINTERBURG (G5688) area. One PW stated other unknown elms will make a similar attempt to the N of this point.

While there are no other known Pz type divisional reserves in the West, at least three Inf Divs are carried as possible reserves - 361, 169, and 715. This list can be enlarged by divisional staffs that may be contacted coordinating training and replacement bna. (See: XIX Corps Per Rpt No 291)

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Early in the period the enemy placed high velocity fire in the town of LIPPBORG in an attempt to conceal vehicular movement S of the LIPPE RIVER. Movement ceased when our arty fire was directed against the activity. During the morning half-tracks and/or SP guns were reported moving toward HAMM from the SW.

Late in the afternoon our trs cleared NEUHAUS taking 200 PWs, some of which identified 500 Pz Res Bn. Elms which withdrew NE from the town, according to PWs, were an estimated 100 SS trs and 3 to 4 tanks with the intention of attacking our trs in SENNELAGER (B5753).

8th Armd Div: The counterattack in vic NEUHAUS prior to dawn was frustrated by our arty. An estimated Bn of inf supported by arty and 8 to 12 tanks were involved in the attack. 5 enemy tanks were reported destroyed. Resistance in NEUHAUS remained determined during the day.

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2d Arm'd Div: The enemy, utilizing the excellent defensive terrain, continued to resist our advances. During the morning, 200 inf fought stubbornly in vic B7570 with SA and AT fire. 16 to 18 enemy tanks were reported operating in scattered groups throughout the Div zone. AT fire was received from vic KOHLSTADT (B7859) shortly before dark. Adv alms reached B6675, B7670, and B7658.

b. Component Elements:

Air: 2 enemy aircraft reported over Div sector between 0300 and 0400. No hostile action reported.

Armor: Civilians report 3 tanks vic roadblock B679512.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Total PWs from 4 July 1944 thru 2 April 1945: 42,644

b. Weather Forecast - 4 April 45: Overcast forming at dawn and continuing through the morning. Clouds becoming broken in afternoon. Visibility improving to good after early morning. Favorable for ground operations and moderately favorable for air operations.

c. Translation of Enemy Document:

59 Inf Div

Div CP, 22 March 45

G-2

G-2 Periodic Report No 13

1. Enemy Situation (end of period at 2200 A):

After the enemy had succeeded in establishing a bridgehead across the RHINE near REMAGEN, he withdrew strong forces from north and south of the breakthrough and committed them in the bridgehead area.

In the bridgehead area near REMAGEN the following were identified:

- 9 US Armored Div near Konigswinter.
- 78 US Infantry Div near Aegidienberg.
- 3 US Armored Div north of Honnef.
- 2 US Armored Div northeast of Honnef.
- 1 US Infantry Div near Kalenborn.
- 9 US Infantry Div near Ohlenberg.
- 7 US Armored Div east of Dattenberg.

Approximate enemy front lines:

Mouth of SIEG River up to BOLSDORF, from that point toward S ROTT, OBERFLEIS, WINDHAGEN, BREMSCHIED, ROCKENFELD, RHEINBROU

According to Prisoner of War reports the 104 US Infantry Div is also being committed in the breakthrough area.

By the massing of troops in the breakthrough area, the enemy seems to be greatly weakened as far as Infantry troops are concerned in front of our sector. An estimated 12 light and 3-4 heavy Arty Btries have been identified.

At the present the enemy is making numerous assault attacks to gain information about our own strength. PWs of the 8th US Infantry Div, which is being committed south of COLOGNE, stated that the RHINE River will be crossed if occupied weakly by our own forces.

d. Location of Div PW Cage: SENNELAGER (B5753).

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Annex No 1 to G-2 Periodic Report No 192.

ORDER OF BATTLE NOTES

1. Units in Contact:

The following units were represented among the 847 PWs taken today:

Home Guard Bns: I/6, VI A, "D", 180, 464, 479, 486, 491, 778, 874, 1006.

Infantry Units: 4 Pz Gren Bn, Combat School 116 Pz Div, 361 Pz Gren Tng Bn, OC School DETMOLD, 6 Ren Bn.

Arty Units: 16 Res Arty Regt, 169 Res Arty Bn, 87 Werfer Regt, 62 Res Arty Bn (mtz).

Pz Units: 146 Pz Arty Res Bn (116 Pz Div), Stragglers of various units of 116 Pz Div, 500 Pz Res Bn Paderborn, 11 Pz Res Bn.

AAA Units: 74 Searchlight Bn, 957 RR AA Bn, 840 AA Bn, 46 AA Bn, 565 AA Bn.

Engr Units: 16 Pz Engr Bn, III/21 Fortress Engr Hq, 85 Tech Engr Co, Constr Co (4 AA Div).

Miscellaneous: 605 Sig Regt, 6 Med Res Bn HAMM, II Technical Corps, RR MP's, Soest Radio Station, Labor Service, Organization TODT, Lippstadt Air Field, Hungarian (in service), Air raid police, Volksturm, Stragglers.

PWs taken today again represent a large assortment of miscellaneous units, most of which have no affiliation with any existing Div. Some of the units are affiliated with 406 and 476 zbv Divs but the impression remains that the control which these Divs actually have over their affiliated units is very slight.

Some of the PWs were captured as they attempted to infiltrate through our lines on their way toward German held territory. Some PWs claim that they were thrown together into small groups to defend designated localities along the S bank of the LIPPE Canal.

The identification of various units of 116 Pz Div (including 16 Pz Regt), through stragglers, confirms earlier reports of the continued movement of 116 Pz Div to the E. The presence of elms of 116 Pz Div S of HAMM should not be discounted since most of this Div is reported out of contact on XVI Corps front.

2. 500 Pz Res Bn: Small groups of SS trs and tanks have been reported attacking friendly units in NEUHAUS (B6750) area. PWs captured yesterday from 500 Pz Res Bn claim that this Bn normally provides reinforcements to 502 and 507 SS Tank Bns. PWs did not know the locations of these Bns but claimed that 15 Tiger tanks, in groups of 5, were sent to ELSSEN (B6548) and other localities N of PADERBORN, on 25 March.

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3. Enemy Combat Strength on Ninth US Army front:

190 Inf Div....3000	183 Inf Div....3500 (5 tanks)
116 Pz Div.....4000 (35 tanks)	178 Inf Div....2500
180 Inf Div.....3000	338 Inf Div....2500 (5 tanks)
406 zbv Div.....3000	59 Inf Div.....2000
2 Para Div.....4500	Misc Units.....4000 (25 tanks)

(Source: Twelfth Army Gp Weekly Intelligence Summary No 33 for week ending 27 March 45)

ISADORE HAMLIN,
1st Lt, Inf,
OIC, OB Team #20.

Annex No 2 to G-2 Periodic Report No 192.

ENEMY DEFENSES

Interior Defense Lines

There is no photographic confirmation to date of any continuous or well-developed defense lines EAST of the RHINE from WESEL to KARLSRUHE. While there is a certain amount of digging and construction of field defenses and road blocks in the vicinity of many towns and villages throughout the areas immediately threatened by the recent advances of the Allied Armies, it appears that this activity is a purely local effort, probably confined to locally available manpower, and concerned mainly with the requirements of purely local defense. Nowhere is there any good indication of an over-all plan, welding these individual efforts into coordinated defensive systems.

There is little that can be added to the previously reported information, more or less vague in character, and coming from a number of sources of varying reliability, concerning the main interior defense lines projected by the German General Staff. The picture remains generally the same, with occasional photographic confirmation of isolated old pillboxes, pinpointed by PWs and other sources, but practically no recent constructional activity.

Another version of the course of the EMS River line below RHEINE has been received from an ungraded source, from information supplied by a German military courier who claims to have driven through the entire area in February 1945. According to this source, there already exists a defense belt one to two kms deep, with anti-tank ditches, fire trenches and artillery positions, running along both banks of the EMS from RHEINE to WIEDENBRUCK. From WIEDENBRUCK the line continues to PADERBORN-BUREN-BRILON - the Western end of the EDERTAL dam - MARBURG-GIESSEN - along the LAHN to WEILBURG and thence along the WEIL to FRANKFURT-am-MAIN. In the stretch between WEILBURG and FRANKFURT, the defense zone includes the TAUNUS, with the KLEINER FELDBERG forming the Western point, and the wooded area near HOMBERG and OBER and NIEDER URSEL.

Late February cover of the RHEINE - WIEDENBRUCK area, and of the LAHN River between MARBURG and GIESSEN fails to reveal any sign of this defense line.

A second line, similar to the first and roughly parallel to it, is reported to start some fifteen kms NORTH of RHEINE and runs through the TEUTOBURGER WALD, passing twenty kms WEST of OSNABRUCK, SOUTH of BIELEFELD, 10 kms WEST of DETMOLD, and along the Western slopes of the EGGEBOERGE, WEST of DRIBURG and WARBURG, thence continuing to WOLFHAGEN - NAUMBURG - AFFOLDERN - WILDUNGEN - TREYSA - ALSFELD - ASCHAFFENBURG. The high ground fifteen kms WEST of the stretch WILDUNGEN - TREYSA forms a part of the defense zone.

This line closely follows the course which has frequently been reported in the past. Again, however, there is no photographic confirmation.

(See: SHAEF Weekly Int Sum #53)

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Annex No 1 to G-2 Per Rpt No 193

Tactical Interrogation Report No 2
(covering period 031600 to 041600)

1. No of PWs: 346 (In addition, 577 hospitalized soldiers were found in BAD LIPPSPRINGE.)

2. Identification of PWs:

396 Repl & Tng Bn	9	Recuperation Squadron Rcn 15	
167 Repl & Tng Bn	1	Repl Bn	225
1/6 Home Guard Bn	53	46 Lt AA Repl Bn (mtz)	39
876 Home Guard Bn	2	371 Lt AA-MT Bn	20
664 Home Guard Bn	1	456 RR AA Bn	3
O.C. School DETMOLD	5	96 AA Res Bn	6
115 Pz Regt, 15 Pz Gren Div	3	AA-WAC	1
500 Pz Repl & Tng Bn	6	651 Communication Bn	3
511 Pz Bn	1	Communication Det VI, BIALEFELD	2
416 TD Repl Bn	1	Medical Det VI, PADERBORN	3
2 SS Pz Repl & Tng Regt	6	Horse Pool VI	4
686 RR Const Bn	1	Russian Workers (Army)	2
11 Const Engr Repl Bn	1	Techn Corps	3
19 Engr Repl Bn	1	Airport LIPPSTADT	3
50 Navy Arty Bn	1	RAD (German Labor Service)	5
Volkssturm	10	Stragglers	28
		Total	346

3. 2 SS Pz Repl & Tng Regt: Regt consisted of two Bns. 1 Bn consisted mostly of recruits and was located vic AUGUSTDORF (6968). 2 Bn consisted of trained replacements and convalescents and was located at SENNELAGER (6753). Both Bns were formerly used as a panzer pool for SS Panzer Divs. However, during the present crisis 2 Bn was employed as a tactical unit. 2 Bn had approx 30 Panther, 50 Royal Tiger, and 40 Mk IV tanks. Both Bns consisted of 4 Cos each; 180 men to each Co. 2 Bn left SENNELAGER approx 29 Mar. PWs heard that CO of 1 Bn, Capt UDEN, surrendered with approx 400 men vic PADERBORN last Sunday. EM were told that he should be shot on sight.

Fifty men of 2 Bn, plus some 300 convalescents from neighboring hospitals, were to defend NEUHAUS. When our tanks approached the town most of them retreated.

When our First Army spearheads approached MARBURG, the tng area at SENNELAGER (which is known as one of the largest German Army camps) was cleared. Most troops left between 27 Mar and 1 Apr. All PWs of this unit confirm that a pool of Royal Tigers, Panther and Mark IVs, totaling at least 300 tanks, were dispersed in woods around SENNELAGER. These tanks were driven away between 27 Mar and 1 Apr in direction of PADERBORN, DETMOLD, and HANNOVER. PWs state that SENNELAGER was never bombed. Minafiels have been sown in fields on both sides of the road leading NE through MARIENLOH (7352). They also claim many mines in area between SENNELAGER and TEUTOBURGER FOREST.

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4. 371 AA-M Repl Bn PWs were captured via NEUHAUS. Unit consisted mostly of old and sick people. This Bn, of Co strength, supplies replacements for a unit fighting on East front. The men who were captured came to draw rations at a dump near NEUHAUS. When it was learned that the Americans were approaching, officers in charge of dump told men to allow themselves to be captured by PG forces since they were not capable of combat anyhow.

5. Reoperation Squadron 15 Repl Bn. PG surrendered with his entire force on 15. Their mission was to hold out and support together with approx 100 SS men, until defensive positions were completed around NEUROBBER FOREST. PG men retreated with one Panther tk (one was destroyed) and 2-75mm assault guns in the direction of Bld LIPPSPRINGE, leaving this unit to continue the fight. Rather than sacrifice his men, PG surrendered with the entire force.

6. 371 AA-M Repl Bn PWs were captured via NEUHAUS. Unit consisted mostly of old and sick people. This Bn, of Co strength, supplies replacements for a unit fighting on East front. The men who were captured came to draw rations at a dump near NEUHAUS. When it was learned that the Americans were approaching, officers in charge of dump told men to allow themselves to be captured by PG forces since they were not capable of combat anyhow.

1. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	2. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
3. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	4. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
5. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	6. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
7. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	8. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
9. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	10. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
11. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	12. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
13. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	14. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
15. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	16. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
17. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	18. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
19. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	20. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
21. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	22. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
23. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	24. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
25. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	26. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
27. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	28. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
29. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	30. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
31. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	32. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
33. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	34. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
35. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	36. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
37. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	38. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
39. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	40. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
41. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	42. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
43. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	44. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
45. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	46. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
47. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	48. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
49. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	50. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
51. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	52. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
53. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	54. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
55. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	56. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
57. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	58. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
59. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	60. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
61. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	62. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
63. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	64. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
65. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	66. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
67. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	68. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
69. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	70. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
71. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	72. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
73. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	74. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
75. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	76. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
77. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	78. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
79. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	80. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
81. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	82. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
83. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	84. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
85. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	86. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
87. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	88. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
89. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	90. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
91. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	92. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
93. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	94. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
95. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	96. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
97. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	98. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10
99. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10	100. 371 AA-M Repl Bn	10

5. 371 AA-M Repl Bn PWs were captured via NEUHAUS. Unit consisted mostly of old and sick people. This Bn, of Co strength, supplies replacements for a unit fighting on East front. The men who were captured came to draw rations at a dump near NEUHAUS. When it was learned that the Americans were approaching, officers in charge of dump told men to allow themselves to be captured by PG forces since they were not capable of combat anyhow.

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7. 371 AA-M Repl Bn PWs were captured via NEUHAUS. Unit consisted mostly of old and sick people. This Bn, of Co strength, supplies replacements for a unit fighting on East front. The men who were captured came to draw rations at a dump near NEUHAUS. When it was learned that the Americans were approaching, officers in charge of dump told men to allow themselves to be captured by PG forces since they were not capable of combat anyhow.

8. 371 AA-M Repl Bn PWs were captured via NEUHAUS. Unit consisted mostly of old and sick people. This Bn, of Co strength, supplies replacements for a unit fighting on East front. The men who were captured came to draw rations at a dump near NEUHAUS. When it was learned that the Americans were approaching, officers in charge of dump told men to allow themselves to be captured by PG forces since they were not capable of combat anyhow.

HISTORIAN

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NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD OF BN CPS. HQ BELOW REGT AND DIV ARTY WILL DESTROY THIS DOCUMENT BY BURNING WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS OF RECEIPT.

Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 4 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 193
(From 040001 to 042400 Apr 45)

MFPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P3, Q3;

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines: Adv elements reached B860497, B875540, B8359 and RR at B8465.

b. Units in contact: See Annex No 1.

c. Reserves: 116 Pz Div remains unlocated and therefore available for commitment. 130 Pz Lehr and 3 Pz Gren Divs have been reported counterattacking against the E wall of the pocket. Fus Bn of 361 Inf Div (one of the 2 remaining Divs in HOLLAND) has been identified on British front. Only Inf Divs carried as reserves for the west are 331 Inf Div (from N HOLLAND), 169 Inf Div (from NORWAY) and 715 Inf Div (from ITALY).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary:

329th Inf. Our attack in the morning through the woods at B5852 SE of SENNELAGER (B6753) caught the enemy by surprise. Two tanks and approx 60 inf sleeping nearby were taken. Our advance was temporarily held up by two enemy tanks at B797601 early in the afternoon. Moderate resistance was then encountered until our forces entered HORN (B8364) and VELDROM (B8259). Here the enemy resisted stubbornly from house to house with St and Panzerfaust. Our troops in VELDROM received considerable 20mm fire from the high ground to the East. 1 & R Platoon encountered no opposition in reaching Hill at B8257. At close of period our troops in HORN had advanced to the railroad. VELDROM was not completely cleared.

Gennaj (Brig Gen) KRYSSING, a Dane, captured in HORN early in the evening formerly organized and assembled a volunteer corps from DENMARK in 1942. Being relieved after only three months in that command, he then served with the Germans as an observer. He has had no recent command.

331st Inf. Attacking late in the afternoon our forces advanced to B8654 and B8347 against light scattered resistance.

113 Cav Gp. SA and MG fire characterized resistance during the morning as our troops advanced to BUKE (B8350), clearing it at 1600. AT gun at B8450 was

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knocked out, and resistance was increasing with our advance. By 1830 our troops advanced to B880497, B889513, and B880497.

b. Component Elements:

Air. 1 ME-109 was destroyed near Div CP in BAD LIPPSPRINGE (B7454) shortly after 1400. Enemy had strafed along highway SW of the town. At 1700, 330th Inf reported 6 enemy aircraft strafed near RJ B4053.

Armor. 5 enemy tanks were destroyed in 329th Inf zone during the period. Civilian reports 8 tanks vic BAD DRIBURG (B8849).

Engineer. PWs report fields are mined on both sides of road running NE from MARLENLOH (B8252) to BAD LIPPSPRINGE.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast - 5 Apr 45: Scattered to broken clouds forming in morning with high clouds moving to the East late in the day. Visibility good. Temperature 39 to 52 degrees.

b. Sabotage: A booby trap apparently mounted on the spring of a $\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicle cost one soldier both feet and injured another in NEUNKIRCHEN (B4959) during the period. The explosive was detonated when one of the men stepped into the vehicle, placing his foot between the front seats and an inch or two to the rear. Only a few scraps of brown paper and a battered eight-inch piece of aluminum remain of the bomb, and its precise specifications are not known. Examination of the vehicle indicates that the explosion was not caused by a mine in the road and that the bomb was mounted in the spring or slightly higher in the right rear underpinning of the vehicle. The vehicle was stationary when the explosion occurred and the bomb was evidently a pressure type.

The booby trap is believed to have been placed between 021900 April and 030915 April, while the vehicle was parked outside an American occupied building under the general surveillance of a guard in the vicinity. The vehicle was driven to another part of town at 0915 and parked outside a unit headquarters for approximately half an hour under constant observation of American soldiers standing outside. It was driven a few yards to the center of the road, with the explosion taking place as the other members of the party were climbing in. CIC investigation to determine the responsible parties is still incomplete.

This incident is strong evidence of the need for constant vigilance against sabotage by a hostile native population. Standard military booby traps and materials for make-shift devices must be assumed to be widely dispersed about this area. All that a would-be saboteur needs for another such act as this is carelessness on our part. (Source: 30th Inf Div)

C. F. Doe
for DESHOTELS
G-2

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Annex No 2 to G-2 Per Rpt No 194.

EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

1. SS Maj Gen KRYSSING to HINDLER

On 4 April 1945, 83d Inf Div captured SS Gruppenfuhrer (Maj Gen) CHRISTIAN KRYSSING, a Danish fascist who apparently received his commission in the Waffen SS for purely political reasons. Brief interrogation (KRYSSING had a fractured leg and was suffering from shock) did not reveal any information of a military nature. Our lists did not contain any reference to him. The following are excerpts from two letters written by him to Reichsfuhrer SS HEINRICH HIMMLER:

11 June 1944

To the Reichsfuhrer SS:

I request that I be released from the Waffen SS because I am of no further value to DENMARK while serving with the organization. I furthermore do not wish to play any role in the future affairs of DENMARK. The following are my reasons:

My further use ceased when on 23 Feb 1942 I was thrown out of the leadership of the "Free Corps" (Danish quisling orgn) without having been given the reasons for such action. I did not wish to return to DENMARK then because I did not want to leave my two sons alone and because I felt that I might be able to do something for the future of DENMARK while being in the Waffen SS.

The first reason does not exist anymore. As for the second reason it is clear to me that I am a stranger in Waffen SS affairs since no one has seen fit to consult me on Danish policy.

I would request that my name not be considered for any command function and I therefor drop any claim for a pension. In conclusion I wish to request that SS Obersturmfuhrer (1st Lt) LORENZEN, my adjutant, not be lost for the cause of DENMARK and that he immediately be promoted to SS Hauptsturmfuhrer (Capt).

Heil Hitler!!

C.K.

13 June 1944

To the Reichsfuhrer SS

In reference to my letter of 11 June 1944 I wish to point out that SS Oberguppenfuhrer (Lt Gen) BEST has convinced me that my further service in the Waffen SS will benefit the future of DENMARK. Therefore I withdraw my resignation. I do not wish to be responsible for any damage to the German cause and therefore I have changed my decision. In the last three years I have lost contact with Waffen SS and therefore believe that I cannot accept a command function. I only wish to continue my service as a symbol of German-Danish amity. I wish, however, not to be assigned to any occupational force in DENMARK.

In conclusion, I once more beg for the promotion of SS Obersturmfuhrer LORENZEN.

Heil Hitler!!

C.K.

KRYSSING kept a diary consisting of brief entries of his travels. The following entry was in the space reserved for 5 April (one day after capture by our trs): "American PW?"

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2. Reviving the FREI KORPS in the SAUERLAND:

A document found in a mail pouch taken from the LUDINGHAUSEN post office (classified top secret) indicates the possibility that FREI KORPS is being re-organized in the SAUERLAND. FREI KORPS was the notorious organization of German officers who, after the last war, conducted guerilla warfare against Occupation forces and maintained the kernel for the future organization of the Nazi Party. In this document FREI KORPS and Volkssturm are used interchangeably.

3. Dissension between Party and Army:

The following is a translation of a circular letter from a local party leader to his subordinate commanders:

LÜENEN VOLKSSTURM

30 March 1945

The fight approaches our homes. Around us there passes a flood of shattered and scattered Wehrmacht personnel who retreat haphazardly before the advancing enemy. It is a despicable picture of cowardice such as has never been displayed in the past. They do not carry forward the honorable banner of the Prussian army. They are not soldiers of the National-Socialist people's army. They are the very ones who seek shameful escape when the enemy approaches our Homeland.

4. Total War:

A document issued by a Volkssturm Bn CO sheds new light on civilian attitudes in the battle zone. Following is a translation of portions of this document which is classified "Top Secret".

In the defense of HERFORD the following incidents were observed; During the occupation of the town by 1 Bn, 11 Pz Gren Regt, and when the Americans began to approach the town, white flags were displayed by the civilian population on church towers and beside shrines. In addition, it was noticed that the Ortsgruppe (Nazi Party Local Office) was looted by the civilian population and that pictures of the Fuhrer were scattered on the streets. Civilians betrayed locations of our troops and artillery positions. In case similar conditions will exist in the defense of LÜENEN severe measures will be taken to put a stop to the condition immediately.

Signed, Bn Adjutant.

ISADORE HAMLIN,
1st Lt, Inf,
OIC, CB Team #20.

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Hq, 83d Inf Div
APO 83, US Army
2400, 5 Apr 45

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 194
(From 050001 to 052400 Apr 45)

MAPS: GSGS 4416, 1/100,000, Sheets P3, Q3.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Front Lines: Adv alms reached B6769, B6866, B7064, C0469, C0561, C0960, C0456, B9949.

b. Units in Contact: See Annex #1.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary: Opposition from tanks and dug-in infantry comprised the bulk of enemy resistance during the period. Throughout the morning good advances were made against scattered SA fire. Four tanks operating in the vic of STEINHEIM (B9363) and WOBEL (B9467) temporarily slowed our advance early in the afternoon. When the tanks were forced to withdraw, supporting infantry readily surrendered. Thereafter, opposition continued moderate as SCHIEDER (B9769) was cleared and our troops occupied SCHWILMBERG (C0065).

On the right of the Div zone an estimated 50 enemy resisted from dug-in positions in vic B987585 shortly after 1200 hrs. Here, resistance was described as scattered SA fire and occasional AT gun and tank fire. Good advances were registered as the towns of LOWENDORF (C0561) and FURSTENAU (C0960) were entered.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weather Forecast - 6 April 45: Broken clouds with occasional showers throughout the morning and continuing through the afternoon. Visibility poor. Conditions generally unfavorable for all military operations.

b. Field Marshall MODEL: Several German officers expressed their dislike of the present CG of the German Army Group "B". They complain that MODEL does not consider the actual capabilities of the units subordinate to him, but considers mainly T/O strength and conditions which are not hampered by lack of transport, Am, well-trained Repls and an enemy airforce, - in other words - non-existent conditions. One officer FW declares that MODEL actually is the greatest saboteur because of his constant shifting of units from one sector to another. This creates confusion, weakens the MIR during the time of the relief, and swallows the most precious of all commodities, gasoline, provided the men don't have to march to their new sector. A march in turn only creates greater fatigue among the men. Officers usually refer to this shifting of units by MODEL as the "Modeler". (See: 99th Inf Div, thru VII Corps G-2 Per Rpt No 90)

c. Location of Div PW Cage: NIEHEIM (B9457).

CRH
DES HOTELS
G-2

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Annex No 1 to G-2 Per Rpt No 194.

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT NO 3
(Covering period 041600 to 051600)

1. Units In Contact: Following is a list of PWs taken today and the units to which they belonged. 414 PWs were taken during the period.

82 Inf Repl Bn	38	DETMOLD Close Combat Sch	17
396 Inf Repl Bn	16	(CT ALBRECHT)	
464 Inf Repl Bn	8	CT MEYER (from SENNELAGER)	4
398 Inf Repl Bn	3	19 Engr Repl Bn	3
146 Inf Repl Bn	1	35 Smoke Co (WAGs)	2
15 Rcn Repl Bn (Recupera-		702 Transport Bn	2
tion Squadron)	7	1/6 Home Guard Bn	5
500 Pz Repl Bn	15	308 Home Guard Bn	1
502 Hv Pz Bn	6	11 Home Guard Bn	16
64 Pz Gren Repl Bn	1	Home Guard Bn "D"	2
26 Fus Bn	4	6 Med Repl Bn	13
6 Survey Repl Bn	9	6 Vet Repl Bn	3
371 TD Bn	5	PADERBORN Hospital	12
216 TD Co	2	Driver Repl Bn VI	28
OC School DETMOID	3	MINDEN Driver School	2
46 Lt AA Bn	35	NSKK	1
887 Lt AA Repl Bn	4	Polish Worker (Army)	1
512 Lt AA Bn	2	Italian Workers (Army)	16
359 AA AT Repl Bn	6	Russian Workers (Army)	13
PADERBORN Air-field	2	Orgn TODT	12
DETMOLD Air-field	14	Labor Service	2
LIPPSPRINGE Air-field	4	Volkssturm	1
V Air Corps Res Bn	14	Stragglers	55
351 Comm Regt (A/C)	2		

2. 82 Inf Repl Bn: PWs were on their way from GOETTINGEN to another training area when they were committed as infantry. Entire Co of 60 men surrendered without a fight.

3. 296 Inf Repl Bn: Unit is composed of former Luftwaffe and Service personnel. They were put in line three days ago W of HORN (B8364) where they surrendered as they had no ammunition for mortars and MGs. They had received rifles only a few hours before American trs approached their positions.

4. 359 AA-AT Repl Bn: This tng unit was broken up into small groups and sent out from PADERBORN three days ago. There were 4 - 20mm AA-AT guns per Co. This unit generally supplies reinforcements for a unit now engaged on the Russian front.

5. 35 Smoke Co: This unit and two others (51 and 54 Cos) were trained for chemical warfare (smoke). These three Cos were composed of 150 men and approx 300 foreign born girls. During the last five days the men were being used as infantry. PWs (2 Dutch and 1 Belgian girls) complained bitterly about the bad treatment they had been getting from German soldiers.

KURT SANDER,
Capt, (MC),
OIC, IPW Team #51.

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5, 6 & 7 Bns - 18-150mm Gun How
8 Bn - ? -210mm How

Supply of ammo and guns is down to the absolute minimum. Unit was under the control of 12 SS Corps. An Inf regt, unit designation having a serial number over 1200 and a CO by the name of Major BEITZ, was also stationed in DUSSELDORF. PW believes that trs in the Ruhr pocket are of much higher quality than the improvised opposition at our front.

3 April, PW overheard a conversation between Lt Col VEITH, CO of 571 Res & Tng Regt and either Gauleiter MEYER or FLORIAN. The Gauleiter and an assistant were to make their way into the Ruhr in order to contact General MODEL who is supposed to be in the pocket. He and his assistant were then taken to vic LICHTENAU, S of PADERBORN, and started on their journey.

PW claims that 466 Inf Tng Div with its CP at BOKENDORF (0253) as recently as 3 April, controls 571 Res & Tng Regt, 6 Survey Bn, plus all other misc units in this sector.

4 April PW saw approx 10 damaged Tiger tanks, drawn by tracked vehicles, moving E on road DRIBURG - BRAGEL.

Lt Gen BADE inquired at the home of Count Oyrhausen, DRIBURG, about the whereabouts of General Kesselring, whom he was to contact. A general confusion prevails and nobody seems to know where the OKW (High Command West) is located.

PW heard that a bridgehead W of WESTER River between POLLE (715569) and HOLZMINDEN (718561) should be maintained. A general retreat to the WESTER has been in progress. Civilians were warned not to carry jewelry or watches as Americans were known to take them away. Former financial wizard SCHACHT is rumored to be kept in chains at a concentration camp. When Kesselring was told to assume Rundstedt's command he is supposed to have said: "I don't mind taking over—but certainly I can't hold the line either!!"

4. 6 Driver Res & Tng Bn: Bn is composed of older men to be trained for transport units. Bn was located at BIELEFELD. 4 April, when our spearheads approached, approx 100 men were put in line as inf and ordered to counterattack in HORN when our forces had already penetrated to the center of town. After being beaten back, they withdrew under cover of night and arrived the following morning 0700 in STEINHEIM. Off PW in charge was told to proceed to ENTRUP (9759) and to hold town at all costs. Realizing today that all surrounding villages were captured, Off PW, a 1st Lt, decided to surrender. He left his village alone and was able to negotiate the surrender of his entire force very quickly as the Div Cago was conveniently located in the next town, only a mile distant.

5. 10 Air Corps Constr Co: Unit was used to build and repair airports. Co was put in line as inf 2 hours before they surrendered in BREDENBORN (9958).

6. 1066 Signal Co: PW, captured vic DRIBURG, states that his Co arrived at that town from KLINEY, DENMARK, 30 March. The transport leaving DENMARK 26 March included 4 Btry, 1066 Arty Regt with approx 8 horse-drawn guns, caliber unknown. Without being committed, 4 Btry and Sig Co proceeded from DRIBURG to BRAGEL (7054). PW believes that these units retreated towards HOEXTER (7155). 5 & 6 Btry, 1066 Arty Regt left DENMARK 20 March, and PW saw them at the RR station at HOEXTER 29 March. However, they did not detrain and probably continued towards HANNOVER. PW claims to have seen 157 Inf Regt, belonging to the same Div, at BRAGEL. He further states that on 27 March, he saw 5 trains with approx 15-20 cars each, loaded with guns and supplies, heading E from HANNOVER. (OB Comment: Though 157 is not listed as one of the Regts under 166 Res Div it is apparent that PW's unit belongs to this Div. 1066 Arty Regt belongs to this Div. Latest reports indicate that all three Regts of this Div (660, 661, 662) after arriving from DENMARK have been identified by VII Corps.)

7. Close Combat Sch DETMOLD (CT Albrecht): This unit, named after its CO, Lt Col Albrecht, formerly belonging to Combat School DETMOLD, was organized 2 April of '00 cadremen of that school. They were put in line vic HORN from where they retreated to WOEBBEL (9467) with about half its former strength. NCO in charge

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surrendered with his men, after Lt Col Albrecht had left them, probably looking for another KG to be organized somewhere in the rear.

G. 286 Reg & Tng Bn: Bn is organized in 4 Cos and has a strength of 400-500 men. P's claim to belong to Div 466 zbv KIRST. Bn arrived from HEMFORD (5491) in HMMN, 30 March. 3d Co had orders to hold town of NIEDER (5472) but never had a chance to do so.

MURT SANDER,
Capt, LTC,
OIC, 3d IFM Team 251.

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Area: The southern part of Hannover (Hannover); Braunschweig (Brunswick), Anhalt, and Provinz Sachsen (Province of Saxony). Total area, 33,040 sq km.

Estimated Population: 4,149,000.

Characteristics: Mostly flat, with some uplands. Horse and cattle country. Oil and potash. Rubber manufacturing at Hannover; chemical and machine industries around Hannover, Braunschweig, and Magdeburg, with much wartime development.

Administrative organization:
Wehrkreis Hq: Hannover.
Recruiting-area Hq: Hannover, and Magdeburg.

Training areas: Altengrabow, Bergen-Fallingb.ostal.

Replacement Units

471 Mobilization Div (Hannover)

411 Div zbV (Hannover)

Inf Repl Regt Staffs

Pz Gr 13 Magdeburg
31 Braunschweig
71 Hildesheim
216 Hameln
267 Quedlinburg

Inf How Repl Co's

(Mtz) 13 Stendal
31 Braunschweig
71 Hannover
216 Hameln
267 Blankenburg

Inf AT Repl Co's

13
31 Braunschweig
71 Hannover
216
267 Blankenburg

Inf Sig Repl Co's

(Mtz) 13 Magdeburg
31 Braunschweig
71 Hildesheim

Inf Engr Repl Co

216 Holzminden

Inf Repl Bns

12 Halberstadt
17 Braunschweig
Pz Gr 66 Burg bei Magdeburg
Pz Gr 73 Salzwedel
82 Göttingen
191 Hildesheim
194 Celle
211 Hannover
348 Hameln
396 Northelm
398 Goslar
467 Blankenburg
487 Quedlinburg
497 Bernburg
588 Hannover
590 Hameln

Rcn Repl Bns

3 Göttingen
171
216 Stendal

AT Repl Bn

13 Braunschweig

Arty Repl Regt Staffs

(Mtz) 13 Magdeburg
(Mtz) 19 Hannover
31 Braunschweig

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Arty Repl Bns
 Lt 13 Magdeburg
 19 Braunschweig
 31 Braunschweig
 Hvy Mtz 49 Dessau
 Lt 171 Braunschweig
 216 Cöttingen
 Hvy 267 Hildesheim

Constr Engr Repl Bn
 11 Halberstadt

Supply-troop Repl Bn (horse-drawn)
 11 Hanover

MT-Supply troop Repl Bns
 11 Stendal
 31 Magdeburg

Veterinary Repl Bn
 11 Cöttingen

Local-defense Repl Bn
 11 Hildesheim

Obsn Repl Bn
 31

Projector Repl Bn
 1 Celle

Engr Repl Bns
 4 Magdeburg
 Pz 19 Holzminden

Signal Repl Bns
 13 Hanover
 19 Hanover
 Pz 82 Magdeburg

Motor-maintenance Repl Bn
 11 Hanover

Medical Repl Bn
 11 Buckeburg

Annex No 2 to G-2 Per Rpt No 195

Tactical Interrogation Report No 4
 (Covering period 051600 to 061600)

1. No of PWs: 573.

2. Identification of PWs:

398 Inf Res Bn	29	10/VII Air Corps Constr Co	51
146 Field Res Bn	2	Air Corps Engr Tng Bn STEINHEIM	9
396 Inf Res Bn	4	4 Air Corps Comm Bn	5
18 Inf Res Bn	38	6 Survey Res Bn	7
167 Inf Res Bn (EAR)	19	500 Pz Res Bn PADREBORN	6
193 Inf Res & Tng Bn	8	Repair Shop, Pz Lehr Div	2
CT Major Greene	4	19 Pz Engr Rus Bn	2
193 Reconvalescent Marsch Co	19	6 TD Res Bn	5
193 Security Bn	2	1/6 Home Guard Bn	6
161 Marsch Bn	3	11 Home Guard Bn	9
Reconvalescent Co, 412 Gren Regt	3	464 Home Guard Bn	3
Communication Tng Bn VI	4	Home Guard Bn "D"	22
Driver Res & Tng Bn VI	141	1/6 Transport Co	3
Inf Tng School MOSEBECK	4	Reconvalescent Squadron 15 Ren Res Bn	7
Closc Combat Sch DETHOLD	21	Med Det COLOGNE	2
9/VI Rear Echelon Co	3	QM STEINHAGEN	17
4 AA Res Bn	4	Med Det SENNELAGER	1
1/933 AA Res Bn	2	Airport LIPPSPRINGE	1
46 (L) AA Res Bn	13	Police	9
943 AA Bn	2	Glassmaker Bn XVI	2
958 (L) AA Bn	2	Jugoslav Workers (Army)	1
48 (L) AA Bn (mtz)	2	O. T. Workers	18
Stragglers	51	Hospital Cases	

3. 571 Res & Tng Regt: PW Sgt, Count von der Schulenburg, was on a wedding furlough to marry Countess Oeynhausen-Gierstoff at DRIBURG (6855). His uncle by the same name was formerly German Ambassador to RUSSIA, and his future in-laws are related to the husband of the Queen of HOLLAND. PW left his unit, Volks Arty Corps 766, which was located at DUSSELDORF 23 March, and arrived the following day in DRIBURG where he had to report several times to the CP of 571 Res & Tng Regt located at that time in the same town.

PW states that all 8 Bns of 766 Volks Arty Corps are in and vic of DUSSELDORF. Organization of Bn is as follows:

1 & 2 Bns - 12-75mm AT Guns
 3 & 4 Bns - 12-105mm Gn How

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