83D CIC DETACHMENT
HEADQUARTERS 83D INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 83, U. S. ARMY

1 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.

1. For the month covered by this report, the 83d CIC Detachment has received one new EM. He was recommended for assignment to the Detachment after a period of detached service from one of the Divisional units. At the close of the period, 2 other EM were still awaiting assignment to the Detachment, their recommendations having been forwarded late in March.

2. At the close of the month, the strength of the Detachment was 7 officers, 10 assigned EM, and 2 EM on DS, the same total as at the end of March.

3. A statement of the stations at which the Division CP was located during the month would be merely a recital of a number of towns in Germany in which the Division passed the night. In the first 15 days of April, the Division CP, and the Detachment with it, moved 14 different times. The Division was in process of driving east from Ludinghausen, Germany towards the Elbe River south of Magdeburg, and on 13 April it came to rest in the town of Calbe, Germany, where it still had its CP at the close of the month.

4. For the past month the activity of this Detachment can be divided into 2 phases, each of which will be summarized separately.

a. <u>The Tactical Phase:</u>

<u>1.</u> For the first 2 weeks of the month, while the Division was moving eastward from Ludinghausen to Calbe, the 83d CIC Detachment due to the speed of movement operated in a manner similar to an armored Division detachment. A summary of that activity follows in the succeeding paragraphs.

<u>2.</u> With a daily movement of between 20 and 30 miles, it was impossible to accomplish any but the preliminary counter intelligence steps. Hence, the Detachment personnel devoted themselves largely to the accomplishment of 3 principle activities; namely, the neutralizing of communications between Allied and enemy territory, the arresting of Nazis and other Germans whose presence in the area constituted a threat to the security of Allied operations, and the sealing of party buildings, in order that the records therein would remain intact for future use by occupational forces.

<u>3.</u> In discussing each of the above 3 steps more in detail, it must be remembered that the reaction of the enemy to our swift advance made counter intelligence work in some cases more fruitful than in others. For example, enemy communication facilities were found in almost every case to be in working condition at the time when CIC personnel arrived to

neutralize them. This job had to be coordinated with signal personnel, particularly in the case of the regular enemy civilian communications system, which not only had to be neutralized, but had to be done in such a way that the system could be put to use by our own forces as quickly as possible for communication to our own rear areas. It was a situation where the mere smashing of a telephone cable with an axe, the normal neutralizing procedure, was not the acceptable method. In the case of the civilian communications system, therefore, CIC personnel were in almost every case accompanied by trained signal men, who could neutralize the system by the removal of certain technical parts, rather than by severing the main cable. This procedure was found to be acceptable to all parties concerned.

4. In the case of other enemy communications systems, however, this care did not have to be taken, and these systems were also found to be in operation, as we made our advance. It was discovered that in the larger towns the Nazi Party buildings had a separate communications system, which it was necessary to neutralize. In one case, a direct line from a town in Germany all the way to Holland was found to be still in operation. The communications system most frequently being used by the enemy was the railroad telephone network. In one case, CIC personnel interrupted a railway official while he was in process of telling an unknown enemy station further up the line of the presence of American troops in his town. The conversation was short-lived.

5. In connection with the arrest of high-ranking Party members and other Germans constituting a threat to our security, some interesting facts came to light, as our advance continued. In the larger towns, the Party officials, SS and SD personnel, and other persons liable to categorical arrest, were usually found to have fled, whereas in the smaller towns the local "big shot" Party man was usually still to be found, apparently assuming that he would be overlooked. In a few cases, Party members indicated their dispair at the general situation by committing suicide - in one case, an Ortsgruppenleiter killed his whole family prior to eliminating himself, in another, a Kreisobmann shot himself just after one of our CIC officers had entered his home to make the arrest.

6. Although it was by no means possible to arrest all persons who should, by higher headquarters' directive, be arrested, the Detachment nevertheless amassed in the 2 week period a rather large total of arrestees, which in summary form is as follows: 5 Nazi Party officials of Kreis level; 50 Ortsgruppenleiters; 8 officers in the SA; 42 members of the Allgemeine SS; 10 members of the SD (Secret Security Police); 5 Hitler Youth engaged in espionage; one member of the Gestapo; 2 members of the German Intelligence Service; 3 saboteurs; 10 members of the staff of the Stein Company, Eschershausen, engaged in the production of enemy airplane parts and tank equipment - 3 of these had worked in the United States for several years, and 2 of them could still be American citizens.

7. In connection with the sealing of important Nazi offices, the advance which was made by the Division produced interesting results. At the beginning of the operation, the usual procedure on the part of the enemy was discovered: namely, that they had either burned or taken with them all party records of value. However, as our advance increased in rapidity and the

enemy's army became more and more disorganized, Party members fled from their offices leaving all their records intact. In one office a half-drunk cup of tea and a piece of toast was found still on the desk of a Party official at Kreis level. The locking of the many buildings in which these records were left behind was the preliminary step undertaken by CIC personnel to insure that occupational forces will be able to let the records speak for themselves, as they go about the long range job of completely de-Nazifying Germany.

b. The Occupational phase:

1. After the bridgehead across the Elbe had been established, the Division was ordered to hold the bridgehead and begin to occupy part of the area through which it had passed.

2. To carry out the above mission, the Division area was split up into 6 sectors, each of which was assigned a CIC team.

3. Each team had as its primary mission the more long range CIC mission of arresting the many Party officials and ardent Nazi personnel overlooked in the rapid advance made earlier in the month.

4. Because of the many towns in the Divisional area, each of these teams was BUSILY engaged in the activity of arresting Ortsgruppenleiters and other high-ranking Party members whose presence in their respective towns would constitute a continuous threat to the ultimate de-Nazification of Germany.

5. One other task which Detachment personnel were constantly called upon to perform throughout the period was the interrogation of many civilians to determine whether or not they were PW's in civilian clothes. It is notable that hundreds of soldiers abandoned their uniforms and donned civilian dress, not with the thought that they might continue resistance, but rather that they might escape detection as soldiers and somehow return home. An accurate estimate of the number of PW's in civilian clothes arrested during the period cannot be given, but a conservative estimate would place the total at approximately 500. The uncovering of these persons as PW's was the clearest concrete indication which the CIC had of the ever increasing disintegration of the German Wehrmacht.

5. No journals or supporting papers are attached to this report, as none are permanently kept by this Detachment.

OLIVER A. VIETOR,
Capt, CA (AA),
Commanding.

Unclassified per ltr, Hq 83d Div, 4 Aug 45. mc by Baker, mg asso 7 Aug 45

1st Ind.

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HEADQUARTERS 83D INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 83, U. S. Army, 16 May 1945.

Commanding General, XIII Corps, APO 463, U. S. Army.
(Attention: Adjutant General)

Forwarded.

For the Commanding General:

N. F. COWDEN,
Major, AGD,
Adjutant General.

Incls: n/c