SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 329th INFANTRY
APO 83
C/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

319.1/401

20 July 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After Action Report.

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.

In compliance with paragraph 10 (83) AR 345-105, the following report is submitted:

Action against the enemy: None.

For the Regimental Commander:

[Signature]

1 Incl.

Unit Journal, 1 June 1944 to 30 June 1944.

319.1/401

1st Ind.

Hq 83rd INF DIV, APO 83, U. S. Army, 22 July 1944.

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U. S. Army.

Forwarded.

For the Commanding General:

[Signature]

1 Incl: n/c

[Signature]

345-10

[Signature]

4390
HEADQUARTERS 329TH INFANTRY
APD 83
C/o Postmaster, NYC, NY
8 August 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After Action Report

TO: The Adjutant General, W.D., Washington, D.C.
(Thru Channels)

1. In compliance with paragraph 10, C 3, AR 345-105, dated 9 March 1943, the following report is submitted:

a. DATA: First Engagement

1. Initial date contacted enemy - 1 July 1944
2. Organization that initially contacted enemy - 2nd Battalion, 329th Infantry
3. Casualties - Companies E & F, 2nd Battalion, approximately 35% casualties. Company E, 2 KIA, 37 WIA, 10 MIA.
   Company F, 6 KIA, 27 WIA, 20 MIA.
4. Principal enemy weapons - Enemy had full use of heavy machine guns with excellent displacement with maximum field of fire. Mortars and 88 mm guns were used extensively in some sectors.
5. Location - Le Flessis, Normandy, France.

b. DATA: Further Engagements

1. Casualties - All companies in contact with enemy have suffered approximately 50% casualties during the first 10 days fighting.
2. Key officers lost from the regiment during operations: Lt Col James A. Brown (Regt Ex 0) (Hosp); Major George A. Wishart (C.O. 1st BN) (Hosp); Lt Col Claude L. Bowen, Jr. (C.O. 2d BN) (SWA); Lt Col Quincy A. Sanders (C.O. 3d BN) (SWA); Major Franklin V. Howard (Ex O 2d BN) (SWA); Major Terry J. Yandshewsky (Ex O 3d BN) (KIA); Major Edwin G. Holt (Regt S-3) (Hosp)
4. Effective strength of regiment after 2 days of combat: Officers 131, Warrant Officers 5, Enlisted Men 2518.
5. Communications: Wire communication excellent taking in consideration of tanks tearing up wire of companies. Radios were not used to a great extent.
6. Summary of action 8 July 1944: At 0600 on Division order the regiment withdrew to a line about 800 yards to the rear. Holding this line until passed through by the 22nd Infantry, 1st Infantry Division at 0945. After being passed through, the regiment reverted to Division reserve and moved to assembly area given by Division. The 2nd Battalion was alerted for attack toward Saint Brey to fill gap between 331st Infantry on left and 22nd Infantry on right.
7. Summary of action 10 July 1944: Regiment attacked at 0330 from LD about 300 yards south of Saint Brey. 2nd Battalion passed through positions of 331st Infantry, met heavy resistance and were held up about 300 yards south of line of departure. 3rd Battalion with 3rd Battalion, 331st Infantry on left came up to LD and were held up by heavy resistance. These positions were held throughout the day. The 22nd Infantry of the right of 2nd Battalion advanced south several hundred yards leaving a gap. At 2100, our 1st BN was moved up to fill this gap. These positions were held throughout the night.
After Action Report (Continued)

(8) Cooperation of attached units: Tanks, Tank Destroyers, and Chemical Mortars were used to the maximum but hedgerow warfare prevented use of Tank Destroyers for Enemy Tanks were dug in.

(9) Effect of artillery and support: Superior artillery support at all times with very effective results on enemy strong points.

c. SUMMARY:

Hedgerow fighting was new to all personnel of this command and enemy's use of 88 mm gun and mortars broke the morale of the troops at different times. In the first stages of the combat, our mortars had to be mounted on 1/4 ton trucks in order to move from position to position to escape enemy dropping mortar fire on the positions. The enemy used timed fire in known bivouac areas and inflicted many casualties. Many troops were killed in fox holes.

Many casualties were due to soldiers initial entry into combat and failure to use cover and concealment as set forth in basic training. Small arms and sniper fire only harassed troops but inflicted very small percentage of casualties.

For the Regimental Commander:

[Signature]

Doyne R. Bunch
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant.

1 Incl.
Unit Journal.

319.1/41
1st Ind.
HEADQUARTERS 83D INDEPENDENT DIVISION, APO 88, U.S. Army, 14 Aug 44.

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 306, U.S. Army.

Forwarded.

For the Commanding General:

[Signature]

M. P. Compton
Major, ADC
Asst Adj General.

1 Incl. n/c