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THE COMBAT INFANTRY

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Schedule

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THE COMBAT INFANTRY - INTRODUCTION

From the day the Russians exploded their first atomic bomb the Solons of the United States have spent their time worrying about who was ahead in the nuclear war race - The United States or Russia. The only glimmer of light that has penetrated this obsession has been since President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara have been in office. They see that the world cannot be won by destroying it, and that an incinerated earth would be of little value to anyone. Mr. Khruschev has always seen this very clearly, and has gone about the business of taking over the world a piece at a time, stopping only when he thinks the Americans might be stupid enough to use the atomic bomb.

Mr. Kennedy, after the bitter experience of the Cuban fiasco, has apparently decided that he can't trust the State Department, the CIA, or the Pentagon for advice, and is raising a brush fire army to stop the Communist inroads. This is excellent as far as it has gone but it hasn't gone far enough. The deficiency is more a matter of quality than quanity. Brush fire armies will represent the United States just as surely as does some dignitary of the State Department. If composed of reluctant time-servers from the draft, or the national guard or reserves, or made up of volunteers who were rejected by the air force or navy, their effectiveness is questionable. Our brush fire armies should be composed entirely of professional soldiers, highly trained and rigidly disciplined. The United States can get all of these it wants from the million high school students entering the labor market each year. All that is neccesary is to offer them pay at the minimum wage level.

The technique of the communists is very plain. They apparently quite honestly believe that their ideology of every man working for the state is more democratic than the American ideology of every man working for himself. They even consider themselves as crusaders for the rights of the common man. Apparently there is no difficulty in convincing impressionable students and street rabble that the communist ideology is the only correct one. They communists have in the past and probably will continue in the future to extend their holdings by brush fire wars.

Brush fire wars may be started from within a country or they may be the result of an invasion from the outside. In either case the results are the same. The side that eventually controls the armed forces, the police, and the government, secures control of the country. The ordinary citizens of the country are only pawns in the game. They usually become the innocent victims in a fight for power. Control in brush fire wars is always eventually vested in the infantry. Whether soldier, marine, or police, the armed man on foot is the final arbiter. His will be the final decision.

This book is a dissertation on the combat infantryman - his strength, his weaknesses, how much dependence can be placed on him if war comes, and what recompense the country owes him for depriving him of his most precious possession - his life. There is always the possibility that the infantryman may get smart and say, "I don't like the rules for this game and I'm not going to play". This happened in the Graves expedition to Russia in World War I, and threatened in World War II and Korea. If it ever happens the rules will be changed and the changes will not be small.

It is not the intention of this article to disparage the other implements of war, but rather to put them in their proper perspective. Since nuclear weapons have been perfected by our potential enemies it is neccesary that we be ready and able to deliver devastating warheads on enemy installations on short notice. We must also be able to main-maintain control of the sea and the air to allow us freedom of movement, but both of these will usually fall into the catagory of supporting services. To conquer and hold is the job of the infantry, whether army or marine, and the value of the other services is in direct ratio to the extent to which they help the infantry in this job. The navy may sweep the enemy from the seas, the air force may completely dominate the air, but their accomplishments will be wasted unless they are accompanied by occupation and control of the ground.

There has always been in this country a certain lack of respect for the army in general and the infantry in particular. This is illustrated by the comic sections of our daily papers. Pick up your daily paper and turn to the comic section. You will see depicted there the highly romantic adventures of a handsome air force lieutent-colonel named "Steve Canyon", or the equally romantic career of another air force officer called, "Terry Lee". If your inclination favors the navy you may find the heroism of "Buz Sawyer" or "Captain Easy" more interesting. You will also find a strip about the army. It records the bumbles of a childish general, two fat and stupid company officers, a fat and despotic first sergeant, and the antics of a number of lazy and moronic enlisted men. To supplement this you may watch TV and see a crooked sergeant victimize a half-witted colonel, aided by a number of extremely unmilitary looking enlisted men.

Newspapers and television put out what appeals to the public, and

and these reflect public opinion. But what happens when the chips are down? In World War II the infantry with twenty percent of the forces involved, suffered about eighty percent of the battle casualties. In Korea when the army had its first hundred thousand casualties the air force and navy had each less than two thousand. The marines had twelve thousand. Throughout history this has been the record of wars, and it seems probable that it will not be changed by nuclear weapons. The other forces get the appropriations and the glory and the infantry gets the casualties. This is not conducive of a high rate of enlistment in the army. Would you like to rest the defense of this country on Beetle Bailey?

THE POOR BLOODY INFANTRY

Was it Kipling that first gave it the designation of "The poor bloody infantry", or is it only a coincidence that the British profanity accurately describes the infantry? Must the infantry always be a faceless mass of cannon fodder expendable on foreign fields? Does it represent just so many "bodies" to fill "spaces" in tables of organization? Should it consist of only the personnel remaining when the air force, the navy, and the administrative and supporting echelons of the army have picked over the available man power supply? Is it neccesary or desirable that the combat infantryman have anything more than a strong back and a weak mind? Is intelligence an asset to him on the battlefield or would a blank mind be better? What force causes him to move forward to almost certain death or serious wounding? Is this force patriotism, mass hysteria, the bonds of fellowship, hate, pride, a love of combat, control by the subconscious mind, or the result of discipline? Is the combat infantryman capable of individual thinking under conditions of mortal danger, or must masses of infantry be sent forward like cattle to the slaughter? Is it possible for infantry to be so trained that under combat conditions the separate individuals and small units will play their parts as in a football game? Is it correct for a general to be credited with being a great leader when his successes were won by excessive infantry casualties? For the good of posterity should the more intelligent and better physical specimens of manhood be kept out of the infantry? Should the fighting elements get the best qualified men and the supporting elements get what is left, instead of the reverse?

Could the infantry be eliminated and our national defense rested on nuclear weapons? Could the numbers of infantry be reduced if we had superiority of aircraft, navy, tanks, and artillery?

The answer to most of these questions will be only opinions. No person is qualified to answer them all. Few people have had the neccesary experience to answer most of them. The persons who could have most nearly correctly answered the questions are probably buried on some battlefield. Many of the authoritive books on combat have been written by generals, whose idea of inspecting the front consisted of visiting some regimental command post, a mile or more in rear of where the fighting was going on. The experiences of the lower ranks, while more authenic, ware restricted by their limited area of operation. Personal prejudice also enters into any such problem. There is hardly an officer in the air force, navy or army who is not prejudiced in favor of his particular department and branch, and every participant thinks his outfit won the war.

This book is by a prejudiced infantryman. It is based upon the campaigns of the 329th Infantry regiment of the 83rd Division in the European theatre in World War II. I organized the 329th Infantry regiment at Camp Atterbury, Indiana in the summer of 1942, trained it for two years, and commanded it through the five campaigns in northern Europe from the landing on Omaha Beach in Normandy, in June 1944 to the crossing of the Elbe river near Berlin in April, 1945. In the course of this combat the regiment suffered over four thousand battle casualties; 942 men being killed and about 3300 wounded out of an initial strength of about 3400, plus replacements for the killed and wounded. This was not an unusual casualty rate for infantry; both of the other regiments in the 83rd Division suffered more.

Casualties do not neccesarily indicate the combat worth of an organization. Battles are not won by getting your men killed, as Napoleon found out when he said, "Give me back my battalions". Casualties do, however, indicate the severity of the fighting. Objectives taken with few casualties more likely reveals weak resistence than outstanding leadership, but this is not always true. A good leader looks continually for ways of out-manuevering strong opposition rather than sacrificing his men by frontal attacks.

During the course of the fighting in Europe the 329th Infantry participated in almost every kind of combat characteristic of the European terrain. Starting with the hedgerow attacks in Normandy, then the attack of a fortress, (St. Malo), winter fighting in the Hurtgen and Ardennes forests in the Battle of the Bulge, fighting for river crossings, (the Roer, the Rhine, the Elbe), and fighting for towns and villages through heavily populated Germany. Our troops learned to mouse-hole through villages, to use night attacks for surprise and cover, to use marching fire to keep the defenders down, and the rewards of mobility in keeping the enemy on the defensive. In the course of the war we captured more than 40,000 German soldiers, besides the ones we killed on battlefields. At the end of the war the 329th Regimental Combat Team was a hardened, battlewise, effective, military machine, the product of battlefield education.

It is the purpose of this article to show by combat experiences that the infantry is not neccesarily just stupid cannon fodder. Every battlefield offers many solutions, and success in battle usually depends upon the bravery, intelligence, initiative, and resourcefulness of the leaders of small infantry units, and upon the bravery and aggressiveness of their men. Unwilling draftees and juvenile delinquents in the infantry is not the answer to our national defense.

Instead of being what is left after the other services have taken their choice, the infantryman should be a superman. He should have the courage of a lion because only those with the stoutest hearts will continue forward through the Hell of a battlefield. He should have the stamina of a marathon runner so that he may continue forward when his body cries for water, food, and rest. He should have the agility of a gymnast because he has to climb over obstacles that stop everything else. He should have the ability to read the ground like an Indian scout, because some small cover or depression properly used may save his life. He should have the eyesight of an eagle - catching a slight movement in the brush or the glint of a weapon may give him the critical advantage of the first shot. He should be able to hit a man the first shot at any range up to two hundred yards. He may not get a second shot if he misses. He should have the hearing of an eavesdropper to detect the minute sounds of an enemy approaching at night. He should have the fortitude of our pioneer ancestors to undergo the constant physical punishment of battle.

The infantry, of course, is not composed of supermen. Instead, with a few exceptions, the infantry gets what is left in the manpower pool after the more desirable fish have been caught by the air force, the navy, and the more pleasant and comfortable staff organizations of the army. The infantry must, therefore, content itself with something less than the superman standards. The infantryman is usually considered satisfactory if he doesn't get combat fatigue at the first hostile shot, can walk twenty five miles in a day, can get over the obstacle course without breaking a leg, can read the largest letter on the eye chart, can fire his weapon in the general direction

of the target, can hear a shouted command, can walk more than a hundred yards off a road without being lost, and doesn't have to be kicked out of his foxhole when an attack is going forward.

Not all infantry are as bad as the above. If they were, our wars would be all Cubas and Koreas. In spite of the selecting-out process allowed by every organization except the infantry, a considerable number of good men are missed and end up in the infantry. With these our wars are won. Our air force may defeat the enemy air force, our navy may dominate the seas, but possession of the ground can be won only by the man on foot. He can be aided by tanks and artillery, but without the infantry to take possession of the ground the results are never decisive.

ORGANIZATION

By the time our division was organized in 1942 the regular army had been pretty well picked over by the demands of the African campaigns, the Pearl Harbor debacle, and the preparations for the invasion of Europe. Our cadre for the organization of the regiment consisted of five regular army oficers, some thirty national guard and reserve officers, and a skeleton force of enlisted men from the cavalry. This cadre was later augmented by enough second lieutenants, who were graduates of the Fort Benning Officer's Candidate School, to bring the officers strength up to 160. We received draftees to fill the ranks to about 3400, and were in business.

Our first problem was the cadre. Most of the officer specialists in the cadre were satisfactory, but out of the thirty officers we had to use nineteen as company commanders. As a premise it might be said that any infantry outfit whose company commanders were good enough, wouldn't have to worry about the other ranks. Conversely any outfit with ineffective company commanders would probably be an ineffective outfit. It takes years to produce an excellent company commander. One cannot be produced by a few hours of training each week and two weeks training in the summer. Officers in the company grades are primarily instructors. They have to know their military by heart. When faced with a problem in the field or in combat they cannot pull a book out of their pocket to see what it says.

Most of our nineteen company commanders were officers who had been furnished by some earlier mobilized outfit. When called upon to furnish officers for a cadre the natural tendency of these outfits was to send their poorest officers. This house cleaning was frowned upon by higher headquarters, but they could do nothing about it. The outfit furnisheing the officers

it. The outfit furnishing the officers could give them high efficiency reports and even promotions. The old outfit didn't care. It was getting rid of the ineffectives. We did the same thing when called upon to furnish cadres, and got rid of most of our dead wood that way. Some of these officers travelled from outfit to outfit during the war and never got into combat.

Our second lieutenants from the officers candidate school at Fort Benning were different. They had been enlisted men in the army, and so knew the basic principles. The school at Fort Benning was tough enough to eliminate most of the ineffectives, so these officers became the backbone of our regiment, replacing the ineffectives among the cadre officers.

Civilians like to give examples of how the army made a truck driver out of a cook and vice versa. These civilians don't give any solution as to what you should do when you have an over-abundance of cooks, truck drivers, clerks, etc., and what you need is riflemen. We put all our draftees through classification processes but most of the specialists ended up as riflemen; for which position very few were qualified.

One of the reasons that the army is so unpopular with civilians is because when war comes the officers act like SOBs and treat the draftees like slaves. Any humanitarian act on the part of a commander would probably cause him to be relieved for being too soft. The temporary officers are worse than the professionals. They have too much authority and not enough knowledge to go along with it. We were probably no better nor worse than the other outfits.

We were organized in September and we spent the first winter

ankle deep in Indiana mud. On over-night manuevers pup tents had to be ditched unless the occupants wanted to sleep in water. Those who couldn't stand it and went AWOL were, upon their return, sent to a stockade containing only a water hydrant and pit latrines. Here they pitched their pup tents and here they lived, except during training hours, until their sentences were up.

We had all winter a casualty rate of about ten percent in the hospital; some from accidents on our obstacle course, but mostly from flu, the result of exposure of soft bodies to winter living out of doors.

The next summer we were sent to Tennessee for manuevers. The roads were rough, the weather hot and dry, and any tendency to fall out was vigorously opposed. In many ways the Tennessee manuevers were worse than the war.

When the Tennessee manuevers were over, at the end of our first year of training, we were almost as well prepared for combat as we were at the end of the second year. What we gained in competence, knowledge, hardness, and discipline, by repeating our basic training at Camp Breckenridge, Kentucky, we lost by the unpleasant monotony of repetition. Our specialists became better at their various specialties, we improved the marksmanship of our riflemen, machine gunners, and mortar crews, and we had less trouble with physical softness and lack of discipline, but the beating the men took in repeating the same thing over and over was not conducive of high spirits,

cipline we lost in morale by the unpleasant monotony of repitition.

The repitition in basic training was caused by two things, We did not have the tanks and artillery neccesary for more advanced training, and we were so restricted by safety precautions in the use of live ammunition that our attacks had no reality. Artillery, tanks, and infantry are the component parts of a combat team. Without any member the team is deficient. Without two members was like training a football team without a backfield or a ball. With our safety rules for rifle firing we could fire only straight ahead, with no manuever- or flanking possible.

When we were finally sent to England in April of 1944 we were technically proficient. Eighty five percent of our men were qualified in marksmanship with their basic weapons, we could march twenty five miles in twenty four hours with field equipment, and all had been ad- justed to tough discipline. We had not, however had the experience we should have had in working with tanks, artillery, and combat aviation. These we had to learn the hard way - in combat.

In June of 1944 we were sent across the English Channel as the second wave in the attack across Omaha Beach, in Normandy. At this time our regiment was augmented by the addition of a battalion of field artillery, a company of medium tanks, an engineer company, and a medical collecting company. The regiment itself consisted of three infantry battalions of approximately nine hundred men each, each, an anti-tank company, a cannon company, a headquarters company, and a service company. The regiment, with its supporting units, became the 329th Infantry Regimental Combat Team - a small army of almost five thousand men. As so organized, we fought the war.

COMBAT ORGANIZATION

Our basic unit in combat was the infantry battalion. Our three battalions each consisted of three rifle companies, a heavy weapons company, and a headquarters company. The arms of the rifle companies were the M-1 rifle, the light, caliber 30 machine gun, the 60 millimeter mortar, grenades, and a small rocket launcher. The heavy weapons company had water-cooled caliber 30 machine guns, and 81 millimeter mortars, (The work horse of the infantry), and two 50 caliber machine guns. The Headquarters Company took care of communications, supply, and intelligence, had a pioneer platoon for clearing mines, and handled transportation. When attacking, which was routine procedure with us, the battalion had attached a platoon of five medium tanks, a platoon of engineers, an anti-tank platoon and a medical platoon. These latter were furnished from the regimental combat team. The battalion, with attachments, numbered about twelve hundred men. Artillery support was furnished by our supporting 105mm artillery battalion, augmented by our cannon company, and sometimes by the longer range 4.2 mm mortars and the 155 mm artillery. We sometimes had a platoon of tank destroyers furnished by the division.

Tactically our battalions usually operated independently, although they cooperated by outflanking resistence that was holding up adjacent battalions. We usually used two battalions in attack and one in reserve. Our tactical schools frown upon independent battalion operations, preferring mass attacks, massed tanks, and massed artillery. I do not concur. Too many men get killed that way. We found that playing it by ear was better than following a fixed plan. Too often the situation develops in such a way that fixed plans bring heavy casualties and failure, whereas being able to adjust

our efforts to discovered weaknesses in the enemy position saved many casualties.

THE BATTLEFIELD

Modern battlefields are not like the pictures in history books. There are no masses of men. We trained our men to always keep at least five paces apart. Machineguns would mow down a mass attack like a harvester does wheat. Except in a meeting engagement, which is rare, one side is usually in trenches or fox holes, and the other is advancing in attack. The ones that are entrenched have a great advantage because it is difficult to shoot a man out of a hole in the ground whereas it is easy to shoot him when he is walking on the surface. To win, however, a billigerent cannot remain on the defensive, but must attack, and by a combination of fire and movement drive the enemy from his defensive positions.

This attacking is the infantryman's job. He needs all of his reserves of courage, fortitude and ruggedness to leave the protection of his trench or foxhole; and the advance in the open against enemy fire is like exposing his body, naked, to the blasts of winter. He knows that as soon as the defenders see him, their artillery and mortars will start bracketing his advance. Enemy machineguns will sweep the ground with bands of fire. If enemy tanks are available they will move out to crush him as he advances. The infantryman is the target for all weapons. The defenders know that if the infantry can be stopped, the battle will be won, but if the infantry gets to them they are lost, for nothing can fight hand-to-hand against infantry except other infantry, and trenches and foxholes become death traps.

The attacking infantryman knows this too. He knows he must continue to advance in spite of the hail of deadly missles all around him, in spite of the possibility of activating a land mine, in spite of the shell bursts, in spite of the machineguns. Even when he sees men falling all around him, even when his buddy cries for first aid, even when he knows the probability of reaching the enemy position is remote, he must still drive himself forward. He continues moving, forward, subconsciously doing the things he has been trained to do. Why does he keep advancing when his every instinct cries out against it? Will he be shot by his officers if he refuses to advance? - Not in our army. Why then, knowing the hopelessness of the situation as far as he personally is concerned, does he not stop, dig a hole and stay there? Many do. Battles are won by the few who don't. Those who continue to fight do not last long. They may survive a few attacks, but it is only a matter of time until the law of averages catches up with them. They are the ones who populate our military cemetaries. They are the amputees and the other wearers of the Purple Heart. Men are killed and injured in other ways in war, but only the infantry goes through the complete Hell of endless physical discomfort, unbearable mental torture, and almost certain wounding or death.

To add to the infantryman's misery it usually is raining when he attacks. The preliminary cannon fire seems to bring it on. If the rain is bad enough it will make adjustment of his supporting artillery and mortar fire difficult, if not impossible; it will keep the supporting airplanes from flying, and may seriously restrict tank operations. But nothing stops the infantryman. Nothing except a wound, and this may not stop him if the wound is not too serious and the infantryman is tough enough.

If the attack is stopped he must dig a foxhole for protection against enemy fire. Rain water accumulates in these holes and makes even sitting down too uncomfortable to endure. He waits. If the enemy shell fire has stopped he will see the stretcher bearers moving wraithlike from body to body, sorting out the wounded from the dead. Here and there will be an aid man administering a blood transfusion. The wounded usually bear their suffering with patient stoicism, although occasionally he can hear the weakening calls for first aid from those too close to the enemy lines for the stretcher bearers and aid men to reach them. If it has been a hard fight the ground will be dotted with the dead, each looking like a pitifully small bundle of old clothes. If the battle has lasted for several days he will see the greenish, pallid faces of the unburied dead, and smell the sweetish, sickening odor of their decay.

Night comes. He crouches in his foxhole, too miserable to sleep, hoping that the ration detail will find him in the dark. Death holds but little terror for the infantryman. He is too near it, and too miserable to care very much what happens. The probability of getting killed is but a small part of his Gethsemane. The navy man in his heated and often air-conditioned ship can be killed by enemy fire. The aviator who flies out to combat, and back to reasonably comfortable quarters and adequate food, can be downed in combat. But compared to the infantryman's life and chances they are in another world.

SECTION II

CAMPAIGNS

1. Normandy
2. St, Malo
3. Sam Magill and the 20,000 Prisoners
4. Luzemburg
5. The Hurtgen Forest
6. The Battle of the Bulge
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SECTION II - CAMPAIGNS

NORMANDY

Our first view of Omaha Beach was from an L.C.I. (Landing Craft Infantry). As it beached we splashed ashore and started up the hundred foot bluff that arose straight up from the beach. The 101st Airbourne Division was there ahead of us and had control of the heights. Engineers had cleared a path through the enemy mine fields and we started up. I was in the lead carrying my bedroll on my shoulder. Once when I paused a few moments for breath an engineer officer growled at me, "Get going there. There are two thousand men behind you." As I reached the top I heard an explosion. A soldier trying to pass the column had run outside the cleared path and exploded a land mine. Three men were killed and eight wounded in one platoon of Company "B". The man who tripped the mine was unhurt.

That night we relieved a regiment of the 101st Airbourne Division east of Carentan, and next day our introduction to combat took place. Our first taste of combat could hardly have been less propitious. I do not know who was responsible for the idea of invading Europe through Normandy. All the British claim that it was an American idea. They were probably right because they had experienced the tragedy of the Dieppe raid which took place on very similar terrain. Whoever was responsible must have been ignorant of the character of the country or considered the loss of thousands of infantrymen just a matter of personnel logistics. A later landing made in southern France was almost unopposed. My opinion is that Normandy should be in the same catagory as Bunker Hill, Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, and Burnside's senseless attacks at St. Marye's Heights. It was just another example of the combat infantry paying with their lives for brass hat stupidity.

Normandy was perfect defense country. The natives were too poor to buy fencing so they built earthen walls to inclose their cow pastures. Through the passage of years these walls had sprouted trees and bushes and had become excellent breastworks; shoulder high, naturally camouflaged, too high for tanks to climb over and too tough for them to crash through. The German infantry lay safely behind these breastworks and using machineguns and mortars mowed down our infantry in the open pastures whenever they approached. It wasn't a battle, it was a slaughter.

We were not in the main attack as a regiment the first day. The other two regiments of the division made attacks along the Carentan-Pierers highway and were stopped almost in their jump-off position by the veteran German troops in their well prepared positions. This day saw, nevertheless, our greatest tragedy of the war. Our Second Battalion was sent to attack a position on the flank of those attacked by the other regiments. Intelligence reports indicated that this position was lightly held and could be easily captured. It was in the edge of a woods, beyond a grassy swamp through which flowed a small creek.

Our men were willing. They advanced across the swamp through a hail of machinegun fire, waded the creek and reached the edge of the woods. There they died. The position in the woods was protected by log bunkers, with machineguns covering every avenue of approach. Before they were stopped and fell back half of the thousand men in the battalion were casualties. The battalion, though later built up with replacements, did not recover from this tragedy until after the Normandy campaign was over.

The next day we were ordered to attack toward Pierers along the east side of the Carentan-Pierers highway. Our attack this time was successful. Our Third Battalion, advancing on a front of about four hundred yards, crashed through hedgerow after hedgerow until they had gained a mile. At this point they stopped because both flanks were threatened and their rear had to be protected by the First Battalion to prevent them from being cut off.

Their advance was not cheaply won. We had no air support because the weather was too bad. Our artillery was not effective because the hedgerows offered the defenders such good protection. If the artillery shells struck short they did no damage. If they went over the hedgerow they burst too far beyond. We had tanks but they couldn't climb the hedgerows or crash through them. We had to blow pathways for them using dynamite charges. I can still remember an unarmed engineer bulldozer cutting paths through the hedgerows, the operator paying no attention to the enemy machinegun bullets that struck his dozer and whined off into space.

Near a small village I saw the Third Battalion operations officer, Captain Clifford McCarthy, riding the hull of a tank with a forty five pistol in his hand. When I complained to the battalion commander that McCarthy could do nothing with a pistol, and would probably be shot off the tank, the battalion commander answered, "He is using the forty five to keep that tank moving forward".

The casualties in this attack were not nearly so bad as the Second Battalion had suffered the day before, but they were bad enough. Quincy Sanders, the battalion commander, was wounded twice and that night I ordered him evacuated. One of the four company commanders, Horace Crowder, was killed and one, Art LeBeau, was wounded.

About half of the platoon leaders were either killed or wounded.

When the battalion stopped they dug in and repelled counter attacks by calling for our artillery to fire on the battalions positions. As our men were in foxholes they didn't get many casualties, but the Germans that were advancing in the open were stopped. That night we received a call that the Third Battalion was running short of ammunition. We loaded a platoon of four tanks with ammunition and ordered it to go to the battalion's position. The lieutenant commanding the tank platoon stated that it was too dark to go at that time. I ordered him to go in the morning at first light. The next morning when we asked if he had started, he said he didn't know the way. As the pathway through the hedgerows was easily seen I knew that he was afraid. I went to his position and asked him if he would go if I led the way in a jeep. He consented to this and we got the ammunition up in time, although my radio operator and I had to lead the last half of the way on foot due to the enemy fire.

The next day we had planned to continue the attack using the First Battalion but when I visited the battalion this had to be changed. The battalion commander was in such a state of complete funk that he was incapable of leading an attack or doing anything else. When I arrived at his command post he was sitting under a tree with his head in his hands. He didn't even know who I was although we had worked together for two years. He had been an excellent battalion commander during training but he just didn't have the emotional stability to stand this kind of combat. I had him relieved of command and never saw him again.

From this point on we went from tragedy to tragedy. Major Franklin Howard, who relieved the First Battalion commander, was seriously wounded in his first attack. Lieutenant Colonel Claude

Bowen, the commander of the Second Battalion, was badly wounded leading his reluctant battalion in an attack. A sniper's bullet struck him in the chest, went through his body, and came out just missing the backbone. I saw him brought into the aid station and thought he wouldn't last out the day. The medicos do some marvelous things, though. In three weeks he was back for duty. Major Terry Yanishewsky, who took command of the Third Battalion when Sanders was evacuated, was killed in his first attack. Captains Horace Crowder, Ralph Hargraves, George Sammons, and Orvil Shelton were all killed during attacks. We drew replacement lieutenants for platoon leaders every night just like rations. Before we had been in combat a week we were scraping the bottom of the barrel as far as leaders were concerned. The chances of the enlisted men to survive under these circumstances can be imagined.

Replacements streamed in to take the place of our casualties. We began to have a bad reputation at field hospitals. I could see the fear and hate in the eyes of the replacements. Every evening I would brief a new group of replacement officers. One evening as I was talking to them, our artillery opened up from directly in rear of us. As the first rounds roared over our heads, all the replacements hit the dirt. As they slowly regained their feet, I said nothing but I thought of what a crime it was, both for them and their men, to put such recruits at combat in command. Half of them would be casualties the next day.

It is One of the queer characteristics of combat is that many of the most important and critical objectives don't even have a name. Orchard 666 was probably our most critical objective in Normandy. Our road net was very limited, and Orchard 666 dominated the crossing

of the two principal roads in the area. The Germans had built a strong point at the junction digging trenches and revetting them them with logs. We had to get control of this junction in order to advance in the area. I put the Second Battalion against it and they were stopped before they reached the orchard. I next tried the First Battalion. They got to the position but were driven back by counter attack. I finally tried the Third Battalion. They overran the enemy trenches and captured what remained of the defenders. There were not many prisoners.

Even after we captured this crossroad it was still a dangerous place. The German artillery had it accurately zeroed in and they sent over an artillery concentration every ten or fifteen minutes just in case some of us were using the crossing. Colonel Bender, who commanded the 331st Infantry got killed there that way. Giffin, my jeep driver, had learned to approach this crossing with caution. He would stop about a hundred yards short of the crossing and watch it for a few minutes. If no shells fell he would give the jeep the gun. We had just started to cross one day when a concentration started to come in. Giffin slammed on the brakes, he piled out one side and I out the other, and we dived into the ditches along the road. The blast of a shell knocked off my helmet but did no damage except to deafen me. As we lay there a medical jeep came along, passed our jeep and started across the road. It got about midway when a shell struck squarely on it, killing all but one of the occupants. I still remember him staggering back down the road, his face a mass of blood, crying like a child.

By this time we had had such serious losses that our offensive capability was about gone. The Germans, also, had been pretty well chewed up, but not as badly as we were. We still continued to attack every day taking a hedgerow or two each day for which we paid a high price. After three weeks both my regiment and I were about finished. I would probably have been relieved of command except for the fact that two successive colonels in the regiment on our right had been killed and two successive colonels in the regiment on our left had been relieved of command because they couldn't get their men to go forward and be killed. I was nearly relieved, anyway, when I told the division commander that I felt like a murderer. He was going to relieve me for combat fatigue but was talked out of it by Major Mauldin, our regimental surgeon.

The reason that we had such a disproportionately large loss of of officers in Normandy was because of the German snipers. All of our officers had to be up in front, leading, or the men wouldn't go forward. The German snipers had been trained to pick off the officers, and they were very good. Colonel Barndollar of the 331st regiment was killed by a sniper. In our regiment, Lieutent-Colonel Bowen was wounded and Major Yanishewsky killed that way. There were undoubtedly many others,whose method of wounding did not come to my attention, that were shot by snipers. I very nearly got mine one day on reconnaissance. I was standing on a mound of dirt, trying to see beyond the next hedgerow, when a sniper's bullet hit the mound right between my feet. He probably had made a mistake in sight setting or did not squeeze the trigger or my career might have been over.

The situation seemed so hopeless that I would have welcomed a shell that would have put me out of it. The Presbyterian idea of the shell with your name on it has some grounds for belief. I was in a French farmyard one day talking to my executive officer and the regimental communications officer. A German artillery concentration started coming in. The executive officer jumped behind a stone wall. The communications officer dived into the open doorway of a barn. I dived into a low hut that had apparently been used for pigs. A shell hit the wall, toppling it and breaking the executive officer's leg. Another shell went into the barn filling the communications officer's fundament with shell fragments. Nothing hit the pig house.

I relieved four recruit battalion commanders during the Normandy fighting. One had combat fatigue, one couldn't get his battalion to go forward, and two were reluctant to go up where the fighting was taking place. One of these arrived smoking a pipe. I sent him up to the Third Battalion, which was temporarily being commanded by Major Speedie. That evening I went up to the Third Battalion command post. Major Speedie was out inspecting the outpost for the night. The new lieutenant-colonel was sitting on a stump smoking his pipe. When I inquired about the situation he said Major Speedie was handling it very satisfactorily. Next morning I went again to the battalion command post to find the pipe smoker sitting on the same stump still smoking his pipe. He said Major Speedie was up at the front with the attacking troops. I told him to report to the Division Headquarters, and that he was through. He left without comment, still smoking his pipe. Major Speedie was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and commanded the battalion the rest of the war except when he was being patched up from the five wounds he received.

We finally broke out of the Normandy hedgerows following a tremendous air bombardment. Although Normandy was undoubtly the critical battle of the war in Europe, and is considered an allied victory, I have never considered it so. The casualty cost was too great. In the Normandy and St. Malo campaign, (St. Malo followed immediately after Normandy and the two are considered one campaign), we had 45 officers killed and 94 wounded out of a total of 160; and 578 enlisted men killed and 1947 wounded out of a total of about 3400. Most of these were lost in the hedgerows.

COMBAT FATIGUE

No history of the Normandy campaign would be complete without a discussion of combat fatigue. It was the only campaign in which we had combat fatigue cases in serious nombers, but it was a very serious problem in Normandy. The very name, combat fatigue, is a misnomer.because those who get it usually have had little or no combat, and have no reason to be fatigued. Actually the longer a man stays in combat the less subject he is to attacks of combat fatigue. I saw only but one case that was caused by too much combat and too much fatigue. This case involved a lieutenant who was commanding a company. His battalion commander, Lt-Colonel Speedie, reported to me that he thought the lieutenant was cracking up and should be relieved. He had been doing an excellent job as commander. I told Speedie to keep him in command until the end of the next day's operation and then relieve him. That was a mistake. That night the lieutenant went berserk and it took three men to hold him.

Combat fatigue has existed through the ages by various names. In World War I it was called, "shell shock". Most men who are combat

fatigue cases get it in their first battle. Some do not have the emotional stability to stand the Hell of the battlefield. Others are plain cowards who use combat fatigue to get a medical diagnosis to cover up their cowardice. Some are so distraught that they don't know what they are doing. The disease is very contagious and may infect a whole organization. Under heavy mortar fire in Normandy, in which a number of shells landed right in occupied foxholes, almost all of "H" Company, including all but one of its officers, were combat fatigue cases.

Once a man has been evacuated for combat fatigue his usefulness on a battlefield is usually ended. If returned to the front he will normally get combat fatigue again at the first hostile shot. We did what we could to stop these losses. When men filtered back from the front we stopped them at the regimental rear boundary and put them to work handling ammunition and supplies and doing military police work. This rehabilitated some of them. There was usually enough enemy artillery fire coming into the rear areas for them to become accustomed to it falling around them, and some of them became steady enough to be returned to the front. If they got completely out of the fire zone they were usually finished.

Our worst attacks of combat fatigue usually occurred immediately following a visit to a unit by the division psychologist. His intentions were undoubtly good but when he talked to the men he suggested ideas concerning combat fatigue that hadn't occurred to them before. I finally asked the commanding general to keep him out of my regimental area. This hurt his feelings but reduced one source of trouble.

It isn't hard to sympathise with combat fatigue cases. It is almost impossible to discriminate between those who are cowards and those whose nerves will just not stand the horror of the battlefield.

A combat fatigue case is either a coward or a weakling except for those who look at the battlefield and say, "To Hell with it. Why should I walk out there and get killed for a cause in which I have no interest?"

I usually made it a practice when going from the regimental C.P. to the front, to stop all stragglers and ask why they were going to the rear. One day I received an honest answer. We had jumped off in an attack and about nine o'clock I was going forward to see how the attack was going. I met a tall thin boy striding with long purposeful strides toward the rear. When I stopped and asked him why he was going back he said, "It's gettin pretty hot up there."

I took no disciplinary action against combat fatigue cases other than having their records marked,"Not in line of duty", so they would not be eligible for a pension. There was one exception. I preferred court-martial charges against a lieutenant that was commanding a tank platoon that was supporting one of our battalions. This lieutenant started forward with the attack, but at the first hostile shot wheeled his tank around and headed for the rear with all of his guns blazing. It is bad enough when the enemy is shooting at you - being fired at by your own tanks is too much. I think the charges against him were dismissed after a psychologist recommended that he not be tried. Things usually look different to people in the rear areas.

I had two combat fatigue cases in my regimental staff. One was my executive officer, a regular army officer with more than twenty years of service. I should have been suspicious of him because during our Tennessee manuevers he used to go around our tent every night with a flashlight looking for spiders. The first week in Normandy I was returning from the front one day and saw this officer being led away

by Major Mauldin, the regimental surgeon. When I asked what was wrong one of my staff replied, "An artillery concentration came in while you were away and he was trying to dig the bottom out of his foxhole with his finger nails".

The other case involved our operations officer. He was the kind of officer that seemed to have everything. He was a college graduate, a football hero, a rising young business executive, a captain in the organized reserve, a graduate of the short course at The Command and General Staff College, and a very promising staff officer. The first time he got caught in an artillery concentration he got a scratch wound and went completely to pieces. He kept saying we were surrounded and all were going to be killed.

SELF-MAIMING

Self-Maiming is a form of combat fatigue. We seldom had any cases after Normandy but we had an average of about two a day during the hedgerow fighting. The self-maiming was always done in the same way. A soldier would always shoot himself in the left foot. I suppose it was always the left because soldiers are taught to shoot right handed and it would be easier for them to shoot themselves in the left foot than the right. I had the surgeon mark all wounds received in the left foot while in foxholes,"Not in line of duty" so they self-maimer would not be eligible for a pension. It hardly seems reasonable that conditions would be so bad that a soldier would shoot himself in order to get out of it, but a person who went through the Hell of Normandy would understand.

St. MALO

Following the Normandy breakout we should have had a little time out of contact with the enemy so we could reorganize and get acquainted with our replacements, but the high command was in a hurry. They needed ports to land supplies and our division was given the task of clearing the St. Malo peninsula in Brittany and capturing the city and port of St. Malo. This developed into a major campaign. After the hedgerows of Normandy any kind of a campaign would, by comparison, seem easy. The country was reasonably open, we could use our tanks and infantry together, and could fire our artillery more effectively.

Our first major objective was the town of Chateauneuf, famous for its wine. It was strongly defended by infantry, and was supported by artillery in a fortress north of the town. All three of our battalions participated in the attack on the Chateauneuf position but the Second Battalion had the roughest going, particularly in taking the enemy strong point north of Chateauneuf. Before our Second Battalion had entered the town, it had been severely punished and two successive battalion commanders had been wounded and evacuated. I remembered Captain McCarthy from the Normandy tank episode and sent for him to take command of the battalion. I briefed him on the situation and advised him not to try to join the leading companies until the enemy fire lessened. I then returned to my command post. The first report we received from the front was that McCarthy had been killed by a sniper while crossing a field to his front lines. I think he was a man without fear - the kind you selsom see.

By this time there were no more field officers, (major and lieutenant-colonel) left in either the regiment or the division. Fortunately Captain Granville Sharp, who had been wounded in Normandy,

as a company commander, reported for duty at this time, and I gave him command of the battalion. He retained command the rest of the war, being given battlefield promotions to major and to lieutenant-colonel.

In the meantime the First Battalion had captured a strongly defended pillbox at the town of La Balue, and the Third Battalion, after meeting strong resistence from St. Joseph's Hill, finally reached the town of St. Servan - one of the three towns that composed the city of St. Malo.

St.Servan was captured by the First and Third Battalions in a street by street limited objective attack. In this attack certain streets were selected as phase lines. The two battalions attacked abreast, driving up to the phase line. Usuallly the artillery fired just beyond the phase line to prevent counter attack. When both battlions were up to the phase line, they would start toward the next phase line. Tanks were very useful in this type of operation, particularly for knocking out barricades and reducing strong points in stone buildings.

While the attack was progressing through the town, an army engineer outfit showedup to open the port. Our sentries stopped them and told them that fighting was still going on. The engineer officer assured the sentry that the town had been captured. The sentry was a little hard boiled. He stepped aside and said, "Go right ahead". In about thirty minutes the engineers were all prisoners. We liberated them two days later. It doesn't pay to argue with a sentry.

After the First and Third Battalions overran the town of St. Servan, our next regimental objectives were the fortifications for the port of St. Malo. One of these, Fort de la Varde, was outside of our zone of action, so we sent the Second Battalion, which was

in reserve to capture it. Sharp moved his battalion to the vicinity of the fort and started an attack. While shelling the fort preparatory to making an assault, he moved up a broadcasting outfit and had them play martial airs. When the battalion started an assault on the fort, the broadcasting outfit played, "The Stars and Stripes Forever", and Sharp's men rushed the fort emitting indian war whoops. What effect these assorted noises had on the Germans is unknown, but they 197 defenders surrendered at the first assault.

When we first started the attack on St. Servan, I called in Lieutenant Reeder, our morale officer, and told him there were rumors of a large supply of liquor in St. Malo, and if he got to it before the other regiments, we would have a party when the city surrendered. An hour or two later I received word that Reeder had been captured by the Germans. Next day, as our advance continued through the city, somebody called my attention to an American flag that was waving in the street. We ceased firing and in a few minutes about two hundred Germans came marching up the street with Reeder in command. It seems that he had sold them on the idea that their condition was hopeless, and they had decided to surrender. I never found out where he got the flag.

When our troops reached the water front we were given the mission of capturing The Citadel of St. Malo - an old Vauban type fortress that was on an island a few hundred yards off shore. The harbor was useless as long as the Germans controlled The Citadel, so it had to be captured. The Citadel was commanded by a Prussian colonel known locally as, "The Mad Colonel of St. Malo". Preferring to take his island the easy way, I had our chaplain, who spoke German, call him on the phone and ask him if he didn't want to surrender. The Chaplain delivered the answer to me...

It was, "Although the Americans may stand on the banks of the River Rhine, it is incompatable with the honor of a German officer to surrender his garrison." So that was that - we would have to take it the hard way.

The fort had its big guns positioned to fire out to sea, but these had been supplemented by half a dozen concrete and steel pill-boxes on the land side. Our first job was the pill-boxes. Our tank destroyer cannon were moved up at night and entrenched behind the concrete sea wall, with their barrels just clearing the wall. At daylight they started working on the pill-boxes. Hitting the pill-boxes was not too hard, they were about six feet in diameter, but they were made of steel and concrete so in order to put one out of action the gunners had to get a hit on the slot in the pill-box through which the machinegun fired. This required fine shooting, but eventually our gunners silenced all of them.

The next problem was The Citadel, itself. Our artillery had been firing on it without getting any return fire, so we decided to try an assault. We put a smoke screen on the fort, and two of our companies ran across the causeway and up to the fort. The fort was buttoned up, and they couldn't get in. The Mad Colonel also called on the other harbor forts, Cezembre and Grande Bey, to fire shrapnel on our attacking forces. The attackers had gone all around the fort without finding an entrance, so we called them back.

We would have to have somebody crack the fort open for us. We first called on the air force. They came over high, dropped one ineffective bomb on the fort and the rest in the bay. It bagan to look like a job for siege artillery. For several days we tried everything we had on The Citadel. Our artillery even moved some eight inch guns

up to within a thousand yards of the water front and had them fire on the walls, but the walls were fifteen feet thick and nothing seemed to be effective against them.

Studying the fort through field glasses, we finally picked up a barely discernable path across the lawn leading to the fort. We estimated that there was a door at the end of that path. At night Lt.-Colonel Skinner, our artillery commander, moved a six inch gun to the water front and entrenched it behind the sea wall. Next morning the gun crew started shooting at the wall of the fort at the end of the path. The first few shots knocked down a camouflage net and revealed a door. Adjusting the fire of a six inch gun so that the point of impact is moved only inches is something an artilleryman can appreciate. It was, however, just a matter of time. We soon had a hole in the wall large enough for a cart to go through.

We then planned another assault. First the air force would drop napalm bombs on the fort, then our assault teams carrying explosive charges would dash across the causeway and enter the fort. The Mad Colonel must have had good information service. Twenty minutes before the attack was to start, white flags appeared all over the fort. Our assault groups, seeing the flags, dashed across the causeway and up to the fort. Soldiers never seem to consider that they can be killed by their own fire. Major Bagley, our operations officer, and I tried frantically on our radios to call them back, and to stop the coming planes but without success. The first planes came over and dropped their bombs, fortunately in the bay. At this point some smart members of the attacking force spread their recognition panels on the lawn of the fort, and the second wave of planes, seeing the panels, verred off. We were saved a tragedy by minutes. We finally contacted the planes on the radio and sent them to bomb the island

of Cezembre.

We took six hundred prisoners off The Citadel. The Mad Colonel was the first out. He was a typical Prussian - tall, thin, in dress uniform with highly polished boots, even a little mustache. He could have played a part in the movies without change.

Two forts still remained in German hands in the bay. One was on the island of Cezembre, and the other was Grande Bey just off the St. Malo harbor. We were given the job of taking Grande Bey, and another regiment the reduction of Cezembre. I estimated that Grande Bey would be tough to take because its only contact with the mainland was a narrow path that was covered with water at high tide. I sent Sharp's Second Battalion over to the vicinity of the fort, telling Sharp to look it over and that I would follow in an hour or two. A couple of hours later approaching Grande Bey, I saw the German garrison filing off as prisoners. Sharp's men had smoked the fort, rushed across the path, tossed in a few grenades, and the 150 defenders surrendered without a fight. A few days later Cezembre surrendered to the other regiment without a fight.

The strength of a fortification is based, not upon the concrete and steel of its construction, but upon the will power of its defenders.

Lieutenant Reeder, after delivering the 200 prisoners that surrendered to him, got busy on the liquor supply, and we were well provided. We moved into the French barracks that the Germans had used, the townspeople of St. Malo came out of the cellars to welcome us, and everybody got well plastered.

SAM MAGILL and the 20,000 PRISONERS

Following the surrender of The Citadel we were trucked across France to Angers on the Loire river, with the mission of protecting General Patton's right flank while he captured Paris. After what we had been through this was pure heaven. The countryside showed no marks of war, the city of Angers was filled with pretty French girls, our soldiers were wealthy, and the duty of keeping the Germans south of the Loire river was no strain.

Our predecessors at Angers had experienced no combat. Their colonel was very strict. He kept them closely confined, had all the whore houses off limits, and his outfit was very well disciplined. Not so the 329th. They had been through Hell, and those that had survived were not looking for a sunday school. I had our surgeon inspect the whore houses, and on his favorable report had them all opened. Men not on outpost duty were free to roam the city and they took full advantage of the privelege. There was plenty of wine and Angers was the bottling center for Contreau liqueur. After the battles of Normandy and St..Malo it was wonderful.

The Germans were on the south side of the Loire river, and when we first ~~first~~ arrived we had a few brisk skirmishes with them across the river. Every night Frenchmen would cross the river and tell us where the Germans were billeted. Next day we would send our dual-purpose 50 caliber machine guns along the road that parelled the river, and have them shoot up the German billets. After about a week of this the Germans disappeared from the south side of the river. I called in Lieutenant Sam Magill, our intelligence and reconnaissance officer, and told him I thought it would be a good idea for him to go across the river and find out what had happened to them.

That night Magill rafted his twenty four men and eight jeeps across the Loire and disappeared. The next night he returned to the command post after midnight, woke me up, and told me there was a German general with 20,000 troops in the Issudun area who wanted to surrender. The general wouldn't surrender to the French or the English, but would surrender to the Americans, if he was given a token battle so that he could surrender with the honors of war. The general was General Elser. Magill, after crossing the river and finding no Germans on the south side, had taken his platoon eighty miles through enemy territory before he made contact. Hearing from the French that the German general wanted to surrender, Magill had put a flag of truce on his jeep, had driven to the general's command post, and announced that he would accept the surrender. This was too much for the general. He wanted to surrender to somebody with more rank. Magill then returned to our command post and reported the situation.

We had no battalions available to put across the river, but the Ninth Army offered us an armored battalion. While we were discussing this Magill had gone back to Issudun and persuaded General Elser to surrender without a battle. Magill told him he was caught between the Third and Seventh Armies and would eventually have to surrender anyway. This was not completely true. He might have fought his way to the German lines. Our air force had been punishing the German column pretty severely, and the F.F.I. (Free French Infantry) had been bushwhacking them all along the line of march. All these were too much for the general - he decided to give up.

We decided to move them up to the river in three columns with about seven thousand men in each column. To prevent the French from bushwhacking them we put a jeep at the head of each column bearing an

American L

American lieutenant with an American flag. As an added precaution I allowed the Germans to keep their guns and ammunition. This brought a vigorous protest from a British lieutenant-colonel who was working with the F.F.I. He asked me how many men I had to consummate the surrender. I told him, "about two thousand". He said, "Two thousand to disarm twenty thousand armed men - The most fantastic thing I ever heard of". Numbers , however, are not important when men don't want to fight. We disarmed them on the south side of the river and put them in stockades without incident.

The German transportation was mostly horse-drawn, and the horses were a problem. In an infantry outfit, if any task needs doing, some men can be found who can do it. We put out a call for cowboys and got about twenty. These cowboys would herd the 800 horses down to the Loire river twice a day for water. The rest of the time they grazed them on the French farmer's fields. We compensated the farmers by giving them as many horses as they thought they should have. We weren't niggardly - we had lots of horses.

As the last of the prisoners moved into our stockade, a German major, accompanied by two men carrying a chest, came up to my jeep and reported. Speaking perfect English he told me that he was the paymaster of the column, and that he had the equivalent in francs of approximately five thousand dollars in the chest which he would like to turn over to me. I was stupid. I told him I was busy and to turn it over to my supply officer. To this day I do not know what happened to the chest and its contents.

LUXEMBURG

The day after the surrender we were relieved of the German prisoners by a military police battalion and were ordered to Luxemburg. Our duties in Luxemburg were very similar to those we had on the Loire river. The German's Siegfried Line was just across the Sauer river with the German outposts along the Sauer and Moselle rivers. When we first arrived their outposts were on our side of the rivers but we soon changed that by driving them across the rivers and putting companies in Echternach and Gravenmacher to keep them there.

Our command post was in Jungalister on the high ground west of the rivers. To get from our command post to the rivers was somewhat hazardous because there was a section of the road that was visible from the Siegfried Line. The minute a vehicle appeared on this section of the road some German would pull the lanyard on a big gun in the Siegfried Line which was pre-sighted at the road. Giffin, my driver, could beat them on this. By the time he hit the open space he was making about sixty five, and before the Germans could pull the lanyard we would be under cover. Unknown to us another jeep followed us one day and got three casualties from a shell fired at us.

The front was relatively peaceful for a couple of months so we started a re-training program. This re-training program was somewhat similar to the kind of drills a football coach puts his team through between games. The assumption that a soldier is trained when he goes into combat is as erroneous as the assumption that a man is educated when he graduates from college. In each case the education just prepares the individual to assimilate knowledge.

Our re-training program in Luxemburg was greatly superior to any training we had gone through in the 'States. The most important consideration in stateside training was that nobody must ever get hurt.

This brought out so many restrictive regulations that the training had no resemblance to reality. In the 'States, also, we never had the tanks, the artillery, and the ammunition to do realistic training. In Luxemburg all this was different. We put on attacks against dummy positions, using overhead artillery fire, practicing enveloping attacks with tanks and infantry using live ammunition, and everything as near to battle conditions as possible. We could have been court-martialed in the 'States for violating the safety regulations, but this wasn't the 'States. We had no casualties from our own fire, but got a few from the big guns across the river. They could hear us firing and apparently wanted to get in the act.

As a combat force we came to maturity in Luxemburg. In all our campaigns thereafter our attacks resembled the plays of a trained football team. This showed in our later casualty rates, which were only a fraction of those in the Normandy and St. Malo campaigns.

WINTER WARFARE

THE HURTGEN FOREST

The effectiveness of any military operation is probably reduced at least fifty percent by operation in snow and below freezing weather. The best example of this is Russia. Several good armies, throughout history, have beaten the Russian armies, but so far nobody has ever beaten the Russian winter, and it is very probable that nobody ever will. Winter makes quagmires out of roads, immobilizes tanks, makes radios inoperative, freezes the water in machinegun water jackets and truck radiators, and destroys the initiative of troops, who under winter conditions can think of nothing but the physical discomfort of half frozen hands, feet, and ears. We got our first taste of winter warfare in the Hurtgen Forest.

We had been enjoying life among the pleasant and hospitable people of Luxembourg, and were not happy when we received orders to relieve the 8th Regiment of the 4th Division, in the Hurtgen Forest. The 4th Division had been fighting in the Hurtgen Forest for about a month and was badly decimated. Their move to Luxembourg was supposed to be a break for them. They hardly suspected at the time that they had moved directly into Von Rundstedt's path in the coming Battle of the Bulge.

We took over from the 8th RCT on December 8th in dugouts on the snowclad slopes of the forest. The scenery was not inviting. The tops of most of the trees were shattered and the snow black-stained from shell bursts. The forest roads and trails were hub deep ruts. The slopes were too steep and slick for tanks. Below us, through the trees, we could see the villages of Gurzenich,

Birgil, and Rohlsdorf along the Roer river, and on the far side of the river, the city of Duren. The villages looked inviting and sleeping in the snow was not pleasant, so, after a days reconnaissance, we started an attack.

The Germans were in snow-camouflaged bunkers, their machineguns laid to fire along the openings in the trees. The fighting was vicious and at close range. They had the advantage of position, we had greater strength and were fresh. In two days we overran their outer defenses and were in the edge of the forest looking down on the Roer river villages. We couldn't be stopped then. Sharp's Second Battalion drove into the outskirts of Gurzenich, and moused holed it's way to the center of the town. Our tanks shook themselves free of the snow and mud, and carrying men of the First Battalion on their hulls, charged down the main street of Gurzenich through the Second Battalion, and reached the bank of the river. Here they changed direction so that they came up behind the defenders of the bridge that crossed to Duren. When the defenders saw the tanks behind them, they came out with their hands up. Speedie's Third Battalion took Birgil with a marching fire attack, repelling a counter attack by Von Rundstedt's armor. We were up to the Roer river and had houses to sleep in. Men who are not interested in the four freedoms will often jeopardize their lives for a warm place to sleep.

We could probably have crossed the Roer river at this time. The Germans blew the bridge but the river could be waded. Some of our patrols went into Duren and reported no resistence. The high command was afraid that the Germans would open the dams upstream and flood us out so we were ordered not to cross.

HITLER'S FAREWELL GESTURE

THE BATTLE of the BULGE

All rabble rousers are ham actors. The better actors they are, the greater following they have in the rabble. World War II brought out several first class actors; Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill and Roosevelt were the best. Of these, Hitler, working on the relatively intelligent German people, was probably the most effective. It was in character that he would make a grandiose gesture when he thought all was lost. The Battle of the Bulge was actor Hitler's final act. It was a magnificent gesture. The fact that it was doomed to failure from the start, and that it would cost thousands of lives, was in keeping with the theatrical behest, "The show must go on".

We were fighting for the towns of Gurzenich and Birgil along the Roer river when Von Rundstedt's drive struck at Luxembourg, south of us. We received some of his supplementary armored attacks against our troops in Birgil on December 16th, but repelled them. We really didn't get into the Battle of the Bulge until Christmas day. We had been relieved of our positions along the Roer river on December 23rd and had moved into reserve positions near Aachen. On Christmas night we moved sixty five miles and took over positions from our 2nd Armored Division around Humain, Belgium, to help them stop the German drive for Liege.

We were never very excited about the Battle of the Bulge. Some newspaper reporters tried to get all alarmed about it, and General Montgomery tried to use it to advance his position as a military seer, but the drive was just a gesture. We were spread very thin along the frontier at the time, and the Germans could drive through anywhere by concentrating their troops at one place.

After he broke through, however, Von Rundstedt was in real trouble. The Americans and British were on both of his flanks and immediately started closing the pincers. He was lucky. If the weather hadn't been so bad and the snow so deep the war would probably have ended with the capture of most of his army before he got back to the Rhine.

Our part in the Battle of the Bulge brought on one of our strangest operations. Leaving Speedie's Third Battalion to defend Humain, we started Cook's First Battalion toward Rochefort, which was about a mile to the southeast. "B" Company was the advance guard for the First Battalion and the first news we had from that area was that "B" Company had disappeared into Rochefort, and that all Hell had broken loose in the town. Rochefort was surrounded on three sides by the L'Homme river, the far bank was occupied by German tanks, and although we tried all around the river bank we couldn't get any more troops across the river and into the town.

The next day we put an artillery smoke screen on Rochefort, hoping that the company could get out under its cover, but nothing happened. We had been unable to get contact with "B" Company on the walkie-talkie so I reported to Division Headquarters that the men of the Company were probably all prisoners. Next morning there was movement in the streets of Rochefort, and in a short time "B" Company came marching out reporting that all the Germans were gone. Pressed for explanations Captain Hill stated that when they reached the river the bridge was defended, so they waded across the river, protected by a cover of fog, and got into the town without a fight. Since the weather was near freezing, the Germans evidently hadn't expected them to wade. When the Germans found they were in the town they brought up tanks and started an attack. "B" Company took refuge

in the stone buildings, particularly the railroad station, replying to the tank fire with bazookas when the tanks got too close. The German tanks were at a disadvantage in the narrow streets. Their guns couldn't be elevated enough to fire above the first floor, and "B" Company's men moved up into the upper stories, repelling any attempts of foot soldiers to enter the buildings by rolling grenades down on them. The Germans finally gave up and started their retreat toward the Rhine.

When asked why they hadn't answered our radio calls, Captain Hill said that their radio had frozen up, probably from getting wet crossing the river. I asked if he had seen the smoke screen and he answered affirmatively. When asked why he hadn't come out under the screen he said, "Colonel, do you remember telling us in a commander's meeting that if we ever gave up an objective without your consent you would relieve us of command?"

The rest of the Battle of the Bulge was an attempt by our forces on the north side of the bulge, under British command, to make contact with General Patton's forces coming up from the south, and thus cut the German army in two. This plan would have probably been successful but for the unfavorable weather. More snow fell until it was knee-deep. The temperature approached zero. We were in the Ardennes Forest with it's steep forested slopes, the few roads covered with ice so that our tanks continually slipped off and had to be hoisted back onto the roads. Our regimental objective was the crossing of the Langlir river. The Germans held the crossing with a few tanks and retreated east. After some delay Lieutenant-Colonel Sharpe found another bridge farther down the river, crossed over to get on the German's flank, and they retreated; but we were too late.

The Germans abandoned a few tanks that were out of fuel, but the mass of their forces reached the Rhine.

Chasing the Germans back to the Rhine brought out another example of the combat infantryman's attitude toward war. We had bivouaced in the snow for two nights when we caught up with the German's rear guard located in three small villages, Honeylez, Bovigny, and Courtil. After capturing Honeylez we prepared to attack the larger village of Bovigny. I started the First and Third Battalions against it, telling the battalion commanders that the first in the village could have it for shelter. At about ten o'clock we received messages that both the battalions were in the village. While I was trying to make a Soloman's decision, the Third Battalion called on the radio saying that the regiment on our right had not reached Courtil, and asked if they could have it for shelter if they captured it. Courtil was not in our zone of action, but I called Division Headquarters, they changed the boundary, the Third Battalion captured Courtil, and everybody was happy except the regiment on our right who had to spend another night sleeping in the snow.

Morale is a relative condition. The rear area combatant needs U.S.O. shows, Red Cross canteens, and Post Exchange snack bars. The front line infantryman thinks he is doing all right if he has a warm and dry place to sleep, has some hot food to eat, and is out of enemy artillery range. After our units made contact with those moving up from the south we moved into billets with the residents of Tohogue, Belgium, and just rested.

The Battle of the Bulge cost us 5 officers and 72 enlisted men killed, and 29 officers and 251 enlisted men wounded.

NIGHT ATTACKS

THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINE

When our troops first entered Europe nothing was so demoralizing to them as the sound of German machine-pistols firing their screaming bursts in our area during the night. We had a standing operating procedure that as soon as darkness came, we buttoned up for the night and shot anything that moved. It was several months before we could even consider making night attacks. Recruits are so terrified at night that they will shoot at any noise whether made by friend or enemy.

Night attacks have great advantages if the troops are sufficiently battle tested to use them. The cover of darkness masks the attacking troops during their most dangerous time - the approach. By using phase lines for coordination and extemporized sound signals for orders, the attackers can control and coordinate their movements so that they won't fire at each other. The defender can only wait and shoot at shadows and noises. The effect upon the defenders morale is usually devastating. He knows that an enemy is approaching in the dark, but can't see him and often can't hear him.

We captured the major part of the city of Neuss, opposite Dusseldorf on the Rhine river, with a night attack. We had driven in the enemy outposts at Tits and Loveling, and just as darkness fell we started Lieutenant-Colonel Cook's First Battalion toward Neuss. They were stopped by German fire at the edge of the town, and Speedie's Third Battalion was put in action on their flank. Both battalions fought all night, street by street, and house by house. Some of the defenders were civilians with arm bands stating that they were, "Volkstrumers". Our men didn't discriminate,

they shot anybody that had a weapon. By daylight we were in possession of the city, and could look across the river flats to the highway bridge across the Rhine to Dusseldorf.

The Rhine river flats, a bare expanse of open ground between Neuss and the river, was honeycombed with trenches dug by the defenders of the bridge. After several hours of artillery fire on the trenches, Lieutenant-Colonel Speedie started "I" and "K" Companies toward the bridge but they were pinned down by the fire of the defenders. He then lined up "L" Company, with four tanks dispersed along the line, and started assault fire across the flats. In assault fire each rifleman and machine gunner marches a few steps, then stops and fires a few shots at the top of the trenches, and then marches a few more steps. Men are from three to five paces apart, and as they go forward, alternate men march and shoot so that there is continuous fire. The tanks keep abreast, firing their machineguns as they advance. The defenders are very reluctant to stick their heads up when the attackers bullets are cracking around their ears. I watched the assault from the edge of Neuss. Not a man in the assaulting wave went down. They overran the trenches and the Germans boiled out behind them with their hands in the air.

When "L" Company reached the waters edge there was an explosion and a big chunk was blown out of the center of the bridge. I had alerted Sharp's Second Battalion to be ready to cross the Rhine if we captured the bridge. This explosion caused me to hesitate. The bridge was still standing but might not support tanks. I decided not to cross - one of my major mistakes in the war. The bridge might have been as serviceable as was the Remagen bridge captured

five days later. That night the Germans completed the destruction of the bridge.

The value of our night attack was demonstrated the morning after the fall of Neuss. We found at the approaches of the city eight concrete emplacements, each containing an 88 mm gun and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. They were set so that they could sweep the flat approaches to the city. Their crews had apparently abandoned them when our troops by-passed them in the dark. A day attack would have been very costly.

The Rhine was one of the major objectives of the American army so we knew we would not be moving again until future operation plans had been made. Major Kohler, our supply officer, came to me with word that there was a schnapps distillery in Neuss, and inquired whether or not some could be issued to the troops. I told him to let them have all they wanted. About ten o'clock Major Mauldin, our surgeon, came in and asked if I had issued such an order. When I confirmed it he said, "Well, for your information we have had more casualties from personal fights since that order was issued than we had capturing this town."

At Neuss we saw our only U.S.O. show of the war. Lily Pons came to Munchen-Gladback and gave a concert. She sang a program of American folk songs to about 5000 men assembled in the theatre there. It was wonderful, and I doubt if Lily ever sang to a more appreciative audience.

THE DRIVE ACROSS GERMANY

The final drive of the 329th RCT across Germany is an outstanding example of infantry mobility under combat conditions. We were in reserve when the Rhine was crossed and did not get into action until the Ninth Army had advanced about sixty miles beyond the Rhine. We were then put in the lead and remained there for the rest of the war. Our drive started at Sennalager, Germany on the 3rd of April. We advanced in a zone about six miles wide, with the 2nd Armored Division on our left in a parellel zone. Our advance took us along the north side of the Ruhr with the Lipp Canal as our right boundary. The 2nd Armored headed for Magdeburg. We headed for Barby. Both are on the Elbe river about 50-to 60 miles from Berlin. The country was thickly settled, with towns and villages every few miles. There were numerous small rivers across our route. Many of the towns were relics of the feudal days, with stone walls and narrow entrances. Most of the fighting was for river crossings and for road blocks at the entrances of the towns.

The 2nd Armored had a days start on us but the campaign soon developed into a race for the Elbe. They were motorized and we were on foot but we reduced this advantage by liberating every vehicle that would roll in the towns that we captured. We rode thirty-eight men on a tank and broke all the rules for overloading trucks and trailers. Soon we had every man riding on something. This gave a very unmilitary appearance to our columns and the newspaper men dubbed us "The Rag-Tag Circus". But we moved, and fast. One day one of our officers took a second look at a Volkswagon in our column and found that it contained two German officers. I suppose they had concluded that the column was going where they wanted to go.

The campaign wasn't all just rolling from town to town. There were a number of mountain passes and river crossings that were strongly defended - particularly if there were S.S. or Hitler Jugen troops in the area. The two areas from which we expected the most resistence turned out to be not so tough. One was the Ruhr and the other the Harz mountains.

The Ruhr had been almost completely leveled by our air force, but the Germans had gone underground and their operations were about seventy five percent of normal. The Ruhr, itself, was not in our zone of action, but our boundary was the Lippe Canal, which was the north boundary of the Ruhr. We had a few battles for towns along the canal but they were not as serious as we expected. Our mission called for us to by-pass the Ruhr, and the job of cleaning it out devolved upon another outfit.

We expected trouble from the Harz mountains. We had received intelligence reports that Hitler was establishing a redoubt in the middle of the Harz mountains for his last stand. We did not search out the mountains, but captured a dozen or more towns in the Goslar-Harzburg area. Later, some other outfit took out 65,000 German troops that we by-passed in the mountains.

We expected a tough fight for Halberstadt, which was a fairly large city including a camera plant. To our surprise we took it rather easily following the principal of watching for opportunities. Our Second Battalion had the responsibility of taking Halberstadt. The zone of our Third Battalion passed north of the city. Major White, who was commanding the Third Battalion, saw that the defenses of the city were concentrated on the south side against the Second Battalion, and very little or no defense on the north side. Without orders he attacked the city from the north and the Germans gave up.

Normally we advanced on parellel roads, two battalions abreast. The battalion that was in reserve got a little rest, but not much. There was almost continuous fighting. Some of the towns were strongly enough defended so that the resistence had to be out manuevered. Our average advance, fighting and all, was from sixteen to twenty miles a day. We kept this up for ten days, reaching Barby on the Elbe river on April 12th.

The 2nd Armored Division had reached Magdeburg on April 11th, and had put a bridgehead across the Elbe river. The Germans counter attacked with light armor, and, as the 2nd Armored had only infantry in the bridgehead, they withdrew it back across the river. We captured Barby at ten o'clock on April 13th. I had warned Major Dodge to be prepared for a river crossing and he had the assault boats ready. Lieutenant-Colonel Cook and I made a reconnaissance of the river bank and could see no Germans on the far side so at one thirty that afternoon Cook's First Battalion crossed the Elbe in the assault boats. Major Dodge then made rafts out of the assault boats and we ferried all the anti-tank guns in the regiment across the river. We then broke up the rafts and sent the Third Battalion across in the assault boats. By dark we had a firm bridgehead about a mile east of the Elbe river.

At daylight next morning the Germans came at our bridgehead with their armor, expecting the same conditions as with the 2nd Armored. They came in boldly. Our anti-tank gunners let their vehicles get within easy range and then knocked out most of them. The rest retired. Our bridgehead was firm unless they could bring up heavy tanks. Later we extended the bridgehead to include Walternienburg.

Our last fight was a German tragedy. We had strengthened our bridgehead and had prepared defensive positions before the

Germans made their last effort. There was a German military school in Zerbst, which was about three miles beyond our bridgehead. On the morning of the 16th of April the students made an all-out attack against our bridgehead. It was Normandy in reverse. They advanced about six hundred yards across an open field, supported by assault guns. Our artillery opened up on them when they debouched and our machineguns, anti-tank guns and rifles when they came within range. Our anti-tank guns knocked out their assault guns and the other weapons mowed down their infantry. Not a man reached our lines. A tragic and senseless waste of brave men.

This was our last fight of the war. Zerbst, which was on the highway to Berlin surrendered to us a few days later without a fight. The speed of our advance across Germany had upset all previous calculations. When the Allies agreed to the Elbe river as the limiting line they probably never imagined that we would cross it before the Russians captured Berlin. It is probable that the gates of Berlin would have been thrown open for us had we continued our advance in April.

When we approached the Elbe we had begun picking up Russian signals on the radio. We finally contacted them on the radio through one of our officers who spoke Russian. On the 30th of April our Cavalry made physical contact with Russian units at Appellendorf. On May 4th the Russians relieved us in our bridgehead and we moved back across the Elbe to Wolfenbuttel, Germany. The declaration of peace on May 8th was an anti-climax as far as we were concerned.

OPERATIONS IN ENEMY TERRITORY

FROM THE RHINE TO THE ELBE

The people in the United States have never known, in their lifetime, what it means to have the harsh foot of a conqueror on their land. At best it is very unpleasant. Our men, in general, had no hatred for the Germans. They were fighting them because they were ordered to. In our final drive across Germany our regiment was the leading unit, and therefore the first to come in contact with the civilian population. In general the Germans were meticulous about observing the rules for conduct in war and we were also. There were some exceptions. We were advancing about sixteen to twenty miles a day and usually captured a dozen or more towns and villages each day. We did not take time to search the houses and at first lost some of our supply and communication men by having them fired on by die-hards after our assault troops had passed through a town. I established as a standing operating procedure that we would not take such persons as prisoners. When they were flushed out and came from their positions with their hands up, our men mowed them down. Bushwhackers, in my opinion, are not entitled to combatant treatment. The word got around and such practices stopped. I heard, after the war, of a German commander who was tried by United States court-martial for doing this in Italy, and executed by firing squad. Had the Germans captured me they may have done the same.

During our advance the German resistence varied, usually depending on the kind of troops defending the towns. If they were S.S. or Hitler Jugen, we were in for a fight, if they were home guard they surrendered rather easily. The Hitler Jugen were the toughest. They wouldn't surrender, and although they were only ten

to fifteen year old boys they could shoot like men and consequently had to be killed like men. Our failure to search houses brought out some queer incidents. One of our supply officers, passing through a village, while going forward to join his battalion, saw a German soldier duck behind a house. He stopped his jeep, drew his forty five, and got out. His driver took his M-1 rifle out of the boot, and both prepared to be heroes. The driver in cocking his rifle accidently discharged it into the air and fifty two German soldiers came out from around the houses and surrendered.

I can recall only one violation of flag of truce procedure. We were advancing along the Lipp Canal, which borders the Ruhr, and saw across the canal a town with sheets out of the windows. I called for Lieutenant Magill, our intelligence and reconnaissance Officer. He brought up a squad and started them across the bridge over the canal, while he and I watched from our side. Suddenly someone opened fire on us with a machine pistol from the nearest house. Fortunately, none of us was hit. I called up a couple of tanks that were nearby and with about a dozen rounds they made a wreck of the house and, I expect, casualties of most of it's occupants. Tough on the noncombatants, but they shouldn't harbor truce violators.

As our drive approached the Elbe river the attitude of the civilian population became more friendly than antagonistic. In some towns they even stood on the sidewalks and cheered as we went by. I expect we would have been more acceptable to them than the Russians, but they were disappointed. Two weeks after we crossed the Elbe river we evacuated all the area we had captured, turning it over to the Russians.

Our last action in the war was the capture of the city of Zerbst, which is about five miles east of the Elbe river and about fifty miles from Berlin. We had received some attacks out of Zerbst, so were softening it up with artillery before we attacked. A car bearing a flag of truce came out of the town, so we suspended artillery fire. The car contained the Burgermeister who asked that we stop firing because they had not been able to bury their dead from the last air strike. When I asked him if he would surrender the town he stated that he did not have that authority, but would take an emissary to the military commander. I sent Captain Schoomer into the town and he came back with word that the commander had orders from Hitler not to surrender the town, but that he would not fire at us if we attacked. We advanced with tanks and infantry and took Zerbst without firing a shot. The highway to Berlin was open. I expect we could have taken it in a few days with a little support. While we awaited orders, a German prisoner-of-war camp commander showed up and asked that we take 18,000 allied prisoners-of-war off his hands as he had nothing to feed them. We sent trucks into the suburbs of Berlin and evacuated the prisoners. That was our last operation of the war.

In our final drive across Germany we usually buttoned up each night in towns that were large enough to provide billets for all of the soldiers. Higher headquarters had issued orders that there would be no fraternizing with the German people. Whether or not they did this with tongue-in-cheek or because of the usual staff lack of horse sense, I do not know. Almost all of the able-bodied men of the towns were away in the German armies. The towns were full of women and children who had no other place to go. I suspect that our soldiers

slept with a different German woman every night, and shared their rations with them. I made no effort to stop this as long as there were no complaints by the German women. They didn't complain. They probably dug out a bottle of wine for the occasion. Only one case came to my attention. This was the mass rape of a woman whose profession was to pose with her husband for pornographic pictures in various sex positions. I didn't do anything about that either.

The fighting part of war is not pretty. Any gentlemanly instincts that a soldier may have are only a handicap. The ever-present possibility of death tends to make opportunists of most combat men. Some of them may be grieving for their wives and children, but most of them have their minds on the main chance.. As evening approached they would attack a town with great vigor, in order to be shacked up before dark.

DISSOLUTION

OCCUPATION DUTY

When the German surrender was announced on May 9, 1945 we thought that the war was over for us. The Pentagon didn't concur. There was still the Pacific war to be concluded. We believed that some of the new divisions that had come into Europe about the time of the battle of the bulge would be sent to finish it - they were fresh, had hardly been bloodied, and yet had enough combat experience to be effective. But no. Our division was selected by somebody to help deliver the coup-de-grace to Japan.

We belly-ached about the Pentagon flogging a willing horse, but turned over our occupation duties to another outfit and moved to the German training area at Grafenwohr for refresher training. Some weeks later while a battalion manuever was in progress, pandemonium broke out over on the left of the attacking line. I went over to see what was going on, and was told that the war was over. One of the radio operators,using his set in the manuevers, had picked up the news of the Japanese surrender. It was useless to continue the manuevers - nobody had any interest in anything except going home and being a hero. We were transferred to Bavaria and took over occupation duty again.

In Bavaria we moved into billets requisitioned from the former members of the Nazi party, and the dissolution characteristic of all armies of occupation was started. Our area of responsibility included dozens of towns, several prisoner-of-war camps, and a number of camps for displaced persons. We picked the most comfortable buildings for billets, established messes with German girls to wait on us, sent trucks to Italy for a supply of liquor and started to live it up.

Our dissolution was rapid and complete. From as effective a military machine as our country has had since the Civil War, we went to the opposite extreme in a few short months. This dissolution was due to several causes. First, the duty was too easy. The Germans gave us no trouble. They immediately started rehabilitation. The resurgence of Germany since World War II is no mystery to anyone who saw the way they attacked the apparently hopeless job of rebuilding their towns and replanting their fields. With nothing but hand tools they accomplished miracles. The German soldiers were in POW camps, so the women and childred plowed the fields, often using cows to draw the plows.

We placed an officer in charge of each town and each POW and DP camp. In the towns the officers found that the best way to administer the town was to let the Bergermeister do it. He knew all the answers. When winter approached the POW's came to me with requests that they be allowed to go to their homes on pass to get winter clothing. They promised that all would return. With my fingers crossed, I allowed a small group to go. They all came back so we finally allowed all the others to go. None failed to return.

The greatest cause of our dissolution was the change in personnel. The sequence of their return to the United States was based upon the number of points, determined by combat service and decorations, each soldier had earned. Our oldest and best soldiers had the most points so they were the first to go. They were replaced by an undisciplined mob of juvenile delinquents, who liked to show their heroism, since the fighting was over, by beating up some old German non-combatant and breaking his glasses. The fact that our government regards these gravy-train riders as heroic

veterans and wastes billions of dollars on rewarding them for an educational vacation is extremely painful to contemplate.

The final cause of our going to pieces was the change in officers. As soon as the fighting was over a flood of minor staff officers, who had fought the war in the safety of some big headquarters, was sent to replace the officers in our units who were eligible to go home on the point system. These paper shufflers were not tough enough for the job of handling juvenile delinquents and could not win the respect of the combat veterans.

When the 329th Infantry left Europe for demobilization it bore no resemblance to the military machine of pre-VE days. The G.I. had reverted to his natural state. Harsh, dangerous and exciting conditions had brought out the best in him. The end of rigorous discipline and a few months of soft living soon cancelled the effects of combat morale.

SECTION III

BATTLE COMMENTS

1. Leadership
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6. Combat Intelligence
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18. The Russians

LEADERSHIP

Leadership is a characteristic that is difficult to define. It is also hard to come by. Civilian corporations, as well as military organizations, are continuously in search of persons who will accept responsibility, and who have the neccesary intelligence and energy to be successful leaders. Militarily, at least, there are no fixed rules by which a leader can be selected. The system used by the army is the trial and error method. Previous records are examined but the conditions of combat, which usually are different from any previous activity, may throw out all preconceived judgments. The only way is to try somebody and see. If they prove competent, they are retained in command, if not, they are relieved and somebody else is tried.

We found that the best method of replacement of combat casualties in the leader positions was by battlefield promotion of the most promising of the leader's subordinates. John Markowitz went into Normandy as a buck sergeant and was killed in Luxembourg as a captain commanding Company "K". After Normandy we requisitioned only privates. The leadership positions were filled from the lower ranks by battlefield promotions. A recruit officer on a battlefield is a recruit officer. He might be competent but it is men's lives that are being gambled with, and it is better to leave them in the care of somebody that has demonstrated that he is still able to think when his life is in danger.

Many alleged authorities on combat leadership have written articles on what it takes to make a leader. If they know, they are smarter than I am. I never found out. The three Lieutenant-Colonels that commanded our three battalions were as different in personal

characteristics as any three men one would normally meet, yet each in his way was successful. Tim Cook, who commanded the First Battalion, was a man in his thirties. He appeared to be slow and to lack initiative, but I always found him at the front where the fighting was going on. Granville Sharp, who commanded the Second Battalion, demonstrated the highest qualities of leadership. He took over command of the battalion when it had lost five commanders and its morale was low from excessive losses. In just one campaign he brought it up to a first class fighting organization. John Speedie, who commanded the Third Battalion, was a disciplinarian. I could always identify his column because the vehicles were all shined up. His battalion took the toughest objectives during the war. George White, who substituted for Speedie while Speedie was being patched up from his several wounds, showed outstanding initiative. Sharp, Speedie, and White were all in their middle twenties, they had all come into the army as lieutenants, and each was fully capable of commanding a thousand men in combat. They had all been brought to field grade by battlefield promotion.

Our company and platoon commanders usually didn't last very long. To get their men to go forward in attack they would usually have to be in front, leading. This would bring them under enemy fire before the others and caused many casualties among the officers. Two of the twelve assault companies each suffered loss of six company commanders - in each case three killed and three wounded. It would seem that such casualties would ruin the combat effectiveness of a company, but up to the end of the war these two companies were, if anything, more aggressive than the others.

One disadvantage of being a good leader is that such leader is left in his job when others are promoted, because of the difficulty

of finding a qualified replacement. Lieutenant Sam Magill, our intelligence and reconnaissance officer, was never promoted although he was much more capable than most of the captains. He was of too much value in his intelligence and reconnaissance capacity to be spared. Had he been promoted he would have had to be transferred to another job. The rank attained by many officers during the war is no criterion of their ability.. Many were promoted and transferred in order to get rid of them. I transferred half of our original cadre of national guard and reserve officers for this reason. Some officers spent their entire military careers moving from place to place because they lacked the leadership to make good anywhere. Some of these moves included promotion. The final test of an infantry officer is combat. Many show outstanding qualities of leadership on the parade ground, but do not have the emotional stability to stand the terrors of combat.

Some of our more egotistical generals during our late wars thought that they could determine an officer's leadership qualifications by just looking at him or talking to him. During our training for World War II my regiment was inspected by the army commander. He interviewed my First and Second Battalion commanders. After he had dismissed them he asked me which I thought was the best. I weaseled by saying one was better on the parade ground and the other better in the field. He assured me that I was wrong; that one would make a fine commander in combat and that I would have to get rid of the other. The one he praised so highly got gang-plank fever when we were ordered overseas, and got himself into a hospital. The one he condemned turned out to be one of the most outstanding combat leaders of the war.

BRAVERY & COWARDICE

There is a considerable mass of opinion that holds that all men are afraid in battle. This may be true but I have seen men who showed no indication of fear when they were under fire. Whether this was self control or a lack of fear I do not know, but many have shown no more apparent worry than would a man regarding the traffic in a street. On the other hand there are others whose fear is plainly written on their faces. These have a pasty grey mask over their faces which is readable to all. Some are able to perform their duties in spite of their fear, but the fear is plainly apparent and may infect others. We had one staff officer whose face always wore this grey mask. He continued to do his duties so he was not relieved, although he probably had a bad effect upon those with whom he came in contact.

There are times when it pays to show a decent respect for danger. Captain McCarthy was killed in the St. Malo campaign when a reasonsble amount of caution might have saved him. There are also some precautions that should be observed. The explosion of shells, except some with time or proximity fuses, is up and out. A man lying flat on the ground will usually escape wounding unless the shell happens to hit right on top of him. On the other hand if a man is standing up the shell fragments will usually find him. On one occasion we received a replacement lieutenant-colonel. I sent him up to the First Battalion to observe an attack that was in progress. He came back a few hours later on a stretcher. When I asked the battalion commander what happened he said, "While the lieutenant-colonel was up here an enemy artillery concentration came in. We all hit the dirt except this fellow. He stood still, I suppose to show his brav-

ery and got a skin full of shrapnel". Smart soldiers hit the dirt when shells are coming in, and do their moving when the shelling stops. Captain Dan Gust, our anti-tank officer, and Lieutanant Sam Magill, our intelligence and reconnaissance officer both roamed no-man's land throughout the war and both survived.

Cowardice usually takes the form of skulking in foxholes when an attack is going forward. What steps our junior officers took to get their men to go forward I do not know, but I think most of the advances were voluntary. I personally kicked a few pants of those who were hanging back. They had a tendency to stretch out in long columns in the early part of the war which was not noticeable in the later stages.

One of our greatest troubles was the tendency of men to go to the aid of their wounded buddies. If we had allowed this we would very soon have had nobody left to do the attacking. The wounded had to wait for the medicos.

It is a waste of time to threaten men with court-martial if they won't fight. The man in the foxhole who knows that if he gets out of his hole he is likely to be killed is not frightened by threats of being sent to a nice warm, safe, guardhouse. The discipline that will cause men to fight has to be inculcated before they reach the battlefield.

Our defense departments are making some studies trying to determine what kind of a man will fight and what kind will skulk or surrender at the first opportunity. I think that the investigators are just spinning their wheels. A big strong heroic looking and acting character will, as likely as not, grovel at the first hostile shot, and some insignificant little runt will turn out to be a hero. It is hard to make a study because the bravest usually get killed.

MORALE

Napoleon's saying, "The morale is to the physical as three is to one", is as applicable today as it was when it was written. The value of an infantry outfit on a battlefield is dependent on its esprit-de-corps, or as we term it, "morale". This means whether the mass of infantrymen will fight aggressively or will just seek the nearest cover and skulk until the fighting is over. If their morale is not good and they won't fight their commander is usually relieved of command. Many of our best officers have been killed exposing themselves in front of the lines trying to persuade their men to continue forward. If soldiers have been properly trained and disciplined before exposure to enemy fire they will usually fight even if they know their lives are in danger. Most soldiers want the respect of their brothers-in-arms. This, and their desire to prove to themselves that they are not cowards, probably has more effect on battle morale than anything except winning battles.

The basic ingredient in morale is confidence. The soldier's confidence in his leaders; his confidence that they will not callously sacrifice him to gain some unimportant objective; that his leaders are competent and know what they are doing. The soldiers do not have to like their leaders. The wisecracks about officers and non-commissioned officers being shot in the back because they were so tough on the soldiers is for rear area consumption. When a soldier's life is in danger he is looking for strong leadership - the stronger the better. Wrongs, fancied or otherwise, are forgotten when the chips are down.

The conditions under which soldiers fight always affects their morale. The same soldiers that were stopped in Normandy by the first

strongly defended hedgerow, risked their lives without thought when we were driving the Germans back to Berlin. The American G.I. is not stupid and is not as easily influenced by rabble rousing propoganda as are the natives of most other countries. Some of our congressmen became incensed because we did not teach our soldiers the four freedoms, and after the war directed that a period of such orientation be held each week. I doubt that the morale of many soldiers is influenced by such orientation. When I harangued the troops I never mentioned the four freedoms, but instead told them that the only route back home for them was through the German army.

The best indication of the morale of an organization is the soldier's loyalty to his outfit. This is sometimes revealed in curious ways. When a soldier got wounded in battle he would be sent to a field hospital, and when fit for duty, to a replacement depot. As the war progressed we had the problem of soldiers going AWOL from hospitals and replacement depots and rejoining their units at the front. This was somewhat hard to understand as they were taking chances of getting wounded again or being killed. I received dozens of letters directing me to take disciplinary action against such soldiers for going AWOL. My standard reply to these directives was that disciplinary action had been taken.

War has some unusual by-products. I have never known any time or activity where men's unselfish devotion to each other was higher than when in combat.

THE AMERICAN G. I.

Since the days of "The Rabble in Arms" of the Revolutionary War, the United States G. I. has not changed appreciably. The mass of them, if left to their own devices, will live like pigs and behave like juvenile delinquents. There is always, however, a leaven of better men who will take the lead in combat, and most of the others will follow along, more, I suspect, because they don't want to be left behind than through any desire to be heroes. That is why our casualties are always greater, proportionately, among officers and noncommissioned officers than among privates - they have to be in front.

Discipline is a dirty word to the American public. It brings up the picture of sadistic officers punishing worthy G.I's for the pure pleasure of satisfying their domineering instincts. On the contrary the duty of keeping the G.I. from catching all kinds of diseases, and requiring him to keep himself and his equipment in some degree of cleanliness and working order is one of the most onerous tasks that an officer must perform. Without some standard of discipline I seriously doubt if a military unit could even be brought to the point of contact with an enemy. In Pusan, Korea, during the Korean war, I watched the undisciplined troops of the divisions that were to fight there, disembark, and estimated that the officers would have a tough time getting them to the front, not to mention fighting after they got there.

I do not, however, go along with the idea that soldiers are supposed to be some kind of knights-errant. The principal purpose in having them on a battlefield is to win battles, not to show how pure and virtuous they are. Our men used to have a saying to the effect that anyone who wouldn't engage in sexual intercourse wouldn't

fight. The only condition that we enforced was that they could not use force in their relations with indigenous women.

The only compensation for being a combat infantryman is that he is the first to get to the spoils of war. These spoils include loot, particularly liquor and women. I did very little to stop this except when the looting interfered with military operations, or as the saying went, "One shootin and two lootin". Since they had no way to carry their loot the things they took amounted to very little. I had to issue orders against the wearing of top hats with the uniform. This was one of their favorite practices.

One of the most serious problems in combat was to get the G.I. to take care of himself. Most of them would never go to the trouble of burying discarded food or food containers to prevent the accumulation of flies. In the battle of the bulge when we were having more casualties from frozen feet than from shell fire, we had extra sox issued to everybody, only to find on inspection that only one in ten was wearing them. Rather than dig a foxhole deep enough to protect them from fire the majority would only scratch the surface, and depend upon luck to get them through a shelling.

Although somewhat exaggerated the drawings of cartoonist Bill Mauldin of Willie and Joe that appeared in "The Stars & Stripes" during the war more closely follow the attitude of the American G.I. than any account I have seen. The effectiveness of our G.I.'s in combat is due in a large measure to their ability to adapt themselves to any situation, and to take advantage of anything that will improve their personal comfort.

MOBILITY

The Drive Across Germany

Mobility, throughout history, has ranked with morale and fire power as one of the decisive factors in war. The marches of the barbarians, particularly under Genghis Khan, are history's outstanding examples of the effectiveness of mobility. Their's was a horse mobility, and troop movements of more than sixty miles in a day were not uncommon. The fact that a great deal of the alleged required equipment of soldiers is unneccesary was demonstrated in the Civil War by General Sherman when he cut away from his supply base, alloting only one supply wagon to a regiment.

The tendency of our military services is to continually add to the soldier's equipment. When the troops arrived in Pusan for the Korean War they were each carrying two barracks bags, in addition to their weapons and packs. Korean longshoremen had to help them down the gangplanks. Our recent manuever to air transport troops to Porto Rico was a complete flop. The cry immediately went up for larger and faster planes. What actually is needed is less equipment.

Except for a few machinegun and mortar men, the load of an infantry soldier in combat should not exceed twenty five pounds. He carries his individual weapon, one day's supply of ammunition, two grenades fastened to his belt suspenders, his canteen of water, one meal of canned food, his raincoat, (it always rains in combat) and his entrenching tool. In addition he may carry a round of mortar or rocket ammunition. Anything added reduces his mobility in direct ratio to its weight. Sleeping bags can be brought up by jeep and trailer after dark. He keeps his toilet articles, and extra socks and underwear, in his sleeping bag.

When we moved in Germany, which was almost every day that we were not fighting, Sergeant Holt, our operations sergeant, would prepare a march table for the troops. This table designated a certain point, usually a crossroad, as the I.P. (Initial Point) and gave each march unit a time to cross the I.P. The time interval between units was normally two minutes. If one unit was late it would throw out the whole schedule, so good and sufficient reasons for being late were never accepted. The commander got his unit there on time or he was replaced by someone who could get them there on time. Since there were usually twenty five to fifty march units spread out over an area several miles in diameter this required some nicety of planning on the part of the commanders and a high state of discipline on the part of the troops. Our ability to move rapidly was the primary reason that we led the drive across Germany in the later stages of the war. At one point in the drive an armored battalion was put in ahead of us, but after being held up half a day by two little villages, and having to be rescued by Sharp's battalion, they were drawn off to a flank where they wouldn't be in our way, and we were put back in the lead for the rest of the war.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

Battlefield intelligence has two missions: (1) The endeavor to learn about the enemy's forces, his plans, and the strength and disposition of his troops on the field of battle. (2) Preventing the enemy from learning the same about our troops.

Americans do not have the talent for this cloak and dagger skulduggery, and our intelligence services have always been weak. The European war was no exception. As far as the combat troops were concerned, military intelligence was more of a nuisance than a help. Had higher headquarters been able to give us information, that could be relied upon, concerning the strength and disposition of the enemy facing us, it would have been very helpful, but about all they sent us was a rehash of what we had sent in ourselves. The exception was aerial photographs which would show enemy gun positions and foxholes, if these excavations were not camouflaged. Our best information was obtained by cocking an ear toward the weapons that the enemy was shooting at us. If they were just infantry mortars and small arms we could usually expect that the positions were lightly held and we could barge in. If, however, they were sending over 88's and 150 mm Mortar shells we proceeded cautiously. We were at a great disadvantage in fighting against tanks, due to the inadequacy of our anti-tank weapons, so the greatest efforts of our intelligence and reconnaissance platoon and our anti-tank personnel were devoted to finding out whether or not we were opposed by tank units and, if so, where they were located. We kept tank and tank destroyer units attached to our assault battalions ready for instant use in case they ran into tanks. It is possible that our military intelligence might have been better if our posi-

tions had been more stabilized, but we were always on the offensive, and always moving, so we had little time to evaluate intelligence.

Security regulations, taking mostly the form of censorship, were just a nuisance. I have always thought that the purpose of censorship was more concerned with preventing derogatory information from reaching the United States than in keeping information from the enemy. The other phases of security were more serious. We had very complicated and expensive gadgets for converting messages into code and for decoding messages. These were desirable for higher headquarters but a nuisance to us. They took too much time. We developed many expedients for using radio in the clear to avoid use of these gadgets. On the operation maps that we issued to the battalions we numbered most of the more prominent objectives so that we could talk about them in the clear using only the number. This conversation would mean nothing to a person who did not have the number code. The battalions did the same on the maps they issued to their companies. When speaking about a unit we used the nickname or code name of the commander instead of the official designation of the unit. Monitors from higher headquarters were always listening in on our radio conversations and they were harder to fool than the Germans.

Trying to conceal troop movements was usually useless. All our vehicles had bumper markings and all that was neccesary was to have an enemy agent sit on the side of a road and take down these markings as the units went by. We couldn't remove the bumper markings because if anybody ever left an unmarked jeep for five minutes it wouldn't be there when he returned, but would end up in somebody else's motor pool.

COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL

Communication is always a tough problem in war. Telephone lines get broken by artillery fire or chewed up by tank treads, radios go out when most needed, radio operators get killed or wounded, or the operator is too concerned about staying alive to listen on the set. Communication men must work day and night and under all kinds of danger keeping the telephone lines in repair. One of the bravest men I knew in the war was Captain Raikos, our regimental communications officer. I was not favorably impressed with him initially because of his dapper appearance, and particularly because of an inch long fingernail that he favored on one little finger. I was wrong, however. Raikos had an overabundance of courage. He would go out with a repair crew and come back with half of them wounded. Every day, when he went out, somebody would say, "Raikos won't come back today". But he fooled them. He survived the war.

The telephone is much safer to use in war than the radio. The enemy very seldom penetrated far enough into our positions to be able to cut our lines and listen in on telephone conversations. Radio, on the contrary, is free to everybody, and the enemy will always have intelligence personnel, listening in who understand our language. In our last drive across Germany we periodically cut in on the German commercial telephone lines and transacted our business with the rear areas over these lines.

In a rapidly moving situation field telephone lines cannot keep up with the movement of the troops so radio must be used. If the advance is rapid enough it doesn't make too much difference whether the enemy knows about it or not. When he gets the information it will be too late to do anything about it. In our last drive the forward

headquarters of our regimental combat team consisted of two radio jeeps, one containing Major Bagley, our operations officer, and the other for me.

A recent article on modernization in the army gave a description of helmets with built-in radio receivers so that there could be communication by radio down to the level of the private soldier. We had trouble during the European war with radio operators in the battalions, companies, and platoons. They thought that the Germans could locate their positions by listening in on the radio communications, and consequently they kept their sets turned off. Even if all the difficulties of channels and frequencies could be solved, I doubt that many infantrymen would be listening to the radio when somebody was shooting at them. In Korea, during the first six months of the war, our soldiers lost or threw away 180,000 steel helmets. If these had contained radios the cost would have been multiplied.

INFANTRY WEAPONS

The infantry M-1 rifle has been criticized since the war as not being up-to-date. It is gradually being replaced by a somewhat lighter rifle. The weight of the rifle, although important, is not the whole problem. The volume, and consequently the weight, of the ammunition, is equally important. A high rate of fire is not as ne neccesary in battle as a reasonable degree of accuracy. Most light weapons with high cyclic rates of fire are inaccurate at ranges over fifty to a hundred yards. When our men first came in contact with the German machine pistol they were terrified by the sound, and started a big outcry which resulted in changing our carbine from semi-automatic to automatic. The effect of this change was to give a large volume of fire, most of which went over the nearest hill. Give Give an automatic weapon to a scared soldier and he can shoot up his daily allowance of ammunition in about five minutes. In an attack a soldier has to carry on his back all the ammunition he will use that day. Hundreds of men were drowned in the Normandy and African campaigns because they were overloaded with ammunition. It is desirable to have a rifle that can be set to fire automatically in emergencies, such as mass attacks at close range, but most of the firing in combat should be aimed single shots.

Machineguns, having fixed mounts, are the best long range small arms weapon. We even used them in marching fire, cradling the guns in the gunner's arms while the assistant gunner fed in the ammunition belt. We found no virtue in the Browning automatic rifle to offset it's additional weight. It's replacement by the new rifle will be an advantage.

The great killer of the war was the mortar. Our surgeon estimated that over 60% of our casualties

timated that over eighty percent of our battle casualties were from shell fragments. Most of these were from mortar shells, although to the G.I.'s all incoming shells were 88's. As the war progressed our attacking platoons would have each man carry a round or two of mortar ammunition. They even used them sometimes at close range as a substitute for rifle grenades, for greater effect. The design of the mortar has not changed appreciably since the Stokes mortar of World War I. It has been improved in range and accuracy, but the principle is the same and probably will remain so, since it is the only weapon that the infantry can carry by hand that can fire into distant foxholes and trenches.

When we first started operations in Europe, I asked our surgeon to report to me any casualties, either our own or German, from knife or bayonet wounds. He never reported any, although I questioned him several times. The paratrooper, with his trench knife strapped to his leg, is a fearsome looking individual, but I suspect that a boy scout knife would be more useful.

For close-in fighting the hand grenade is most effective. There has been little change in it since World War I, and as our grenade was superior to any others in World War II, it will probably remain unchanged.

I personally heard of only one man being killed with a pistol during the fighting. We were planning an attack in the Roer river campaign. A small woods lay in our zone of action. German tanks had been active and I feared that there might be some concealed in the woods. At twilight I called in Captain Gust, our anti-tank officer, and told him I would like to know whether or not there were tanks in the woods. He went out and returned about ten o'clock with

the report that there were six tanks in the woods. When I asked him how he knew, he said he went into the woods and counted them. Asked if there was not a sentry on duty he replied, "Yes, I shot the sentry with my pistol". We had the artillery fire white phosphorus on the woods and the tanks took off. They dont like white phosphorus.

Our only serious weakness in weapons during World War II was in the field of anti-tank weapons. Our anti-tank cannon was too light to stop big tanks, and the range of our rocket launchers was too short. Our rockets also lacked penetration against the sloping sides of tanks. In the battle of the bulge two of our bazooka teams stalked a German tank and fired on it from both sides. Both rockets glanced off and the tank destroyed both teams.

The weakness in anti-tank weapons has been corrected since the war. We now have an anti-tank rocket that will stop any tank. It can be hand carried by the infantry. It will only be neccesary to have infantrymen with enough courage to await the enemy tank's approach and fire on it from positions of concealment. Due to their construction and protective features of a tank it has very poor vision particularly in any direction except straight to the front.

Except for anti-tank weapons there has been little effective change in infantry weapons since World War II. Nor is any great change needed. Where improvement is needed is in morale, not in weapons.

There is much talk lately to modernizing the infantry. Some authorities, who quite apparently never saw a battlefield, have even suggested that the infantry itself is obsolete. Whenever an American is faced with a problem involving manuel labor, his immediate reaction is to get some gadget or machine to do the work for him. This escape has worked exceedingly well in our present economy, but its effectiveness in war remains still to be proved. Some of our advanced thinkers have suggested that the foot soldier be mounted on helicopters, flying platforms, and similar labor saving devices. In World War II we couldn't even get the low silhouette jeep close to the front. Flying platforms and helicopters would be sitting ducks for a machine gunner within half a mile of the gunner's position. In Korea, except for a few Russian tanks most of the modern weapons that the North Koreans and Chinese had were those that they had captured from United Nations troops. Most of the others were of the vintage of World War I. Yet they fought the well-armed and well-supplied United Nations troops to a standstill. It is the will to fight - not the weapon - that is of the most importance in the infantry.

SUPPORTING WEAPONS

A supporting weapon is one that helps an infantryman in battle. Its value in war is in direct proportion to the extent to which it aids the infantry. The greatest delusion presently influencing governments is the importance of ~~of~~ air support in brush fire wars. This is difficult to understand when the example of Korea is fresh in their minds. In Korea the United Nations had complete air superiority, but that had little influence on the outcome of the war. The Cuban fiasco is blamed on the failure of air support, but any combat infantryman would know enough not to attempt a landing on a hostile shore with the equivalent of a battalion of infantry led by an untrained civilian, with or without air support.

Airplanes can sink vessels, destroy buildings, kill noncombatants, and frighten untrained troops, but they have little effect upon good infantry. If in towns the infantry will get in the cellars of houses, if in the open they will be dispersed in foxholes. Air bombardment will kill some of them but not enough to be decisive, particularly if the infantry has anti-aircraft artillery support to keep the planes from flying low. During the Normandy campaign we had reached the outskirts of a village called Saintenny when we were ordered to drop back fifteen hundred yards so the air force could bomb the town. We dropped back, the Germans dropped back with us, the air force destroyed Saintenny, and it took us three days to fight back to where we were before the bombing.

During our operations in Europe we were occasionally bombed by German aircraft, but the results were negligible. Except for the breakout in Normandy the effects of our aircraft were also negligibile. Our air force operated independently. Our marines have

their own supporting air force and their system works better. As in the Russian army, the marine planes that are supporting the ground forces are under ground control. Any weapon that is not under the control of the commander on the ground is of doubtful value to him. During the fighting in Normandy an anti-tank battalion commander reported to me saying that he had been ordered to support my regiment. Hardly pausing for breath he stated that he had orders from his group commander to not put his tank destroyers closer than four hundred yards from the front. Since we were fighting at ranges of from a hundred to two hundred yards his weapons were useless to us, so I told him to go back to the rear - we didn't want him.

Our artillery and tank support after Normandy were both excellent. Their crews lived and worked with our infantryman, and considered themselves integral members of the team. The so-called "Blitz" gives the impression of independent tank operations. That is not true. The tanks and infantry have to supplement each other The infantry protects the tanks from Molotov cocktails and from rocket launchers, and occupies the captured ground. The tanks take out tough objectives such as road blocks, strong points in buildings, and pill boxes.

Our artillery was always excellent. As the war progressed our infantry lieutenants and sergeants learned to adjust artillery fire and could replace artillery officers as forward observers. Artillery has one weakness - it cannot shoot a man out of a hole in the ground. The man has to be rooted out by infantry. Air bursts, by using the proximity fuse, are more effective than ground bursts, but are not decisive. The infantry still has to take the ground.

MINES

Land mines are defensive weapons. They have been extensively used in recent wars to deny or limit the use, by attacking troops, of avenues of approach. Mines have a psychological as well as a physical effect. The attacker cannot see properly camouflaged mines and never knows when he will stumble into a trip wire that will explode one. Tanks are particularly vulnerable to mines, as mines of the Teller type will break the treads of the tanks. We were always on the offensive during the war so our use of mines was small. We still, however, had about as many casualties from our own mines as we had from enemy mines.

The greatest danger from our own mines was caused by the failure of units that had placed mines to take them up before they left an area. It was often as neccesary to sweep for mines an area that had been occupied by our own troops as it was to sweep areas formerly occupied by the enemy. Our troops also had the erroneous impression that they couldn't be killed by their own mines. We lost two of our best officers that way. The operations officer of the Third Battalion and the company commander of Company "K" passed through their own mine field on a reconnaissance in Luxemburg, returned by a different route, tripped one of their own mines, and both were killed.

We used one company of engineers almost constantly in clearing mines, augmenting their efforts with our own mine platoon. Although this work was highly dangerous I knew of only one instance of an engineer being injured by a mine. This happened when the engineers were clearing a position we had just captured. While they were working, an enemy artillery concentration came in, one of the engineers jumped into a ditch that hadn't been swept and tripped a mine.

I saw him at the aid station immediately after. His foot had been blown off. He was talking and laughing as though he had received a present. Whether this was the effect of drugs, or his relief that he hadn't been killed, I don't know. The stump of his leg was not pretty.

Mines have an effective role in defensive operationsn but their use by the aggressor during offensive operations is of doubtful value. They are not only dangerous but they seriously restrict the attacker's freedom of movement unless removed. This removal takes time and may warn the enemy of a pending attack. Unless the enemy is very active in counter-attacks it is probably better for the aggressor to leave the mines in the supply area.

VILLAGE FIGHTING

Most of the fighting in the present, "Brush fire wars", seems to occur in and around cities and towns. It is more often a matter of applying the principles of riot duty than the tactics of combat. The most neccesary characteristic for such combat is ruthlessness. The Russians understand this as was shown by their subjucation of the uprising in Hungary. Their action not only quieted the Hungarians but effectively discouraged similar action by any of the other satellites. Their military strength was so great that they didn't care whether or not they made a few martyrs.

In most of the towns that we captured in Germany the civilians offered no resistence. Occasionally some die-hard would take a pot shot at our soldiers, with the usual result that he ended his career immediately. We didn't have the time, and did not care to take the risk, of being humanitarians.

Tanks were the best weapons for fighting in the towns of Europe. Most European houses stand wall to wall, without yards. Tanks had the handicap of being vulnerable to mines and to bazooka fire, but offered protection from small arm's fire. Their assets of being able to crash through barricades, and to destroy stone buildings with their cannon fire, more than made up for their lack of manueverability in the narrow streets. Our tanks were always accompanied by engineers to clear land mines and by infantry units to protect them from bazooka fire.

Our infantrymen adopted a practice called, "mouseholing" for attacking defended houses along a village street. Instead of going

along the street where they would be vulnerable to fire, they worked from house to house by blowing a hole through the wall between the houses, tossing a grenade through the hole to eliminate anybody that was in the adjoining room, and then going through the hole into the next house. This method was more applicable to villages than to towns. It was too slow for large operations. For the larger cities, such as Neuss and St. Malo, we used a method of phase line attacks, taking the city street by street. For these attacks we used the tank-infantry combination.

The recent outbreak of brush fire wars throughout the world is probably an indication of what the United Nations will face in the future. These wars are fomented by the communists, who use impressionable students to do the dirty work for them. Since the students are throughly brain-washed it is useless to try to reason with them. Like all other people, however, they can be impressed by greater force. If the nations facing a communist take-over had the moral courage to answer the first shower of rocks from the students with a burst of machinegun fire they might make a few martyrs but they would stop the "revolution". The only answer to force is greater force.

DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

There has always been a question in my mind as to the effectiveness of, or the neccesity for, the appalling destruction wrecked upon a country in time of war. When we passed along the north north side of the Ruhr in our drive across Germany, the whole area seemed to be completely destroyed. Only the factory chimneys, like solitary bare trees after a forest fire, remained standing. Yet an allied examining group reported that the Ruhr was operating at nearly eighty percent of efficiency in producing war material until overrun by ground troops.

When we first entered Germany an artillery contemporary of mine was bragging about the beautiful destruction his artillery group had wrecked on the city of Aachen. He didn't appreciate my remark that the United States taxpayer would probably eventually pay for it.

When we were overrunning the city of St. Malo in a street by street attack we were ordered to stop while our artillery put a "serenade" of artillery fire ahead of us. This fire did some damage to the buildings of St. Malo, but had no effect on our advance. People in stone buildings are relatively immune to ordinary artillery fire.

The small boy instinct for destruction often comes out in war. One day, after we had captured a German town, I was walking down the street when I saw ahead of me an American GI methodically knocking in with his rifle butt the plate glass windows of all the stores.

I was severely reprimanded on one occasion by our division commander because one of our units had run across an abandoned German tank and had destroyed it with an incendiary grenade.

In our final drive across Germany we developed a method of capturing towns that saved both lives and property. When we captured a town we would telephone the Bergermeister of the next town telling him that if he didn't want his town shot up, to have sheets put out of the second story windows, and have all the soldiers in the town at the town entrance ready to surrender. We took dozens of towns that way and gained on the Second Armored Division on our left, which usually stood off half a mile and shelled a town before entering it.

To anyone who saw the appalling destruction to the German cities along the Rhine river, the resurgence of Germany since the war is even more remarkable. My impression was that a thousand years of building had been destroyed.

STAFF

A commander's staff consists of the officers he has to help him accomplish his mission. Prior to World War I the United States army units had very small staffs. The battalion staff of an infantry battalion in World War I consisted of one officer - the Adjutant. Between the wars our army became acquainted with British staff procedure, and in World War II the battalion staff had increased to about ten officers. In 1924, in Panama, I was simultaneously, Post Adjutant, at Fort Clayton, Regimental Adjutant of the 33rd Infantry, S-1 ofthe 33rd Infantry, Personnel Adjutant, Recruiting Officer, Billeting Officer, and Club Officer; and I played eighteen holes of golf almost every afternoon. The present organization has at least one officer in each of these positions, and they are all so busy none of them has time to play golf.

Most officers like to be general staff officers. It keeps them out of the rain and sun in peace times, and out of the combat area in war. It adds to their prestige when the war is over to say, "I was on General Stoopnagle's staff," instead of "I commanded "G" Company of the 329th Infantry." Also the path to promotion and to the stars leads through the staff. Generals are not likely to forget their staff officers when efficiency reports are made or promotions are being considered. The present infantry battalion executive is a major and usually succeeds to command of the battalion, although the job of a captain commanding a company is many times more dangerous and requires a much higher quality of leadership. The staff officers in the Pentagon are the people who make the tables of organization, and they are not prone to neglect themselves as far as rank and promotion are concerned. At the end of World

War II, I offered to three lieutenant-colonels in succession the command of an infantry battalion. Each politely declined. They wanted to be staff officers.

Officers on the staffs of generals, like generals, usually die in bed; but that is not always true of infantry unit staffs. I used up four regimental executive officers during the fighting. One went out with combat fatigue, one was wounded and evacuated, one was killed by a mine, and one was sent forward to command a battalion. The fifth I kept in the rear areas.

My most valuable staff officer was Major Bagley, who was an enlisted man at Pearl Harbor and succeeded to the job of operations officer when his predecessor went out with combat fatigue in Normandy. He ran all the operations of the regiment, and when the orders for an attack had been issued he often went forward to one of the battalions to take part in the attack. He got a facefull of white phosphorus that way one day, but wasn't evacuated.

Major Kohler, our supply officer, was probably the next most valuable. He handled the numerous and difficult supply problems without supervision, and we were never short of supplies. I think he used a little bribery in the form of captured liquor to get us precedence on supplies, which shows his business acumen. In our campaign along the base of the Harz mountains, he tried to liberate a German truck that was about a hundred yards inside the woods. It probably was a plant. Anyway the Germans captured him. He was recaptured about three weeks later, eighteen pounds lighter from German forced marches.

Our most unsung staff officer was Master Sergeant Holt, who was our operations sergeant. He had been a draftsman in civil life

and could turn out an operations map that would get him an "A" at The Command and and General Staff College.

Our regimental surgeon was Major Mauldin from Atlanta, Georgia. He, and his four assistant medical officers were all decorated for treating the wounded under fire. The only ineffective medico that we received was one who came in as a replacement for one of our battalion surgeons who was wounded. This medico protested vigorously that he was an allergist and consequently should not be in the front lines.

All our Chaplains also received decorations; not for their religious contributions, but for carrying badly wounded men out of danger. They didn't wait for stretcher bearers but carried them out piggy-back.

Just as big government has such complete control in Washington that it can never be reduced, big staffs have such complete control over our military organization that they can probably never be reduced. In present military organizations there are often more officers in the staff than there are in the units they supervise. All military staff organizations, including the Pentagon, could probably be reduced fifty percent with salutary effect on our fighting capacity.

THE SUPPLY PROBLEM

The saying,"An army travels on its stomach" is still true and the American stomach gets bigger with every war. Some malcontent writes home about how tired he is of canned rations, and how he would love a bottle of beer. Before long the public demands that he have fresh meat, fresh fruit and vegetables, and beer, without any consideration of the supply problems involved in getting them to him. We got along very well in World War II with canned rations and what liquor we could liberate . In the latter part of the Korean war the troops were furnished fresh food. Preparing fresh food for troops in combat is not practicable. The soldier is doing very well if he gets hot food just after dark and just before daylight, with a can of pre-cooked food for the noon meal. There were not many times during our operations that we were not able to at least reach our men with their food and their sleeping bags just after dark. This Spartan life applies, of course, only to the combat infantryman. The other services do better. I recently read an account of one of the decisive naval battles in the Pacific. According to the account, the personnel of an aircraft carrier were served ham sandwiches and iced lemonade while the action was going on. That is a gentleman's way of making war, but it isn't for the infantry.

One of the most important problems in the infantry is keeping the supply lines open. Like the severing of an artery in the arm or leg, the severing of the supply line will cause the member to die unless rapidly restored. In defense, supplies can be stored up, but in offensive operations the infantryman carries only supplies for one day. Supply lines may be cut by tank raids or by enemy

counter-attacks. These breeches have to be restored by anti-tank weapons or reserve units as quickly as possible to prevent isolation of the group that is cut off. Supply by air sometimes may be used as a temporary expedient, but will not usually be effective over an extended period. The disaster of Dienbienphu in Viet Nam illustrates the neccesity of having open supply lines. Twice during the war we relieved air borne units and both times we had to furnish them transportation to get them out of the area.

The loss of equipment on the battlefield is one of our most serious problems in combat. The state of discipline of an infantry outfit can often be determined by examining the area they have just passed over. If it is littered with cast-off equipment the state of discipline is low. In general, the soldier will throw away anything he thinks he can get along without. When he is hit by shell fire he leaves everything he was carrying at the place where the wound occurred. We used a system of having supply groups follow the attacking echelons to pick up cast off equipment, but we still had serious losses.

Stragglers from the battlefield usually fall into two classes; those who still have their weapons, and those who have thrown their weapons away. The first may be entitled to some consideration, the second are not, although there isn't much that can be done about it at the time. In addition to the losses, the attrition of equipment in combat is tremendous. A pair of shoes will usually last a man about a month. The combat conditions of dirt, rain, and neglect will cause weapons to deteriorate much more rapidly than under normal conditions, and it is an unusual soldier that under the danger and hardship of combat will give his weapons and equipment the attention they should have.

ALLIES

Our policy of giving military assistance, including our newest weapons, to any nation that will take them is at least a questionable, if not dangerous, policy. The friends of today may be the enemies of tomorrow. The very weapons that we have furnished them may be turned against us. In the Korean war the best weapons that the Reds had were those that they had captured from the South Koreans or from our troops. It is difficult to foresee in these times of governmental turnovers and changing loyalties, which nations can be depended upon to remain in the Democratic camp. Weapons furnished to allies should be restricted to those of a defensive nature, and for police purposes. We are at present in the most precarious position the nation has faced since the American Civil War. Our late friend Russia, which we helped when it was in trouble, put us there.

In our operations in Europe we came in contact with two allies, the British army, and the Free French - called the F.F.I.

The British are great people for organization. Our army learned most of it's ponderous staff procedure from them. They are always "regrouping" or "tidying up their rear". They don't believe in attacking until they have planned the sector of fire of every gun in the attack. They probably got that way from the terrific losses that they took in World War I, and are trying to avoid a repitition of the same. Our methods are more of the nature of the calculated risk. While General Patton was running loose all over Europe the Supreme Command was trying to get General Montgomery to open the port of Antwerp, so that the American vessels bring in supplies

could bring in supplies. The war was almost over before General Montgomery was well enough organized and regrouped to act.

After we stopped the Germans at Rochefort, Belgium, in the battle of the bulge, and the Germans started their retreat, our regiment was relieved by a British brigade, and we were given a mission of cutting the retreating German column in two at the Langlir river. Time was of the utmost importance. When the British showed up we were packed and ready to go, but the British brigadier insisted on a detailed reconnaissance before he relieved us, in spite of my assurance that the Germans were all gone. It took him from nine in the morning until four in the afternoon to make the reconnaissance. When he finished he suggested that I come to his trailer and have a spot of tea.

We had some contact with the Free French. My impression was that they preferred to swagger around the French towns, to impress the girls, rather than to do any serious fighting. A group offered their services to us to capture an island in the Loire river, but after repeated delays and requests for additional equipment, we decided that they weren't serious. On the other side of the picture we had a group that worked as security for our flanks in the St. Malo campaign that did an excellent job, although it involved no fighting.

The idea of using indigenous troops to save the lives of United States soldiers on foreign battlefields may have had some merit in its original conception, but so far it hasn't worked out very well. The only result so far has been to have to spend more United States infantry to correct the failures of the indigenous troops than it would have taken to do the job with professional soldiers in the first place.

DECORATIONS

Speak to a combat infantryman about the row of ribbons on some officer's chest and he will favor you with a sardonic grimace. At the end of the war the only decoration that these men would wear was the Combat Infantry Man's Badge. Ribbons have no particular value anyway since their awarding has about reached the status of a free issue of cigarettes. Their original intent was to impress civilians, but the average civilian can't tell the difference between The Distinguished Service Cross and The Good Conduct Medal. The most authenic heroes are probably dead infantryman, who received no recognition. In our division, which suffered 15,000 battle casualties, only five men were awarded Distinguished Service Crosses, and four of these were posthumus. None of these was awarded to our regiment. This was partly my fault. In our first attack in Normandy, Lieutenant-Colonel Quincy Sanders led his battalion through a mile of successive hedgerows, although twice wounded. At the first opportunity I put in a recommendation that he be awarded The Distinguished Service Cross. The recommendation came back disapproved, with the indorsement that, "He was only doing his duty as an infantryman". I knew of no more deserving case, so I didn't put in any more recommendations for The Distinguished Service Cross.

In general the awarding of decorations is based upon how dramatic a romanticist the citation writer is, not how outstanding was the act of bravery. We were just too busy with the enemy to find time to write up the citations. Besides the witnesses were usually dead or in a hospital somewhere so they couldn't be reached. What little time our officers had between fights they preferred to use bathing or washing their clothes. They could do a pretty good job on both using a steel helmet.

The most decorated person I knew in the army was a staff general. I heard that he received The Distinguished Service Cross for flying across Korea in an airplane. After the war I read an account of a navy flier who was awarded The Congressional Medal of Honor in Korea for wrecking his plane going to the rescue of another pilot whose plane was on fire. As both fliers were rescued by helicopter the action was evidently not in the immediate presence of the enemy. Had this happened in an infantry outfit he might have been recommended for The Soldiers Medal, but The Congressional Medal of Honor - hardly.

One man in our regiment was awarded The Congressional Medal of Honor. He was Sergeant Frank Neppel, in command of a machine gun in "H" Company when Von Rundstedt's armor came across the Roer river in the battle of the bulge. A platoon of tanks, accompanied by foot troops, attacked Neppel's machine gun squad, killing all the members of the squad except Sergeant Neppel. Neppel was blown back from the machine gun position, and both his legs blown off near the knees. Crawling back to the gun position on his elbows, Neppel righted the machine gun, and with a burst of fire mowed down the German infantry that were accompanying the tanks. Shorn of their infantry support the tanks turned around an went back across the Roer river. Neppel, for no good reason that I know, survived.

DISPLACED PERSONS

War always produces its pitiful lines of displaced persons, wandering, without destination along the military highways. They seem always to be following some inner urge that prevents them staying at their homes where they would be safer and more comfortable. The basement of a house is usually safe but they leave it and start walking, or get an uncomfortable ride on some overcrowded and rickety truck.

One of our occupation duties was to take care of these DPs. They were placed in camps, usually segregated according to their nationality. In the winter of 1945-1946, as inspector for Upper Austria, my principal duty was to prevent, as far as possible, their suffering from cold and hunger. The winter of 45-46 was the coldest for many years. The DP camps were temporary buildings with the water pipes close to the surface of the ground and always subject to freezing. The natives were supposed to supply the DPs, and their own supply problems were critical. The allowance of fuel for the DPs was about a double handful of lignite a day - about enough to cook a meal. The DPs used it for a combination of heating and cooking their one meal a day. The elderly DPs spent the rest of their time in bed, trying to keep warm. At my request the army issued each DP an extra blanket but this was not enough for comfort. Those who were strong enough were put on rehabilitation work. I can still remember the red hands of the poor old women replacing the cobble stones in the streets. The children were often running around in the snow with knitted foot coverings in place of shoes. A picture in one of our magazines of a small boy going into raptures over a pair of leather shoes would be easily understandable after that winter.

The DP ration was on a bare subsistence level. It waried from 950 to 1150 calories, depending upon the supplies available. The DPs used this ration in its most efficient manner. They made a thick soup, putting into it everything except bread that was issued in their food ration. The bulk of the ration was peas so each DP had about a quart of a thick, greenish soup every day, as their one meal of the day. Strangely, this soup was usually very palatable.

DPs are always the innocent victims of war. Their uncomplaining suffering under such painful conditions is sometimes difficult to understand.

THE RUSSIANS

Our first contact with the Russians, after the meeting on the Elbe river, was on the Danube river near Linz, Austria. We had been transferred from Bavaria, Germany to Austria a few months after the Japanese surrender. We were on the west side of the Danube river, with the Russians on the east side. As far as we were concerned the war was over and we relaxed. Not so, the Russians. They were busy every day digging trenches and building fortifications on their side of the river, as though expecting momentarily an attack from our side.

We paid no attention to this until they dropped a couple of artillery shells in our area while doing some practice firing. Our division headquarters protested and the Russian general with his staff came over ostensibly to apologize. We were going to laugh it off, but they were dead serious. They all wore sidearms, refused drinks, made their remarks, and departed. There was nothing resembling friendly relations in their actions.

Not long after this I attended a small luncheon for the United States Ambassador-at-Large. He spent the whole time telling us how essential it was that Naziism be destroyed. We commented afterward that he was either trying to propagandize us or was too stupid to be a clerk in the State Department, not to mention Ambassadors. He was worrying the carcass of the dead wolf while the bear was looking down his throat.

Later a few incidents occurred that illustrated the Russian attitude toward humanitarianism. They had several repatriation teams searching for Russian soldiers in our area. They found some in our DP camps, but a number of these, knowing what was in store

for them, committed suicide when the Russian police started searching the camp.. Although the Russians in the DP camps were probably war-time deserters, this resulted in ill feeling toward the Russian police by our soldiers, as well as by the other DPs.

The difference in the United States attitude toward the deserter problem was best illustrated by the outcry that arose in our country over mistreatment of American prisoners by one of our colonels who was in charge of an American guardhouse in England. He was excoriated by the entire press of the United States and his promotion suspended for using physical punishment to control prisoners, most of whom were deserters from the battlefields. In Russia they would all have been shot. Since I saw a large number of better and braver men lose their lives because these alleged buddies left them in the lurch when the going got tough, I probably would have done the same as the colonel who was excoriated.

My final brush with the Russians was somewhat personal in nature. Major Gust and I were hunting ducks on the Danube river, and seeing some pheasants on the Russian side were foolish enough to shoot two of them. We landed to retrieve the pheasants and had some difficulty finding one of them. Suddenly I heard a command and looking up saw a tommy-gun pointed at my middle with a tough looking Russian at the trigger end. Needless to say we offered no resistence. Although we were wearing our insignia of rank, the Russians went over us just like they would any other POWs. They weren't gentle. After searching our boat, they took us to a nearby guardhouse, and notified their headquarters. Several hours later a Russian officer showed up and talked to Major Gust in German. Evidently deciding we were just hunting, and not reconnoitering

their positions, he had us released. It was not a pleasant experience.

My impression of the Russian infantry was that it was tough, disciplined and competent. The individuals didn't appear to be too bright, but I wouldn't like to fight against them.

SECTION IV

THE KOREAN DEBACLE

1. Personnel Mistakes
2. Introduction to Korea
3. Tactics and Strategy
4. The Inchon Landing
5. Evacuation Plans
6. Korean Morale
7. Korean Supply
8. Collaborators
9. Summanry

(9)

THE KOREAN DEBACLE

The Korean war is not properly a part of the foregoing account, but should be included for the lessons it illustrates in how not to make war.

The Korean war was the war that nobody wanted. It came too soon after World War II for anybody, least of all the combat infantryman, to be very enthusiastic about it. It probably could have been prevented had not Congress refused to pass a small appropriation for defense weapons for South Korea. Failing this, the United States might have stayed out of Korea and allowed it to go communistic. That would have been no loss. Since the government failed to do either, the combat infantryman, as usual, took the punishment.

When the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parellel,I was Chief-of-Staff of the 25th Infantry Division in Japan. On the day the hostilities started one of our regiments was engaged in a landing exercise with the navy. If the intelligence chiefs at higher headquarters had any knowledge of the Red build-up, and pending attack, they failed to so inform our Division Headquarters.

General Dean's 24th Division was immediately ordered to Korea. I suppose our high command thought that one United States division would be enough to stop the North Korean attack. EIGHTH ARMY Headquarters stripped the other two divisions in Japan of a large number of their non-commissioned officers and specialists in order to fill the vacancies in the 24th Division. This personnel mistake had two bad effects. First, strange non-commissioned officers and specialists joining units in combat are about as effective as strange football players would be substituting while a game was in play. Second, and worse, the stripping of the other two divisions left

them without essential personnel when they followed the 24th Division into the combat zone a few weeks later.

The next personnel mistake was the failure to use experienced combat leaders that were available in Japan. The generals who commanded the divisions in the Eighth Army had mostly come up through the staff line. No matter how smart a man is, he doesn't learn about combat sitting in a chair. General Walker, who commanded the Eighth Army in the initial fighting had most of his experience as a tank commander, and the Korean terrain was not adapted to tank warfare. I was told that I was too old and too deaf to fight, so they left me in Pusan. That was all right with me. I would have done my best but had no enthusiasm for the physical and mental punishment. Several other experienced combat leaders were left in the rear areas while the young and inexperienced troop leaders made the same mistakes that we made in World War II.

The final personnel mistake was the redeployment system that was initiated during the fighting. This system directed that when a soldier at the front had served six months in the combat zone, he would be relieved and sent back to Japan. All the soldiers knew their date of redeployment and as this date drew near they fought with one eye on the enemy and the other eye on their date of redeployment. Wars are not won that way.

INTRODUCTION TO KOREA

We landed at Pusan in June - the very worst month in Korea. The natives use human excreta for fertilizer, and June is the month that they fertilize. They also eat a vegetable that gives their feces such a sickening odor that a strong stomach is neccesary to prevent

continuous nausea. This odor pervades everything and there is no escaping it.

Our welcome to Pusan was not propitious. The North Koreans were at the outskirts of Taegu which was only twenty four miles away, and were expected to break through at any time. Every night was bedlam. The troops at Pusan were port troops, quartermasters, ordnance, engineer, signal and medical. They were quartered in schoolhouses and other public buildings and a large number in pyramidal tents. They mounted their own guards. These guards were usually recruits, not trained for guard duty, and very jittery. Whenever there was a movement at night in the brush around their billets they would fire first and challenge afterwards. I finally reduced this by getting a lieutenant of infantry, who had been wounded and evacuated from the front, to roam the area at night in an armored car with orders to pick up any sentries who fired at night, and put them in the guard house. Next day the sentries would be court-martialed and fined fifty dollars. This slowed up the firing to some extent.

One night this lieutenant called me on the phone and asked if I knew that a colonel on the staff had called out an ordnance company and a quartermaster company to attack a Red group on a hill near their quarters. The plan was that the quartermasters would go up one side of the hill and the ordnance men up the opposite side. I had a picture in my mind as to what would happen when these two groups reached the top of the hill. Fortunately the lieutenant in the armored car got in between them in time to stop the battle. The enemy turned out to be three American soldiers drunk on native liquor and celebrating by firing their carbines.

At this time the Reds could probably have won the Korean war by an air attack on the gasoline tank farm at Pusan, Korea. Why they never tried it is one of the war's mysteries. The tank farm was concentrated on a spit of land that could have been easily located from the air at night, and the anti-aircraft defense was negligible. If it had been bombed with incendiaries, we would have been seriously handicapped if not out of the war entirely. Our army is too dependent on trucks to operate without them. Later we extended our operations to include the towns of Ulsan and Masan so were not so vulnerable . Why the Reds overlooked this opportunity has never been explained. Perhaps they have some stupid people in their top echelons like we do.

We had a fire in the tank farm later in the war and for a while it looked as though we might lose it. The fire was overcome by the heroic efforts of prisoners of war that were working in the area. Fortunately it broke out about noon when the area was filled with workers.

TACTICS and STRATEGY

The Korean war was an infantry war. Except for control of the seas by the navy and control of the air by the air force, both of which were easy, it was a ground job. The terrain was not suitable for tanks and the hills limited the use of artillery. It was primarily a task for the infantry. There just wasn't enough infantry and what we had was not good enough. They couldn't be everywhere, and the North Koreans and Chinese were more rugged and required less equipment. They outmanuevered our infantry in the rough hill country and had a better appreciation of the neccesity of holding the high ground instead of taking the easier way through the rice paddies. The marines, who came in later, made better use of their air support than the army could. Their air force was in direct support and didn't need twenty four hours notice to bomb something. The marine force, however, consisted initially of only one division.

The Inchon Landing

Our best operation of the war was the Inchon landing. When our Xth Corps landed at Inchon and caught the North Koreans between it and the Eighth Army the Reds were practically destroyed. We had been told at Pusan to expect 40,000 prisoners. We received 140,000. The Reds were scattered and in full retreat north of Seoul. There appeared to be no doubt that we could drive clear to the Yalu river. In fact one army combat team under Colonel Powell reached the river but later was drawn back.

Following this Red defeat our Xth Corps put on a manuever which violated almost every rule in Napoleon's book. After capturing Seoul the corps was reloaded on its transports, all our truck and rail transportation was commandered, and the entire corps was moved from

Inchon around the southern tip of the Korean peninsula to Hungnam on the east side and put into action there. This took about two weeks. In the meantime the Reds, seeing that they were no longer pursued, stopped for breath, reassembled into combat units, and with the aid of the Chinese, who crossed the Yalu river, they struck the Eighth Army and knocked it south of Seoul. The above manuever of the Xth Corps violated the following combat principles:

(1.) The principle of exploitation - Not destroying a defeated enemy.

(2). The principal of mass - Separating two parts of a force by an effective obstacle - the Korean mountains.

(3). The principal of concentration at the critical point - The area of Seoul and Pyongyang.

(4). The principal of security - Our intelligence services failed to find out that the Chinese intended to cross the Yalu river. This crossing exposed our troops north of Seoul to mass attacks, and the absence of the Xth Corps left the Eighth Army without sufficient troops to repel them.

(5). The principle of supply - Due to lack of transportation the Eighth Army had to abandon tons of critical supplies, and the 2nd Division was for a time on short rations.

Whether or not the Chinese would have crossed the Yalu river if the North Koreans had been completely destroyed, and the line of the Yalu river had been held north of Pyongyang by our troops, is anybody's question.

EVACUATION PLANS

Following the Chinese invasion the fate of Korea was very nearly permanently settled by evacuation of the Korean peninsula by the forces of the United Nations. It would have taken only a little more push by the Chinese to force us out. They, also, apparently did not understand the principle of exploitation.

A short time after Seoul fell to the Reds, I was ordered to Eighth Army headquarters to receive instructions relative to the evacuation of the port of Pusan. At that time I was G-4 (Supply Chief) at Pusan. They told me at Eighth Army headquarters that they intended to evacuate Korea, and for me to make plans accordingly. Evacuation would involve backloading by ships to Japan of an enormous amount of heavy equipment, and threatened to be a very complicated operation. I asked for and received assurance that this was not a tentative decision, but that firm plans had been made to leave Korea to the Reds. I went back to Pusan and made plans for back-loading railway ambulance cars, heavy bridging equipment, and other heavy equipment of various kinds.

We had tactical plans for the evacuation of the troops in Korea through the port of Pusan. We pulled out these plans and dusted them off. They involved setting up a defense perimeter on the hills surrounding the port to protect the Eighth Army while it loaded at the docks. Our largest combat unit was a battalion of engineers. It was assigned the area on both sides of the main highway from Seoul to Pusan - the most dangerous avenue of enemy approach. The commander of the engineers remarked, "It looks like I will be the last man out of Korea". I reassured him by telling him he would be the next to last man out of Korea.

About the time the evacuation plans got under way, General Ridgway arrived in Korea, and gave the Eighth Army, "About Face". Whether this was his own idea or he brought it from the Pentagon I don't know, but there was no doubt as to the change in purpose. Evacuation was no longer mentioned. Seoul was recaptured and the war settled down to an expensive winter stalemate.

During this time our air force repeatedly bombed the bridges across the rivers in the northern part of Korea, and brought us photographs showing the bridges broken and in the water. Photographs taken the next day would show the same bridges back in use, having been repaired during the night. For this reason I seriously doubt if bombing the bridges over the Yalu river would have greatly effected the outcome of the war, unless there were infantry troops on the south bank to prevent the Reds from repairing them.

KOREAN MORALE

There have been many derogatory comments made and printed about the morale of the troops in Korea. The more remarkable characteristic is that they fought at all. To persuade a reasonably intelligent American boy that he should give up his life for some obscure political reason, on a worthless peninsula five thousand miles from his home is stretching patriotism too far. If the United States wants to settle its ideological differences the hard way, they have the neccesary money to hire mercenaries. The government apparently assumed that if troops were put on a battlefield they would fight. To a degree this is a correct assumption, but the lack of enthusiam and discipline will prevent victory over other troops that are poorly equipped but have high morale. The Chinese described our soldiers as men without patriotism, fighting against their will, and ready to surrender at the first opportunity.

In Korea, when the combat situation had become stalemated, our high command tried to substitute more agreeable living conditions for combat morale. This was a failure. A man that won' fight on canned rations won't fight on fresh rations. The R&R (Rest and Recuperation) to Japan only had the effect of making the conditions at the front less attractive when the soldier returned from R&R. The redeployment system for soldiers with six months at the front resulted in a lack of incentive to get the war over with. Instead they waited out their six months. There were undoubtedly many cases of heroism by individuals and small units, but the general attitude of the whole area was that of complete apathy. Wars are not won that way.

The outcome of the Korean conflict, like most of the wars in history, was based upon the quality of the infantry. The quality of the infantry in Korea was the lowest of that of any of the three wars in which I have particapated. The incentive wasn't there.

KOREAN SUPPLY

There is probably no war in American history where there was a greater waste of military supplies than in Korea. Some units, when they were defeated and had to cross rice paddies, threw away everything they had, even their shoes. After six months of the war our Quartermaster at Pusan reported that he had issued 180,000 replacement steel helmets, despite the fact that all troops going to the front were originally equipped with helmets. The troops apparently threw them away when they became uncomfortable, and their generals demanded that the supply service furnish them with replacements.

Our supply service in Korea was based upon sea supply by LST, supplemented by rail and truck. During the time our forces were in

the Seoul area the mass of supplies was sent through the port of Inchon. The tides at Inchon are over twenty feet in height. The LSTs could come into the port on the high tide, the locks on the tidal basin closed, and the LSTs unloaded as needed, going out again on a high tide. When our troops were driven out of Seoul some jittery commander ordered that the locks on the basin be blown up, evidently not considering that the basin would be useless to the Reds, since we controlled the sea, but would be of great value to us if we ever recaptured Seoul. We recaptured Seoul later, but months passed before we could get new locks.

The principal reason for the enormous losses of equipment in Korea was that the soldiers were over-equipped when they landed. They came down the gangplanks each trying to carry two barracks bags as well as their weapons and packs. We had to have Korean longshoremen help them off the ships. Having been through this in Europe, I knew that a solder in battle would throw away anything he could get along without, so I tried to persuade one General to leave the barracks bags at Pusan. He passed off the comment by saying it was army orders. In a week or two most of the barracks bags came back to Pusan in slat sided cars, half destroyed by being exposed to rain.

Replacement of spare parts during the early part of the war became so critical that the ordnance department, in some cases , had to furnish a new jeep for want of parts for an old one.

A Senator from Maine made a big fuss in Congress over alleged shortage of artillery ammunition in Korea. The shortage was of the same kind that we had in World War II. We were always rationed on artillery ammunition - there is never enough to plow the fields with it.

COLLABORATORS

There has been much discussion in the United States relative to the collaboration by American soldiers prisoners of war with the Chinese during the Korean war. In my opinion the only person who is qualified to criticize such collaborators is one who was captured and didn't collaborate. The fault lies, not in the fact of collaboration, but in putting a man in battle in Korea against his will. Every able-bodied man should be required, when needed, to fight for the defense of his country. But to call upon a man to sacrifice his life on a battlefield five thousand miles away be - cause of some political beliefs by non-combatant politicians is certainly not justified. If the cause is considered just enough to require troops, then a country as rich as The United States should hire mercenaries for such purpose, paying them what is needed to get them. To pick one man in ten and say to him, "You are chosen to give up your life for this cause" cannot be defended by any arguments that I have heard.

The whole theory of non-collaboration is wrong. The people who issue the order that the soldier will give only his name, rank, and seriel number are in headquarters so far in rear that their possibility of becoming prisoners is too remote to be considered. But they want to be plenty tough on those who might get captured. From my experience the whole hush-hush idea is without merit. The average soldier doesn't know enough about the overall plans to give information that would be of any value. If he can ameliorate his condition his condition by cooperation with the enemy he should be allowed to do so. It is tough enough just being a prisoner without doing what he can to make it easier. Some restriction on giving out information might be required of officers, particularly officers that might have

access to plans, but to put restriction on enlisted men is foolish as well as unenforceable. The virtuous air of patriotism assumed by the critics of collarorators is particularly irritating when their own lack of vulnerability to danger is considered. Turncoats who actually go against their own country and make false statements should be dishonorably discharged. They differ from the mass of collaborators who only want cigarettes or physical comforts.

Large numbers of prisoners is indicative of a low state of morale. Good soldiers won't surrender as long as they have ammunition, unless they are surrounded by vastly superior numbers. Those who surrender easily should not have been brought to the battlefield. It is of no military value to a country to go to the trouble of bringing a soldier to a battlefield only to have him give up at the first hostile shot. Some of our units in Korea were put into the lines and the whole unit just faded away during the night, sometimes leaving the flank of another unit exposed. Undependable units on your flank in combat are worse than an exposed flank. If you know there is nobody on your flank you will take the neccesary steps to guard it.

SUMMARY

The Korean War proved that in spite of the fact that World War II had ended only five years before, we had no suitable forces to fight brush fire wars. We had no tough, well disclipined, infantry units, commanded by combat experienced officers, and having their own artillery, tank, and air support, ready for instant use anywhere in the world.

Our soft, over-equipped, and over-staffed occupation troops were no match for the tough Chinese infantry, that could fight all day on a handful of cartridges and a handful of rice.

Our half-trained National Guard units were merely bloody sacrifices. They paid with their lives for the military policies of a government whose motto seems to be, "Billions for air weapons but not one cent for the man who does the fighting."

We had complete control of the sea, and complete control of the air - more navy and air force than we needed. When I left Korea, the air force and the navy (less the marines) had each sustained about a thousand casualties. The army casualties were about a hundred thousand, and the marine corps about twelve thousand.

A face-saving alibi has been advanced that we could not win the war in Korea because we could not bomb communist installations north of the Yalu river. In World War II the enormous destruction in England failed to stop the English, and the apparent almost complete destruction of the Ruhr failed to stop the Germans, so this is rather a weak alibi on which to rest our national prestige. Since we would not have been able to folow up our bombing with infantry occupation its probable value is debatable. Wars are won by the occupation of the enemy's terrritory, not by destruction of property.

SECTION V

THE REGULAR ARMY

1. The profession of arms
2. Discipline
3. Discrimination against the regular
4. The draft
5. Caliber of the army
6. Wastes in military pay
    a. Dependents
    b. Army pay
    c. Flying pay
    d. Too many officers
    e. Too many headquarters
    f. Too much travel
    g. The reserves
7. Military law inforcement
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THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

The profession of arms , like any other profession, requires long and hard study. Most professional officers spend their entire lives in study, and still feel that their education is inedaquate for tasks involving the lives of thousands of men, and perhaps the safety of their country. Our government, however, insists that the decisions effecting national defense shall be made by civilians, most of whom have little or no knowledge of strategy, tactics and logistics, and whose ignorance leads them to be influenced by the most positive talker in the military services. The fact that our retired generals and admirals are usually offered positions as heads of large corporations, while heads of large corporations serve as chiefs of defense establishments, is one of our national absurdities. It is just as sensible as it would be to send a doctor to build a bridge, and send an engineer to a hospital to perform a major operation. High ranking civilians in the defense department have the very nice position of having lots of authority while not being responsible for results if things go wrong. They can tie the hands of military chiefs and still point the finger of blame at them when a scapegoat is needed.

The characteristic that makes the difference between the professional soldier and the civilian in uniform is discipline. A company commander can do anything with a disciplined company - he can do nothing with one that isn't disciplined. The classic example of discipline is the legend about Emporor Christophe who was supposed to have marched his troops to their death over a cliff to demonstrate his control. The outstanding records of graduates of West Point are due to the rigorous discipline they underwent there

I have seen a company of infantry in the wilds of Panama stand as rigidly at attention while the flag was being brought down at Retreat as though a thousand people were watching them, even though an extemporized flagpole was used and only a single bugle to play, "To the Colors".

The ceremonial part of military life is the one thing that lifts it, temporarily, from being just a dirty business. All the world's a stage and soldiers have the same desire to be on the stage as any other actors. The opportunity to parade to the sound of music brings out the best in most of them. One of the army's greatest examples of false economy was the elimination of regimental bands. The army could have done better by eliminating the staff officers who thought up the idea. There is seldom a meeting in a communist country that does not include a ceremony of marching troops. They understand the psychological effect of colors, music, and marching men.

The time spent on ceremonies and practicing for ceremonies is not wasted time. The morale effect of an hour spent on a ceremony would be greater than the morale effect of the hour spent on information and orientation as presently required. Ceremonies have to be well performed or they have a negative effect. Soldiers out of step, not uniform in appearance, and with sloppy alignment will bring out more ridicule than respect. In 1928 I participated in an Armistace Day ceremony in the University of California stadium. After a rather lackadaisical exhibition by various National Guard, ROTC, and Naval units, the 30th Infantry regiment marched into the stadium in a mass formation that brought the forty thousand spectators to their feet in waves of cheering. At this same ceremony a lone bugler sounded "Taps" while forty thousand people stood so still that you could have heard a pin drop. Such formations have a morale value that

cannot be over-estimated. The soldiers pride in himself and his organization will carry him to the battlefield and into the gravest danger. His very posture and the way he walks will indicate this pride. He is not likely to sully it when danger comes.

Uniforms have the tendency of putting on their wearers the false appearance of equality. Two soldiers may look alike, but one will be a hero and the other will hide when the fighting is going on. Military units also have individuality. One company will fight and a similar company will be worthless on the battlefield. The character of individuals cannot be completely changed, but it can be moulded by discipline. The habit of obedience, like the sub-conscious mind, will usually take control in time of danger, and force the individual to jeopardize his life, if neccesary, in compliance with orders.

In training American soldiers more time is spent on disciplinary drills than on tactical exercises. If the people of The United States were required to obey the laws, and children were accustomed to obeying their parents, the training time for soldiers could be cut in half. It takes about a year to break a soldier of the slovenly habits and slack obedience of civil life. When I was a company commander we used to have a saying, "The soldier's worst enemy is his mother."

The value of training and discipline has long been accepted in the military world. Basically, the training of a professional football team is no different. Putting untrained and undisciplined soldiers on a battlefield would be similar to collecting eleven big, strong boys, and putting them on a football field to play against the Baltimore Colts. There have been many instances in history where trained and disciplined troops have defeated ten times their numbers in armed rabble. As far as armed enemy civilians are concerned, they

are, in war, more of a nuisance than a danger. They cannot act by concerted effort, and most of them can't hit anything when they shoot at it.

THE REGULAR

Congress has always been over liberal in its treatment of the non-regular service man, but has had an attitude that bordered on active hostility toward the regular. Regular officers were denied the bonus for World war I service, although their hardships were just as great as that of the non-regulars. Widows of reserve officers killed in action in World war II received several times as large pensions as widows of regular army officers killed the same way. During the time of the Civilian Conservation Corps the enrollees received thirty dollars per month while regular army privates in the same camps received twenty one dollars.

The regular army in times of peace is an organization that differs from the civilian world. The life of its individuals is closely circumscribed by regulations and orders. Pacifists call this "Regimentation". Having lived for some years under both military and non-military regimes, I find much to praise in the military way of life. It is pleasant to live in an area where the traffic laws are complied with. Not having to lock your quarters when you go out is convenient. The reassuring sound of tattoo across the parade ground at night gives a feeling of security. Lack of money is compensated for by concerted action and cooperation by military personnel. Compared to military life, as I saw it, civilians seem to lead rather dull lives.

Most professional soldiers after becoming adjusted to military life, grow to like it and become critical of civilian practices. They are not favorably impressed by the impotence of civilian police, by

the total lack of respect for anybody or anything. They do not admire the unshined shoes, the sloppy clothes, the disregard of time, the inaptness of public officials, the prevalence of graft, crime, and general lawlessness. They may not approve of some of the military orders and regulations, but the veteran regulars know they can't beat the system, and prefer it to civilian slackness.

Most of the criticism of the army by civilians arises in time of war when the mass of the officers are newly recruited from civil life, and have picked up army authority without the knowledge that should go with it. The "hurry up and wait" of war times results usually from inexperienced commanders. The neccesity of being at the fixed time at the properly appointed place is party responsible. It is not an offense in the army to be ahead of time, but to be late is one of the military cardinal sins.

In spite of the records of history, and the advice of high officers, Congress has never considered it desirable to have a professional army. It will appropriate billions for such ethereal projects as sending a rocket to the moon, or for expensive defense measures of questionable usefulness. It will pay exorbitant wages to civilians building useless warning systems, but its best offer for a man's life in the army is basically less than a hundred dollars a month. The offer is the same, soldier, sailor, marine, or airman. No consideration is given to the character of the service demanded. How can anyone expect that a man, if given a choice between sleeping in a foxhole and sleeping in a comfortable room, would choose the foxhole. How can they imagine that if given a choice between working with interesting machinery, and walking mile after mile in the hot sun or in drenching rain, a man would choose the latter. How can anyone imagine that given a choice in war between serving in a unit that has

ninety percent casualties, and one that has ten percent casualties, the man would choose the former. The United States juvenile is not so dumb, and he has a lot to live for. In order to get a professional army, the deal will have to be somewhat fairer. Blaming the unpopularity of the army, as compared to the other services, on army officers is a clear failure to appreciate the facts of life. During World War II Congress passed an act which gave the combat infantryman ten dollars extra a month while in combat service. Ten dollars a month for an infantryman's life!

The army in peace times draws its volinteers from three main sources - men who can't get or hold a better paying job in civil life, juvenile delinquents who can't get along in their home communities, and adventurers that can't get in the air force or navy. Of these the adventurers are usually the best. When there are not enough volunteers to fill the ranks, the military draft furnishes men who serve more or less willingly for two years and then take their discharges.

THE DRAFT

Over every young man in the United States there hangs, like the sword of Damocles, the threat of the military draft. Like the sword, the threat is the worst part about it. In execution, the draft is fairly easy to beat, but its possibility makes planning for education or a career uncertain. The worst of this is that the uncertainty is not neccesary. Our original selective service law(draft) was a neccesary and honorable instrument, when passed, because we were in a war. Its use may again be neccesary if we are foolish enough to get into another all-out war. Past experience does not encourage a person to believe in the so-called desire for peace by the United States.

We have jumped into our last three wars at the first opportunity. Second thoughts may have kept us out of all three, and none of the three has improved our international position or settled anything. We may, therefore, need to keep our draft law on the books, but it should be suspended from peace time use.

The operation of the draft law, at present, is unfair, ineffective, and not an asset to the national defense. Its proponents claim that it is neccesary in order to provide cannon fodder for the army. The only reason enough volunteers cannot be obtained for the army is that the pay offered is not high enough. If the pay for privates was increased enough, the draft would be unneccesary.

There are too many ways to beat the draft. I seem to recall something like forty three percent rejected for physical reasons. This is patently absurd. A large number probably complained of pains in their lower spine, claimed that they couldn't read the eye chart, or hear, or said that they wet the bed, or had asthma in their youth. It is also fairly easy to play dumb and answer all questions with, "I dunno", and thus be rejected on the mental tests. There are also many other ways to escape the draft, such as enlisting in the navy or air force, accumulating dependents, acquiring police records, being deferred for educational reasons, and other ways.

Most of those who are drafted are just time servers. If they were really interested in the military profession, they would enlist. The best ones serve out their two years more or less willingly, but only about five percent of them re-enlist. The drafted soldier marking off each day on the calendar is like the front line infantryman in the Korean war marking off each day before his redeployment. Such soldiers are weak reeds for the support of our national defense.

The draftee, like the enlisted recruit, has to have about a year of disciplinary drills and training to get him out of his slovenly civilian habits. It takes another year to teach him the use of weapons, tactical principles, and the use of ground and cover. About the time the draftee would become of some value for use in a brush fire war, his period of service expires. Even before his time is up he is not inclined to expose himself to being killed or wounded when he has only a short period before he will be out of danger. It is not likely that the dash and recklessness required of a good infantryman will be found in such material.

The draftee, also, has a lien on the treasury for the rest of his life, whether he sees combat service or not. Such a lien is not neccesary in the case of the volunteer. For him it is a job of work and he takes his chances as an occupational hazard.

THE ARMY

From this combination of questionable regulars and reluctant draftees the army has built in the past, and may have to build in the future, its military machines. Prior to World War II when a recruit joined an army company he wasn't briefed on what the service was going to do for him, but was told in no uncertain words what he would do for the service. The so-called "New Army" is approaching the problem more from a Dale Carnegie angle, and it may change from the days when police judges gave juvenile delinquents their choice between the army and the reform school.

It is, however, difficult to understand why Congress cannot offer to high school graduates enough pay to make military service a respected occupation, particularly since the country is presently facing the grave possibility of being isolated by the kind of brush fire wars that only the man on foot can extinguish. Brush fire wars demand

that only the man on foot can extinguish. Brush fire wars demand trained and disciplined soldiers, which only professionals can produce. The difference in the psychological effect upon foreigners caused by dedicated soldiers, as compared to unwilling time servers, is alone enough to warrant the expense of paying them a living wage.

MILITARY PAY

It is not the purpose of this article to recommend an increase in the cost of national defense. It costs now about twice as much as it should. There have grown up in the military services since World War I a number of personnel policies that probably double the cost of maintaining military units. These policies, in addition to being extremely expensive, actually have a serious detrimental effect upon the efficiency of our defense forces. The most expensive, and the most detrimental, of these policies are:

1. The encouragement of service men to marry. This is particularly applicable to the younger ones.
2. Spending tax money on dependents instead of using it to get better soldiers.
3. Paying too much to generals and not enough to privates.
4. Paying flying pay to non-flying officers.
5. Increase in the number and rank of officers and non-commissioned officers, in relation to the number of privates.
6. Increase in the number of headquarters and the number of staff units used to service them.
7. Maintaining thousands of reserve units that would be useless in either atomic or brush fire wars.
8. Increase in the number of military lawyers and military police.
9. The twenty year retirement law.
10. Supporting millions of undeserving veterans.

DEPENDENTS

When President Eisenhower ordered that the number of dependents sent overseas should be reduced to reduce the outflow of gold, there was an enormous clamor set up,which resulted in President Kennedy rescinding the order. The outflow of gold is important, but it is not the only important phase of this problem, and perhaps not the most important. Dependents overseas, in the event of hostilities in that area, would be a major problem. Our government should make up its mind whether the primary mission of our military forces is to defend the country, or whether it is to please the wives and children of military personnel.

At the present time there are more dependents in the army than there are soldiers. The reason for this is that soldiers get additional pay if they have dependents, so they feel that they had just as well get married, and then turn their domestic problems over to the army. Inspect any military installation and you will find the hospital corridors, the commissaries, the post exchanges, the snack bars, the theatres, the schools, even the overseas transports,all filled with women and children. If the money paid out for all these fringe benefits for dependents was offered in pay to single men there would be no neccesity for the military draft.

The marriage of immature service personnel is good for neither the men nor the service. Domestic problems divert the attention of the soldier from his primary mission. If the dependents are in a danger area the soldier is more concerned about the safety of his dependents than he is about defeating the enemy. Career officers and enlisted men of higher rank might be excepted, but no service man with less than five years service should receive any dependency al-

lowances. It would greatly benefit the services if no dependents were allowed to go overseas, but instead, tours were shortened to about one year and used as a training exercise. More ill feeling toward Americans has probably been caused by allowing the presence of dependents in occupied countries than by any other policy. The high living standards of United States dependents, which calls for indigenous servants, causes active resentment on the part of the natives.

The idea that a man is a better soldier when he has dependents is fallacious. Between World War I and World War II the marriage of any soldiers below the grade of First Sergeant was not recognised and very few were married. When I commanded Company A of the 30th Infantry in 1927-1929 it did not contain an officially married man, even among the officers and non-commissioned officers. Yet it was rated "Superior" in both years. The soldier may win more Good Conduct Medals if he is married, but he will probably win fewer "Silver Stars" Soldiering is a tough business, and not the proper vocation for male domestics.

A great part of the expenses of dependents is hidden expense, like hidden taxes. Transportation, schooling, medical attention, housing, recreation facilities, big commissaries and post exchanges are all a greater military expense because of dependents. For brush fire wars, particularly, the services need unencumbered soldiers, ready to move anywhere in the world on a few hours notice without having to consider family problems. There used to be a saying in the army, "A bachelor has no rights that anyone is bound to respect". For this reason the bachelors always got more than their share of duty in the field - they had no families that had to be considered. If there were fewer dependents in our brush fire army its potential effectiveness would be much greater.

ARMY PAY

In passing the last pay bill Congress gave big increases to generals and nothing to privates. Anybody who thinks they can make an army out of big shot generals,with juvenile delinquents for the rank and file, had better resurvey the problem. Generals take no part in the fighting. They are administrators. I know only two generals who tried to get mixed up in the fighting. One of them was captured and the other was relieved of command. The fighting segment of the army begins with privates and ends with captains. All the personnel above the grade of captain, with a few exceptions, is administrative overhead. An army is built from the bottom up - not from the top down. If the higher officers are tough enough they can improve the lower ranks by judicious pants kicking, but the strengh of an organization lies in the effectiveness of the lower ranks.

The private of today is the sergeant of tomorrow. Good military leaders are not secured from men who can't hold a civilian job. The basic pay of a private should be the legal minimum in industry of forty dollars a week - without fringe benefits for dependents. This would allow the army to spend most of its time on training for combat instead of baby sitting for a mob of juvenile delinquents and uninterested draftees. From the amount of money the heroes of the last two wars have taken, and will take, from the government, professional soldiers at three times the pay of draftees would be an economy.

Mass tactics are not applicable to brush fire wars. Success or failure may result from the action of small bodies of infantry led by corporals and sergeants. Big pay for big generals may have no effect on the problem except to increase the cost to the taxpayer.

FLYING PAY

The government is presently paying flying pay of a hundred dollars or more a month to about twenty seven thousand officers. Of these, less than ten thousand are on duties that require them to engage in routine flights, such as The Strategic Air Command. Paying the others flight pay is just an unneccesary fringe benefit. They probably fly a few hours a month, but are engaged in duties that require no flying. The flying that they do is usually in propeller planes and has little training value since jet planes have been perfected.

Extra pay for flying was initially given because of the hazards involved. The hazards of flying now are less than the hazards of driving an automobile. There are probably more air force flying personnel killed in their own automobiles each year than are killed in airplane accidents. Those who are on duties that require them to do routine flying should continue to receive flying pay, not because of the hazards involved, but because the planes are so expensive that the highest type of officer should be flying them. Flying pay for the others should be stopped. A paper shuffler in the air force is no different from a paper shuffler in the army.

TOO MANY OFFICERS

About the time of the Mexican border troubles, we used to laugh at the Mexican army. The popular saying was, "It is all generals and no privates". Besides this the Mexican military trains were full of women and children. Our laughing was premature. Our services now have both of the Mexican evils.

Formerly a corporal in our army commanded a squad, and a sergeant commanded a section. A First Sergeant was the chief administrative officer of a company. In its attempts to compete in popularity with the air force and the navy, the army has created all kinds of sergeants positions, and has advanced the rank of the leader of every unit from the squad up. This has caused unneccesary and undesirable links in the chain of command, and a large increase in the cost of operation. It has also cost loss of respect for the chevron. When everybody wears chevrons, nobody respects any of them. A red pencil used freely on the tables of organization, to delete unneccesary non-commissioned officers, and to reduce the rank of others, without reducing their pay, would be an improvement.

The same principle applies to officers, and here the evil is greater. An army, like ours, that contains more majors than second lieutenants, is not a combat outfit, it is an administrative featherbed. The higher the headquarters, the greater the number of officers, and the higher the rank of the administrative personnel. If the rank of the mass of the personnel in these headquarters was kept in the captain and lieutenant bracket, there might be an incentive for officers to serve with troops in the field, instead of shuffling papers at a desk. The tendency is always toward more staff officers, and higher rank for staff positions. A good, tough martinet with

authority and a red pencil, could do much to improve the combat effectiveness of the army, and could also save the taxpayers a lot of money. A similar action on the other services would be appropriate, as they are apparently worse than the army.

TOO MANY HEADQUARTERS

Every link in the chain of command reduces the strength of the chain. The greatest casualty in our over inflated staffs is time. It takes so long for anything to pass through the several headquarters, that by the time a decision is reached the opportunity for effective action has passed. The military follows Parkinson's law, (ie) "The number of persons required to do the work equals the number of persons available." When there are enough staff personnel available, headquarters are created within headquarters, such as a camp headquarters within a division headquarters. Camp headquarters may then organize various headquarters within its jurisdiction, and so on ad infinitum . When the organizers are finished there are often more officers in the various headquarters than there are working with the troops. To get a paper processed through these successive headquarters is a long and ineffective process. At least half of the headquarters in the army could be dispensed with, and improvement in administration, and the saving of much time, would result.

Headquarters tend to breed auxiliaries for their support and comfort. These auxiliaries are such units as communication units - to keep their telephones in operation. Medical units - to furnish them aspirin. Engineer units - to build them comfortable housing. Transportation Units - To provide jeeps. Quartermaster units - to provide them with food and clothing. Military police units - to

keep order and direct traffic. Special service units - to furnish recreation facilities. Red Cross units - to provide coffee and entertainment. Womens Army Corps units - to provide secretaries and female company. A well organized headquarters has enough of these units to keep everybody busy - like doing each others washing. It takes more than half of the personnel in any of these units to take care of its own needs, so less than half are available to take care of the rest of the headquarters units. When I inspected the port troops in Pusan Korea, during the war, there was not a single staff unit that had as many as fifty percent of its personnel available for duty outside of its unit area.

When the 25th Division left Osaka, Japan for the Korean front in June of 1950, we selected a small group of over-age officers and enlisted men to take care of the dependents, and the military property while we were away. A lieutenant-colonel was left in command. When I returned from Korea a year later the same job was being handled by a brigadier-general, with six full colonels on his personal staff, assisted by more other officers than there formerly had been in the division headquarters. There had been no apparent change in the duties required, except for the organization of a small rest and recuperation center.

Both of the above instances took place during a time when combat troops in Korea were being hard pressed by the Chinese and were dangerously short of infantry.

When one of our regular army divisions was given, before Korea, the task of making an assault landing on an island, it organized a manuever staff within its regular staff to draw up the invasion plans. When the staff completed its work the result was a file of documents

eight inches thick, including annexes and exhibits. What value eight inches of documents would be to an officer wading ashore under fire, I cannot surmise. I heard later that none of the plans included in this brainstorm were ever carried out. They seldom are. Only the simplest and most general plans are ever carried out in war. In our operations across Germany in World War II, we used for orders only a map overlay showing zones of action and numbered objectives, with a few notes on its margin relative to supply dumps, communications, transportation, and evacuation routes.

The outstanding example of the validity of Parkinson's Law is The Pentagon. I recently read that there were one hundred and eighteen air force generals in the Washington area. It would be very difficult to get anything through eighteen generals, a hundred and eighteen is completely ludicrous. Most of the policies in the pentagon are made, not by generals, but by lieutenant-colonels. If you are walking down a corridor of the pentagon and happen to pass a smart looking lieutent-colonel carrying a sheaf of papers and a worried look, something is about to be changed. It is about a fifty fifty chance as to whether it will be changed for the better or for the worse, but it will be changed. An officer on duty with the pentagon must come up with a bright idea frequently or he might be sent out to some camp to do field service. If he can come up with some new word such as "energize" or "firmed up", he is made. If not he has to change something, and get the change approved by some general. These changes are accumulative. They breed other changes. When I entered the army the Army Regulations was a book about an inch and a half thick. Now it would not be possible to get the regulations on a five foot shelf.

TOO MUCH TRAVEL

The army could save a great deal of money and do its required work much better if it stopped the merry-go-round of travel of army personnel which has been going on since World War II. If Congress wants to save defense money it should put out an order that no officer could be transferred from one station to another unless he had completed three years at the old station. For such duties as school and manuevers he could be put on temporary duty and revert at completion of the duty to his regular station. Besides the time and money wasted in travel there is the efficiency loss caused by getting acquainted with a new job. It seems to be unusual, now, for any officer to stay on the same job for as long as three years.

The main reason for most of this travel is the army policy that every officer should receive the desired education to qualify him to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This might be desirable if it were possible without injury to the service, but such an idea is not possible. The army covers too great a field for any person to master it all. If, instead, an officer was educated to be a good commander of troops, or a good operations officer, or a good supply officer, or a good personnel officer; and have him follow those positions in time of peace and time of war, something might be accomplished. The present practice of having an officer transferred from one kind of job to another, and from one school to another results in a group of officers who are jacks of all trades and masters of none. If the officers are to be good for anything, except preparing staff papers, there must be some specialization. There is a fallacy, prevalent in high commands, that all that is neccesary for succesful combat is to issue correct orders. No greater fallacy could be possible. Cuba is an example.

Where the staff leaves off, leadership starts. It is criminal, in time of war, to place troops under a general who has never commanded anything, but has spent his career sitting in a chair, processing staff papers, or solving some problem on a map. He will find when he gets in combat that it is quite different.

The following is an actual schedule of ten years of service of an officer of ordinary capabilities:

April 1951 Okinawa to Korea

November 1951 Korea to Fort Worden, Washington

December 1951 Fort Worden to Desert Rock Nevada

June 1952 Camp Desert Rock to Fort Worden, Washington

December 1952 Fort Worden, Washington to Fort Leavenworth Kan.

June 1953 Fort Leavenworth Kansas to Glessen, Germany

November 1954 Glessen, Germany to Frankfort, Germany

May 1956 Frankfort Germany to Fort McPherson, Georgia

May 1958 Fort McPherson Georgia to Taiwan (Formosa)

November 1960 Taiwan to Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

The best solution of this problem is to take the travel money away. If the travel money is limited, the army will have to do more advanced planning and eliminate some of their unneccesary activities.

THE RESERVES

Most of our national guard and reserve units would be of little value in brush fire wars because of the time factor. The national guard units are not sufficiently well trained for combat service. The days of the minute man with his rifle over the door are over. The patriotism of the national guard is unquestionable, but it isn't possible to train a man for combat using only two hours a week in an armory, and a two weeks summer camp each year. Modern combat is too complicated for such sketchy preparation. One of our national tragedies has been our custom of putting brave but untrained men on the field of battle to be uselessly sacrificed. The latest example of this was the Korean war. Potentially, national guard units might be as good or better than regulars, as they often have a high type of personnel, but no military organization can be prepared for combat without extensive field training. The national guard should be restricted to the continental limits of the United States and used for internal security. There won't be time to train them in an atomic or brush fire war.

The organized reserve belongs back in the era of World Wars I and II. It is composed mostly of administrative units that might be of use in a prolonged war, but are of doubtful value in atomic or brush fire wars. If most of the units were demobilized it would have little effect on the national defense. Just before the Korean war a contemporary of mine showed me a troop list of the reserve units in one of our states. There was not a single infantry organization on the list. In Korea the army needed infantry, not supervisors. Korea was our first brush fire war in modern times.

At present the organized reserve is primarily used as a refuge

At present the organized reserve is primarily used as a refuge for service personnel getting credit for military service. Young men can use it to beat the draft or to avoid the danger of having to serve in the infantry. Officers and enlisted men can use it to get credit toward retirement, thus further increasing our already dangerous cost of non-productive military personnel. The great mass of reserve units should be demobilized and the money spent on them used to increase the pay of active personnel. We are spending too much defense money on non-productive personnel.

The recent howl that has gone up from national guard and reserve units that were called into active service illustrates the fallacy of the reserve system. Their complaints about the hardships of camp life leads one to wonder about their value on a battlefield, where conditions are many times worse. The national guard and reserves were of value in the days of mass armies, but those days are over. They are just expensive political playthings.now.

MILITARY LAW ENFORCEMENT

At the end of each war there is always a big public clamor against military justice, which results in changes in the courts-martial manuel. The changes do not have any effect upon military justice except to add more guard-house lawyers, and to elongate the judicial processes. The primary difference in military law and civilian law is that if a man in the service commits a serious offense he is found guilty and punished. In civil life, if he has a smart lawyer, he can beat the case.

The changes in the manuel of courts-martial has had the effect of trying a man not just once for an offense, but instead, he is put through the equivalent of a trial half a dozen times before the results become final. The final result is usually the same whether he is tried once or six times. About ninety percent of the cases are plain AWOL or being drunk and disorderly, so they are really equivalent to police court cases. The most important result of court-martial changes is to provide soft jobs and higher rank for thousands of guard-house lawyers.

In my company commander days, the company commnader was held responsible for the conduct of the men in his company, and his efficiency rating was based, to a considerable extent, on his success in keeping them out of court-martials. He was given some disciplinary power to enhance his authority. This authority has been sharply curtailed by making the services more democratic. The responsibility for order now appears to be vested in the military police. It should be a matter of national shame that trains during our wars have to be ridden by military police to keep service men in order. If the money spent on military police and guard-house lawyers was offered

to procure a more desirable standard of personnel, and disciplinary power was restored to commanders, the services would be greatly improved. There is no such thing as a democratic army. If it is an army it isn't democratic, and if it is democratic it isn't an army, it's a mob; as anyone will find out if he ever tries to get it onto a battlefield.

Probably one of the greatest wastes of good military personnel is in the military police. They are often selected from a large group of men because of their appearance and intelligence. Many of them would make excellent squad and platoon leaders in combat units, if they were not baby sitting with a gang of juvenile delinquents. During World War II we used our walking wounded and combat fatigue cases for military police. They did very well directing traffic and guarding prisoners, while the sound soldiers did the fighting. The only qualification we needed for MP's was an arm band.

THE TWENTY YEAR RETIREMENT LAW

One of the most unneccesary wastes of taxpayers money is the twenty year retirement law. It is no more neccesary to retire military men when they have completed twenty years of service than it is to retire civilians who have worked that long. If the twenty years were in time of war it might be desirable, but when the service is only for a year or two in war time and the rest in peace time this give away is absurd.

The original purpose of the law was to get rid of the great mass of field grade officers who were blocking promotions, and who should not have been promoted to such high grade in the first place. A few of them who were combat commanders, and went through the dangers of combat, might be excepted, but the great mass of them, who were petty staff officers, deserve no such consideration.

At the end of twenty years of service these officers should be given the following options:

1. To be discharged without further compensation.

2. Be retired at half pay with allowances, but required to serve in a civilian capacity until they are sixty years old. The army could then use their knowledge and experience, and they could replace a civilian employee. If at any time their work was unsatisfactory they could be discharged. In emergency they could be recalled to duty in their military grade.

Retirement at the highest grade a soldier attained during war is also unfair to the taxpayer. The soldier should be retired with the grade he held at the time of retirement. Two years as a lieutent-colonel and eighteen years as a sergeant should not warrant retirement in the grade of lieutenant-colonel.

UNDESERVING VETERANS

The term "veteran" itself is a misnomer. The great mass of the so-called veterans served less than four years, and to most of them the term "recruit" would be more appropriate. They underwent some physical and mental punishment during their service, but hardly enough to deserve the billions of dollars that have been spent on them since the wars. Over ninty percent of them were never under fire.

A few years ago I interviewed some twenty five veterans who were attending a college under the G.I. Bill of Rights. Of the twenty five, I found only one that had been under fire. He was an ex-member of the 25th Infantry Division, and had been captured by the Chinese in Korea. During his captivity his weight dropped from a hundred and eighty pounds to less than a hundred pounds. When I saw him he was up to a hundred and twenty pounds. The college dean stated that he was a problem because of his resentment toward authority, and his lack of friendliness toward the other students. After talking to him, I could readily understand his attitude. He was almost a physical wreck. His hands shook and he had trouble in speaking. Yet he was receiving the same pay and allowances as the twenty four healthy, unscarred, non-combatants that were in his classes. The lack of discrimination by the veterans bureau between the really deserving veterans and the gravy train riders is the greatest failure in veterans affairs.

Axiomatically, it should be the duty of every able-bodied man to fight for his country, even without compensation when this is neccesary. The reason veterans organizations continue to milk the treasury is undoubtedly because they have the political power.

They have some justification because of the high wages and profits made by those not in the services. The veterans organizations should, however, use some moderation in their demands. Too many people know about the thousands of well-to-do business men, who never left the United States in a war, going to veterans hospitals for free treatment.

The veterans mental hospitals are full of men who probably turned yellow when the first shot was fired, and now regard their hospitals as the same kind of a santuary as does a child who wants to return to its mothers womb. If allowed to stay long enough they will never return to a normal life. For their own good,doubtful cases should not be admitted. If denied such a refuge, they might make something of their lives. If all who ask at the hospital doors are admitted, the tax burden for veterans will never grow any less.

It may not be politically expedient to cut veterans appropriations, but to charge the cost to national defense is not fair . If treatment in veterans hospitals was restricted to those who were wounded in war, the cost would be reduced to a fraction of the present amount.

SUMMARY

In summary it might be estimated that fity percent of the money appropriated for the national defense is well spent. At least fifty percent is a contribution on the altar of political expediency and to waste.

The reasons for veterans benefits, for the gravy train of twenty year retirements, and fringe benefits for dependents, is the same as for pork barrel appropriations - to win political support. No military reasons exist.

Appropriations for flying pay for non-flying officers, pay for reserve officers who would be of little or no value in future wars, featherbedding in the regular services, and multiplication of staffs are all military evils that have some political connections.

The defense departments stating that they can't possibly get along on less than forty billion dollars a year without jeapordizing the national defense is in the same catagory as the alcoholic who says he couldn't possibly get through the day on less than a quart of liquor, and the movie queen who states that she couldn't possibly clothe herself on less than a hundred thousand dollars a year. They can't unless somebody is firm enough to take it away from them.

In spite of the defense departments profligate spending, nothing is being done to improve the status and quality of that part of our national defense personnel that will be the decisive element in fighting brush fire wars - the combat infantryman.

SECTION VI

WHAT NOW?

It has been an accepted principle through the ages that soldiers should stick to fighting, and let the politicians handle international affairs. At the risk of violating this principle, I would like to express an infantryman's views on our various international problems. From the results of opinion polls, and the views expressed by columnists, it is not probable that I will get much concurrence in these views.

For the last sixteen years the people of the United States have lived in fear, and there is nothing in the present situation to indicate any change. The only results of our tense international relations since World War II, are bigger and better buildings for bureaucrats, chairbourn jobs for deserving politicians, and a bigger and bigger bite on the taxpayers. It is not clear whether all this build-up is to relieve the unemployment situation, or to improve governmental facility in English composition. It has certainly not been effective in settling anything. It appears at times that there is no desire to get things settled, but rather a tendency to keep up international tensions so that the C.I.A. or The State Department can build more buildings, and give more jobs to politicians.

The CIA probably defends its spending by saying it has to find out what is going on behind the scenes in all parts of the world. From an infantryman's point of view this activity is of no value unless at the critical time the CIA can come up with accurate forecasts of what is going to happen. So far the CIA has drawn a blank on the most important happenings in the world.

Item: They did not know England and France intended to invade

Egypt until a newspaper correspondent told them that the invasion was a fact.

Item: They did not know North Korea intended to invade South Korea until North Korea crossed the 38th Parellel. If they knew they did not inform the United States troops in Japan that had to stop the invasion. I was there.

Item: They did not know that the Chinese intended to cross the Yalu river. If they had known they might have saved the disaster of the defeat north of Seoul, and the loss of thousands of infantrymen.

Item: They sent the U-2 across Russia just as a peace conference was to be held. Any other time might have been all right, but not at that time.

Item: They estimated that the Cuban invasion would be a success, and that the population would arise to support it.

There has never been a time in the history of The United States when this country has done so much, unselfishly, for other nations, and there has never been a time when it has been so universally disliked. Snooping around in other peoples affairs might be desirable if it produced favorable results, but when the only result is to antagonize other nations, as in the case of the CIA, it would be much better dispensed with. Our intelligence services before World War II, and the organization of the CIA, performed much more satisfactorily. They still exist. If the CIA was demobilized tomorrow, the branch intelligence services could take over, with perhaps not as much coordination, but certainly with much less cost, and at least as good results. Among these results would be a better feeling among our neighboring nations. The end results couldn't possibly be as ineffective as the efforts of the CIA.

Our wrong-horse State Department is only a step behind the C.I.A. as an enemy agency and may be ahead of the C.I.A. Since it became infiltrated with leftists during the Roosevelt regime it has been too consistently wrong to have been that way accidently. In almost every section of the world when the United States has had the opportunity to stand on the side of the rightists, the State Department has been neutral or on the side of the leftists. The few people that have had the moral courage to stand against the leftists have usually been condemned by our State Department. Siding with the "Agrarian Reformers" in China, criticising Belgium in the Congo, France in Algeria, Portugal in Angola, Verwoerd in South Africa, Trujillo in The Dominican Republic, and Batista in Cuba, may give us a virtuous feeling of democracy, but what are we going to do when they all go communistic? The greatest wrong-horse of all was, of course, going into World War II and destroying Germany - the only effective block to communistic Russia. The next worst and more recent was siding against England and France in the Suez affair. This not only cooled two of our warmest friends, but has put us in a most embarressing position with regard to the Panama Canal. Strategically we cannot afford to give it up, yet we have no better claim to the canal zone than England and France had to Suez. We can hardly expect them to stand with us against the claims of Panama after our unfriendly attitude in the Suez case.

There are so many people in the State Department that when a wrong-horse bobble like the Castro affair is uncovered, responsibility cannot be fixed on anyone. If it were reduced to about one fourth its present size some control over the pinks and rats might be possible, and it would probably function four times as efficiently.

At the end of World War II, the United States assumed the job of policeman of the world, At the time this assumption was not without reason. The free nations of the world were too badly damaged by air bambardment to protect themselves, and we, alone, had the atomic bomb. The neccesity for our maintaining the world police role is no longer valid, as neither of the former reasons now exist. Militarily we are over-extended. We cannot guarantee peace in the entire world. Berlin is an island in a hostile sea. If we successfully defend our rights in Berlin, it remains just what it was before - an island in a hostile sea. It might make some sense to fight for East Germany, but not for Berlin. If we win we are right where we were before, if we lose we might become involved in a nuclear war. In either case we are likely to lose thousands of infantrymen. To think that the combat would be restricted to small or "clean" atomic bombs is about as optimistc as saying a girl is just a little bit pregnant. To risk our survival on such a minor issue as that of defending a nation who very recently murdered millions of people, and threatened the existence of freedom in Europe, is at best a questionable policy. Germany is now one of the wealthiest countries in the world. If they prize Berlin, let them build up the neccesary forces to defend it.

China: If at the close of the civil war a part of the confederate army had moved to the Florida Keys, set up a government, and had England support it with military assistance, that would have been equivalent to the Formosa situation. Formosa is historically Chinese territory. We have no more valid reason for interference there than a foreign nation would have had to interfere in the affairs of The United States after the civil war. If we stopped kidding ourselves and recognised Red China, the de facto government of China, Red China

might stop boiling and simmer down. To expect China to ever revert to democracy is only wishful thinking. The Chinese are no danger to us as long as they do not have the atomic bomb. and their transportation is limited to their present junks.

Korea is strategically and economically worthless to The United States. It has cost a great deal of money, and the lives of thousands of American infantrymen, to sustain a government of highly questionable integrity. From my personal experience, based on a year in Korea in the earliest part of the war, the Koreans are a nation of thieves, and not worth ten American infantrymen, not to mention the hundred and fifty thousand casualties we had during the war. At the most critical stage of the fighting, they nightly broke into our freight cars, destined for the front, and stole our medical supplies, post exchange items, and needed clothing. Politically, they are a bad risk. During the Korean war one of our prominent politicians took a poll of the political desires of the citizens of South Korea. The results of this poll showed the Koreans over four to one in favor of communism.

Democracy, or self-determination by the people of the world, is a nice theory but it is only a theory. The Russian revolution was supposed to substitute the will of the masses for the royal rule of the Czars. It has succeeded in establishing a more progressive economy but only by reducing the Russian masses to the status of slaves. The constitution of the United States, in its inception, was probably as fine a program for government as will ever be initiated. It has been prostituted by the hirelings of organized minorities to the status of an entrenched bureaucracy, parasitic on the body politic, and threatening to bleed its host to death.

The lesser nations of the world, emerging from the protection of their parent colonizers, are mostly the battle grounds for self-seeking

opportunists, more interested in their own power and prerogatives than in the welfare of their countrymen. The choice, in most of these countries is only a choice between dictators. Spending the United States taxpayer's money for Cadillacs for these dictators, or for Paris gowns for their wives, may possibly be defended on the grounds of keeping them out of the communist camp. The spending of the lives of American infantrymen to sustain them in power cannot be defended on any grounds. They are undependable as friends and impotent as enemies.

The United States, in its role of playing God, has very successfully undermined the so-called free world. Siding against Britain and France in the Suez crisis, being critical of France in Algeria, voting against Portugal in the Angola case, helping to drive Belgium out of the Congo, all have, or will, further restrict the free world and add to the communist penetration. Giving freedom to such nations of Africa as the Congo is about as sensible as it would be to remove the authority of parents over teen-age children and then show surprise when the girls become unwed mothers and the boys thieves and vandals. The European nations are much better qualified to solve the problems of Africa than we are. If our leftist leaning State Department would keep out of that area, the situation would be much healthier.

While we have been blundering around in the jungles of Africa and Asia, our neighbors to the south, being by-passed by Santa Claus, have become restless. The situation there is not healthy because the wealth is concentrated in too few hands, with the mass of the people living a precarious existence as half-starved and illiterate peons. Most of them are ripe for such a rabble rouser as Castro. Since most contemporary revolutions end with the country in the communist camp

it might be well for us to do something through The Organization of American States before there are any more Cubas. This will not be easy. The assumption that the love of freedom is greater than the love of bread is as great a mistake as offering self-determination to a savage. The peons of Central and South America have for generations seen their country's wealth, under so-called democratic regimes, concentrated in the hands of a few families while their condition remained a changeless poverty. They are looking for a new deal. Whether the new deal conceals a communist dictatorship or not isn't important as long as it promises amelioration of their present condition. The outstanding example of this is Castro in Cuba. He may succeed in ruining the Cuban economy but he has the solid backing of the rabble because he is giving them houses and schools. It is only the people who have something that fear revolutions. The have-nots have nothing to lose.

The best way to keep the countries of Central and South America out of the communist camp is to offer them something better than the communists offer them. Porto Rico is an example of the possibilities in this field. If United States capital was offered the same degree of security in the states to the south that they have in Porto Rico they probably would put enough money into these countries to bring them a healthy increase in prosperity. Such investments would have to be guaranteed by our government against seizure and confiscatory taxation. Our government in turn should look to the government of the effected states for guarantees, and these guarantees should be further assured by The Organization of American States. The United States government should be prepared to protect such investments

by force if neccesary. This would prevent the despoliation of United States assets by such communistic rabble rousers as Castro. To further encourage such investments, the tax climate in Central and South American investments could be made so much more favorable than European investments, that United States manufacturers would be encouraged to put their plants in that area.

In addition to encouraging business investment, The United States should be prepared to make long term loans to South American states for such public improvements as roads, railroads, dams, hydroelectric plants, and similar utilities. These loans should be made with strings attached; the strings being the right to inspect to see that the money was spent for the purpose intended and not for graft. There probably would be considerable objection to such restrictions by some heads of state but if the alternative was no loans they would probably agree. Like our politicians they are primarily interested in being perpetuated in office and could not afford to let their vanity jeopardize their continuance as heads of states.

If the representatives of The Organization of American States were told that the money that has been formerly poured down the rat holes in Asia and Africa would be available to them, and further, that The United States was prepared to guarantee their stability of government, they would probably go along with some external interference. The alternative of finding themselves under a communist regime should not appeal to them. The international situation indicates that we are going to lose the remainder of Asia and most of Africa to the communists. If we can put an "Off Limits" sign on the western hemisphere, we might be able to stop them there.

The time to stop a brush fire war is when it first starts. One or two regular divisions put into Cuba when Castro first began stealing United States property would have settled the trouble there, and saved us the present situation. For such police actions the United States needs at least a corps of regular army divisions that have no other commitments. The officers in this corps should be professionals, and the enlisted men should be volunteers of high caliber. It should contain no draftees and no juveniles. These men should be paid what it costs to get them. They should cost less than a trip to the moon, and would be much more valuable. As side effects this might reduce unemployment, and crime.

When any serious trouble breaks out in any western hemisphere country, this force should be sent to take control and supervise free elections. The squawking about "Imperialism" by the greatest imperialists in the world should be ignored. They should be informed that we will consider the infiltration of communists into the western hemisphere the same as they would consider our infiltration in Hungary or Czeckoslovakia.

The expectation that The United Nations can control the outbreaks of war in the world is only wishful thinking. Castrated at its birth by the veto, the United Nations is becoming increasingly only an expensive debating society. With the entrance of a number of semi-civilized African nations, its usefulness will decrease rapidly.

Whether we like it or not,we are in a no-holds-barred contest with communism. The free nations of Europe can and should take over the defense of Europe, and the United States can and should take

over the defense of the western hemisphere. They should cooperate against communist penetration in either area.

All this infatuation with nuclear warfare and visits to the moon should be given a secondary position. The countries of the world will probably be controlled in the future, as they have been in the past, by the combat infantryman