

SUBJECT: ACTION OF 1ST BN., 331ST INFANTRY, 33RD INFANTRY DIVISION IN FRANCE, JUNE 24--JULY 5, 1944, (COMMANDED BY HENRY NEILSON, O-19588, LT. COL. INFANTRY).

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By June 24, 1944, the bulk of the Div. had debarked from troop ships on Omaha Beach, ~~France~~, and proceeded by foot marching and organic vehicles to vicinity of Treviers. The 331st Infantry went into an assembly area in the vicinity of Briqueville, where we remained for about 4 days, as I recall.

On June 27th, I believe it was, the Regt. was directed to move under cover of darkness by motors to a point about 3 miles east of Carentan, thence by foot to the vicinity of Cantepie, about 3 miles generally west of Carentan, to relieve the 101st Airborne Division. The movement, was made without incident and the 1st Bn. closed in its assembly area under scattered hostile artillery fire about 0300 June 28th. Troops immediately dug in with the Bn. C.P. set up in a large stone house in Cantepie.

The Regtl. Commander, Col. Martin D. Barnd^Ollan^R, directed that the 2nd and 3rd Bns. occupy the positions held by the 101st Airborne in the Sector of the 331st Infantry, with the 1st Bn. in Regt. Reserve.

The usual reconnaissance by the Bn. Commanders and their staffs and Co. Comdrs. was made on June 28th and 29th. The 101st Airborne in the Sector of the 331st Infantry was relieved on the afternoon of June 29th, as I recall. It was accomplished secretly so the enemy would not be aware of the

relief taking place. 1st Bn. prepared counter-attack ^{plans} ~~plans~~ and prepared defensive positions. Foxholes were dug.

During the period June 30 to July 4 inclusive, patrols were sent nightly into the German positions to obtain information ~~desired~~ ^{desired} by the Regtl Comdr., and to secure prisoners. No prisoners were captured by these patrols, but considerable information was secured as to the location of their positions. All these patrols were cleared by the A.C. of S, G-2, so that no friendly patrols would operate in territory into which our artillery would be firing. Nightly both sides would fire artillery, our artillery being the heavier in density.

I sent out as many patrols as I was permitted under officers in order that as many key NCOs and officers as possible in my Bn. might gain experience and confidence in working against the Germans. We had no casualties during this patrolling and never engaged the Jerry. All patrolling stressed stealth and secrecy. The experience and confidence gained ^{was} ~~was~~ valuable and went a long way to reduce the tendency at first on the part of the troops to be nervous and "trigger happy".

During this period (June 30 to July 3rd inclusive) I conducted officers conferences and they in turn conducted conferences with their men on challenging, patrolling, secrecy, counter-signs, small unit tactics, working with tanks, and other pertinent subjects with a view to "smartening" up every officer and soldier for facing the Jerry. My Bn. was well trained and confident, so that in the time remaining I stressed making the soldier smart in his job. These finishing touches to the soldiers' training under the very noses

paid close attention to all instructions.

During this period care of weapons, vehicles and equipment was stressed and strict daily inspections were held by all leaders, with officers actually making the final inspections. I utilized my staff to assist me in inspecting my companies and ⁱⁿ daily visiting them. Morale was high.

On July 2nd, Co. "A" took over the defensive positions on the right flank of the 2nd Bn. (Co F as I recall) in order to permit ~~the 2nd Bn, Commanded by Lt. Col. Faher,~~ (later killed by a 88 mm shell at St. Lo) ^{who commanded the 2 Bns,} to get his Bn. more concentrated to attack on July 4th as his defensive front was very wide. Co. A was Commanded by Capt. John Reigen. The remainder of my Bn. remained in Regt. Reserve in the vicinity just south of Cantepie.

At this point I would like to point out the encouraging results of the "smartening" instruction which I and my officers had given the men while at Cantepie. Where the 2nd and 3rd Bns. were very jittery and "trigger happy" and were sustaining casualties daily due to their nervousness, ^{and me} constantly pinning down patrols returning from missions in German territory, Co. A did not fire a single shot or have a single casualty while outposting and manning their defensive position. I attributed this to the confidence which we were able to instill in them in their ability and in their weapons. In short, we "smartened" them up and were strict in our discipline.

It might be appropriate to add here that although the relief of the 101st Airborne Infantry in the sector of the 331st Infantry was made smoothly and secretly, it soon proved to be wasted effort. Our Regt. no sooner occupied ^{its} ~~the~~ positions ^{than} the men began to shoot promiscuously due to their nervousness and to throw considerable

mortar ammunition into the Jerry lines, ^{thus} telegraphing ^{the news} to the Germans that a fresh unit had taken over the positions of the 101st Airborne. ~~The general lack of activity, except for patrolling, which the 101st had maintained was almost immediately discontinued.~~ ^{the 101st had maintained little activity beyond patrolling - the activity of our Harrison}

~~It~~ was due to nervousness on the part of officers and men, who had been saturated by the 101st Airborne with tall tales about the toughness and the fighting ability of ~~the~~ Jerry. The 101st ^{were} a little jittery when relieved and were ^{more} mighty glad to see us come to relieve them, although they had done no fighting for about ten days, they informed us.

The Regtl. Comdr. informed all Bn. Comdrs. on the 2nd July that a general attack was to take place on the 4th July. On July 3rd H hour was definitely announced as 0445 July 4th, to be preceded by about a 30 minute artillery preparation.

My Bn. moved to an assembly area about midway between Meautis and Cantepie in Regtl. Reserve closing about 0730, July 4th. There the men's ^{the} rolls were dropped, men dispersed and slit trenches ^{were} dug for protection against hostile artillery. I reported to the Regtl. CP ^{at 0700 hrs} at ~~0700~~, which was located in a stone house about 400 yards south west of Meautis. (The 3rd Bn. CP was in a house at Meautis - 3rd Bn Commanded by Lt. Col. George Schuster).

About 0730 the phone rang and ^{we were informed} ~~it was learned~~ that the Regtl. Comdr. had been shot through the heart at the forward OP about 350 yards south of the Regtl. CP. He had exposed himself and was apparently shot by a sniper. There were Jerries all about in ones and threes, sniping at any one who exposed himself. The Regtl. Ex. O. went up to the OP, turning over the Regt. to me until such time as he checked back in. I commanded the Regt. for about 3 hours until

Col. Whitcomb, the extra Colonel in the Division, took over at the direction of General Robert C. Macon, the Division Commander, who arrived at the Regtl. CP about 1000^{Col. Whitcomb had arrived at the regtl CP about 0900} but declined to take Command without orders from the Division Commander.

During the morning and afternoon the 2nd Bn. took quite a mauling from the Jerries. Their frontage was wide and terrain over which they had to attack was more or less open and swampy. Co E became badly disorganized when, about mid-morning, its Co. Comdr. and a couple of its other officers became casualties. German patrols and snipers appeared to be largely responsible for this. I therefore sent a Regtl staff officer (Major Staples) to the 2nd Bn. C.P. to direct Col. Faber to relieve Co. E with Co. G, his Bn. Reserve and to have Co. E revert to 2nd Bn. Reserve and reorganize. I directed that steps be taken to clean out the Jerry snipers and to restore the line as Co. E had lost some ground and lost contact with units on its flanks. About 1300 the situation appeared to be improving.

But the 3rd Bn. on the left was making no progress--in fact ~~they~~^J lost some ground according to reports coming in. About 1100, ~~I believe~~, Lt. Col. Schuster, Comdg. the 3rd Bn., became a casualty (wounded) and was evacuated. His executive officer, Major Brown, took over the front lines of the 3rd Bn. as I wanted to be familiar with the situation in that zone of action as it was clear that on the left near the Carentan--Periers Road my Bn., the Regtl. Reserve, would probably be employed, although I felt sure that it would not be committed until the next day (~~July 5~~).

In the vicinity just South of La Chenay I found Major Brown and with him visited the front line of Co. K. They Co. had been mauled somewhat and had had

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a lot of fight taken out of them. I talked with the Co. Comdrs. of Co's K and I, observed a platoon of tanks in an orchard just behind the front line of Co. K, and talked to some of the men. ~~The~~ Jerry had stopped the 3rd Bn. cold with the exception of Co. L on the Right, which appeared to have made a little progress. The officers could give me no information as to the situation on their left.

This was wicked fighting terrain--full of hedgerows, which the Jerry manned with automatic weapons ~~and~~ freely interspersed with riflemen. Observation was limited to the next hedgerow and usually the first inkling you had of the Jerry's whereabouts was a rifle shot or a burst from a machine pistol, bagging one or more of our men or at least making them scamper to better cover. German Artillery and mortar fire fell intermittently, but caused no damage and few casualties.

Everyone by this time was convinced of the toughness and battle experience of the German Paratroopers that we were attacking. They were deadly ^{shots} and past masters at scouting and patrolling, ~~and sniping~~. They were tough soldiers, and were battling us to a stand-still and inflicting heavy casualties.

About 1530 Col. Whitcomb directed that I move my Bn. to an assembly area about 400 yards north of La Chenay. I Directed Capt. Wayne L. Bart, my Bn. S-3, to instruct my Executive Officer, Major Kenneth Scott, to move the Bn. to the new assembly area, disperse the men and report back to me at the Regtl. C.P. as soon as possible.

A little later I again visited the 3rd Bn. C.P. About 1700 a runner from Regtl. C.P. brought me a message directing that I report to Regtl. C.P. at once for orders.

At 1730 July 4 the Regtl. Comdr., Col Whitcomb, began his order committing the 1st Bn. It was to be a coordinated attack, supported by a Platoon of tanks, artillery, and a Platoon of 42 chemical mortars. Time of attack was ~~1800~~

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Regtl. Comdr. start his attack. This would have been a big order under problem conditions in this situation, but throw in some well-trained Jerry Paratroopers and you have something.

I asked if the line of departure was secure, as the 3rd Bn. C.O. had been unable to give me any information as to situation on his left. The Regtl. Comdr. did not know, but told me to select my own line of departure if the one he indicated was not in our hands just so I got the attack off on time. I replied that I could not launch a coordinated attack in an hour and a half under the circumstances. He directed me to get my attack off by 1930 anyway if I possibly could as the Regt. had made practically no progress all day.

I called my Bn. S-3 and in substance directed as follows: "Bart, acquaint Major Scott and Co. Comdrs. with the situation. Move the Bn. in the order Cos. C,B,A,Bn. Hq., and Hq. Co. and D to the line of departure (pointing on map) with advance elements out, in case the L.D. is not in our hands, although I'm sure it is. Frontage 300 yards with left resting on the Carenten-Periers Road. Bn. is to launch a coordinated attack at 1900 supported by ^a ^d Plat. tanks, ^a Plat. of ~~42~~ ^{4.2"} chemical mortars and artillery to seize the ground ^{here} (making a goose egg on his map), but the Bn. will not jump off until I give the order. Have Bn. C.P. set up here (pointing on map to place about 350 yards north of L.D. on the trail running North from the L.D. and adjacent Carenten-Periers Road). Meet me at this new Bn. C.P. location at 1830. It is now 1715—any questions? O.K., see you shortly."

Then followed almost an hour of coordinating details with the 908 FA Bn. Comdr., setting up and lettering phase lines as far South as Santeny, after first showing the Tank platoon leader, where I wanted him to assemble his tanks without delay. Then more coordinating details with the 42 chemical mortar platoon leader, a few questions addressed to the Regtl. Comdr. and his staff and I departed for my Bn.

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I reached my Bn. C.P. about 1830. The tanks were moving up and blocked the use of the trail leading south into the L.D. There I told my Bn. AT officer I would not employ the AT guns initially but to hold them in readiness. Terrain did not permit their employment. Then a heavy Jerry artillery concentration fell on us and we sustained some casualties. My Bn. AT officer lying beside behind a hedge was badly hit in the back by a tree burst, ~~and~~ and several others were hit in the next minute or so. This artillery fire continued to fall on us and as walking casualties were coming along the trail from the front seeking 1st aid, the Bn. Surgeon, Capt. Davis, not far from me said "Col., let's get these wounded men out in the open field where I can work on them. This damned artillery is just as heavy in one place as another and these men need attention." This was done. I have never seen a cooler man under fire than my Bn. Surgeon, Capt. Davis.

This artillery appeared to be of 150 or 155 millimeter caliber--heavier than 105's. Apparently some German observer had picked up the movement of the tanks and brought artillery down on them. It was a large concentration and very heavy.

After about ten minutes of this pounding I knew I couldn't remain there any longer, but had to get to the front and meet my Bn. So my operations Sgt. and I began to move forward again. We had not gone far when we ran right into a heavy concentration of artillery fire and dropped into some foxholes that had been previously prepared by the 3rd Bn., 335th Infantry, when it was holding its sector on the defense. After several experiences like this I finally disregarded the artillery and moved on up to the front. Met Capt. Reegis, Co. A Comdr., coming down the trail toward me with a shell fragment in his throat. Didn't even stop--but in passing asked him where his Co. was, and told him to continue walking and he'd hit the aid station.

Shortly I met my Bn. S-3. Line of departure was in the hands of elements of 3rd Bn., 330th Infantry, who had not left their foxholes for several days,

it appeared; Major Scott was getting the Bn. in position to cross the L.D. but heavy concentration of artillery fire were making the job pretty difficult and we were getting casualties all the time because we had to keep moving instead of taking cover in foxholes and in holes in the ground, etc. It was a pretty big order preparing to launch an attack in the face of such hostile artillery fire. Well, we had our hands full.

About 1930 I returned to the Bn. C.P. where I met Col. Whitcomb. Artillery fire here was only intermittent now. In answer to his question I replied that my Bn. had not yet attacked. He directed that I get going. Left instructions reference wire communication and radio and with my S-3 moved up to L.D. again. Col. Whitcomb left a few minutes earlier after directing that I be sure to capture my objective.

This artillery of the Jerries searched the area more or less continuously for more than an hour and a half. There were a few short lulls, but it never wholly ceased; there were always random rounds falling some where in the Bn. Area.

On the L.D. we found the elements of the 3rd Bn, 330th Infantry, well dug in (elements of Cos I and K). All appeared pretty well shaken from the artillery fire, and scared of the German snipers just over the sunken road (the L.D.)

Got the situation from the 3rd Bn, 330th Infantry Ex. O. in his foxhole to effect that they had been unable to leave the sunken road as the fields and hedge rows beyond to the south were filled with Jerry snipers and automatic weapons. He said it would be suicide to jump off, but I told him those were my orders.

Well, by 2030, after about a fifteen minute artillery preparation within 100 yards of the Sunken Road (L.D.) which I increased 100 yards in range after about four minutes and again increased another 100 yards at the end of about four minutes, I got the leading platoons of Co. D across the L.D. (Capt. Eugene

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Jackson, Comdg.).

Capt Bart and I moved up and down the L.D. prodding the officers and men across the L.D. and making sure that the officers and leaders knew their mission, formation objective, etc. It took us an hour to get three companies across the L.D. in a column of Cos two platoons abreast. Heavy weapons Company was to occupy the sunken road prepared to support by fire our attack. Tanks were late getting across the L.D. due to mine fields and trouble finding crossings. Coordination was lacking due largely to hammering we had received from the artillery, so I told the Tank platoon leader about 2145 to move to the rear and get out before dark overtook him.

We (Capt. Bart and I) moved to the front of the Bn. and found them all pinned down--the leading Co. by Jerry riflemen in small numbers and some artillery fire and the following companies pinned because the elements in front had stopped. And they had gotten themselves into practically a column of files instead of platoons in line two abreast as I had directed. It was necessary for me to get Capt. Jackson straightened out and finally to get out in front of the Bn. and practically line them up, 5 paces apart. Luckily, of course, it was getting good and ~~dark~~^{dark} by then and we had only a few casualties from Jerry small arms fire. We moved forward like a tidal wave and I followed them within a few yards of the leading wave. My 3-3 moved to the rear to see that succeeding platoons followed closely in the same manner. At every hedge row the Jerry stopped to shoot his bursts at us, but the Bn. kept moving until 2330, although it had been dark for about 40 minutes. I was going to my objective darkness or not if the Jerry didn't smack me harder than he had been.

At 2330 the Jerry hit us as we came up to a hedge row--Automatic weapons, bazookas, rifles, and mortars. The mortars didn't amount to much. I hesitated to launch a night attack in the face of such a display of power. I didn't dare risk loss of control and accompanying disorganization, so I directed Capt. Bart to inform all Co. Comdrs. the Bn. would stop here, prepare a perimeter

(all around) defense with listening posts out to prevent the Jerry patrols from sneaking in and grenading the men, a favorite trick of the parachute troops and to dig in at once. Weapons platoons to be sited to meet German counter-attack from the flanks and front. Contact patrols sent to flanks. Carrying parties from Cos consisting of not less than 15 men to go back for water, rations and extra ammunition. Security measures observed, counter-sign checked.

The Bn. had advanced with few casualties (about 60 dead, wounded and missing) about 650 yards to Le Varimesnil. Most of casualties were as a result of having to launch an attack through heavy artillery fire. Had we advanced in broad daylight instead of at dusk and during darkness we would have suffered much heavier casualties. The aggressiveness of the Bn. reduced casualties.

About 0130 July 5th I received a message from the Regimental Commander directing that all Bn. Comdrs. report to the Regtl C.P. at 0615 July 5 for orders. As my wire head had not reached me yet (team wounded I learned later) I gave necessary instructions to my S-3 about waking the Bn. at 0430, an hour before daylight to meet a possible German Counter-attack and to be prepared to resume the attack the next morning. I left for Regt. at 0430 taking a squad with me for protection because I knew patrols were operating in my rear, if I wasn't already surrounded having gotten ahead of units of my right and left.

At 0615 the Regtl. Comdr. prefaced his order for continuation of the attack, with a reprimand to 2nd and 3rd Bn. Comdrs. for their failure to gain any or so little ground on July 4th, although both had fought their hearts out and had taken heavy losses in officers and men. It had been rough going, so the rebuke was hard to take.

Coordinated attack was scheduled for 0900 July 5. 1st Bn, 331st Inf, was to spearhead the attack of the Div., the Regtl. Comdr. informed us and Co. K, 331st Inf, was to be attached effective at once to the 1st Bn. and report where I directed. Regtl and my Bn. objective was the high ground about 2000

yards beyond my present position, Le Varimesnil. F of tanks and artillery (6 Bns) available. Usual coordinating took place between leaders and staff officers.

Reached my Sunken Road and Hvy Wpns Co. C.P. at about 0810. Learning that my Bn. was surrounded, as I suspected, and that no one had been able to reach the Bn. I phoned Capt. Bart, for my wire was still in. I gave him the order for renewal of the attack at 0900 after a ten minute artillery concentration and directed him to put out the order at once as I might not be able to reach the Bn. on account of all the Jerry snipers and patrols between me and the Bn.

It was then he told me that the Bn. had lost some ground (about 200 yards) as a result of German counter-attack. Told him to get it back and that I was on way up.

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Well, in short, the reinforced squad I had ~~and~~ I were pinned down by Jerries, at least $\frac{1}{2}$ my squad casualties, and for about an hour or more it was rough. We finally got back to the Sunken road, where I got in touch with my S-3 and informed him of my failure to get through. He kept me informed of the situation by telephone--the Jerries apparently had not discovered the thin assault wire and I furnished him with artillery and mortar support whenever he wanted it. Also informed the Regtl. Comdr. of the situation and he directed that I remain at the Sunken Road as he was coming right up to take over and "run the show". About 1230 he showed up and merely directed that I get my objective. I asked that Co. K be ordered to hurry up so I could use them to fight me forward.

Finally got Co. K loaded up with grenades, rocket launcher ammunition, mortar and rifle and MG ammunition and we started for the front about 1345 and about 1445 reached the leading element of my Bn., leading Plat. of Co. F

There I learned the situation from my S-3. The attack had been stopped could after an advance of about 1500 yards, good progress in this hedgerow country. The 3rd Bn, 329th Infantry, on our left was almost abreast of us at this time. The platoon of tanks was 2 hedgerows behind our front line, and the Plat. leader stated that he was unable to advance further without a bull dozer. Therefore directed tanks to prepare to move up behind the leading wave prepared to renew the attack, my S-3 to reconnoiter a route using the Carentan-Periers Road. Directed that tanks infiltrate one at a time. Risky but it worked-- weren't even fired on during the movement although German 88's and tanks in ~~the~~ ^{the} defilade were firing at tanks in their park but no hits were obtained. My Bn Artillery Liaison officer had not yet showed up although he was right behind me initially and I had directed that he follow me up to the front where I would need him. However, he was a very scared officer and when Jerry artillery began to fall among us as we moved forward he froze in a slit trench and became wild-eyed as he had done the day before. I got him moving again and told him to follow me as closely as he could. I moved on and did not see him again. Sent runners back to get him and his radio, then a squad of men and finally, later my S-3 and the Executive officer of Co. B, Lt. Dancin, a very good officer. My orders were to bring Lt. Luam, the Arty. Ln. Officer and his radio forward regardless of how scared he might be. My wire was out, and radios not working. I had to have artillery support to renew the attack.

The sniping and machine gun fire from the Jerry's ^{was} was wicked. We were suffering casualties all the time.

The next hedgerow was about 350 yards away, behind which the Jerry lay waiting. Just behind him lay the high ground, the Bn ~~Plat.~~ objective. They had the observation and could watch almost our every move.

During all this time I was discussing and estimating the situation. Finally about 1520 directed Lt. Moore to work his way up toward the Jerry position along the hedgerow, knocking out the pill boxes on the way. Told him that as

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soon as my artillery liaison officer arrived I would give the Jerry a good pasting as we had six battalions of artillery available to us. Then we would launch our attack spearheaded by the tanks. (Extra ammunition was being issued)

Lt. Moore's Co. moved forward knocking out pill boxes along the way. About 150 yards from the hedgerow occupied by the Jerries, he came under heavy machine gun fire and received some casualties. I directed him to hold, that I was sending Co. K, Capt. Deger, Comdg, up to help him.

Since the Artillery Liaison Officer had not yet arrived, I told Capt. Bart that I was going to take a chance and have the tanks lay down some H.E. on the Jerry's position and maybe flush them with tree bursts, would then follow up with tank-infantry attack. Preparations were made. About 1605 the attack was launched and the tanks repulsed after advancing about 50 yards. Two tanks were lost, the remainder returned behind our lines undamaged. The Jerry 88's or tanks in hull defilade stopped us. We did not pick them up as they leave no smoke after firing, as do our guns. This showed me what I feared; that I could not launch an attack against the final objective without artillery support. So I sent Capt. Bart and Lt. Dancin back with some riflemen for his protection to have Capt. Sonders bring up Co. D with more rocket-launcher ammunition and rifle grenades and their own weapons without delay. Also get me communication or the Arty liaison officer because I must have arty support as soon as possible so I could renew the attack. Also directed Capt. Bart to phone Regt. and give the situation to Regtl. Comdr. that I needed more tanks and artillery and any infantry reinforcements he could spare. It was going to take a lot to get this objective, for the Jerry had everything in his favor.

When the attack failed the tank Plat. leader was pretty badly shaken and started to crack, so I immediately ordered him to fire at once on several targets (pillboxes, apparent machine gun emplacements, etc.) to silence them. This gave him and his men something to do and soon they were all right.

Whenever we would put our heads above the hedgerows, snipers or machine gun fires would crack down on us, some with telling effect. Couldn't locate them.

What I thought was a pill box that I directed the tank Plst. leader to fire on turned out to be a German medicine ^{um} tank in hull defilade, because shortly after I was hit in the foot and knee by a tree burst, he blew up this Jerry tank, which thought it had been detected and ^{had} moved forward to engage our tanks. It was a beautiful sight! A little later two more Jerry tanks were knocked out.

After I was hit I moved out toward the center of the field behind our front hedgerow--I was on my way up to join Lt. Moore when I was hit--the better to give commands and issue instructions, ~~as I could see more now that I could not walk but only crawl painfully.~~

Sent word to Lt. Moore and Capt. Deger that I had been hit (this was about 1630) and informed that Capt. Deger was in command and to hold where he was if at all possible as the attack would be renewed as soon as artillery support was available.

I ordered men thinned out behind the hedgerows as 88's were beginning to search us out and give us tree bursts--a wicked thing.

Another runner went back to inform Capt. Bart of my injury. Everything had quieted down including the action of the Bn. on our left. So I directed that the two men wounded by some air burst as I be loaded on a light tank and the three of us evacuated to the Bn. Aid Station. One of the men was badly tangled in the legs and 1st St. Bucks, Co. B torn in the buttocks. He turned out to be a fine, aggressive fighting man, as also did Spooly Sgt. Hendrickson, Co. B, both always at the front.

Left Bn. about 1650 and arrived at Bn. Aid Station at 1700, where 1st aid was administered. There saw one of my officers, Lt. Kleppin, Co. E, slightly wounded and directed him to convey the Situation as I explained it to him to Major Scott, my Ex. C., and for him to inform Regt.

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Too much praise cannot be given to my fine officers and men for the marvelous fighting they did. Lt. Moore and Capt. Floyd Sanders, Comdr. Co. D, were my outstanding troop leaders. Capt. Hart ran the Bn. in my absence most of July 5th and did a beautiful job. An outstanding Young officer. Lt. Barber, Hvy. LG Plat. Ldr. and Lt. Gravelyn, Mortar Plat. leader, were also outstanding.

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